CIHM 
Microfiche 
Series 
(Monographs) 


ICMH 

Collection  de 
microfiches 
(monographies) 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  canadien  de  microreproductions  historiques 


m 


i^sMMSMM^i^ 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes  /  Notes  techniques  et  bibiiographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best  original 
copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this  copy  which 
may  be  bibliographically  unique,  which  mav  alter  any  or 
the  images  in  the  reproduction,  or  which  may 
significantly  change  the  usual  method  of  filming  are 
checked  below. 


0 


Coloured  covers  / 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I      I    Covers  damaged  / 


Couverture  endommag^e 


□    Covers  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Couverture  restauree  et/ou  pelliculee 

Cover  title  missing  /  Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

I I    Coloured  maps  /  Cartes  geographiques  en  couleur 

□    Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)  / 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 

□    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations  / 
Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  material  / 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documents 

Only  edition  available  / 
Seuie  edition  disponible 

Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion  along 
interior  margin  /  La  reliure  serree  peut  causer  de 
I'ombre  ou  de  la  distorsion  le  long  de  la  marge 
int6rieure. 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restorations  may  appear 
within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  those  have  been 
omitted  from  filming  /  Use  peut  que  certaines  pages 
blanches  ajoutees  lors  d'une  restauration 
apparaissent  dans  le  texte,  mais,  lorsque  cela  etait 
possible,  ces  pages  n'ont  pas  et6  filmees. 

Additional  comments  /  Various  pagings. 

Commentaires  suppl6mentaires: 


D 
D 
D 


D 


L'Institut  a  microfilme  le  m.eilleur  exemplaire  qu'il  lui  a 
ete  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details  de  cet  exem- 
plaire qui  sont  peut-etre  uniques  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier  une  image  reproduce, 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une  modification  dans  la  metho- 
de  normale  de  filmage  sont  indiques  ci-dessous. 

Coloured  pages  /  Pages  de  couleur 

j j    Pages  damaged  /  Pages  endommagees 


D 


Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Pages  restaur^es  et/ou  pelliculees 


D 


Pages  d§color6es,  tachetees  ou  piquees 

Pages  detached  /  Pages  detach^es 

Showthrough  /  Transparence 

Quality  of  print  varies  / 
Qualite  inegale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  material  / 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppl6mentaire 

Pag-^T  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata  slips, 
tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  totalement  ou 
partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une 
pelure,  etc.,  ont  6t6  filmees  a  nouveau  de  iagon  a 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 

Opposing  pages  with  varying  colouration  or 
discolourations  are  filmed  twice  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  s'opposant  ayant  des 
colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
filmees  deux  fois  afin  d'obtenir  la  meilleure  image 
possible. 


0 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checkt  J  below  / 

Ce  document  est  filme  au  taux  de  reduction  indigue  ci-dessous. 


10x 

14x 

18x 

22x 

26x 

30x 

12x 


16x 


2  Ox 


:Ax 


28x 


32x 


The  copy  filmed  here  has  been  reproduced  thanks 
to  the  generosity  of: 


L'exemplaire  filmA  fut  reproduit  grace  i  la 
gAnArosit6  de: 


National   Library  of  Canada 


Bibliotheque  nationale  du  Canada 


The  images  appearing  hare  are  the  best  quality 
possible  considering  the  condition  and  legibility 
of  the  original  copy  and  in  keeping  with  the 
filming  contract  specifications. 


Les  images  suivantes  ont  ix6  reproduites  avec  le 
plus  grand  soin.  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  et 
de  la  nettetA  de  l'exemplaire  filmA.  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
flimaga. 


Original  copies  in  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sioit,  or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couver*.  'e  en 
papier  est  imprimie  sont  filmis  en  comrr  »ncant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
derniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  selon  le  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  film^s  en  commenpant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  derniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  ^^  (meaning   "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END  '), 
whichever  applies. 


Un  des  symtoles  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
derniAre  image  da  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbole  — •■  signifie  "A  SUIVRE  ".  le 
symbole  V  signifie   'FIN  ". 


Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc..  peuvent  etre 
film^s  A  des  taux  de  reduction  diff^rents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  etre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  cliche,  il  est  film^  i  partir 
da  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  h  droite. 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  n^cessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mAthode. 


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JAFAN 

IN  WORLD  I'OLri'ICJ 


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JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


ip^y^fi^ 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

jnSW   YOKK    •    BOSTON       CniCAGO    •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA    ■    SAN    yRASClSCO 


MACMILLA.V  &  CO 

LONDON 


Limited 


BOMBAY       CALCUTTA 
MELBOCBNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO   OF  CANADA,  Lth. 

TOkONTO 


I 


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\ 


JAPAN 
IN    WORLD    POLITICS 


BY 
K.  K.  KAWAKAMI 

ArTHOR  OF  "  AMERICAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS,' 
'  ABIA  AT  THE  DOOR,"  ETC. 


I      % 


Nrm  fork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1917 

All  righU  retti^td 


•^ll'f 


46oi: 


(t. 


•1 


COPTEIQBT,  1917 

Bt  the  macmillan  compavy 

Set  up  and  electrotjrped.     Publighed  August,  1917. 


TO  MY 

BELO\TD  CHILDREX 

YIRI  ALBERTA 

IlIROSHI  CLARKE 

MARCLV  KIYO 

May  Thi-y  Prove  Each  a  New  Link 
in  the  Chain  of  Friendship  that 
has  Bound  America  anil  Japan  for 
Half  a  Century!  May  They,  as 
They  Go  Forth  into  the  World, 
Strive  Nohly  and  Valiantly  for 
that  End.  to  the  Furthering  of 
Which  Their  Father,  Conscious 
of  the  Utter  Inadequacy  of  His 
Resources  and  Abilities,  has 
Struggled  to  Contribute 
his  Mite! 


PREFACE 

I  started  my  modest  career  in  Japan  twenty  years 
a^'o  as  a  social  reformer — a  dreamer  of  dreams,  if 
you  will.  I  was  fresh  from  college,  care-free,  buoyant 
of  spirit,  full  of  the  optimism  of  youth  and  the  ardor 
of  the  reformer.  I  dedicated  myself,  or  rather  fan- 
cied I  did,  to  the  great  task  of  social  uplift.  I  had 
read  quite  a  mmilKT  of  English  l)o<jks  on  socialism 
and  on  the  labor  movement  in  Europe  and  America. 
I  had  become  so  enamoured  of  socialistic  ideas  that 
I  adopted  the  Christian  name  of  the  immortal  author 
of  Dd.f  Kapifal.  Imagine  a  Jaj)anese  boy,  who 
had  never  been  abroad,  going  under  a  foreign  name, 
and  a  German  name  at  that!  You  may  be  sure  I 
shocked  my  family,  my  relatives,  my  friends, — 
evervbodv. 

I  had  no  desire  to  make  myself  unduly  notorious. 
I  was  sincere  and  was  animated  with  the  aspiration 
to  do  for  Jiipan  what  Karl  Marx  did  for  Gernumy. 
The  idea  was  childish,  ridiculous.  Need  I  say  I  had 
none  of  the  qualities  which  made  the  German  ex- 
ponent of  socialism  great  and  immortal?  But  I  had 
the  enthusiasm  of  a  pioneer,  and  thought  that  I 
could  serve  my  country,  as  a  herald,  at  least,  of  the 
Western  masters  of  Soeiali:3m.     That  my  country 

vii 


yWM^^SRKTS-' 


VIU 


PREFACE 


wanted  none  of  such  radicalism  seemed  to  me  suffi- 
cient reason  why  I  shouhl  preach  it. 

With  hope  hhizing  the  path  before  me  I  entered 
upon  a  new  career.  First  I  wrote  a  few  books  on 
Socialism.  Then  I  appeared  upon  the  platform, 
urging  the  organization  of  labor  as  the  first  step 
towards  Socialism.  Soon  there  appeared  the  Social 
Democratic  Party,  of  which  I  was  one  of  the  organi- 
zers. In  the  meantime  the  efforts  of  such  men  as 
Sen  Katayama  and  Professor  Al)e  resulted  in  the 
organization  of  a  number  of  labor  unions.  The  new 
movement  seemed  well  under  wav. 

Then  I  left  for  the  Ignited  States  for  education 
and  to  broaden  my  observation.  That  was  in  1J)01, 
when  I  was  twenty-five  years  old.  I  had  hoped  that 
my  .sojourn  in  the  land  of  freedom  would  strengthen 
my  socialistic  convictions  and  my  belief  in  trade 
unionism.  I  had  almost  idealized  the  labor  move- 
ment in  America,  forgetting  that  their  leaders  were 
after  all  hunuin,  full  of  frailties  and  weaknesses. 
To  me  trade  unionism  was  of  value  only  as  a  stepping 
stone  to  a  socialistic  society,  and  I  had  fancied  that 
the  labor  leaders  of  America  were  of  the  same  opin- 
ion. 'I'o  me,  moreover.  Socialism  was  nothing  if  it 
was  not  internationalism.  To  my  thinking  Socialism 
was  not  merely  an  ccononu'c  theory,  but  a  theory 
for  .social  reconstruction  based  upon  new  moral 
ideals.  It  advocated,  among  other  things,  I  thought, 
the  untrammelcd  intercourse  of  peoples,  and  held 
that  the  bigger  and  richer  nations  should  assist  iu 


PREFACE 


UC 


the  otonomic  salvation  of  smaller  and  poorer  na- 
tions, even  when  it  was  not  quite  ready  to  accept 
the  broader  principles  of  uni\-ersal  hrotherliood. 
To  be  frank,  I  did  not  understand  all  tlie  intricate 
economic  theories  of  Socialism,  neither  did  I  reason 
out  to  nty  satisfaction  the  final  form  of  society  which 
I  wished  to  see  established  in  our  nu'dst.  Only  in 
its  broad  outlines  did  I  think  of  Socialism,  and,  con- 
sidered in  broad  outlines,  Socialism  seemed  to  offer 
a  panacea  for  the  ills  of  the  world. 

^^ith  such  fancies  I  came  to  America.  My  ob- 
servations ami  experiences  since  then  have  con- 
spired to  disillusion  nie.  I  have  dise<)v<'red  that 
the  American  labor  unions  in  reality,  are  not  the 
labor  uiu"ons  I  had  i)ictured  in  my  youthful  nu'nd. 
Neither  are  their  leaders  men  of  knif,'htly  (pialities, 
champiomii<,'  the  cause  of  the  w<'ak  a^'aiust  the 
oppression  of  the  powerful.  To  add  to  my  disaj)- 
I)ointment,  even  the  Socialists  here  were  not  true 
to  their  professed  internationalism.  With  ^'reat 
reluctance  I  drifted  away  from  Socialism  and  trade 
unionism,  enthusiasm  for  which  was  primarily  re- 
sponsible for  my  cominj.^  to  this  country. 

I  need  not  dwell  h<  re  ui)on  incidents  and  <n-ents 
which  carried  me  away  from  Socialism.  I  shall  oidy 
say  that  I  have  gradually  come  to  the  conclusion 
tiiat  the  age  of  Socialisni  has  not  yet  dawned  upon 
I  lie  world.    We  live 

"Bt'twiH'ii  two  worMs  — one  (jcaii, 
The  otlitT  jKJWcrless  lu  be  1m  rn." 


PREFACE 


Tliat  it  is  our  duty  to  assist  in  tlie  birth  of  the  new 
world  ^'ocs  without  saving,',  l)ut  in  order  to  liastcn 
the  dawn  of  the  new  a^e  the  a^'e  of  International 
Soeiahsin — certain  conditions  must  first  be  altered 
or  removed. 

The  foremost  of  such  conditions  is  found  in  the 
attitude  of  the  advanced,  powerful  ])eo{)les  of  the 
West  towards  the  backward  and  weaker  peoples 
of  the  Ivist,  whose  rehabilitation  and  ameliora- 
tion need  sympathetic  assistance.  I  use  the  term 
*'j)eoples"  advisedly,  for  the  n'adjustnient  of  the 
relationshi{)  between  East  and  West  is  of  nuich 
bn)ader  and  deeper  si^'uificance  than  that  between 
the  (iovcnun<'uls  concerned.  I'nless  the  peoples 
of  th(>  \\\'st  learn  to  view  their  relations  with  the 
Fast  in  a  new  li^dil,  it  is  futile  to  expi'ct  their  govern- 
ments to  deviate  from  the  i)ath  they  have  been 
followiuf,'.  What,  then,  is  the  West  thinking  of 
the  East? 

Si)caking  in  general  terms  and  disregarding  ex- 
ceptions, the  West,  the  powerful,  imperialistic  West, 
looks  upon  the  ftvble,  resigning  East  as  an  entirely 
dill'ereut  world  which  must  occupy  an  inferior  posi- 
tion in  the  sc.de  of  world  comuiunilies.  To  extend  a 
helping  haml  to  the  East,  to  gui(K'  its  unsteady  steps 
into  the  paths  of  ])rogress  and  civilization,  to  lift 
it  from  sK»ughs  of  tlesi)ondency  and  accord  it  a  place 
of  e<|ualily— such  a  task  is  not  given  to  the  West 
to  undertake.  Look  at  India  and  China,  and  all 
I  lie  rt->t  of  Asia,  with  the  \o\w  exception  of  Japan. 


PREFACE 


XI 


Here  you  have  a  concrete  example  of  the  Occident's 
ath'tufle  towards  the  Orient.  Jai)an  has  saved  her- 
MJf  from  tlie  common  fate  of  her  unhaj)py  nei^dil)ors 
lu-cause  she  was  quick  enoiifrh  to  see  that  the 
only  way  to  win  the  rc>|)<'ct  of  the  a^'fj;ressive  Occi- 
dent was  to  "beat  it  at  its  own  pime." 

Here  is  n  chasm  wl  ich  must  he  hrid^'ed  before  we 
can  honestly  advocate  Socialism,  with  its  corolhiry  of 
Internationahsm  and  Pacifism.  Before  it  Sociahsm 
and  Pacifism  are  a  mockery.  When  Sociahsts  in 
Europe  and  America  ph'df,'e  themselves  to  inter- 
nationalism they  are  thinking  oidy  of  P^uroiM?  and 
America,  forf^'etting  that  across  the  ^  'cans  teeming 
millions  are  crying  for  greater  fields  of  activity  and 
for  rc<lemplion  from  Imndage  to  Western  c-apital. 
\Mien  the  traile  uniomsts  of  EuroiM."  and  America 
sj)eak  of  the  brotherhood  of  workers,  they  are  think- 
ing only  of  their  own  race.  When  the  pacifists  of 
Europe  and  America  advocate  world  peace,  they 
seem  to  mean  nuiintenance  of  peace  })y  sustaining 
the  Hiatus  quo  of  the  relations  of  the  East  and  West — 
by  permitting  the  West  not  only  to  continue  its 
occupation,  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  of  more  terri- 
tory than  it  is  justly  entilh-d  to  possess,  but  to  ex- 
clude from  such  territories  all  <lark-skimied  races 
whose  overcrowded  home  lands  not  only  offer  scant 
ojjportunily  to  their  natives  but  are  tluMuselves 
sul)ject  to  untrammeled  expIoitali(jn  at  the  hands 
of  the  West.  Even  ("hri^liam'ty  has  abruptly  stoppe<l 
and  struck  its  standard  before  the  racial  wall,  and 


Xll 


PI{EFA(  E 


liiis  no  co'ira^'o  to  advanrc.  A  Western  nation  may 
declare  a  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  is  reluctant  lo  ac- 
cord an  Asiatic  nation  u  similar  privilej^'e.  The 
West  exi)ects  the  East  to  oj)en  its  <loors  to  the  ex- 
ploitation of  the  white  race,  hut  reserves  the  right 
to  shun  its  own  doors  in  the  faces  of  Orientals. 

It  all  conies  to  this,  that  to  the  Western  mind, 
the  East  is  a  ne^digihle  ciuantily  to  he  dealt  with  as 
whim  or  fancy  may  <lirect.  In  Shan<,'hai  there  is  a 
"foreign"  park  at  the  entrance  to  which  is  posted 
the  sign:  "Chinese  and  Dogs  not  Allowed."  T^p 
to  only  a  decade  or  so  ago  similar  signs  were  posted 
at  the  "foreign"  i)ark  in  Yokohama,  the  sight  of 
which  rasped  the  nerves  of  the  patriots  of  Nippon. 
When,  at  last,  the  Japanese,  by  dint  of  their  achieve- 
ments in  the  arts  of  peace  and,  alas!  of  warfare, 
compelled  the  removal  of  those  shameful  signs,  you 
may  he  sure  the  foreigners  were  generous  in  cursing 
their  "cockiness."  These  little  incidents  are  in 
themselves  of  no  importance,  hut  as  an  indication 
of  the  feeling  and  attitude  of  the  whole  West 
towards  the  whole  East,  they  are  of  great  value 
and  significance. 

In  the  concourse  of  nations  the  attitude  of  the 
powerful  towards  the  powerless  is  much  the  same 
as  the  a!!itude  of  capital  towards  labor  in  the  com- 
nmnity  of  indi\  iduals.  Even  as  capital  thinks,  or 
UM'd  to  think,  that  it  is  to  its  advantage  that  labor 
should  be  kept  ignorant  and  down-trodden,  so  the 
great  colonial  Towers  of  the  West  apparently  think 


PREFACE 


XIII 


with  reference  to  continued  submission  on  the  part 
of  the  weak  Orient.  So  Utn}*  as  eaj)ital  ifinores  the 
obvious  principles  of  social  justice  in  (K'aling  with 
labor,  th  >re  must  always  exist  potential  causes  of 
conflict.  Does  this  not  furnish  fo(Kl  for  n-flection 
on  the  part  of  the  great  Occidental  Powers  which 
regard  \sia  as  their  "liappy  hunting  ground," 
while  denying  to  the  Asiatics  the  freedom  of  entry 
into  their  own  territory?  AVhen  Western  entrepre- 
neurs and  capitalists  enter  into  Asiatic  fields  of 
exploitation,  their  home  Governments  are  ready 
to  back  them  with  the  might  of  their  armies  and 
navies,  which  are  expected  sooner  or  later  to  reduce 
the  unhappy  countries  of  Asia  to  a  state  of  bondage. 
When  the  masses  of  the  East,  crowded  out  of  their 
own  countries,  seek  breathing  room  in  the  yet  un- 
developed countries  of  the  Wtst,  the  West  is  ready 
to  expel  them  even  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  Try 
however  hard  you  may,  you  cannot  escape  the 
logical  conclusion  which  must  inevitably  be  drawn 
from  the  existing  state  of  relations  between  the 
East  and  West.  One  of  two  things  must  eventually 
be  done — either  the  freedom  of  migration  of  all 
peoples  from  one  country  to  another  nmst  be  recog- 
nized, or  the  great  colonial  I'owers,  holding  vast 
ti'rritorics,  rich  with  resources  yet  sparsely  populated, 
must  give  up  some  of  their  holdings  in  favor  of  land- 
hungry  peoples,  choked  and  smothered  in  their 
native  countries.  Without  dispelling  the  potential 
cause  of  conflict  it  is  futile  to  speak  of  disarmament. 


XIV 


PREFACE 


or  permanent  i)e;iee.     The  dove  of  peaee  builds  its 
nest  only  in  the  haunts  of  justiee. 

If  tlie  E;:>t  still  sik'nlly  aequiesees  in  the  present 
order  of  thing's  it  is  simply  heeause  the  East  is  power- 
less to  ass(Tt  its  rif^hts.  Most  of  us  hesitate  to  look 
this  qu<'>lion  scpiarely  in  the  face,  heeause  its  mag- 
nitude, with  all  its  portentous  possibilities,  appals 
us.  Yet  it  is  a  (|uestion  which  must  be  met  honestly 
and  eouraj^'eously,  if  we  are  to  avoid  a  world  ca- 
tastrophe nu7,'hti<'r  than  the  upheaval  which  is  now 
shaking  Euroj)e  from  its  foimdations. 

"How  will  tlio  future  rerkon  with  tliis  man? 
How  answer  tins  hrute  (juestion  in  that  hour 
When  whirlwinds  of  rebellion  shake  tlie  world?" 

The  East  is  not  yet  ready  to  ask  the  "brute  ques- 
tion." Will  it  ever  be  n-ady?  No  one  can  tell. 
This  much  is  certain,  that  the  East  will  r»ot  be  ready 
for  the  task  for  many  generations,  perhaps  for  many 
centuries,  to  come.  In  writing  the  above  passages, 
therefore,  I  am  thinking  not  in  terms  of  years  or 
decades,  but  in  terms  of  centuries.  ISIy  words  should 
not  be  construed  as  the  prophecy  o'.  an  inunediate 
or  even  an  approachitig  conflict  bet'  ecu  the  Eastern 
and  the  AVeslern  worlds.  If  I  look  only  upon  the 
hori/on  that  opens  inunediately  before  me,  I  can 
be  supremely  optimistic.  To  be  sure,  we  shall  be 
s[)ared  the  i)angs  of  seeing  such  u  holocaust.  Even 
our  chiUlren  and  grandchildren  may  not  live  to  wit- 
ness the  appalling  spectacle.     It  is  only  when  I  gaze 


PREFACE 


XV 


into  the  distant  future  that  I  hvf^'ui  to  rtali/.e  the 
ominous  nature  of  the  .situation. 

Mr.  Hearst's  inchistrious  warning  af.  inst  the 
cotinng  war  l)et\veen  the  white  and  the  y<'Mow  races 
is  not  without  certain  elements  of  truth,  hut  he 
makes  Iiimself  absurd  when  lie  tries  to  make  it 
appear  that  the  danger  is  inuninent.  arguing  that 
it  can  he  averted  if  America  will  only  build  dread- 
noughts and  organize  a  powerful  army  without 
delay.  He  does  not  see,  or  pretends  not  to  see,  th  • 
ol)vious  fact  that  such  a  world  conflict  as  he  pre- 
dicts will  never  come  until  the  whole  of  Asia  is  re- 
suscitated and  invigorated,  and  is  made  as  efficient 
as  the  most  advanced  peoples  of  the  West.  Before 
that  time  dawns  upon  the  world,  such  guns  and 
dreadnoughts  as  America  may  I'uild  at  Mr.  Hearst's 
instance  will  have  gone  to  the  .scra|)  heap.  Asia's 
deliverance  from  the  Occident  lies  in  the  employ- 
ment of  much  the  same  method  as  has  been  em- 
ployed by  labor  in  its  deliverance  from  its  bondage 
to  capital.  That  m.  thod  is  collective  hargainmg. 
How  can  Asia,  in  its  present  decrepit  state,  resort 
to  collective  bargaining.''  With  the  .solitary  e.xcep- 
tif)n  of  Japan  there  are  no  forces  which  Asia  can 
bring  together  for  the  purpose.  The  general  awaken- 
ing of  Asia  is  to-day  as  far  away  as  it  has  ever  been. 
It  is  idle  to  think  that  Japan  will,  single-handed, 
champion  the  cause  of  Asia  and  throw  a  challenge 
to  the  mighty  array  of  Western  Powers.  So  far 
from  dreaming  of  such  a  Quixotic  task,  Japan,  an 


XVI 


PREFACE 


essentially  practical  nation,  is  impollcd  hy  tlic  in- 
stinct of  s('ll-f)rescrvati<)n  to  oast  her  lot  with  the 
West.  Her  danger  to-day  lies  rather  in  her  inclination 
to  employ  the  characteristic  Western  methods  in 
dealing  with  her  fellow-countries  of  the  Asian  con- 
tinent. 

It  pains  me  that  I  cannot  he  a  firmer  believer  in 
pacifism.  Temperamentally,  I  am  a  lover  of  peace. 
I  do  n(jt  gloat  over  force.  Providence  denii-d  me 
the  qualities  of  nn'litancy.  And  yet  I  see  hut  little 
justice  in  maintaimng  i)eace  on  the  basis  of  a  .slat us 
quo  of  world  conditions  which  is  not  based  ujxm 
justice.  Still  I  may  call  myself  a  pacifist  in  .so  far 
as  I  am  interested  in  any  movement  calculated  to 
defer  the  final  clash  of  the  two  worlds  so  long  as 
possible,  hoping  that  in  the  meantime  the  peoples 
will  come  to  a  keener  appreciation  of  justice  and 
will  accord,  without  bloodshed,  such  rights  as  would 
seem  to  belong  to  the  peoples  of  the  liitherto  mute 
Orient.  Let  us  hoi)e  that  a  day  of  peace  prolonged 
is  a  day  gained  for  saner  thinking.  No  doubt  this 
is  a  temporizing  attitude,  a  policy  of  expediency,  a 
biding  of  time,  j)erhaps  unworthy  of  men  of  courage, 
and  yet  I  prefer  it  to  war.  With  special  reference 
to  American-Jai)anese  relations,  supreme  efforts 
nuist  certainly  be  made  for  the  maintenance  of 
peace. 

In  my  previous  two  books,  American-Japanese 
Relations  and  Asia  at  the  Door,  as  in  the  present 
volume,  I  have  elected  to  appeal  especially  to  the 


1 


PREFACE 


xvu 


American  people,  because  I  have  great  confidence 
in  their  innate  sense  of  justice.  Of  ail  nations,  the 
Tnited  States  alone  has  not  joined  the  universal 
scramble  for  territories  and  concessions  in  the  Orient. 
Both  abroad  and  at  home  this  country  has  achieved 
many  deeds  which  bespeak  her  generosity  and  love 
of  fair  play.  Let  us  hope  that  America  will  once 
again  set  the  noble  example  before  the  world  of  doing 
for  the  peoi)les  of  Asia  what  other  powerful  nations 
are  as  yet  unwilling  to  do. 

In  writing  Asia  at  the  Door  I  referred  to  Amer- 
ica and  the  Americans  in  the  first  person  plural. 
In  this  book  I  follow  the  same  method.  In  reviewing 
the  previous  volume  a  writer  in  a  pronnnent  New 
York  journal  queried,  "Why,  'we'  when  Mr.  Kawa- 
kami  knows  that  he  cannot  be  naturalized?"  Why 
not?  That  I  happened  to  be  born  and  re  '  1  on  a 
little  island  called  Nippon  is  merely  ii  >ntal. 
That  the  laws  of  the  United  States  do  not  permit 
me  to  become  a  citizen  is  no  impediment  to  my 
converting  myself  morally  and  mentally  into  an 
American  citizen.  My  home  is  wherever  I  have 
come  to  stay  and  wherever  I  have  become  most 
deeply  attached  to  my  surroundings  and  associa- 
tions. One  may  fulfill  all  the  legal  qualifications  for 
citizenship,  and  yet  remain  morally  unfit  to  be 
called  an  American.  If  I  have  at  times  seemed 
critical  towards  America  it  is  simply  because  I 
would  see  a  more  perfect  America,  a  nobler  America, 
and   not   because   I  cherish   oonteinpt   or  enmity 


XVIll 


PREFACE 


towards  the  people  Jiinong  whom  I  live.  Would 
that  my  American  friends  couhl  rea<l  my  contribu- 
tions to  newspapers  in  Japan  defending  the  cause 
of  America. 

The  rok'  wln'cli  I  have  essayed  to  play  is  far  from 
envia})h',  wiiming  the  sympathy  of  neither  Japa- 
nese nor  Americans.  Yet  I  am  convinced  of  the 
wisdom  of  it.  There  are  Americans  a  plenty  who 
excel  in  the  art  of  fault-finding  with  regard  to  Japan: 
it  is,  therefore,  my  .self-imposed  duty  to  present  to 
the  American  puldic  the  brighter  side  of  my  native 
country.  And  the  Americans  accuse  me  of  sub- 
serviency to  the  cause  of  Japan.  There  are  enough 
Jai)anese  censoriously  ijiclined  towards  America: — 
to  them  I  consider  it  my  i)rivilege,  no  less  than  my 
duty,  to  i)resent  the  best  side  of  my  adopted  country. 
.\nd  the  Japanese  denounce  nie  as  slavish  to  a  coun- 
try whose  citizeiishij)  I  have  not  been  permitted  to 
acfjuire.  The  truth  is  that  I  have  no  intention  ex- 
clusively to  serve  ei'lier  Japan  or  America;  it  is  my 
desire  to  serve  both,  and  all  mankind  by  removing 
.some  of  the  nu'sunderstandings  now  casting  a  dark 
shadow  upon  the  relationship  of  the  two  nations. 

It  is  regrettable  that  circumstances  imj)el  me  to 
write  such  a  book.  Neither  in  this,  nor  in  the  pre- 
vious volumes,  is  discernible  anv  trace  of  my  social- 
istic  beliefs.  On  the  contrary  they  contain  many  a 
passage  whicli  may  easily  be  interpreted  as  im- 
perialistic. The  thought  of  it  saddens  me.  Yet 
T  h.ive  come  to  the  conclusion  that  socialism  can- 


mm 


«lfel 


PREFACE 


XIX 


not  be  achieved  until  the  relations  between  the  East 
and  the  West  are  radically  changed.  In  my  name 
I  retain  the  initial  borrowed  from  the  author  of  Das 
KapHal,  a  perpetual  rebuke  to  my  apparent  re- 
cession from  the  position  taken  twenty  years  ago. 

Most  of  the  chapters  of  this  book  were  originally 
published  as  separate  articles  in  the  \orih  American 
Rcricir,  the  Atlarific  Moulhly,  the  Century  Magazine, 
the  American  lierieiv  oj  Reriens^  the  Forum,  the  Neiv 
York  Evening  Post,  and  Pearaona  Magazine.  Ac- 
knowledgment is  due  to  the  editors  of  these  publica- 
tions for  permission  to  use  in  this  volume  those 
articles  with  the  necessary  revisions  and  elaborations. 

I  cannot  conclude  this  preface  without  acknowl- 
edging my  indebtedness  to  Mr.  D.  S.  Richardson, 
of  Berkeley,  California,  who  has  taken  sympathetic 
interest  in  the  purpose  for  which  this  book  has  been 
written,  and  who  has  read  the  manuscript,  offer- 
ing valuable  criticisms  and  suggestions.  Due  to 
my  absence  from  America  when  the  manuscript 
went  to  press,  the  uninteresting  task  of  proof  read- 
ing devolved  upon  my  loyal  friend  Frank  Putnam, 
of  INIiKvaukee,  Wisconsin,  to  whom  I  owe  a  debt  of 
gratitude. 

K.  K.  K.\WAK.VMI. 

Peking,  China,  1917. 


i-j*a 


CONTEXTS 


CIIAPTKR  I 

THE  JAr'.NESE   I.NjiTI.NTT   OF  SELF-PRESERVATION' 


PAGE 


Aincriciii-.Iapanrx'  IMran^finont,  a  Tr:it:<'ily  in  History — Fiinrla- 
iiiciital  I{i:i^i)n  for  Amcrira's  Misundcrstaiiiiiii^'  — AiiuTican 
I'ailii!!' to  Appreciate  tfieJapannse  Instinct  (if  Sclf-I'rcscrvation 
—  How  Fi  ar  of  Wotcrn  Powers  was  In-lillcd  in  the  Japanese 
liosoin  'I'lie  Soiiij  of  the  Ulack  Ship.>  ConinKxiore  I'crry's 
Si|iia(irnn  Wi^lirii  Fncroacliincnts  I  |>onJapan — The  Chinese 
Menace  in  Korea  — I{ns>ian  Afji^ression  — The  (ierinan  Menace 
— Jajiaa  Seeking  in  \ain  for  a  "  Place  in  the  Sun" 1 


CTUPTER  H 

AMERICAS  I3S[E3   WITH  JAPAN 

Japan  Amazed  at  America's  Preparedness  Propaganda — Conjuring 
np  the  Japanese  Ho/ie— Was  Japan  Anti-American  Mefore 
Ameriia  was  Anti-Japanese? — America's  A^^istance  in  Con- 
(lildiii^'the  PortMiioMth  peace  Treaty— Tokyo  Uiot  of  111)  not 
Anti- American— Three  Issii<'3  Betwe.-n  Japan  and  Anierica — 
Are  They  Likely  to  Lead  to  War!'— Tlie  Pacilic  Coa>t  tlie  Dan- 
>.'er  Spot— Clouding  tiie  Heal  Issues— American  Charges  Against 
Japan—  The  I'ress  Censorship  in  Jai)an . 


16 


CHAPTER  HI 

IS   AMERICA   PREPARINQ  AUAINST   JAPAN? 

Japan's  F,xi>t  ing  Naval  Strength  -America's  Present  Nasal  Strength 
--Statistical  Taliieof  the  Two  Navies— Analysis  of  the  Same— 
The  American  Navy  Three  Times  as  Powerful  as  the  Japanese 
Navy—  The  Tc.kso  Jijl-Shimpo  on  Japan's  Inadeijuate  Naval 
i'logranime— Japan's  New  Fi\e-\car  Huildin^  Programme — 

XX  i 


XXII 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Aiiicrica's  New  Tlirfc-Vciir  Uiiilfiinc  Prr)prammo— Rcliitive 
Slri'n^'tli  of  tlif  American  ami  Japaiiix-  Na\  ics  in  1!»IH— The 
Hrili-.li  Navy  no  Aiii  to  .Ia|)an  in  Ain<Ti<.  -Japani-sc  \Var— 
(irrniany  and  .Iai)an  I'liysical  Impossibility  of -jHpanese  Inva- 
sion of  America.  jjj 


(  HAI^TKR  IV 

LAM)  HI  .\(;Kri;  Tiir.  ha'  kghoim)  or  tiik  iMMiriitAxiov  qi  estio.v 

Caucasian  Moiioix.ly  of  Land  -Kxproj)riation  of  A-iatics  -Kxciusivc 
Toliey  of  the  Caucasians  'I'lie  Anj,'lo-Sa\un  Priority  in  the 
Race  for  Colonics  Colonial  Statistics  of  tlic  Towers  -Density 
r>f  I'opiilation  of  \arioiis  Countries  K.|uital)lc  Dislrilmtion  of 
Land  or  IVe.-  Mijjration.  the  I,o','ieal  Hemedy  President  Wil- 
son's World  Monroe  Doctrine  no  Salvation  of  Asia 


46 


(  IIAITF.U  V 

JAl'WKSi;    IM\II(iH\Tli>N    TO    AMI.IUCA 

How  Japan  will  Solve  the  Population  Prolilem—Hate  of  Increase  of 
Japanese  Population  'i'crritorics  A  vaiiahle  for  Japanese  Immi- 
pration  Japan  Not  to  i;inl>arras.s  KM;,'land  and  America— The 
"(ientlemctrs  A^'reement  "  Its  KliVct  I  pon  Japanese  Immi- 
gration -Reasons  for  Recent  Increase  of  Japanese  Immigration 
The  "Picture  Hride  "  Ja|)ancse  Marria.i^o  Custom— Statis- 
tics of  "Picture  Rrides  "  Japan  and  the  New  inuniKtation 
Law  Japan's  Real  Contention  Has  the  Cuilcd  States  the 
Ripht  to  Discriminate  Against  the  Japanese:-  Hawaii  and  the 
Pa(  ilic  Coast  -  AmericaiH  in  Hawaii  Confident  of  Assimilating' 
Japanese  Japatiesi'  Iminijrrati.ni  Compared  with  Chinese 
Immigration .  . 


56 


ClIAITrR  \T 

TIIK    rACinc    COAST    ANO    TIIK   JAPA.VKSE 

Anti-Japanese  L.^isiation  in  the  West  — Proposed  Anti-Alien  Land 
Law  of  Idaho  Calilornia  AnIi-AHcn  Land  Law— Official 
Statistics  of  Japanese  LandlioldiuKS  in  California  — Kxamples  of 


CONTEXTS 


xxiu 


P^GF, 


Whimsical  Anti-Jnpiinosc  I^cRislation — Why  Politicians  toy 
with  the  Japanese  Question — F^t-al  Cause  of  California's  Hos- 
tility to  Japanese-  Immi  rration — Japan's  I>i»n(l  Laws— Rights 
of  Alirns  in  Japan — How  Japan  Faced  the  Anti-Japanese  Agita- 
tion Mere— Fairness  of  the  California  Press — Chan^'e<l  Attitude 
of  California  I.ahor  Towards  Japanese- — San  Frarcisco  "S.  hool 
Incident  "  of  l!M((!  Not  a  Itace  Issue — Labor's  Hlunde  n  Maik- 
in^;  the  Anti-Alien  Laml  Hill— Japanese  Standards  of  Living  and 
Wages— Japanese  Sympathy  for  American  Lat)or  Cnions 


7» 


(  HAI'TER  VII 

TITK    F.XPATRIATION    Ob    TllK  JAI'ANKsK 

f'olonel  Roosevelt's  Vision  — His  Prophetic  Message  of  1900 — A 
Fatal  Mistake  of  Congress-  The  Crux  of  the  Japanese  (Ques- 
tion— Continental  School  of  Nationality  Law-  Tin-  "Dual 
Nationality  "  of  American-horn  Cilizensof  Kuro[)can  DcMcnt  -- 
The  Japanese  Law  of  Nationality-  'I'he  F\()atriatii>n  of  Amer- 
ic,m-l)orn  Japauc>e Their  Nationality  not  "  Dual.  "  l>ut  "Sin- 
gle "  -The  Ja|).inese  not  the  Apotheosis  of  Patriotism  -Thi- 
(ierman  Natiuuality  Law  of  July,  1!>1;{  -The  Refle<tion  of  Pan- 
(iermanism  Cpon  American  (iermaiis  -Physical  As-,imilal)ility 
Does  not  Mean  \!ental  Assimilahility— The  Mental  Attitude  of 
Kuropean  Immigrants  Compan-d  with  that  of  Japanese — Ex- 
patriation of  Japanese  Born  in  Japan  -Attitude  of  Naturalized 
Japanese  in  Case  of  American-Japanese  War— Mongolians 
Moth  Asiatic  and  European — Hyhrid  Rai-cs  More  I'rogressivi- 
Than  "  Pun-"  Races — Intermingling  of  Japanese  and  Caucasian 
HI(M)d — Professor  Hael/  on  F^urasians — Important  Dwision  on  a 
Japanese  Petition  for  Naturalization 


97 


CIIAPFER  Mil 

THE  OPF.N   l)l)(JU   I.V   IHINA 

Japan's  Early  Attitude  Towards  Cliira  China's  Rlunder  in  Korea 
—Chi no- Japanese  War-  European  Encroachments  Cpon  China 
—China  uu  the  Verge  of  Disruption —Secn-tary  Hay  Declares 
the  Op.n  D<«)r  "  Policy— His  Detinition  of  the  Same  -Russia 


XXIV 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Ignores  the  Ilay  Note— Amerir.-m  Failure  to  Hack  up  the  Policy 
—Japan  tiieonly  Nation  Hesolvcd  to  Fight  for  ihe  Ilay  Policy— 
Aineriian  Critiijstn  of  Japan  I  nfair— Russia  Still  a  Menace— 
Hrilish  Inroads  into  Tilx't —Spheres  of  Induenet — The  Hritish 
Concession  in  Sze-chuan— Japanese  Adiiirenee  to  the  Open 
I)<M)r  l'oli<  y— Sphere-of-inHuence  Theory  Needs  Mo<lifieation  — 
Misinformation  Coneerninj,'  Prefennllnl  Tariff  Ftijciyed  hv 
Japan  — No  l)iscriniination  Pra(ti(r<i  |,y  Japa;:ese  HmIUmiv  in 
Man;huria— Jaj)anese  Kflicieiiey  Henefils  all  in  Manchuria- 
Japanese  Competition  Fair  and  rnimpeaelial>i«-    117 

(IIAPTKR  IX 

JAPAN-    AM)    AMF.HICA    I\    CMIW 

Japan's  Anihition  to  ne<(>me  a  Creat  Commercial  Factor  in  China — 
This  does  not  Conflict  with  Anierican  Fnlerprist — Anti-Amer- 
ican FceliuKin  Japan  — lis  U:i\>nn  d'Klrc  -IVtou  Sliihusana'^ 
Mea  of  Aiiicrican-Ja|)anese  Codpcratitiu  IJo.v  Japan  Benefits 
Atiieri.a  in  Korea  Japanese  Pn>,s  In\i!cs  Aincrica  to  Hejoin 
the  Financing  Mody  in  China  American  Inler.ialiot!:il  ('or|)o- 
ralion's  Ideaof  Coo|)eration  with  Jupan  -Fii^'lish  Opposition  to 
Such  Cooperation  — American  Complaint  aixiut  Japan's  Cnrea- 
sonalilencss— Complaint  of  Atnerican  Manuracturers'  Kxport 
Association— Anti-American  Circular  of  Mriti.h  {'hauil)er  of 
Commerce  -Trade  Competition  in  Cliiii.i  After  the  War— 
Fngland  ( )l>st  ruef  s  American  Trade  in  China  —  America's  Share 
in  (  hina  Traile  -  Japanese  Monopoly  of  (  hina  Trade  I  iiipossihle 
—Secret  of  Japanese  Success  in  (  hina  —Mean,  the  Determining 
Factor  in  Trade  Comi)etition  in  Manchuria— Japan,  China's 
Hest  Customer— !i(M(,()()0  Japanese  in  Cliina,  iin  Asset  to  Jap- 
anese Trade -Japanese  Investments  in  China — American 
Trade  has  n<jt  Suffered  in  Reality 149 


ciiArrKR  X 

japan's    IU.I  NDKIW    IN    CHINA 

Japan's   niumh-rs  in   China  —The  Chen-ehia-fung   Incident— Jap- 
anese  Demands   after   the    Incident —China    Needs   Japanese 


CONTENTS 


XXV 


PACE 

Efficiency — How  Japan  ncnefits  Mai;churians — New  Japanese 
f'al)inet  Inaugurates  a  New  Chinese  Policy — Foreifjn  Minister 
Mofono's  Statement — Japan's  IJeal  Diflieulties  in  China — A 
Japanese  Justification  of  tjje  "Twenty-one  Demands" — 
"(iioup  Five" — Substance  of  the  Chino-Japanese  A^;reeracnt, 
Mav,  191.5 167 


CHAPTER  XI 


A.MF;nirA    AM)  JAPAX   I.V    KOREA 


Misconception  Concernin)»  Japanese  Rule  i"  Korea — Senator  Stone's 
Resolution — American-Korean  Treaty  of  l!S(>:i— Chinese  Plot 
in  Kon-a  — Korean  Envoy  to  America — America  Tacitly  Rooog- 
nizesChineseSuzi  raintyOver  Korra — Japan  First  to  Ri'cof»nize 
Korean  I ndi'pendence-  Factional  Feuds  in  Korea— China  Eager 
to  Aunix  Korea — Cliino-Japanese  War  —Japanese  Elfort.i  to 
Refonii  Korea -The  Russian  Intrigue  in  Kore.i  -Russo- 
Ja[)Miiese  War— End  of  Korean  Independence — The  Open  Do*)r 
in  Korea  Never  Closed 


\HH 


CHAPTER  XII 


JAPAN    AND   THE   PI11UPPINE3 


Japanese  Intercourse  with  the  Philippines  Three  Centuries  ago — 
Toyotomi's  Ambition  to  Conquer  the  Klands- Japan  Closes 
Doors  nflcr  Toyotomi's  Death— Japan's  l'rcsei,L  Attitude 
Toward  th(<  Phili[)pines— Filipino  Attitude  Towards  Ja|>an — 
Japanese  ( 'ontrolof  the  Philippines  Impracticable  -Thi'  I-lands 
not  Suited  to  Japanese  Colonization —Two  Conditions  I'nder 
Whi(  h  Japan  may  take  the  Pliili|)pines— Why  Japan  did  not 
Object  to  the  American  Occupation  of  the  Islands  —What  Japan 
Wants  on  the  Islands— American  Occupition  Henelieial  to 
Jai)an 208 

CHAPTER  XHI 

JAPANESE   "designs"    I  P(»\    MEXICO 

Sen.s;itional  Reports  AlK>ut  the  Japanese  in  Mixico  -Statistics  of  the 
Ja|)ani>e — N'iscount    '^'enoniolo's   Project  — His    Dream   of    El 


XXVI 


CONTENTS 


PAOB 

Dorado  Ruddy  Awakonod  — A  Thriving  Japanosp  rolon;-  in 
Chiapas— 'I'li<,s<- '•  j!00,(»()0 .Ia[)an.M- Tr.Mjps  '  in  M.-xico— Kiuial 
Kinship  IJi-lwc-rn  the  Japanoe  and  the  Mexicans— CJufjlirlmo 
Ferrcrus  Vi<-ws-jaF)an.s>'  in  the  M.xiran  Army— Mexicans 
More  Friendly  to  the  Ja|)s  than  to  the  Ciringoes— The  "Big 
Interests"  in  Mexico  The  Ccrnian  Pn.pa^'anda— The  Jap- 
anese Designs  uFx.n  MaKdalena  Hay—The  Truth  about  the 
Maplah'iia  Hay  Scare-  Why  Cli.ul.s  M.  Sch.vab  Failed  in 
China  A  Case  of  Tit  for  Tat-Why  tlie  Mikado  Refused  to 
Receive  Ferix  Diaz.  niLrla's  Sp.vial  Knvoy— The  .lapanev  in 
South  America— (;erriian  IMot  to  Tnite  Mexico  and  Japan— 
-secretary  Lansings  Denial  Disappoinlint; m 

CHAITER  XIV 

AMKKICA   AND   Till;  ANGLO-JAPANEHE  ALLIANCE 

The  First  An^'lo-Japanese  Alhanee— It  Acconhri  Japan  no  Material 
Henefil-Ks  Real  Significanct — Its  Rencfit  to  Kn«Iand— The 
Srond  Alliance  -Its  Raison  dKtrc  The  Third  Alliance  and 
the  American  Situation  Jajjan's  Duty  in  the  Fres.'nt  War— 
Wiiy  Japan  Filtered  into  the  War  -Diplomatic  Negotiations 
R<>l\vc<n  Tokyo  and  London  nft<T  Fngland  Declared  War — 
The  Future  of  the  Alliance  to  he  Determined  i)y  Russia's  Atti- 
tudt^-The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  and  the  Russo-Japanese 
Fntentt — Hritish  and  Japanese  Interests  in  China- Japanese 
Complaint  About  Kngland's  "Sellishness"  — Kngland's  Com- 
plaint About  Japans  Agiircssiveness— The  "Dog  in  the  Man- 
ger "-Hritish  Interference  with  Hindus  in  Japan— Japan's 
Duly  in  India g^a 


CIIAPTKR  XV 

AMERICA    AND  CiEHMAN-JAPANESE   RELATIONS 

German  Overtures  to  Jat.an  Frankfurter  Zcitung  cm  Japan  and 
Amc  rica  Attitude  of  Cicrman-Americans — (icrman  Tempera- 
ment Ditrcicpt  from  Japanese— Fundamental  Principle  of 
German  Toliry  in  the  Far  East— Prince  Hismarck— (;eneral 
Hernhardi— The  Kaiser's  Game  in  the  Chino-Japanese  War— 


CONTENTS 


xxvu 


PAQB 

German  "Advii-o"  to  Japan— German  Occupation  of  Kiau- 
<how— Tlie  Kaiser's  Game  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War — Jap- 
anese Fear  of  Germany  not  Kasy  to  Remove 265 


CnAI»TER  XVI 

AMERIfA    AND   TUK    RrssiVJAPANESE   ENTENTE 

American  Objection  to  Russo-Japanese  Friendship — lla  Reason 
Removed  hy  the  Liberation  of  Russia— Why  Japan  Fought 
Russia—Why  Japan  Needs  Russia's  Friendship— Russia's 
Former  Empire  Scheme — Russia's  Ambitions  in  the  Far  East — 
Iler  ilneroachment  upon  Manchuria— America's  Failure  to 
Cheek  Russia— Japan  Disgusted  with  Foreijjn  Criticisms — 
History  of  Russo-Japanese  Rapprochcmrnt — First  Convention — 
Secon<l  Convention— The  latest  Convention  Almost  an  Alliance 
—  Its  Real  Object— It  does  not  Affect  American  Interests — 
Special  Agreements  Between  Russia  and  Japan 284 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


CHA1>TER  I 

THE  JAPANESE  INSTINCT  OF  SELF- 
PRESERVATION 

Ameriran-Japancsc  ostranKcment,  a  tragedy  in  history— FundamenUl 
r.a.s<m  for  American  niisunderstandinj,'— American  failure  to  appre- 
ci:itf  the  Japan<>o  instinct  of  self-preservation— How  the  fear  of 
Western  powers  was  instilled  in  the  Japanese  bos.jm— The  s<ing  of 
the  Black  Ships— Commodore  Perry's  squadron— Western  en- 
croachments upon  Japan— The  Chinese  menace  in  Korea— Russian 
a^'urcssion— The  (Jerman  menace— Japan  seeking  in  vain  for  a 
"place  in  the  sun." 

One  of  the  saddest  events  in  the  history  of  the 
world  is  the  estrangement  of  Japan  and  the  United 
States.  For  half  a  century,  up  to  the  end  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  war,  Japan  proudly  regarded  her- 
self as  a  protege  of  America,  while  the  latter  cherished 
fond  admiration  for  the  achievements  of  the  youth- 
ful nation  for  whom  she  had  stood  sponsor  at  its 
(k'l)ut  into  the  dazzling  society  of  the  Powers.  With 
Japan  reaching  mature  estate  at  the  termination  of 
tiie  Manchurian  struggle,  this  long  and  tried  friend- 
ship began  to  cool.  Was  it  due  to  fault  on  the 
part  of  Japan  or  does  the  responsibility  rest  with 
America.' 

1 


«  JAPAN'  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 

To-day  we  can  no  longer  speak,  without  a  sense 
of  f,'rief,  of  the  "traditional"  cordiahty  between  the 
two  nations.  Xo  longer  can  we  point  to  the  impres- 
sive statue  of  Commodore  Perry  erected  by  Japanese 
on  the  pine-clad  beacji  where  the  American  sailor 
first  set  foot  upon  Nippon's  soil,  without  a  keen 
realization  of  the  fact  that  the  monument  has  ceased 
to  be  a  symbol  of  unalloyed  friendship  and  a  guar- 
anty of  everlasting  peace  between  the  Republic  and 
the  Empire.  In  those  happy  days  of  our  cordial 
relations  with  Japan  we  used  to  speak  of  Japan's 
modest  achievements  as  versatile,  brilliant  and 
wonderful;  now  we  are  prone  to  condemn  the  Japa- 
nese as  imitative  and  superficial,  as  aggressive  and 
cocky. 

For  this  sudden  revulsion  of  sentiment  on  the  part 
of  the  American  people  many  factors  are  resijonsible. 
But  the  fundamental  cause  lies  undoubtedly  in 
American  fear  of  what  appears  to  the  people  of  this 
country  aggressive  imperialistic  desigu^  o.  ihe  part 
of  Japan.  They  fail  to  see  that  Japan's  policy  has 
essentially  been  one  of  self-preservation;  that  what- 
ever move  she  has  made  abroad  has  been  animated 
by  the  instinctive  feeling  that  the  status  of  her  small 
archipelago,  overcrowded  yet  endowed  with  scant 
resources,  was  menaced  both  from  within  and  from 
without.  To  the  American  people,  occupying  a 
vast  empire  and  virtually  immune  from  foreign 
encroachment,  this  is  a  condition  hard  to  realize. 
Their  failure  or  inability  to  apprcduic  the  Japanese 


THE  JAPANESE  INSTINCT  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION     3 

instinct  of  self-preservation  is,  to  my  mind,  the 
fui.damental  cause  of  the  misunderstandings  which 
have  brought  the  two  nations  to  the  verge  of  enmity. 
'I'o  drive  this  home  to  the  reader  a  brief  survey  of 
Japan's  foreign  relations  during  the  past  three  score 
years  seems  necessary. 

Up  to  the  early  part  of  the  past  century  Japan  had 
enjoyed  Arcadian  peace  for  more  than  two  hundred 
years.  She  had  issued  an  edict  not  only  forbidding 
foreigners  from  entering  her  territory  but  restrain- 
ing her  subjects  from  going  abroad.  She  had  been 
convinced  that  the  European  priests  and  traders 
who  came  were  the  forerunners  of  conquistador es, 
and  was  anxious  to  keep  herself  free  from  the  dire 
effects  bound  to  follow  the  sinister  politico-religious 
designs  harbored  by  them.  Self-sufficient  and  self- 
sat  I'sfied,  she  saw  no  reason  why  she  should  have 
anything-  to  do  with  the  dangerous  aliens. 

Fortunately  for  her  ro  foreign  power  had  ap- 
peared, strong  enough  to  force  open  the  gate  behind 
which  she  held  the  latchstring  Tov/^rds  the  middle 
of  the  past  century,  however,  clouds  began  to  gather 
over  the  calm  horizon.  Warships,  those  formidable 
heralds  of  Western  civilization,  began  to  appear  off 
and  on  near  the  coasts  of  the  archipelago.  Con- 
fronted by  these  marauders  the  islanders  found 
themselves  helpless,  for  they  had  tied  their  own 
hands  by  prohibiting  the  construction  of  seagoing 
ships.  Soon  the  alarming  news  spread  into  the  re- 
motest corners  of  the  land,  for  it  was  carried  on  the 


m 


mmm 


mm 


4  JAI'AN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 

winded   words   of   the   "Song  of   the  Black   Ship." 
which  Dr.  Inazo  Nitobe  translates  as  follows: 

"Tlirough  a  black  night  of  cloiul  and  rain. 
Tiie  Black  Ship  plies  her  way— 
An  alien  thing  of  evil  mien— 
Across  the  waters  gray. 

"Down  in  her  hohl.  there  labour  men 
Of  jet  black  visage  dread; 
While  fair  of  face  stand  by  her  guns 
Grim  hundreds  clad  in  red. 

"With  cheeks  half  hid  in  shaggy  beards, 
Tiieir  glance  fixed  on  the  wave. 
They  seek  our  sun-land  at  the  word 
Of  captain  owlish-grave. 

"While  loud  they  come— the  boom  of  drums 
And  songs  :  i  strange  uproar; 
And  now  with  flesh  and  herb  in  store, 

Their  powers  turn  toward  the  western  shore. 

"And  slowly  floating  onward  go 

These  Black  Ships,  wave-tossed  to  and  fro." 

The  vague  fear  inspired  by  the  Song  soon  grew 
into  terror  when  in  1837  an  American  warship 
.startled  the  little  village  of  Uraga,  not  far  from  the 
Shogun's  capital,  with  the  booming  of  cannon.  It 
seemed  as  though  the  "foreign  devils"  "with  cheeks 
half  hid  in  shaggy  beards"  had  determined  to  break 
open  the  doors  of  Nippon.  The  prompt  departure 
of  the  Americans  did  not  in  the  least  relieve  the 
Japanese,  for  they  left  word  that  a  more  formidable 


% 


THE  JAPANESE  INSTINCT  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION     5 

American  expedition  would  soon  be  forthcoming. 
The  Shogun,  the  military  magistrate,  lost  no  time 
in  issuing  edicts,  urging  the  lords  ai.d  barons  to 
strengthen  the  defenses  of  the  "sacred  land."  But 
how  could  they  strengthen  the  defenses?  There  were 
no  guns,  no  warships— not  even  a  fort  to  defend  the 
coast.    The  country  was  helpless. 

Amidst  the  tumult  and  excitement  into  which  the 
country  was  thrown  by  the  visit  of  the  first  American 
warship,  Commodore  Perry's  magnificent  squadron 
announced,  with  the  roar  of  guns,  its  appearance  in 
Yedo  Bay,  never  before  plowed  by  a  Western  vessel. 
It  was  a  foreign  invasion!  The  daring  Americans 
seemed  determined  to  land  troops  right  under  the 
nose  of  the  august  ruler  of  Nippon.  The  million  in- 
habitants of  the  capital  were  soon  thrown  into  con- 
sternation. "In  all  directions  were  seen  mothers 
flying  with  children  in  their  arms,  and  men  with 
mothers  on  their  backs.  Rumors  of  immediate 
action,  exaggerated  each  time  they  were  com- 
municated from  mouth  to  mouth,  added  horror 
to  the  horror  stricken.  The  tramp  of  war  horses, 
the  clatter  of  armed  warriors,  the  noise  of  carts,  the 
parade  of  firemen,  the  incessant  tolling  of  bells,  the 
shrieks  of  women,  the  cries  of  children,  dinning 
through  all  the  streets  of  a  city  of  more  than  a  mil- 
lion souls,  made  confusion  worse  confounded." 

That  was  in  1853.  Commodore  Perry  unmistak- 
ably intimated  that  the  broadsides  of  his  men-of- 
war  would  promptly  be  put  to  use  once  Japan  de- 


j-.V 


i~  .j^]}^-'->'rr : 


V  '  rtV^^ 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


(•lined  to  accodo  to  his  demands.  To  make  the  situa- 
tion more  difficult  for  the  Japanese,  the  country  was 
immediately  divided  into  various  factions  over  the 
burning?  issue  of  for(>ign  relations.  To  open  or  not 
to  open  the  doors  of  the  "sacred  land"  to  foreign 
intruders  was  the  question  upon  which  Japan  was 
thrown  into  a  hopeless  state  of  internal  dissension. 
'I'he  inconsiderate  foreigners,  of  course,  gave  the 
Japanese  no  time  to  argue  out  the  problem  among 
themselves.  Their  mandate  was  imperious.  Only  at 
the  risk  of  ruthless  bombardment  of  her  coast  could 
Japan  dare  refuse  it  or  even  delay  Ikt  obedience. 

And  so  Japan,  willy-nilly,  signed  the  treaty  of 
1854  with  the  American  envoy,  soon  to  be  followed 
by  many  another.  Looking  at  the  situation  through 
the  perspective  of  the  years  that  have  since  gone  by, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Japan  acted  wisely  in  accept- 
ing the  foreign  mandate.  Nor  can  it  be  doubted 
that  the  United  Stat*  ,  in  urging  the  opening  of 
Japan,  acted  with  the  best  of  intentions.  But  the 
Japanese,  in  those  days  of  anxiety  and  excitement, 
could  not  see  the  situation  so  clearly.  The  fact 
remains  that  they  were  compelled  to  accept  the 
treaties  simply  because  the  menacing  muzzles  of 
the  hideous  guns  protruding  from  the  monstrous 
*' Black  Ships"  had  struck  terror  into  their  hearts. 

The  conclusion  of  the  treaties  seemed  to  aggra- 
vate, ft)r  the  time  being  at  any  rate,  the  chaos  which 
seized  the  co\mtry  upon  the  advent  of  the  Black 
Ships.     The  unti-foreign  factions,  reluctant  to  see 


-i^M^^ 


'^^m^^.-_wm-^^ 


1  m:  JAPANESE  INSTINCT  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION      7 


■^.-4 


the  "Land  of  the  Gods"  df^filed  by  the  presence 
of  evil  ah<ns,  took  measures  that  ran  counter  to  the 
pohCy  <K'  (led  upon  by  the  Shogun  Government. 
The  result  was  the  bombardment  of  the  city  of 
Kaf,'oshinia  l)y  a  British  squadron  in  ISO.'J,  and  the 
l)(,mbar(lnient  in  the  same  year  of  the  coasts  of 
Chosiu  by  the  allied  fleets  of  England,  France,  Amer- 
ica and  Holland.  In  both  cases  Japan  had  to  pay 
heavy  indemnities,  though  America  later  (in  1883) 
relinquished  her  claim  to  her  share  therein,  and 
returned  to  Japan  $750,000  with  interest  of  $30,000 
added  to  the  original  sum.  This  was  oi.„'  of  the 
many  magnanimous  deeds  which  placed  America, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Japanese,  apart  from  the  unen- 
viable group  of  Western  Powers  which  treated 
Jai)an  with  undue  severity. 

Thus  from  the  very  beginning  of  Japan's  foreign 
intercourse  the  feeling  of  self-preservation  was 
deeply  instilled  in  her  bosom.  She  was  made  to 
feel  that  from  four  corners  of  the  earth  enemies 
were  pressing  forward  against  her.  She  was  at 
their  mercy  and  had  to  act  at  their  beck  and  call. 
She  was  deprived  of  the  autonomy  of  the  tariff, 
denied  judicial  authority  over  foreign  residents, 
and  compelled  to  acquiesce  in  the  imperium  in 
cmperio  which  the  foreigners  set  up  within  her  own 
borders  in  the  form  of  settlements  from  which  Japa- 
nese laws  and  administration  were  excluded.  The 
arrogance  and  imperiousness  of  foreigners  caused 
the  blood  of  the  Japanese  to  boil. 


i 


8 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Japan  was  (Hsgrared,  but  helpless.  And  as  she 
lof.ked  out  of  the  windows  she  had  just  opened  • 
tlie  world  about  her,  she  saw  a  spectacle  v  .cli 
offered  no  consolation  to  her.  She  saw  most  of  the 
Asiatic  countries  under  the  European  yoke.  She 
saw  her  immediate  neighbor,  China,  shorn  of  her 
outlying  territories  by  the  wiles  or  arms  of  one  Power 
or  another.  Would  not  the  fate  of  these  unfortunate 
neighbors  be  eventually  her  own?  The  danger  was 
at  her  door.    How  was  she  to  escape  it? 

This   awakening  consciousness  of   imminent  na- 
tional calamity  welded  the  country  into  a  homogene- 
ous unit .    It  was  no  use  lamenting  and  fretting  under 
alien  domination.     Only  by  adopting  the  enemy's 
weapons    could    Japan   hope   to    face   the   enemy. 
Spurred  by  dictates  of  self-preservation,  she  made 
feverish  efforts  to  study  and  adopt  the  sciences  and 
the  arts  of  peace  and  war  which  she  believed  to  be 
the  sources  of  Western  prowess.     All  this  while  she 
made  repeated  attempts  to  persuade  Europe  and 
America  to  relinquish  the  exterritorial  rights  they 
had  established  in  Japan.    But  her  achievements  in 
the  arts  of  peace  furnished  no  convincing  argument 
for  the  reversal  of  Western  policy,  and  it  remained 
for  her  victories  in  warfare  to  attain  the  coveted 
goal,  for  exterritorial  jurisdiction  was  abolished    in 
18i)}),  four  years  after  the  war  with  China,  while 
tariff    autonomy    was    restored    to   Japan   only   in 
1911. 
Japan's  first  necessity  of  speaking  in  the  language 


THE  JAPANESE  INSTINCT  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION     9 

of  Mowder  and  ball  came  with  China's  obvious  in- 
tention to  annex  Korea.     Though  her  prestige  had 
been  badly  shaken  at  the  hands  of  European  Powers, 
China  was,  nevertheless,  still  regarded  as  the  slumber- 
ing giant  of  the  East,  infinitely  more  powerful  than 
Japan.    China  herself  looked  contemptuously  upon 
her  island  neighbor  as  a  sort  of  mimicking  pigmy, 
small  both  in  stature  and  in  intellect.    When  Japan 
told  the  Chinese  that  the  independence  of  Korea  was 
essential   to   her  own   safety   and   existence,    their 
reply  was  a  rebuff  and  threat.     Utterly  regardless 
of  the  rei)eated  Japanese  protests,  they  proceeded 
with   their  own   sinister  design   to   absorb   Korea. 
The  islands  of  Nippon,  fearful  of  the  potential  prow- 
ess, not  yet  exploded,  of  the  huge  Chinese  empire  of 
4()(),UO0.OOO  people  and  4,000,000  square  miles,  could 
not  sit  (juiet  under  the  impending  prospect  of  having 
so  formidal)le  a  power  as  her  neighbor  across  narrow 
straits.    To  them  the  absorption  of  Korea  by  China 
meant  the  destruction  of  their  own   national   ex- 
istence.    Again  it  was  tlie  instinct  of  self-preserva- 
tion, inherent  in  a  small  nation,  that  persuaded  the 
Japanese  to  prevent,  even  at  the  point  of  the  sword, 
the  Chinese  annexation  of  Korea. 

When  Japan  drew  the  sword  against  China  in 
1894  she  had  no  idea  of  playing  the  part  of  a  King 
Stork  superseding  a  King  Log.  Her  idea  was  to 
insure  Korea's  independence  so  that  no  third  Power 
could  use  it  as  a  vantage  ground  from  which  to  swoop 
down  upon  her  own  fair  islands.     For  more  than 


10 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


fifteen  years  she  had,  at  no  small  saerificc  of  lives 
and  treasure,  made  earnest  efforts  to  put  the  Korean 
house  in  order,  but  in  vain.  H()[)elessly  wayward, 
Korea  had  fallen  vietim  to  China's  scheme  of  annex- 
ation, compelling  Japan  to  resort  to  arms  for  the 
sake  of  Korean  independence. 

Af'er  the  war  with  China  Japan  resumed  and 
continued  for  another  decade  her  struj,'f,'le  to  reform 
Korea.  Korea  was  unresponsive.  Life  had  faded 
out  of  her  decadent  constitution,  and  she  was 
doomed.  Yet  the  Japanese  struggled  on  in  the  vain 
hope  of  regenerating  her,  when  a  th--  1  Power,  far 
more  formidable  than  China  had  ever  been,  stretched 
out  a  grasping  hand  across  Manchuria  and  into  the 
peninsida  of  Korea.    This  was  Russia. 

Russia  had  been  looming  ominously  upon  the 
Far  Eastern  horizon  ever  since  the  Chino-Japanese 
war  at  the  end  of  which  she,  in  unison  with  Ger- 
many and  France,  deprived  Japan  of  the  chief  spoils 
of  her  victory,  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  pur- 
loin them  herself  at  the  first  convenient  moment. 
Scarcely  was  the  ink  dry  upon  the  treaty  which 
ended  the  war  with  China  when  Russia,  in  1898, 
appropriated  the  Liaotung  peninsula,  the  very 
territory  from  which  she  had  ousted  Japan  in  the 
name  of  peace.  In  the  vast  empire  scheme  of 
the  Russia  of  that  time  the  occupation  of  the 
Liaotung  i)eninsula  was  but  a  prelude  to  the  whole- 
sale seizure  of  IVLinchuria  and  Korea  as  well  as 
the  greater  part  of  China  proper.    How  could  Japan 


% 


THE  JAPANKSK  INSTINCT  OF  SELP-PRESERVATION     11 

vi(  w  with  equanimity  such  ruthless  advance  of 
tlie  Muscovite?  She  could  not.  The  result  was 
tiie  Russo-Japanese  war  of  1904,  Japan's  second 
war  of  self-preservation. 

After  two  costly  wars,  fought  for  self-preservation, 
Japan's  p()>iti()n  may  be  said  to  have  become  fairly 
secure.      Yet  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  en- 
gendered l)%  ilie  terror  struck  into  Japanese  hearts 
by  the  Black  Ships  and  all  that  came  in  their  train, 
sfill  i)ersists  and  manifests  itself  in  her  activities  in 
China.      Of    this    the   Japanese   campaign    against 
Kiau-chow,  in  the  early  stage  of  the  European  war, 
is  a  notable  example.     Next  to  Russia,  Ciermany 
was  the  country  which  Japan  had  dreaded  most. 
Wlien  the  Kaiser,  with  the  Czar  and  the  French 
President,  resolved  to  prevent  the  Japanese  occu- 
pation of  the  Liaotung  peninsula  at  the  end  of  the 
Chinese  war,  the  German  minister  at  Tokio  pre- 
sented  himself  at  the  Foreign  Office  and  handed 
to  the  Mikado's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  a  written 
"advice,"  part  of  which  read  in  substance:— "Ger- 
many is  strong,  Japan  is  weak;  what  may  follow 
your  refusal  of  this  advice  is  not  difficult  to  foretell." 
When,  therefore,  the  Kaiser  upoi  a  flimsy  pretext 
occupied  Kiau-chow  and  convened  the  whole  prov- 
ince of  Shantung  into  a  German  sphere  of  influence, 
Japan  was  scared,  and  asked  herself  if  Germany 
and  Russia  were  going  to  dismemlx?r  China,  ulti- 
mately to  deal  with  her  own  archipelago  in  the  same 
way.    It  would  have  been  surprising  had  not  the 


I 


* 


H 


n 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Japanese  seized  upon  tlie  first  lej^itimate  opportu- 
nity to  dislodge  Germany  from  China. 

For  many  years  to  come  Japan's  efforts  will  be 
concentrated  upon  the  solution  of  the  Chinese  ques- 
tion. Whether  or  nor  she  is  equal  to  the  task,  she 
nuist  liere  make  .supreme  efforts,  for  her  place  in 
world  politics  primarily  lies  in  the  molding  of  Asia's 
destiny.  She  will  be  spurn-d  on  to  play  the  leading 
role  in  the  disposition  of  the  Chinese  situation,  not 
from  any  motives  of  empire  building  but  from  the 
necessity  of  self-preservation.  Open  the  map  of 
China,  and  mark  out  the  territories  staked  out  by 
various  European  Powers  as  their  spheres  of  influ- 
ence. Then  you  will  begin  to  realize  why  the  Japa- 
nese, deep  in  their  hearts,  still  cherish  the  fear  of  the 
Occident. 

In  spite  of  Russia's  defeat  in  the  Manchurian 
war  of  1904,  her  jMxsition  in  tiie  Far  East  has  been 
strengthened  rather  than  weakened.  Since  the  war 
she  has  doubled  the  tracks  of  her  strategical  rail- 
ways in  Siberia  and  Manchuria,  and  is  in  a  position 
to  pour  troops  into  China  in  much  larger  numbers 
than  in  1904.  She  controls  by  far  the  largest  por- 
tion of  Manchuria,  and  has,  in  addition,  established 
a  suzerainty  over  the  vast  territory  of  Mongolia. 
Japan  knows  that  her  resources  are  too  limited  to 
undertake  the  destruction  of  Russian  domination  in 
those  countries.  Her  bitter  experiences  on  the  battle 
fields  of  Manchuria  a  decade  ago  convinced  her  of 
the  futility  of  engaging  such  a  formidable  f(!e  as 


Wlslc^^^S 


"M^^i^^ 


3 


THE  JAPANESE  INSTINCT  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION    13 


^ 


4 


i# 


.1 


Russia  single-handed.  By  dint  of  pluck  and  audacity 
she  scored  victory  after  victory  over  the  Northern 
Colossus,  but  she  could  not  help  feeling,  even  while 
she  was  dealing  unerring  blows  upon  the  enemy,  that 
in  time  Russia  would  overcome  her  by  the  sheer 
weight  of  numbers.  Once  more  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  asserted  itself,  and  counselled  her  to 
befriend  Russia.  The  entente  cordiale  recently  entered 
into  between  IVtrograd  and  Tokio  is  the  outcome  of 
Japan's  endeavor  for  rapprochemeyit.  Will  the  pact 
prove  cfTcctive  to  prevent  Russia's  further  advance 
towards  Peking?     Japan  is  skeptical. 

Cast  your  glance  further  south  on  the  map.  Here 
you  see  England  intrenched  in  Tibet  and  the  vast 
Yangtse  valley.  The  "valley,"  measuring  some 
580,000  square  miles,  is  commercially  the  most 
important  section  of  China.  Compared  with  it 
Manchuria  and  north  China  sink  into  insignificance 
as  a  field  for  commerce.  Yet  in  that  vast  territory 
England  seems  determined  to  exclude  enterprises 
of  other  nations,  most  of  all  those  of  Japan. 

Still  further  .south  France  claims  Yuannan  and 
Kwaiisi  as  her  srihere  of  influence.  How  can  the 
conflicting  interests  represented  by  the  various 
spheres  of  influences  be  harmonized.'  To  argue 
against  the  establishment  of  such  spheres  is  too  late, 
though  Japan's  ideals  should  be  their  ultimate 
abolition.  We  must  face  facts  as  they  are  and  seek 
the  best  solution  for  China  and  the  outside  Powers 
concerned.     And  in  seeking  the  solution  Japan,  I 


11 


ii 

i 


14 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITK  S 


am  inclined  to  iK-licvo,  tliinks  rightly  that  she  must 
herself  strengthen  her  position  in  Cliinii  so  that  her 
voice  will  not  be  ignored  in  the  councils  of  the  Towers 
interested  in  that  unhappy  country. 

The  feeling'  of  self-preservation,  which  may  well 
be  ref,'arded  as  the  guiding?  factor  in  Japan's  forcij,'n 
policy,    is   something?   which   the   American   people 
cannot  easily  understand.     Here  are  two  countries 
almost   so   widely  different,   in   pt)int  of   si/e   and 
potential  strength,  as  to  permit  of  no  comparison. 
With  unlimited  resources  at  her  disposal,  w  ith  finan- 
cial   strength    great    enough    to    meet   any    emer- 
gency that  may  arise,  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
effectively  forestalling  fort'ign  encroachments  upon 
her  neighbors,  America's  citizens,  in  spite  of  the  pres- 
ent  agitation   for  preparedness,  feel  deep   in  then' 
hearts  that  their  country  is  as  secure  from  invasion 
as   any   country  can  possibly  be.     Enjoying  such 
an    advantageous   position,    the    American   cannot 
readily   put  himself  in  Japan's  place  and   look  at 
tlie    problems,    which    Japan    is    called    upon    to 
solve,   as  the   Japanese  would  look  at  them.    He 
has    no    common  feeling,  no   sympathy   with    the 
Japanese,  because  he  cannot  realize  the  intensity 
of    the    feeling   of    self-preservation    uppermost  in 
the  mind  of  the  islanders,  potentially  weak,  ridden 
with  debts,  groaning  under  heavy  taxes,  forbidden 
to   seek   opportunity   in   the  lands  of   tlie  Cauca- 
sian race,  constantly  feeling  the  pressure  brought 
to  bear  upon  them  by  aggressive  Powers  ever  since 


w^tmi 


TIIK  JAPANESE  INSTINCT  OF  SELF-PhESERVATION    15 

flicir  fir>t  contacl,  an'!  yet  impelled  to  .slioulfler  the 
bunion  of  the  yellow  race,  and  especially  of  tin- 
Chinese,  a  task  imposed  upon  them  by  their  instinct 
of  self-preservation. 

One  often  hears  of  Germany's  necessity  to  seek 
a  place  in  the  sun.  In  a  sense,  Germany  has  al- 
ways had  a  place  in  the  sun  everywhere  in  the  world. 
She  has  been  free  to  send  her  sons  and  daughters 
into  any  country  to  settle  and  colonize,  or  to  ex- 
I)I<)it  trade  and  resources  there.  How  different 
Jajian's  case  is!  Here  we  have  a  people  whose  need 
of  a  place  in  the  sun  is  not  imaginary  l)ut  decidedly 
real.  The  Caucasian  Powers  fiave  appropriated  by 
far  the  largest  part  of  the  world's  habitable  surface, 
and  have  erected  around  it  an  insurmountable  wall 
barring  out  all  dark-skinned  races.  Where  is  Japan 
to  find  a  place  in  the  sun.^  Urged  by  the  instinct 
of  self-preservation,  she  is  making  serious  efforts 
to  set-k  a  solution  for  this  question.  She  has  not 
vet  succeeded.    Will  she  ever  succeed? 


CHAPTER  II 


AMERICA'S  ISSUES  WITH  JAPAN 

Japan  nmazod  at  our  preparedness  propaganda — Conj-rinj?  up  the 
Japanese  bo^'ie— Wiis  Japan  Bnti-Amcrican  bt-fore  Amerka  Wii3 
anti-Japanese? — America's  assistance  in  concluding  the  Ports- 
mouth I'tace  Treaty— Tokyo  riot  of  1905  not  anti-American— 
Three  issues  between  Japan  and  America— Are  they  likely  to  lead 
to  war?— The  Pacific  Coast  the  danger  spot— Clouding  the  real 
issues — American  charges  against  Japan — The  press  censorship  in 
Japan. 

When  the  "preparedness"  propaganda  was 
launched  in  this  country  two  years  a^'o  Japan  was 
amazed.  Not  that  the  Japanese  were  reluctant  to 
see  America  increase  her  armament.  Of  America's 
just  and  legitimate  desire  to  establish  an  army  and 
a  navy  adequate  to  safeguard  her  vast  empire,  they 
had,  of  course,  no  reason  to  complain.  W'hat  grieved 
them  was  not  the  stupendous  programme  of  arma- 
ment proposed  for  adoption,  but  the  stentorian 
pronunciamentoes,  uttered  by  so  many  Americans 
of  prominence,  that  this  country  must  prepare 
against  an  approaching  conflict  with  Japan.  Could 
it  be,  they  wondered,  that  the  United  States,  their 
teacher  and  guardian  of  yesterday,  hud  so  completely 
changed  her  attitude  and  made  up  her  mind  to 
contest  with  the  Japanese  in  the  arena  of  battle  for 
the  "mastery  of  the  Pacific"? 

l« 


AMERICAS  ISSUES  WITH  JAPAN 


17 


I  need  not  present  here  tlie  galaxy  of  dk  aguished 
publicists  and  editors  who  have  dih'gently  been 
I)ainting,  to  the  mingled  amazement  and  indigna- 
tion of  the  gullible  public,  the  frightful  pictures  of 
the  Mikado  as  the  inevitable  enemy  of  America. 
But  I  cannot  refrain  from  noting  the  fact  that  in 
some  public  schools  on  the  Pacific  Coast  even  teach- 
ers have  been  poisoning  the  youthful  minds  of  their 
pupils,  telling  in  the  classrooms  that  war  with  Japan 
is  certain  to  come.  Is  it  any  wonder  that  the  Japa- 
nese have  been  frightened?  They  had  hoped  that 
if  America  felt  the  need  of  a  larger  armament  for 
self-defense,  she  would  go  about  the  task  in  the 
right  spirit,  and  attain  the  end  without  injecting 
into  the  matter  the  bogie  of  Japanese  designs  which 
have  in  reality  never  existed.  Their  ho[)es  have 
been  sadly  blighted  by  the  persistent  cry  raised 
in  this  country  of  the  Japanese  menace  on  the  Pa- 
cific Coast,  in  Mexico,  in  China,  in  the  South  Seas, 
in  the  Philippines, — everywhere. 

Apologists  for  America,  who  are  peculiarly  anti- 
Japanese,  have  recently  invented  or  discovered  a 
fact  which  they  are  exploiting  to  the  utmost  for  the 
{)urpose  of  proving  that  before  the  American  people 
ceased  to  be  amiable  to  Japan,  the  Japanese  had 
virtually  launched  an  anti-American  propaganda 
in  their  own  country.  They  tell  us  that  when  the 
peace  treaty  of  Portsmouth  was  signed  between 
the  Mikado's  envoy  and  the  Czar's  with  no  indem- 
nity offered  to  Japan,  mobs  broke  loose  in  Tokyo 


wm^m 


18 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


and  attempted  to  attack  the  American  embassy  to 
give  vent  to  tlu'ir  dissatisfaction  over  Mr.  Roose- 
v<'lt's  failure  to  secure  a  peace  treaty  more  favorable 
to  Japan.  From  that  moment,  they  say,  the  Mika- 
do's subjects  compk'tely  changed  their  attitude 
towards  America,  vvhile  the  Japanese  Government, 
perhaps  intentionally,  connived  at  the  popular 
agitation  against  America  and  failed  to  tell  the 
public  the  true  story  of  the  peace  conference  with 
special  reference  to  the  valuable  part  played  by 
Mr.  Roosevelt. 

To  the  open-minded  this  contention  would  appear 
to  be  a  (juibble  unwortiiy  oi  any  man  with  self- 
respect.  If  these  apologists  expected  the  Japanese 
Government,  as  they  obviously  did,  to  proclaim 
to  its  subjects  and  to  the  world  that  it  had  asked 
the  American  President  to  mediate  between  it  and 
the  Russian  Government,  and  that  it  had  no  alterna- 
tive to  accepting  peace  without  indemnity,  because 
its  resources  had  been  taxed  almost  to  the  limit  in 
the  titanic  struggle  on  the  Manchurian  fields  of 
war-  if  they  expected  Japan  to  make  such  extraor- 
dinary confessions  to  exonerate  America  and  Mr. 
Roosevelt,  they  certainly  expected  the  performance 
of  a  feat  which  no  Government,  as  such,  would 
.stoop  to  i)erform.  Under  similar  circumstances 
all  that  a  Government  could  do  would  be  to  assure 
Ch"  populace  of  the  wisdom  of  accepting  the  peace 
terms,  and  endeavor,  through  imofficial  channels 
and  by  indirect  means,  to  free  of  all  charges  the 


AMERICA  S  ISSUES  WITH  JAPAN 


19 


foreign  Power  which  had  employed  its  good  offices 
for  the  termination  of  the  war.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
this  is  exactly  what  tlie  Japanese  statesmen  did. 
To  condemn  them  for  their  failure  to  go  further  is 
to  impose  upon  them  an  impossible  task. 

Apart  from  such  consideration  we  must  rememl)er 
that  the  riot  which  occurred  in  Tokyo  upon  the 
conclusion  of  the  Portsmouth  treaty  was,  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  a  demonstration  against  the 
Japanese  Government.  For  almost  two  years  the 
Japanese  had  been  living  under  the  severest  mental 
and  physical  strain,  struggling  to  win  the  greatest 
war  they  had  ever  waged.  Thanks  to  their  self- 
sacrifice  and  their  unwavering  devotion  to  the  state, 
tliev  had  scored  brilliant  victories  both  on  land  and 
on  sea.  It  was,  therefore,  but  natural  that  they 
should  exp(x;t  their  leaders  in  diplomacy  to  secure 
I)eace  terms  which  would  assist  in  lightening  the 
taxation  they  had  loyally  shouldered  to  carry  the 
war  to  a  victorious  end.  When  the  news  was  flashed 
from  Portsmouth,  announcing  Konmra's  failure 
to  win  indemnity  from  Witte,  their  disappointment 
was  unspeakable,  and  the  disa|)pointment  soon 
grew  into  a  frenzy  of  indignation,  condemning  every- 
body connected  with  the  conclusion  of  the  peace 
treaty.  They  attacked  the  offices  of  the  newspapers 
which  supported  the  Covernment,  and  made  a 
violent  demonstration  before  the  Foreign  Depart- 
ment. A  section  of  the  mob  made  towards  the 
American    embassy,   but    was    hapi)ily    intercepted 


20 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


by  the  police.  There  was,  oi  course,  no  excuse  for 
druggiig  Mr.  Roosevelt  and  the  American  embassy 
into  the  demonstration  which  was  essentially  di- 
rected against  the  Japanese  Government;  but  con- 
sidering the  strenuous  condition  under  which  the 
Japanese  had  been  living  for  two  years,  can  we  not 
sympathize  with  them  in  their  temporary  loss  of 
the  faculty  of  reasoning  at  an  instant  of  stunning 
disappointment?  Their  lapse  was,  to  say  the  most, 
only  momentary.  But  for  the  anti-Japanese  agita- 
tion which  broke  out  on  this  side  of  the  water  in 
1!»06  and  which  has  ever  since  been  kept  alive,  the 
Japanese  not  only  would  have  quickly  forgotten 
the  unfortunate  incident,  but  would  have  sincerely 
repented  their  guilt  in  forgetting,  even  for  a  moment, 
the  kind  assistance  America  had  rendered  in  secur- 
ing the  best  peace  terms  obtainable  under  the 
circumstances.  To  utilize  that  incident  as  an 
excuse  for  the  persistent,  insidious  anti-Japanese 
agitation  in  this  country  is,  I  repeat,  a  contemptible 
quibble. 

I  liave  dwelt  upon  the  Tokyo  incident  of  August, 
1905,  not  because  I  attach  any  importance  to  it, 
but  l)ecause  many  i)rominent  American  writers  of 
late  have  shown  a  disposition  to  exploit  it.  It  is 
more  essential  to  deal  with  the  problems  now  at 
issue  between  the  two  nations,  and  threatening  to 
wax  into  burning  intensity.  America's  relations 
with  Japan  nmst  be  adjusted,  not  by  cherishing 
unpleasant  memories  of  past  events,  but  by  weigh- 


tm 


AMERICAS  ISSUES  WITH  JAPAN 


21 


ing  the  problems  that  are  of  direct  concern  to  the 
present  and  future  of  the  two  nations. 

Broadly  speaking  there  are  three  problems,  and 
only  three,  which  threaten  the  friendship  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States.  They  are  the  im- 
migration question,  tke  recrudescent  anti-Japanese 
agitation  or  legislation  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  and  the 
Chinese  question.  Before  entering  into  the  details 
of  these  questions,  we  may  at  once  set  down  our 
conclusions. 

It  may  be  safely  asserted  that  America  will  not 
hesitate  to  go  to  war  if  Japan  insists  upon  free  im- 
migration, or  upon  the  immediate  removal  of  the 
"gentlemen's  agreement"  which  has  placed  a  ban 
upon  Japanese  immigration.  On  the  other  hand, 
Japan  will  resist,  if  need  be,  even  at  the  point  of 
the  sword,  any  American  attempt  to  interfere  with 
what  she  considers  to  be  her  justifiable  activities  in 
China. 

Fortunately  the  truth  is  that  Japan  would  not 
fight  for  the  purpose  of  securing  unrestricted  emigra- 
tion. Her  statesmen,  her  publicists,  her  thinkers 
all  realize  the  certain  outcome  of  such  a  futile  at- 
tempt. To  attain  that  purpose  l)y  war  Japan  must 
be  so  powerful  and  so  successful  in  her  military 
operations  that  she  could  conquer  and  permanently 
hold  at  least  the  territory  west  of  the  Rockies. 
Unless  the  Jv  anese  are  incurable  lunatics  they 
would  not  entertain  so  impossible  a  dream.  Should 
the  Mikado  fail,  as  he  certainly  would,  to  secure 


22 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  IHH.ITICS 


permtinent  occupation  of  the  Pacific  Coast,  and  be 
conipcllc<l  1<)  accept  American  terms  of  i)eace,  he 
would  not  only  liavo  to  abandon  all  liopes  of  sending 
any  fre>li  emigrant  to  these  shores,  l)ut  to  remove 
even  the  sixty  thousand  Japanese  who  are  now 
settled  in  this  country.  This  the  Japanese  siates- 
men  clearly  ffiresee,  and  their  vision  is  a  safeguard 
against  war  on  the  score  of  enn'gration. 

Turning  to  the  Chinese  question  il  seems  un- 
thinkable that  America  would  ever  be  so  near- 
sighted as  to  go  to  war  on  account  of  tlie  "open 
door"  doctrine,  nuich  talked  about  but  little  under- 
stood, (\specially  wiien  Japan  lias  done  and  will  do 
nothing  to  hurt  American  interests  in  the  Far  East. 
IMie  overwhelming  majority  of  the  American  people 
neitluT  know  nor  care  to  know  what  the  "open 
door"  means. 

IJut  there  is  the  third  question, — the  spasmodic 
agitation  against  the  Japanese  in  the  Western  States 
of  the  Union.  How  long  will  Jajjan  be  patient  under 
the  pin-pricking  attitude  of  those  States?  Will  she 
sit  eternally  unruffled  under  the  rebuffs  accorded 
to  her  in  the  sha{)e  of  discriminatory  laws  restricting 
the  rights  of  her  nationals  residing  in  the  West?  I 
have  not  sufficient  confidence  in  Ja{)an\s  equanimity 
to  hazard  the  prediction  that,  whatever  the  Western 
Stales  may  <lo  against  her  nationals,  Japan  will 
neve"  go  to  the  ](>ngth  of  appealing  to  the  tribunal 
of  arms.  S.:d  to  say,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that 
unless  the  Government  at  Washington  and  the  far- 


Sr^ATT 


AMERICAS  ISSL'ES  WITH  JAPAN' 


23 


swing  leaders  of  tlie  American  people  make  earnest 
efforts  to  find  means  to  safi-guard  the  rights  and 
privileges  of  the  Japanese  who  are  lawfully  here, 
the  time  may  eventually  come  when  the  situation 
will  assume  a  most  critical  aspect.  Here  again  I 
think  that  it  would  be  the  height  of  folly  on  the  part 
of  J;:pitn  to  go  to  war  on  such  issues,  but  she  is  a 
nation  whoso  sense  of  calculation  is  not  yet  so  fully 
developed  as  to  consider  every  national  question 
in  the  light  of  material  gain  or  loss.  Fortunately 
or  unfortunately,  she  is  one  of  those  old-fashioned 
nations  which  still  believes  that  there  is,  even  in 
this  commercial  age  of  ours,  such  a  thing  as  national 
honor  to  be  defended  regardless  of  cost. 

Lest  I  may  be  misunderstood,  let  me  emphasize 
that  Japan  will  have  come  to  such  a  supreme  resolve 
only  when  she  has  exhausted  all  the  peaceful  means 
available  to  terminate  the  provocative  policy  of  the 
AVestern  States.  Remember  that  this  question, 
the  attitude  of  the  West  towards  the  Japanese,  is 
totally  dillerent  from  the  cpiestion  of  Japanese  im- 
migration; for  the  ^likado's  Government  has,  as  I 
have  already  emphatically  stated,  no  intention  to 
embarrass  America  by  sending  enngrants  of  the 
laboring  class  to  this  country.  Rightly  or  wrongly, 
Japan  thinks  that  inasmuch  as  she  has  shown  her- 
self conciliatory  and  accommodating  in  the  matter  of 
immigration,  it  should  be  the  duty  of  the  authorities 
and  leaders  at  Washington  to  make  at  least  honest 
efforts  to  extend  citizenship  to  the  Japanese  now 


J 


K"'4i:-. 


-Ss;--  --rl*=Sf 


due  •rft^-i-S^i-^; 


^ 


r^Si^\      Jk  "S-, 


)i4 


JAPAN'  1\  WORLD  POLITICS 


hero  and  thus  shield  thorn  from  the  whimsical  legis- 
lation of  the  viirioiis  vStatcs. 

Viewed  in  its  broad  outlines  the  situation  before 
us  seems  clear  and  simple.  Its  real  nature  and  scope 
have  been  somewhat  obscured,  its  contour,  so  to 
say,  somewhat  blurred,  by  the  injection  of  absurd 
fancies  and  irrelevant  contentions,  born  and  nur- 
tured in  the  editorial  sanctums  on  both  sides,  but 
especially  on  this  side,  of  the  Pacific.  The  nature 
of  such  fancies  and  contentions  has  already  been 
indicated  in  the  story  of  the  Tokyo  riot  just  told. 
Mr.  Geor^'e  Kennan  j?ives  us  in  a  para^'raph  a  list 
of  imaginary  incidents  charged  against  Japan's 
account  since  1906.  "Beginning  with  the  San 
Francisco  public  school  troubles,"  he  says,  "the 
Japanese  ha\e  been  accused  of  preparing  for  war 
with  us  by  buying  7.>0,000  rifles  from  the  Crucible 
Steel  Company  (1908);  of  plotting  against  us  in 
Hawaii  and  the  Philippims  (1909);  of  excluding 
Americans  from  the  JManchurian  mining  field 
(1909);  of  discriminating  against  our  commerce 
by  means  of  transportation  rebates  on  the  Man- 
ehurian  railways  (1909);  »)f  seeking  to  monopolize 
the  truck-farming  lands  in  California  (1909);  of 
sinking  the  dry-dock  Dewey  in  Manila  Bay  (1910); 
of  planting  mines  in  tliat  same  bay  (1910);  of  taking 
soundings  and  making  charts  of  Californian  har- 
bors (1910);  of  .secretly  conspiring  with  Mexico 
against  us  (1911);  of  attempting  to  s<M'ure  Magda- 
lena  Bay,   in  Ix)wer  California,  for  a  naval  base 


AMERICA'S  ISSl  ES  WITH  JAPAV 


25 


(1011);  of  secretly  taking  photographs  and  making 
maps  on  the  coasts  of  Alaska  (1011);  of  trying  to 
get  supreme  control  in  Manchuriiv  under  pretense 
of  figiiting  the  bubonic  plague  (1011);  of  conspiring 
with  Mexican  insurgents  against  us  (101-2);  of  per- 
secuting American  missionaries  in  Korea  and  trying 
to  abolish  Christianity  there  (101'-2);  of  conspiring 
with  Germany  to  overthrow  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
(1012);  of  attacking  the  American  Consul  in  New- 
cliang  (1012);  of  forming  an  alliance  with  our  west 
coast  Indians  against  us  (1012);  of  threatening  to 
attack  Java,  and  thus  compelling  the  Dutch  to  seek 
our  support  (1012);  of  trying  to  buy  Ixjwer  California 
from  Huerta  (1014);  of  attempting  to  get  spies  into 
tiie  fortifications  of  the  Panama  Canal  (101.3);  of 
seeking  to  secure  a  foothold  in  Lower  California  by 
running  a  vessel  ashore  there  and  sending  warships 
to  assist  in  salvage  operations  (101(5);  of  conspiring 
with  Germany  to  get  control  of  the  San  Bias  Indian 
lands  in  Panama  (lOUJ)." 

Add  to  the  list  the  wild  stories  of  two  hundred 
thousand  Japanese  soldiers  in  Mexico;  of  Japanese 
firing  at  the  American  troops  at  Mazathin;  of  Japan 
scheming  to  make  Mexico  licr  ally;  of  Japanese 
diplomats  guiding  Carranza's  hand  in  writing  pro- 
tests against  America's  "punitive"  expedition  into 
Mexico;  of  the  Japanese  in  California  urging  the 
Carranza  Government  to  declare  war  upon  the 
United  States,  and  so  on  and  so  forth,  and  you 
can  understand  how,  in  the  mind  of  the  public. 


It 
f 


26 


JAPAN"  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Japan's  complaints  against  AnionVa  soenied  to  wax 
larger  and  lar^'er  until  their  .sine  qua  non  lias  been 
lost. 

Not  content  with  telling  their  home  folk  such 
wonderful  tales  of  the  gathering  storm  over  American- 
Ja])an<'se  relations,  some  Americans  had  the  kind- 


ness to  cross  the  Pacific  a  few  vears  ago  and 


are 


the 


crednlons  subjects  of  the  Mikado  with  tlie  fright- 
ful story  of  America's  waHike  prc{)arations  against 
Ja{)an.  One  of  tliese  crafty  tattlers  published  in  a 
number  of  Tokyo  newspai)ers  a  self-manufactured 
interx  w  in  which  the  paymaster  of  a  certain  Ameri- 
can cruiser  at  Manila  (giving  the  specific  nanu\s  of 
both  the  nsaii  and  the  vessel)  was  made  to  state 
that  America  w.is  making  feverish  haste  to  com- 
plete preparations  for  the  war  which  she  was  to 
declare  upon  Ja|)an  within  a  V(Ty  short  time.  This 
same  gi'utlemau  contributetl  to  Mr.  William  Ran- 
dolj)li  Hearst's  enterprising  newspapers  an  article, 
asserting  that  the  National  Defense  Council  of 
Japan,  of  which  ex-Premicr  Marquis  Okunui  and 
other  foremost  publicists  were  members,  had  pub- 
lished a  book  on  the  coming  war  with  America,  while 
the  truth  was  that  the  book  was  but  a  flimsy  fiction 
written  by  an  unknown  scribe.  As  I  i)en  tlu>se  words 
a  numbir  of  newspapers,  the  foremost  of  the  Amer- 
ican pr(\ss,  are  disseminating  the  news  that  Japan 
lias  serv(>d  an  ultimatum  ujk)!!  China,  demanding 
the  innnediale  severance  of  her  diplomatic  relations 
with   (ierman\!     And   yet   J.:ipa.n's  critics   tell    us 


•*;   'ri 


AMERICAS  ISSUES  WITH  JAPAN 


«7 


that  the  Japanese  press  are  more  anti-American 
than  tlie  American  press  are  anti-Japanese! 

In  speaking  of  the  attitude  of  tlie  Japanese  press 
towards  the  United  States,  it  seems  pertinent  to 
note  the  censorship  in  Japan,  for  it  has  become 
something  of  an  estabUshed  beh'ef  among  American 
writers  that  the  Japanese  press  is  so  strictly  censored 
that  the  real  opinions  and  sentiiiunts  of  the  Japa- 
nese people  are  practically  withheld  from  the  outside 
world.  This  generalization  often  leads  to  the  sinister 
Inference  that  the  Japanese  Government  and  people, 
hiding  themselves  behind  the  screen  of  censorship, 
are  secretly  propagating  anti-American  ideas  and 
are  engaged  in  warlike  preparations  against  this 
coimtry. 

True  it  is  that  the  Japanese  Government  still 
clings  to  tlie  old-fashioned  idea  of  censorship.  For- 
tunately it  is  equally  true  that  the  censorship  is 
more  of  a  formality  than  a  reality  -a  stupid  piece 
of  red  tape  maintained  by  force  of  habit  on  the  part 
of  oflicialdom.  Its  absurditv  and  futilitv  are  obvious 
when  we  remember  that  by  the  time  the  censor 
returns  a  verdict  on  the  contents  of  a  newspaper  or 
a  periodical  most,  if  not  all,  copies  of  such  a  publica- 
tion have  already  been  delivered  to  its  readers.  A 
great  annoyance  to  the  publishers,  the  censorship 
is,  nevertlieless,  no  small  joke  among  them.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  censor,  except  in  times  of  war, 
is  not  vi^'iliint.  And  in  times  of  peace  his  attention 
i-<  <!irected  mostly  to  items  affecting  public  morals. 


28 


JAi'AN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


If  a  newspaper  is  inclined  to  indulge  in  "realism" 
in  describing,  let  us  suy,  a  matrimonial  scandal  or  a 
sexual  crime,  the  censor  is  likely  to  take  notice  and 
employ  the  "hlack  brush,"  ecjuivalent  to  our  blue 
pencil.  Newspapers  addicted  to  this  sort  of  offense 
are  earmarked,  so  to  speak,  and  are  especially 
watched  by  the  censor.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
exercise  of  his  authority  over  respectable  publica- 
tions is  only  nominal.  In  fact  newspapers  and 
l)eriodicals  which  observe  the  common  dictates  of 
decency  and  public  morality  seldom  suffer  from 
the  brush  of  tl  censor.  It  is  seldom  that  news 
items  or  comments  of  a  political  nature  are  sup- 
l)resscd  by  the  authorities.  This  I  can  emphatically 
s;iy  from  my  own  exi)erience.  In  the  earlier  days 
of  my  journalistic  career  in  Japan  I  was  known  as  an 
ultra-radical.  I  still  recall,  with  a  mingled  feeling 
of  anuiscment  and  rej)entance,  tlie  fervent  editorials 
I  contributed  to  an  enterprising  Tokyo  daily,  criti- 
cising in  scathing  terms  the  publicists  and  states- 
men of  the  time.  One  article  was  entitled,  "Let  us 
IJury  Manjuis  Ito  at  Once!"  It  was  interi)reted  by 
many  as  a  downright  instigation  to  assassination. 
And  yet  neither  the  publisher  nor  I  was  molested  by 
the  authorities.  I  cite  this  instance  simply  as  an  in- 
tlication  of  the  real  naUire  of  the  censorship  in  Japan. 
The  trouble  with  foreign  critics  who  complain 
about  the  censorship  in  Japan  lies  in  the  fact  that 
they  are  unable  to  read  Japanese  newspapers.  If 
they  were  they  would  not   have  to  complain.     In 


AMERICAS  ISSUES  WITH  JAPAN 


29 


spite  of  the  censorship,  which  is  as  stupid  as  it  is 
ineffective,  the  Japanese  press  is,  in  every  respect, 
a  mirror  of  pubUc  affairs  and  sentiment.  If  foreign- 
ers cannot  see  much  in  its  reflections  it  is  not  because 
the  mirror  is  defective,  but  In'c-ause  their  eyes  are 
poor.  I  sh  ould  be  surprised  to  learn  of  a  single  nevvs- 
I)aper  in  America  whose  editorial  staff  includes  a 
man  able  to  read  the  Japanese  newspapers. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  metropolitan  newspapers 
in  Japan  employ  more  than  one  writer  well  versed 
in  foreign  languages,  and  especially  in  English.  In 
the  offices  of  such  newspapers  American  newspapers 
and  magazines  are  extensively  read.  And  yet  Japa- 
nese editors  are  far  from  having  an  accurate  estimate 
of  American  opinion  and  sentiment  with  regard  to 
Japan.  How  much  more  diflScult  for  their  American 
brothers  of  the  fourth  estate,  who  do  not  read  Japa- 
nese newspapers,  to  acquire  correct  knowledge  of 
Japanese  affairs!  Let  us,  then,  be  lenient  even 
towards  such  men  as  Mr.  Hearst  and  his  highly 
inventive  lieutenants! 

Only  a  few  words  more  before  concluding  this 
ciiapter.  Mr.  J.  B.  Millet,  a  Boston  publisher, 
spent  five  months  last  year  in  Japan,  He  had  thrice 
visited  Japan  and  was  well  acquainted  with  Japa- 
nese affairs.  While  in  that  country  last  year  lie  made 
an  effort  to  ascertain  the  real  Japanese  sentiment 
towards  America.  The  result  of  that  effort  is  de- 
scribed by  him  in  the  New  York  Times  in  these 
Wolds : 


30 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


"In  order  to  get  at  the  situation,  I  arranged  to 
have  clippings*  of  editorials  or  communications  from 
writers  of  autliority  antagonistic  to  the  United 
States  of  America  cut  from  leading  vernacular  pa- 
pers. I  fully  e.\i)ected  a  fair  crop,  but  from  May  1 
to  the  middle  of  August  I  obtained  none,  after 
which  date  the  Japanese  press  began  to  answer  some 
of  the  attacks  made  in  the  press  of  our  country. 
But  even  then  nothing  ai)peared  that  was  unjusti- 
fied or  could  be  called  belligerent." 

Is  it  not  time  that  American  critics  should  stop 
comijlaining  about  Japanese  hostility  towards  their 
country? 


CHAPTER  III 
IS  AMERICA  PREPARING  AGAINST  JAPAN? 


Japan's  present  naval  strength — America's  present  naval  strength — 
Statistical  table  of  the  two  navies — Analysis  of  the  same — The 
American  navy  three  times  as  powerful  as  the  Japanese  navy — The 
Tokyo  Jiji-Shimpo  on  Japan's  inadequate  naval  programme — 
Japan's  new  five-year  building  programme — America's  new  three- 
year  building  programme — Relative  strength  of  the  American  and 
Japanese  navies  in  1918 — The  British  navy  no  aid  to  Japan  in 
American-Japanese  war — Germany  and  Japan — Physical  impossi- 
bility of  Japanese  invasion  of  Amerira. 

We  have  seen  how  the  apostles  of  preparedness 
have  been  harping  upon  the  string  of  a  Japanese 
menace.  Whether  they  are  sincere  in  playing  the 
role  of  alarmists  we  need  not  determine.  The  sig- 
nificant point  is  that  these  patriots  show  little  dis- 
position to  study  our  troubles  with  Jai)an  or  to 
make  any  sincere  efforts  to  remove  them  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principles  of  justice.  Apparently 
they  believe  that  these  troubles  would  vanish  as 
if  by  magic,  if  we  only  had  a  powerful  army  and  a 
formidable  navy. 

Presuming,  for  argument's  sake,  that  peace  be- 
tween the  two  countries  might  be  maintained  by 
augmenting  American  armament,  how  large  should 
the  navy  of  this  country  be?  Is  the  existing  Ameri- 
can fleet  inadequate  to  coi)e  with  the  existing  squad- 
si 


32 


JAPAN'  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


ron  of  Jjipan?    And  liow  does  Japan's  building  pro- 


ilh  the  ph 


itly 


we  nave  recent 
adopted?  Wo  may  leave  out  ot  consideration  tne 
relative  strength  of  the  armies  of  the  two  countries, 
for  in  u  conflict  between  two  such  nations  separated 
by  an  ocean  almost  C,()00  miles  wide,  the  army,  on 
<ifli(T  side,  however  powerful,  could  not  carry  war 
into  the  other's  country,  unless  it  were  backed  by  a 
tremen(h)us  navy.  In  the  case  of  an  American- 
Jai)anese  war,  therefore,  it  is  the  navy  that  would 
count. 

Speaking  in  broad  terms,  Japan's  existing  fighting 
fleet,  including  craft  now  under  construction,  con- 
sists of  seven  dre;i(lnoujj;hts  (total  tonnage  2U,200) 
including  three  now  under  construction;  four  battle- 
cruisers  (total  tonnage  110,000);  eleven  battleships 
of  the  old  type  (total  tonnage  1G9,1GG) ;  three  armored 
cruisers  (total  toimage  4'2,0J0);  fifty-two  destroyers 
(total  tonnage  30,118),  and  seventeen  submarines. 
All  in  all,  Japan's  fighting  craft  aggregate  572,434 
tons. 

As  against  this  strength,  the  existing  American 
navy,  including  ships  now  under  construction, 
consists  of  nineteen  dreadnoughts  (total  tonnage 
o()3,703);  twenty-four  battleships  (total  tonnage 
.'520,000);  ten  armored  cruisers  (total  tonnage 
U0,180);  fifty-six  destroyers  (total  tonnage  73,097); 
liftv-<me  submarines  and  twenty-two  colliers  (total 
tonnage  23(5.401).  This  makes  a  grand  total  of 
1. '-274,287  tons,  i.  e.,  701,853  tons  more  than  the 


I 


IS  AMERICA  PREPARING  AGAINST  JAPAN? 


.'?;} 


i 
I 


■'i 


Japanese  fleet.  To  show  the  rehitive  .strenjflli  of 
llie  two  Navies  at  a  glance  I  present  the  following 
lable: 


COMPARATIVE  STATISTICS  OF  AMr:aiCA>f  AND  JAPANESE 

IN   I'JIO 


NAVIKS 


American  Navt 

Ctinstrurtffi 
Oklahoma,  ten  14-in.  guas.  .  . 

Nrvada,         .  .  , 

New  Yurk,    "      "    "       "... 

Tfias,  "     

Arkan.wB.  twelve  12-in.  guns. 

WyoiiiiiiK, 

riuri,'  ',  trn  12-in.  guns 21.S25 

I'lali. 21.S25 

Nortli  Dakota,  ten  12-in.  guns.  .   20.000 

Delaware, .    20, (XX) 

S<).  Carolina,  eight  12-in.  gi.ia.      10,000 
.Michigan,  "    .  .    10,000 

Under  Comtruction 

I'enn.'iylvania,  twelve  Hin.  guna  32,.jG7 

Aruona,  32. (XK) 

Califurnia,  32,0(K) 

Miasi.ssippi  32,000 

Iilaho,  32,000 

No.  43,  32.000 

No.  44,  32.000 


Japanese   Navt 
Dreadnocqhts 

Cimstnirtrd 
.  .    27. .500     Kawachi,  twelve  12-in.  guns.  .. 

.  .    27. .'.OO     S<;tt3U, .. 

.  .   27.000     Fuso.  •'       U  "       "   .  .. 

.  .  27,000 
.  .  27,243 
. .   27.243 


30,r.n<) 

3i),iiO() 
30,G(X) 


Under  Conttruttion 

Vamashiro,  twelve  14-in.  guns. 

.  30.000 

Ise, 

.  30.(',IM) 

Iliuga,                " 

.  SO.CIM) 

No.  A. 

.  30,000 

ToUl  Tonnage 503,703 


Total  Tonnaga. 


Battle-Crcisers 

Kongo,  eight  1  l-iu.  gum 

Iliyni, 

No.Nt.  ilaruri^  (under  coustruptiou)  eight  14in.  guns.  . 

Kirishitna  (under  construction)  eight  14-in.  guns 

Total  Tonnage 110,000 

BATTLESHH»S  OF  OLD  TYPE 


.214 

21X1 

27 

.VX) 

27 

,")(K) 

.    27 

.■/0(l 

27 

,'i()0 

For  First  Line 
New  TTampshire,     Vermont, 
Kunsus,  Minnesota, 

Louisiana,  Connt-cticut. 

TulttI,  6  ships,  loQDuge  96,000 


For  First  Line 
Satsuaia.  Aki. 

ToUl,  2  Bhip.%       mage  39,130 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


For  Second  Line  For  Second  Line 

New  Jersey,        VirKinia,               Nebraska,  Kashima,           Katori, 

Khixle  Island,     Georgia.                Maine,  Mikusa,             Asahi, 

Missouri,             Ohio,                    Kentucky,  Shikishima,       Suwo. 

Wisconsin,          Illinois,                Iowa,  Hizen,                Iwami, 

Kearsage,             Kansas,                Alabama,  Fuji. 
Indiana,              Massachusetts,   Oregon. 

Total,  18  ships,  tonnage  iii,906.   Total,  9  ships,  tonnage  130,016 


Cruisers 
Tennessee,     Ibuki, 
Maryland, 
No.  Dakota, 


Kurama,     Ikoma. 


Montana,        North  Carolina, 
Washington,  Colorado, 
Pittsburgh      San  Diego, 
West  Virginia. 

Total,  10  ships,  tonnage  140,180       Total,  3  ships,  tonnage  42,950 

DEaXROYERS 

14  ships  over  1,000  tons  i  ships  over  1.000  tons 

i(i  ships  «(M>-1,000      "  4  ships  (){M)-1,000     " 

10  ships  400-600        "  46  ships  under  400    " 

ToUl.  56  ships,  tonnage  73,097      ToUl,  5*  ships,  tonnage  36,118 


SCBMARINES 


51 


17 


Even  a  cursory  survey  of  the  figures  given  above 
convinces  us  that  the  Mikado's  fighting  fleet  is  far 
inferior  to  the  Amerieiin  fleet.  But  when  we  scruti- 
nize mt)re  ciirefuMy  the  character  and  equipments  of 
the  ships  on  both  sides,  the  discrepancy  becomes 
more  obvious.  In  the  first  phicc,  the  American 
dreadnoughts  are  much  hirger  than  the  Japanese. 
Of  the  American  fleet  the  seven  hirgcst  dreadnoughts 
have  each  a  disphicement  of  3'sJ,500  tons,  while  the 
Japanese   dreadnouglits   are  of   a  displacement   of 


! 


IS  AMERICA  PREPARING  AGAINST  JAPAN? 


35 


30,600  tons  each.  A^rain,  as  against  six  American 
dreadnoughts  of  27,500  tons  each,  Japan  has  only 
four  battle-cruisers  of  the  same  size.  The  two 
battleships  of  Japan  are  of  a  displacement  of  20,800 
tons  each,  whereas  the  United  States  has  two  dread- 
noughts of  27,243  tons  each,  two  of  21,825  tons  each, 
two  of  20,000  tons  each,  two  of  16,000  tons  each, 
and  six  battleships  of  16,000  tons  each.  In  modern 
naval  warfare  the  dreadnought  is  the  cornerstone 
of  a  fighting  fleet.  In  spite  of  the  increasing  eflSciency 
of  the  submarine,  this  theory  has  not  been  altered. 
Not  only  in  point  of  numbers  but  also  in  the  size  of 
each  vessel,  the  American  fleet  of  dreadnoughts  is 
far  superior  to  the  Japanese, 

I  am  fully  aware  that  the  tonnage  of  a  warship 
is  not  the  only,  or  even  the  most  important,  criterion 
of  efficiency.  Much  of  the  fighting  power  of  a  man- 
t)f-war  depends  upon  the  kind  of  guns  with  which 
.she  is  armed.  How  does  ^he  American  Navy  stand 
in  this  respect? 

Of  nineteen  dreadnoughts  or  the  American  Navy, 
five  are  equipped  with  twelve  14-inch  guns,  four 
w'th  ten  14-inch  guns,  two  with  twelve  12-inch  guns, 
four  with  ten  12-inch  guns,  and  two  with  eight  12- 
iiuh  gims.  The  remainmg  two  dreadnoughts  which 
are  now  under  construction  and  which  are  not  yet 
named  will  probably  be  of  the  type  of  the  California 
and  will  be  equipped  with  twelve  14-inch  guns. 

On  the  Japanese  side  there  are  five  dreadnoughts 
equipped  with  twelve  14-inch  guns,  while  two  are 


■i»M 


30 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


equipped  with  twelve  12-inch  guns.  The  Japanese 
battle-cruisers,  four  in  all,  have  each  only  eight 
14-inch  guns. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  fighting  power  of  a  navy 
cannot  be  estimated  by  the  number  of  the  ships  of 
which  it  is  composed.  Much  depends  upon  the 
number  and  the  kind  of  guns  with  which  each  vessel 
is  equipped.  In  point  of  numbers  the  American 
dreadnoughts  are  almost  twice  as  powerful  as  the 
Japanese  dreadnoughts  and  battle-cruisers  com- 
bined, but  when  the  power  of  the  guns  on  both  sides 
is  taken  into  consideration,  the  American  dread- 
noughts are  almost  three  times  as  powerful  as  the 
Japanese. 

Let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  battleships  of 
the  predreadnought  period.  I  have  said  that  Japan 
has  eleven  of  such  ships,  aggregating  1G9,1G6  tons, 
as  against  America's  twenty-four  with  a  total  dis- 
placement of  320,906  tons.  In  the  face  of  these 
figures  the  superiority  of  the  American  fleet  of  battle- 
ships cannot  be  disputed.  Yet  when  it  is  known 
that  only  two  of  eleven  Japanese  battleships  are 
fit  to  stand  in  the  first  line  of  battle  as  against  six 
of  the  American  fleet,  the  inferiority  of  the  Japanese 
navy  becomes  the  more  obvious. 

On  the  American  side  there  are  fifty-six  destroyers, 
and  fifty-two  on  the  Japanese  side.  Here  the  dis- 
crepancy is  not,  prima  facie,  very  great.  But  we 
must  remember  that  the  majority  of  American 
destroyers    are    seagoing,    having    a    displacement 


T 


'^m^:?m 


IS  AMERICA  PREPARING  AGAINST  JAPAN? 


87 


greater  than  800  tons  each,  while  the  Mikado's 
Navy  has  only  six  destroyers  above  800  tons.  Thus 
fifty-six  American  destroyers  have  a  total  displace- 
ment of  73,097  tons,  which  is  more  than  twice  the 
total  tonnage  of  Japan's  fifty-two. 

As  most  of  the  Japanese  destroyers  are  for  the 
purpose  of  coast  defense,  so  are  the  Japanese  sub- 
marines, of  which  there  are  only  seventeen  as  against 
America's  fifty-one.  While  the  Japanese  subma- 
rines are  mostly  not  seagoing,  the  majority  of 
the  American  submarines  are  of  a  large  type  and 
therefore  seagoing. 

Last  but  not  least,  we  must  remember  that  the 
American  navy  has  22  colliers  aggregating  i2.'it),401 
tons,  while  Japan  has  none.  In  a  naval  expedition 
to  distant  waters  the  collier  is  as  important  as  the 
fighting  ship,  for  without  fuel  no  warship  can  move. 
The  Japanese  Navy,  being  intended  to  protect 
Japanese  and  Chinese  waters  and  not  to  carry  war 
to  distant  lands,  is  not  provided  with  attendant 
coaling-ships.  In  case  of  emergency  the  Japanese 
Navy  requisitions  merchant  ships  for  colliers,  a  use 
for  which  they  are  of  course  decidedly  unsatis- 
factory. 

So  much  for  the  existing  naval  strength  of  Japan 
as  compared  with  that  of  the  United  States.  We 
have  seen  how  insignificant  the  Jai)anese  fleet  is 
beside  the  American  Armada.  And  yet  this  is  the 
fleet  which  has  constantly  been  held  up  by  the 
yellow  journals  and  demagogues  as  the  force  which 


'IP 


^^r^P^^^Pl^^!^S!!^"f^SE 


38 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


the  Mikado  will 


send  across  the 


e  hnc  morning 
Pacific  to  attack  the  fair  coast  of  California! 

But  the  Japanese,  we  arp  told,  are  feverishly 
engaged  in  building  new  warships.  The  fact  is  that 
Japan's  building  programme  has  never  been  un- 
necessarily great.  True,  measured  by  her  financial 
strength  she  may  have  seemed  extravagant.  But 
viewed  in  the  light  of  the  great  dangers  she  has  had 
to  face  and  of  the  tremendous  rate  at  which  Western 
powers  have  been  arming  themselves,  her  naval 
programme  has  been  characterized  by  moderation. 
Has  it  vwr  dawned  upon  the  average  American 
that  as  early  as  1!)()7  the  American  Navy  was  twice 
as  pcnvcrlul  as  the  Japanese?  In  the  two  years  that 
followed  America  launched  six  dreadnoughts,  while 
Japan  launched  only  three.  The  result  was  that 
by  1!)10  the  United  States  had  a  fleet  of  warships 
three  tiines  as  powerful  as  the  Mikado's  fleet,  and 
this  ratio  has  ever  since  been  maintained. 

It  is  significant  that  while  alarmists  are  raising 
hyslcrical  cries  about  the  alleged  rapid  expansion 
of  the  Japanese  Navy,  Japan's  naval  critics  are 
deeply  <l«>ploring  the  utterly  "unprepared"  condi- 
tion of  their  country.  As  an  instance  of  their  lamen- 
tations I  (luote  the  following  passage  from  a  series 
of  ten  articles  written  by  the  naval  expert  of  the 
Jiji-shimpo,  assuredly  the  most  reliable  newspaper 
in  Japan: — 

"It  is  regrettable  that  while  other  Powers  have 
each   been   pursiiin.g   a   tlefinite    naval   p»)liey,   our 


IS  AMERICA  PREPARING  AGAINST  JAPAN? 


39 


J 


Navy  should  be  permitted  to  drift  with  no  precon- 
ceived plan.  The  United  States  adopted  as  early 
as  October  19,  1903,  the  principle  which  is  in  reality 
the  foundation  of  the  stupendous  naval  programme 
formulated  by  Secretary  Daniels.  Accordinj,'  to  the 
programme  of  1903  the  United  States  was  to  build 
thirty-four  dreadnoughts  in  seventeen  years, 

"Turning  to  Europe  we  see  that  Germany  adopted 
a  naval-repletion  programme  in  1907,  Russia  in  1911, 
France  in  1912,  Italy  in  1910,  and  Austria  in  WU. 
In  the  meantime  we  were  lagging  hopelessly  lu'liiiul 
these  Powers.  When  at  last  we  awakened  to  our 
own  sluggishness  and  decided  upon  a  programme 
last  year  (1915),  it  was  only  on  a  ridiculously  small 
scale." 

In  these  two  paragraphs  is  expressed  the  universal 
feeling  of  uneasiness  which  the  Japanese  entertain 
over  what  they  consider  the  aggressive  naval  policies 
of  the  powers  of  Europe  and  America.  Let  us, 
then,  study  Japan's  new  naval  programme  which  the 
Jiji-shimpo's  naval  expert  tells  us  is  "of  a  ridiculously 
small  scale,"  and  compare  it  with  the  great  pro- 
gramme adopted  by  Congress  in  August,  1916. 

The  Japanese  programme,  adopted  in  September, 
1915,  by  the  National  Defense  Council,  calls  for  the 
construction,  in  the  six  years  from  1916  to  1921,  of 
three  dreadnoughts,  six  cruisers,  ten  destroyers, 
and  nine  submarines.  For  the  execution  of  this 
programme  Japan  is  to  expend  $85,000,000  in  five 
vearlv  installments. 


"3iiwag*i«' 


40 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Beside  this  modest  programme  the  American 
programme  looms  menacingly  like  a  giant.  It  calls 
for  the  building  of  ten  dreadnoughts,  six  battle- 
cruisers,  ten  scout  cruisers,  fifty  destroyers,  nine 
ocean-going  submarines,  eighty-five  coastwise  sub- 
marines, one  Neff  system  submarine,  two  gunboats, 
one  hospital  ship,  two  destroyer  tenders,  three  oil 
supply  ships,  two  munition  supply  ships,  one  sub- 
marine tender,  one  transport,  and  one  repair  ship. 

In  addition  to  this,  enormous  appropriations'  are 
made  for  speeding  up  the  completion  of  the  ships 
already  under  construction  ($115,000,000);  for  the 
equipment  of  the  navy  yards  for  ship  building 
($18,000,000);  for  the  increase  of  ordnance  and  for 
the  fitting  of  merchantmen  and  other  auxiliaries 
($57,000,000; ;  for  the  enlargement  of  the  submarine 
base  at  New  London,  Connecticut;  for  aviation 
($6,000,000);  for  the  construction  of  government 
munition  factories  ($1,500,000);  for  the  construction 
of  government  steel  plants  ($11,000,000);  for  the 
storage  of  ammunition  and  torpedoes,  mines,  pro- 
jectiles and  other  materials. 

All  told,  the  Navy  will  have  expended  about 
two  billion  dollars  when  the  three-year  plan  has 
been  fully  carried  out. 

With  these  figures  before  us  let  us  picture  the 
relative  strength  of  the  Japanese  and  American 
navies  at  the  end  of  the  hscal  year  1918  when  the 
American  programme  will  have  been  carried  into 
execution.     By  that  time  only  half  of  Japan's  five- 


IS  AMERICA  PREPARING  AGAINST  JAPAN?  41 

year  programme  will  have  been  carried  out,  but  let 
us  presume,  for  the  sake  of  expediting  comparison, 
that  it  had  been  completed  at  the  same  time  as  our 
three-year  programme.  Then  the  relative  position 
of  the  two  Navies  would  be  as  follows: — 

America        Japan 

DreadnoughU ^  ^ 

Battle-cruisers ^ 

Battleships ^  " 

Cruisers *®  ® 

Destroyers *^  ^ 

Submarines ^*^  ^ 

Fuel  ships **  ° 

In  the  foregoing  table  we  have  left  out  of  con- 
sideration minor  ships  such  as  gunboats,  hospital 
ships,  ammunition  and  repair  ships  with  which 
Japan  is  ill  supplied.  It  must  also  be  noted  that 
two; American  ships  which  are  at  present  classified 
as  dreadnoughts  and  two  Japanese  ships  likewise 
so  designated  are,  in  the  table  above,  counted  among 
battleships,  because  by  1921  they  will  have  become 
too  old  and  out-of-date  to  be  called  dreadnoughts. 

A  glance  at  the  table  shows  that  the  American 
fleet  will  be  more  than  twice  as  powerful  as  the 
Japanese.  But  as  I  have  already  said,  the  American 
ships  are  equipped  with  a  larger  number  of  more 
powerful  guns  than  are  the  Japanese  vessels.  Then, 
too,  the  majority  of  American  destroyers  and  sub- 
marines are  seagoing,  while  the  Japanese  destroyers 
and  submarines,  except  a  few,  are  all  intended  for 
coast  defense.     Moreover,  the  American  Navy  has 


42 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


the  aclvanta^'o  over  the  Japanese  in  that  its  ships 
are  ('quii)|M'(l  with  the  most  advancefl  electrical 
devices,  and  also  in  that  it  has  a  large  number  of 
the  most  uf)-to-(late  auxiliary  ships  such  as  fuel-oil 
sliips,  repair  siiips,  hospital  and  ammunition  ships. 
When  all  these  conditions  are  taken  into  considera- 
tion, it  becomes  evident  that  the  American  Armada, 
built  in  pursuance  of  the  Adnunistration  profjramme, 
will  be  almost  four  times  as  powerful  as  the  Japanese 
Navy,  Heretofore,  the  boast  of  the  Japanese  Xavy, 
if  it  really  had  anything  to  boast  of,  has  been  its 
battle-cruisers,  combin.iig  the  fighting  power  of 
the  dreadnought  with  the  swift  movement  of  the 
cruiser.  In  fact  the  quick  movement  of  Japanese 
battle-cruisers  during  the  war  with  Russia  sur- 
prised the  enemy.  Since  then  the  naval  Powers  of 
Europe  have  followed  Japan's  example  and  have 
been  building  powerful  fleets  of  battle-cruisers. 
Strange  to  say,  America  has  been  slow  in  following 
suit,  and  has  been  building  only  battleships  of  the 
dreadnought  type.  But  now  the  American  Navy 
has  awakened  to  its  deficiency  in  this  j)articular 
respect,  and,  in  the  new  progranmie,  six  battle- 
cruisers  are  providetl  for. 

When  the  American  naval  programme  was  first 
proposed  by  Secretary  Daniels,  in  1!)15,  its  execu- 
tion was  to  have  extended  over  five  years.  Since 
then  the  rapiil  developments  of  the  German  situa- 
tion obliged  Congress  and  the  Administration  to 
shorten  the  period  to  three  years. 


IS  AMERICA  PREPARIN(i  AGAINST  JAPAN?  43 

We  liavo  scon  that  Tapan's  naval  strength  has 
always  been  mueh  smaller  than  that  of  the  United 
Stafcs,  and  that  in  a  lew  years  Japan  will  be  lapging 
far  behind  America  in  the  matter  of  naval  prepared- 
ness. This  is  the  "navalism"  of  Japan— the  specter 
which  certain  publicists  and  editors  have  been 
studiously  exploiting  for  tlie  purpose  of  furthering 
the  certain  ends  they  are  eager  to  attain. 

Those  who  fear  c  pretc.id  to  fear  Japan's  "na- 
valism" point  to  thi  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  and 
warn  that  in  the  event  of  rupture  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  would  throw 
the  whole  weight  of  her  great  Navy  on  the  Japanese 
side  of  the  scale.  These  wiseacres  are  ignorant 
that  Great  Britain  has  entered  into  a  general  arbitra- 
tion treaty  with  this  country  and  thit  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  contains  the  following  provision: 

"Should  either  High  (  ontracting  Party  conclude 
a  Treaty  of  G«'neral  Arbitration  with  a  third  Power, 
it  is  agreed  that  nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall 
entail  upon  such  Contracting  Party  an  obligation 
to  go  to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  sui  h  '.reaty 
of  Arbitration  is  in  force." 

Even  in  the  absence  of  such  a  clause  of  exemption 
the  Japanese  know  that  England  would  not  un- 
sheathe the  sword  to  aid  them  in  their  combat  with 
America.  In  another  chapter  I  shall  fully  discuss 
Japan's  relationship  with  England. 

There  are  superficial  observers  who  apprehend 
that  Germanv.   America's  avowed  enemy   to-day. 


K'l! 


H 


44 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


will,  in  the  not  distant  future,  join  hands  with  Japan 
to  the  Krcat  danger  of  the  Vnitod  States.  These 
men  fail  to  see  that  the  monient  (Jcniiany  becomes 
Japan's  ally,  Enf,'land  will  become  an  enemy  of  the 
latter  Power,  and  will,  in  the  event  of  war  between 
the  United  States  on  the  one  hand  and  Japan  and 
Germany  on  the  other,  come  to  the  assistance  of 
this  country  with  the  prowess  of  her  entire  navy, 
thus  making  German  aid  to  Japan  in  such  a  war 
virtually  ineffectual.  In  another  chapter  I  shall 
dwell  at  length  on  the  future  relations  between 
Germany  and  Japan. 

I  hitve  shown  that  the  Mikado's  Navy  is  far  too 
weak  to  coi)e  with  the  American  Navy,  It  would  be 
superfluous  to  dwell  upon  the  geographical  diffi- 
culties which  Japan  would  have  to  surmount,  if 
they  are  surmountable,  in  waging  an  aggressive 
war  against  America.  I  may,  however,  touch  upon 
this  particular  phase  of  the  problem  by  <iuotiug  a 
Japanese  naval  officer,  a  veteran  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war.  Early  in  1910,  when  Captain  Hobson 
and  Mr.  Hearst  were  diligently  applying  themselves 
to  the  task  of  creating  a  ghost  out  of  Japanese  de- 
signs upon  Magdalena  Bay,  I  was  in  Washington, 
and  talked  with  Commander  Tokutaro  Hiraga, 
then  naval  attache  of  the  Japanese  embassy.  The 
conunander,  who  was  usually  reticent,  waxed  almost 
eloquent  when  our  conversation  turned  to  Mr.  Hob- 
son's  prediction  of  a  war  between  Japan  and  Amer- 
ica, and  expressed  himself  very  freely  on  the  im- 


IS  AMERICA  PREPARING  AGAINST  JAPAN? 


45 


possibility  of  surh  a  war.  EmphusizinR  the  <liffi- 
ciilty  of  protecting  transports  on  a  long  voyage, 
he  siiid: — 

"During  the  Russian  war  Japan  had  a  fleet  of 
warships  guarding  the  six  transports  employed  in 
carrying  troops  and  ammunitions  across  the  straits 
of  Korea,  only  eighty  miles  wide.  Yet  two  of  these 
transports  were  attacked  and  sunk  by  three  Russian 
cruisers,  ^^^lat  would  happen  if  we  tried  to  con- 
vey a  fleet  of  transports  across  the  Pacific  to  a  point 
.")  JOO  miles  away?  To  transport  a  real  army  across 
the  ocean  we  would  have  to  impress  every  steamer 
afloat  in  our  waters.  Has  it  ever  occurred  to  you 
that  a  steamer  can  carry  only  fifty  soldiers  per  100 
tons  of  displacement?  It  is  3,455  miles  from  Japan 
to  Hawaii,  and  2,288  miles  more  from  Hawaii  to 
San  Francisco.  Even  a  Hercules  would  not  be  so 
reckless  as  to  attempt  an  invasion  of  California  with 
such  an  inadequate  navy  as  ours." 

But  why  quote  a  Japanese,  and  a  Japanese  naval 
officer  at  that,  on  such  a  question?  Have  the  Amer- 
icans bitn  influenced  so  thoroughly  by  the  prophets 
of  evil  and  the  propagandists  of  alarm  that  no  Japan- 
ese counsel,  however  sane,  can  hope  to  penetrate 
their  ears? 


CHAPTER  IV 
LAND  HUNGER 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  IMMIGRATION 

QUESTION 

Caucasian  monopoly  of  land — Expropriation  of  Asiatics — Exclusive 
policy  of  the  Caucasians— The  Anf.'lo-Saxon  priority  in  the  rac-e 
for  colonics — Colonial  statistics  of  the  Powers — Density  of  popula- 
tion of  various  countries — Kfjuitahle  distribution  of  land  or  frw 
migration,  the  logical  remedy — President  Wilson's  world  Monroe 
Doctrine  no  salvation  of  Asia. 

Of  the  various  questions  which  threaten  to  wax 
into  serious  issues  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  that  of  Japanese  immigration  to  America 
demands  our  first  attention.  But  before  entering 
into  the  details  of  this  particular  question  it  is  im- 
portant to  take  a  broad  view  of  the  background 
upon  which  it  stands  out  conspicuously.  This  calls 
for  a  brief  consideration  of  the  question  of  "land 
monopoly  and  land  hunj,'er,"  or  the  question  of  the 
distribution  of  the  world's  habitable  surface  among 
the  various  nations  or  races. 

Ti'iie  was  when  Asia  belonged  to  Asiatics,  Europe 
to  Europeans,  and  the  Amtricas  and  other  conti- 
nents and  islands  to  their  respective  natives.  With 
the  art  of  navigation  developing  info  a  high  degree 
of  efticicncy,  all  this  has  become  a  thing  of  the  past. 

46 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  IMMIGRATION  QUESTION    47 

The  more  nrogressive  and  aggressive  Europeans 
were  the  \  to  embark  upon  a  career  of  explora- 
tion and  I  iiest.  The  result  is  that  to-day  almost 
nine-tenth,  o!  the  world's  land  area  is  occupied  or 
controlled  by  the  European  or  Caucasian  race. 

Roughly  speaking,  the  land  area  of  the  earth 
measures  52,825,000  square  miles  supporting 
1,751,700,000  inhabitants. 

Of  this  total  area  the  Caucasian  peoples  occupy  or 
control  about  46,146,084  square  miles,  comprising 
Europe  (minus  Turkey);  North  and  South  America; 
Africa  (minus  Liberia  and  Abyssinia);  Australasia; 
and  Asia  (minus  China,  Japan,  Mongolia,  Tibet, 
Chinese  Turkestan,  middle  and  northern  Manchuria, 
Persia,  Siam,  Afghanistan  and  other  minor  countr,  s 
which  are  not  yet  controlled  by  European  nations). 
It  will  be  seen  that  the  Caucasian  race,  having 
completed  the  occupation  of  Europe  and  the  Ameri- 
cas, has  conquered  and  secured  control  of  the  whole 
of  Australasia,  almost  all  Africa,  the  greater  part 
of  Asia,  as  well  as  the  adjacent  islands. 

And  the  Caucasian  peoples  who  control  so  vast  a 
territory  number  only  623,000,000.  In  other  words, 
there  are  13.5  Caucasians  to  each  square  mile  of  land. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  native  population  of  Asia 
number  no  less  than  900,000,000.  And  yet  they 
control  only  6,679,000  square  miles  of  territory, 
because  Siberia  and  Turkestan  are  occupied  by 
Russia,  India  by  Great  Britain,  and  Tonking  and 
Cochin    China    by    France,    while   Tibet,    Chinese 


46 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Turkestan,  Mongolia,  and  Northern  Manchuria, 
aggregating?  2,()55,0()0  square  miles  are  fast  passing 
under  British  or  Russian  control.  In  other  words, 
there  are  l.'34.8  Asiatics  to  each  square  mile  of 
Asiatic  land. 

It  may,  therefore,  be  .safely  said  that  Asia's 
000,000,000  .souls  have  been  expropriated  of  most 
of  their  territory  and  are  to-day  permitted  to  po.s- 
sess  only  6,079.000  square  miles.  This,  of  course, 
does  not  mean  that  Asiatics  have  been  evicted  from 
the  Asiatic  territories  controlled  by  Europeans,  and 
that  900,000,000  people  are  actually  compelled  to 
live  within  the  area  of  6,679,000  square  miles,  i.  e., 
134.8  to  the  square  mile. 

True  it  is  that  the  natives  of  Asia  are  permitted  to 
continue  their  habitation  in  India,  Cochin  China, 
Siberia  and  other  Asiatic  territories  which  have 
passed  under  the  European  scepter.  But  the  fact 
remains  that  Asiatic  nations  are,  by  this  process 
of  expropriation,  deprived  of  the  opportunity  to 
utilize  the  vast  resources  lying  at  their  very  doors. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Caucasian  na- 
tions are  always  on  the  alert  to  exclude  outside 
enterprises,  and  especially  those  of  non-Caucasian 
p<»oples,  from  the  territories  they  control.  Even 
where  they  jjrofoss  to  follow  the  i)rinciples  t)f  free 
trade,  they  set  up  a  barrici-  against  non-Caucasian 
inunignilion.  Moreover,  by  reason  of  their  priority 
and  their  accunuilated  wealth,  they  have  .so  firmly 
intrenched   themselves  that  outsiders,  most  of  all 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  IMMIGRATION  QUESTION   49 

non-Caucasian  outsiders,  find  little  chance  to  launch 
new  enterprises  in  competition  with  them. 

It  cannot  be  disputed  that  colonies,  sparsely 
populated  yet  rich  with  resources,  are  valuable 
assets  to  a  nation  with  small,  over-populated  terri- 
tory. They  relieve  the  mother  country  in  two  ways — 
they  afTord  shelter  to  its  surplus  popul  'ion,  and 
they  enable  it  to  support  its  population  at  home 
more  adequately  by  reason  of  the  stimulation  and 
increase  which  their  products  naturally  offer  to  its 
commerce  and  industry. 

It  was  the  good  luck  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  to 
gather  in  its  lap  most  of  the  desirable  colonies  in 
the  world.  Those  European  nations  that  came 
after  it  in  the  race  for  colonial  expansion,  have  had 
to  be  contented  with  territories  whose  value  is  often 
doubtful.  And  the  Asiatic  nations,  which  came  still 
later,  not  only  cannot  find  any  oversea  territory 
available  for  colonization,  but  have  liad  to  offer 
their  own  lands  upon  the  altar  of  Western  ambition. 

Let  us  compare  the  areas  and  populations  of  the 
territories  of  the  various  colonial  nations. 

Population 

Population  Per  Sq.  Mile 

4j.(H)(),W)0  370  8 

.SM,5()(),0<K)  .'11   0 

4(t,0<K),(KK)  l!).*}   I 

48.(KK),(MK)  10  0 

1W,550.70<)  65  7 

57.449.S<K)  8  4 

.S5,()0().00()  316  S 

^.(H)(),(K)0  S.S 


Area 
Great  Britain Hl.^U 

Colonics W.0i«t.4;>.> 

France   t«"7.0.U 

Colonies 4,77(>,(>.'i< 

Hu^siii  Proper l,8Cii,.')i4 

Colonies 6.78.-..13;i 

July lI(t.6W 

Colonies 596.000 


i 

\ 


60  JAPAN  1\  WORLD  POLITICS 

Population 

Area  Population       Per  Sq.  Mile 

Belgium ll.'nS  7.500,000  6o9  4 

Colonies 9(M),(K)0  15.000,000                 16  6 

PortUBiil 35,490  6.000,000  169  0 

Colonics 83^,^67  9.^00,000                  110 

Germany 208.780  a5,000,(KK)  310  8 

Clonics I,(«7.8i0  14.000.000                  13  6 

Holland    1^.648  6,(XX),000  474  3 

Colonics 1,046.445  37,0(K).(K)0                 35.3 

rnit<-<l  States  .3.027,000  92.000,0(K)                 310 

Colonies 721.000  10,(XH).000                  14  6 

Spain 19(».O50  20,000,0(M)  105  2 

Colonies 90,.561  1,000,000                   11.0 

Japan  Proper 148,756  52,985,423  356. 1 

Colonies 95.700  15,100.000  187.0 

Leaving  colonies  out  of  consideration,  Belgium, 
with  it.s  (>.)!)  inhal)itunt.s  to  the  square  mile,  is  the 
most  (IcMsely  populated  country,  followed  by  Hol- 
land and  England.  Japan,  Italy,  Germany  and 
France  come  next  in  the  order  named. 

But  these  European  countries  have  each  exten- 
.sive  colonies,  which  cither  afford  room  for  a  large 
population  to  alleviate  congestion  at  home,  or  store 
al)undant  natural  resources  to  be  utiUzed  for  the 
luMU'fit  of  the  home  population. 

Thus  England,  whose  home  territory  has  to  sup- 
port :57()  people  per  s(|uare  mile,  possesses  vast 
colonies  totaling  1^2.(^24,4;J5  s<iuare  miles,  from 
which  all  Asiatics  are  most  strictly  excluded,  though 
their  ijopulation  nuinhcr  but  iU  to  the  s<|uare  mile. 
In  addition  to  these  enormous  oversea  i)ossessions 
England  has  established  vast  "spheres  of  influence" 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  IMMIGRATION  QUESTION    51 

in  Tibet  (463,000  square  miles)  and  in  the  Yangste 
valley  (578,000  square  miles)  running  through  mid- 
China.  From  these  spheres  it  is  England's  obvious 
intention  and  practice  to  bar  outside  enterprises. 

Again  Belgium,  though  most  densely  populated 
at  home,  has  colonies  totaling  000,000  square  miles, 
harboring  only  IG  inhabitants  to  the  square  mile. 
Holland,  the  second  mo^t  crowded  country  in  the 
world,  has  greater    olonics  than  Belgium. 

On  the  other  hand,  Japan,  whose  home  land  shel- 
ters 356  people  per  square  mile,  has  just  recently 
acquired  95,700  square  miles  of  colonial  territories. 
But  these  territories  are  already  thickly  populated — 
having  187  inhabitants  per  square  mile. 

Germany  has  been  clamoring  for  a  "place  in  the 
sun,"  yet  she  had  before  the  present  war  already 
brought  under  her  flag  more  than  a  million  stjuare 
miles  of  colonial  lands,  averaging  only  13  people  to 
the  square  mile. 

Russia,  whose  home  land  measures  as  much  as 
l,86'-2,000  square  miles,  supporting  only  12-2,550,000 
people,  or  65  to  the  square  mile,  has  already  won 
<),785,000  square  miles  of  thinly  populated  terri- 
tories, and  is  still  eager  to  expand  at  the  expense 
of  China  and  Japan.  Are  not  Mongolia  (1,368,000 
square  miles),  Chinese  Turkestan  (550,000  square 
miles),  and  three-fourths  of  Manchuria  ('273,000 
square  miles)  being  gradually  added  to  th.'  map  of 
Russia? 

Here,  in  a  nutshell,  is  a  condition  which  should 


'  il 


52 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


not  be  ignored  in  any  consideration  of  international 
problems  affect inj,'  the  peoples  of  Asia.  It  is  obvious 
that  the  great  Powers  of  the  West  have  accumulated 
more  land  than  tiiey  should  rightly  own— than 
they  can  hold  without  doing  injustice  to  the  smaller 
nations,  which  find  themselves  in  sad  plight,  due 
to  the  impossibility  of  finding  room  for  their 
surplus  population.  The  injustice  of  holding  such 
vast  territories  would  not  be  so  obvious,  if  they 
were  to  recognize,  in  favor  of  the  small  nations,  the 
principle  of  unhindered  immigration  and  of  un- 
restricted enterprise  within  those  territories.  It  is 
when  they  erect  insurmountable  walls  around  them- 
selves and  adopt  a  hidebound  policy  of  exclusion 
that  they  become  a  menace  to  the  welfare  of  the 
human  race. 

It  seems  to  me  apparent  that  any  proposition 
for  permanent  peace  which  fails  to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  present  inequitable  distribution  of 
territory,  (  nnot  be  carried  out  without  trampling 
upon  the  just  claims  of  the  smaller  nations.  An 
attempt  to  build  permanent  peace  upon  the  status 
quo  of  the  world  seems  as  futile  as  an  attempt  to 
rear  a  tower  of  Babel  upon  a  foundation  of  sands. 

A  pacifist  prt)granime  for  permanent  peace  and 
disarmament  nmst,  if  it  is  not  to  infringe  upon 
justice,  presuppose  a  radical  alteration  of  the  status 
quo  of  the  world  wliich  we  have  briefly  described. 
To  permit,  on  the  one  hand,  the  c<»ntiiuiation  of 
the  existing  stale  of  the  distribution  of  territory. 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  IMMIGRATION  QIESTION    53 

and  to  urge,  on  the  other  hand,  the  adoption  of 
the  pacifist  programme  of  disarmament,  arbitration, 
and  permanent  peace,  is  to  offer  a  jewel,  too  precious 
to  be  of  any  practical  value,  to  those  small  nations 
which  are  crying  for  bread.  Such  a  proposition 
will  simply  benefit  the  great  Powers  of  the  West 
which  have  built  up  great  empires  of  territory  and 
wealth  partly  at  the  expense  of  the  weaker  peoples 
of  the  East,  and  partly  by  reason  of  their  priority 
in  the  race  for  colonial  expansion. 

And  yet  any  proposition  to  alter  the  status  quo 
along  the  line  I  have  suggested  would  at  once  be 
condemned  by  the  opulent,  contenteo  Powers  as  a 
disturbance  of  the  peace.  In  their  eyes  a  small 
nation  that  should  dare  raise  a  finger  against  the 
present  order  of  things  would  be  a  disturbing  ele- 
ment, a  rebel  and  an  outlaw.  When  American  edi- 
tors and  writers  censure  Japan's  recent  activities  in 
China  they  seem  unwittingly  to  adopt  the  set 
views  of  the  great  Governments  of  Europe  whose 
interests  can  best  be  served  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  existing  equilibrium  in  the  Far  East. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  programme  to  establish  per- 
manent peace  with  justice  should  contain  one  of 
two  propositions,  namely,  a  more  eciuitable  distri- 
bution of  territory,  or  the  removal  of  the  exclusive 
policy  adopted  by  Western  colonial  Powers  against 
Asiatic  peoples. 

To  the  staid  thinkers  of  the  Occident  this  must 
seem  a  picturesque  and  Quixotic  proposition.     It 


ill 
\W 


54 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


is  no  more  picturesque  than  were  Socialism  and 
trade  unionism  at  tlioir  inception.  Just  as  the 
economic  theories,  which  were,  less  than  a  century 
ago,  denounced  as  visionary  and  perverted,  have 
since  gradually  hcen  woven  into  the  practical  policies 
of  various  nations,  so  the  above  proposition  will 
in  time  he  seriously  considered,  not  only  by  thinkers 
and  theorists,  but  by  practical  n'.en  of  affairs  in 
all  parts  of  the  world.  Unless  we  make  supreme 
efforts  to  realize  this  ideal  we  can  take  but  one 
alternative — the  perpetuation  of  the  savage  "law 
of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,"  which  is  equivalent 
to  the  Bismarckian  axiom,  "  Might  is  right." 

It  was  a  noble  speech  which  President  Wilson 
delivered  to  the  Senate  on  January  22,  1017,  on 
the  outlook  of  peace  in  Europe.  Among  the  lofty 
utterances,  with  which  it  is  replete,  the  following 
demands  our  particular  attention: 

"I  am  i)roposing,  as  it  were,  that  the  nations 
should  with  one  accord  adopt  the  doctrine  of  Presi- 
dent Monroe  as  the  doctrine  of  the  world:  That  no 
nation  should  .seek  to  extend  its  policy  over  any 
other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every  people  should 
be  left  free  to  determine  its  own  policy,  its  own  way 
of  development,  unhindered,  unthreatened,  un- 
afraid, the  little  along  with  the  great  and  powerful." 

Entertaining  profound  respect  for  the  courage  of 
con\  iction  which  prompted  him  to  utter  these  words, 
we  nuist  nevertheless  confess  our  doubt  as  to  whether 
our  Chief  Executive  took  into  consideration  such 


i 

I 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  IMMIGRATION  QUESTION    55 

urgent  lut-ds  of  the  small  nations  as  we  have  de- 
scribed.    We  fear  that  the  adoption  of  a  Monroe 
Doctrine  will  furnish  no  adeijuale  remedy  for  the 
ills  from   which   these  nations  are  sufTerin^'.     For 
such  a  great  country  as  the  United  States  which  i  - 
practically    self-sufficient    and    recpiires   no   outside 
Held  of  aJtivity,  it  is  all  very  well  to  adopt  a  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  advise  other  nations  to  follow  suit. 
But  what  relief  does  it  offer  to  over-crowded  small 
nations?      Am  I  wrong  in  saying  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  as  advocated  by  American  publicists  of 
these  latter  days,  is  essentially  a  selfish  doctrine 
which  ignores  the  crying  needs  and  the  moral  rights 
of    the    small    countries    whose    teeming    millions, 
choking  from  lack  of  land,  are  forbidden  to  seek 
opportunity  in  rich  and  thinly  populated  territories 
of  which  the  world  has  plenty?    May  we  not  hope 
that  President  Wilson  will  go  a  step  further  and  lay 
down  a  more  fundamental  proposition  which  will 
offer   greater   encouragement    and   consolation     to 
the    weaker    nations    not    only    of    Europe    but 
of    A.>ia?     Such    a   proposition,   coming  from    the 
lips   of   the   illustrious    Executive  of   a   great  Re- 
public, would  at  least  have  the  merit  of  awaken- 
ing the  dormant  conscience  of  the  nations  and  of 
setting  the  minds  of  men  thinking  in  the  right  direc- 
tion, even  if  it  should  have  no  chance  of  reaUzation 
in  any  measurable  future. 


I'W 


CHAPTER  V 


JAPANESE   IMMIGRATION   TO   AMERICA 

How  Japan  will  solve  the  population  prohlcin— Rale  of  iticrrase  of 
Japanese  iM)pulation — Territoriis  nvailuble  for  Japuiifse  lininiKra- 
tion— Japan  not  to  embarrass  Kii^Iand  uml  Aiiuriia — The  "gonlle- 
mcn's  aKrciinenf — Its  effect  upon  Japanese  imrni>fration— Reasons 
for  reeent  inerease  of  Japanese  iminijrration— The  "picture  bride" — 
Japanese  marriage  custom — Statistics  of  "picture  brides"  Japan 
and  the  new  immigration  law — Japans  real  contention— 11  ;is  the 
l'nit«Hl  States  the  right  to  discriminate  against  the  Jap.mese? — 
Hawaii  and  the  Pacific  coast— Ami-ricans  in  Mawiiii  confident  of 
assimilating  Japanese — Japanese  immigration  compared  with  Chi- 
nese immigration. 

In  painting,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  broad 
background  to  the  outstanding  question  of  Japanese 
emigration  to  America  I  have  incidentally  suggested 
what  may  be  termed  its  fundamental  solution — a 
solution  applicable  to  all  countries  congested  with 
population.  I  am,  however,  fully  aware  that  such 
a  solution  cannot  be  adopted  in  any  measurable 
future.  Centuries,  perhaps,  will  have  ela[)sed  before 
the  nations  are  ready  to  give  .seriotis  consideration 
to  a  plan  looking  toward  such  a  radical  alteration 
of  the  status  quo  as  I  have  indicated. 

The  sentiments  expressed  in  the  foregoing  chapter 
.should  not,  therefore,  be  construed  as  a  demand 
for  an  immediate  accounting  upon  the  part  of  the 
gr«>at   colonial    Powers.      Rather,   they   are   merely 

5G 


JAPANESE  IMMIGRATION  TO  AMERICA 


57 


meant  to  point  out  tl'.e  obvious  inequity  permitted 
under  existing  world  eonditions,  and  to  blaze  the 
path  along  which  we  may  march  towards  the  goal  of 
permanent  peace. 

As  for  Japan,  she  will  certainly  endeavor  to  solve 
her  diflicult  problem  of  surplus  population  without 
submitting  to  her  Western  friends  any  such  radical 
plan  as  I  have  suggested. 

In  striving  to  adjust  her  population  problem 
within  the  limits  of  her  own  resourees  and  without 
causing  embarrassments  to  the  Powers  of  Europe 
and  America,  Japan  must  foll.»w  two  lines  of  action: 
first,  she  must  exploit  the  resources  of  Hokkaido, 
Korea  and  South  ISIanchuria,  and  secondly,  she 
must  develop  her  industry  and  foreign  commerce 
as  well  as  her  ocean  traffic. 

During  the  past  half  century  the  population  of 
Japan  proper  has  luen  increasing  at  the  rate  of 
400,000  per  year.  In  other  words,  where  there  were 
M3,000,000  Jrpanese  fifty  years  ago,  there  are  to-day 
about  5S,000,000. 

As  the  total  area  of  Japan  proper  measures  about 
148,756  sciuare  miles,  the  density  of  population  is 
about  356  per  square  mile.  „,,    .,      ,, 

If  we  leave  out  of  consideration  Hokkaido,  the 
northern  island  which  is  yet  sparsely  peopled,  the 
density  increases  to  451  per  stiuare  mile.  In  other 
words,  110.^212  square  miles  of  three  of  the  four 
islands  constituting  Japan  proper  represent  the  area 
demanding  relief  from  congestion. 


ri 


•  I..; 


MICROCOPY    RESOLUTION    TEST    CHART 

ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No    2 


1.0 


I.I 


141  ||2.8 

i»  m 

2.2 
2.0 

t  m 

.8 


1.25 


1.4 


1.6 


^     APPLIED  I^^^GE 


'^"i}    East    Ma.r    "-jtreet 
omester.    New    von.         '*6C9 
"^'6)    .^82  -  0300  -  Phone 
^16:'    288  -  ^j.98^  -   Tai, 


58 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


The  first  available  territory  for  the  solution  of  the 
question  is  the  island  of  Hokkaido  just  mentioned. 
Hokkaido  is,  of  course,  very  small,  measuring  only 
30,275  square  miles.  Moreover,  it  is  traversed  by 
mountain  ranj^es,  while  its  winters  are  severe  and 
protracted.  Making  due  allowance  for  its  limitations, 
the  territory  is  capable  of  supporting  at  least  five 
times  its  present  population,  which  is  estimated  at 
2,200,000. 

The  second  territory  available  for  colonization  is 
Korea.  This  newly  annexed  territory  has  an  area  of 
8(5,000  square  miles,  with  a  population  of  14,500,783. 
This  gives  a  density  of  109  per  square  mile. 
The  country,  therefore,  offers  no  great  room  for 
Japanese  settlers.  With  the  proper  development, 
however,  it  will  perhaps  be  found  capable  of  receiv- 
ing 15,000,000  more  people. 

The  third  country  to  which  Japan  looks  for  relief 
is  South  Manchuria.  This  territory,  though  con- 
taining 91,000  square  miles,  is  almost  as  thickly  popu- 
lated as  Korea.  Moreover,  with  the  exception  of  the 
leased  territory  of  the  Kwantung  peninsula  (1,290 
stjuare  miles)  and  a  very  narrow  strip  of  land  along 
the  South  Manchuria  railway,  the  country  is  not 
under  Japanese  control.  By  the  Chino-Japanese 
agreement  of  1915,  the  Japanese  secured  the  privilege 
of  engaging  in  agricultural  pursuits  in  this  region, 
and  it  is  hoped  that  it  will  hereafter  afford  more  room 
and  opportunity  to  Japanese  settlers. 

I  have  shown  that  during  the  past  five  decades 


ifJ^'kk:'.C<[*i^^'/ 


^4i^iO«.'-'^_:^Jici;.:' 


-,Wf^S" 


JAPANESE  IMMIGRATION  TO  AMERICA 


59 


Japan's  population  has  increased  by  20.000,000. 
As  against  this  increase  Japan  has  sent  but  2,690,000 
emigrants  to  various  countries  as  follows:  Hokkaido 
(Northern  island  of  Japan),  2,000,000;  Formosa 
(Southern  island  of  Japan),  100,000;  Korea,  300,000; 
Manchuria,  100,000;  Hawaii,  80,000;  Continental 
United  States,  70,000;  China,  South  America  and 
others  combined,  40,000. 

England,  when  the  rate  of  increase  in  her  popula- 
tion was  highest,  sent  her  sons  and  daughters  abroad 
by  the  hundreds  of  thousands  every  year.     So  did 
Germany.    To  the  United  States  alone  the  German 
Empire  has  sent  many  millions  of  emigrants.    From 
1881  to  18!)9,  when  the  tide  of  German  emigration 
was  highest,  Germans  came  to  this  country  at  the 
average  of  124,200  per  annum.     In  South  America 
Brazil  alone  has  received  more  than  a  million  Ger- 
mans.    It  may  be  safely  stated  that  all  European 
countries  have  alleviated  the  pressure  of  population 
at  home  by  encouraging  emigration.    The  most  con- 
spicuous example  at  present  is  Italy. 

Now  Japan,  one  of  the  most  congested  countries 
in  the  world,  is  compelled  to  solve  the  same  question 
without  sending  emigrants  to  those  countries  which 
offer  the  greatest  opportunities.  With  her  popula- 
tion increasing  at  the  rate  of  400,000  every  year, 
this  is  no  easy  task.  Yet  Japan,  docile  and  courteous, 
is  mindful  of  the  admonition  of  the  "big  brothers 
of  the  West,  and  is  willing  to  undertake  tins  Her- 
culean task.     In  refraining  from  sending  her  emi- 


;  i 


if 


;,  It 

II 


,^F 


60 


JAPAN  I\-  WORLD  POLITICS 


grants  to  Britisli  colonies,  and  in  accepting  the  "gen- 
tlemen's agreement"  with  the  Ignited  States,  Japan 
has  signified  her  intention  to  dispose  of  the  serious 
question  of  surphis  popuhition  without  emharrassing 
the  Western  nations.  Cannot  tlie  American  Govern- 
ment and  people  reah'zc  and  apnreciate  the  supreme 
resolve  she  has  made  in  the  face  of  this  most  difficult 
problem  ? 

As  far  as  the  Japanese  Government  is  concerned, 
then,  the  immigration  question  has  ceased  to  he  a 
vital  issue  with  America,  for  the  Government  re(?ards 
that  issue  as  settled  through  the  instrumentality  of 
the  "gentlemen's  agreement." 

The  effect  of  that  instrument  upon  Japanese  im- 
migration is  briefly  told.  The  tide  of  Japanese 
immigration  reached  its  high  watermark  in  1908 
when  the  report  of  the  Immigration  Bureau  at 
Washington  recorded  the  entry  of  9,541.  Jaj)anese 
to  the  continental  United  States.  Although  the 
"gentlemen's  agreement"  was  concluded  in  1907, 
preparatiijus  for  its  enforcement  refjuired  a  consider- 
able time.  With  that  agreement  working  efTectively 
in  the  year  following,  Japanese  immigration  to  the 
mainland  of  America  fell  to  2,43'"2,  against  which  as 
many  as  5,004  Japanese  departed  from  these  shores. 
Again,  in  1910  only  2,598  were  admitted,  while 
5,024  returned  to  Japan.  In  1911  tlie  figures  in- 
creased considerably,  4,282  Japanese  having  been 
admitted  to  the  continental  United  States.  Never- 
theless, those  returning  to  Japan  in  the  same  year 


JAPANESE  IMMIGRATION  TO  AMERICA 


61 


numbered  5,869,  that  is,  1,587  more  than  were 
admitted.  In  1912  Japanese  arrivals  numbered 
5,358  as  against  5,437  departures.  In  1913  there 
were  6,771  arrivals  aj,'ainst  5,647  departures;  in  1914 
8,462  arrivals  and  6.300  departures;  in  1915,  9.029 
arrivals  and  5.967  departures;  in  1916,  9,100  arrivals 
and  6,922  departures. 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  the  eight  years  during  which 
the  gentlemen's  agreement  has  been  in  force,  48,032 
Japanese  entered  the  mainland  of  the  United  States, 
while  46,170  left  for  Japan.  This  gives  but  1,852 
arrivals  in  excess  of  departures. 

The  anti-Japanese  critics  point  to  the  steady 
increase  of  Japanese  arrivals  since  1912.  But  they 
overlook  or  ignore  three  vital  points.  In  the  first 
place,  the  above  figures  for  arrivals  include  both 
laborers  and  non-laborers,  even  high  officials  and 
great  financiers.  In  recent  years  a  majority  of  the 
Japanese  arrivals  consisted  of  men  and  women  of 
the  non-laboring  class — travellers,  merchants,  stu- 
dents and  wives  of  the  Japanese  residing  in  this 
country.  Thus  in  1913,  5,400  of  the  total  arrivals 
of  6,771  were  not  of  the  laboring  class,  but  those 
rightfully  entitled  to  admission.  In  1914,  6,700 
of  8,462  were  non-laborers;  in  1915  and  1916,  6,815 
and  6,142,  respectively,  were  non-laborers.  The 
gentlemen's  agreement  does  not,  and  cannot,  of 
course,  aim  to  exclude  Japanese  of  the  non-laboring 
class. 

During    recent   years,    and    especially    since    the 


I' 


•;;r-»i'?-ia-;itV-t'''<t- 


mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 


62 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


opening  of  the  European  war,  trade  and  intercourse 
between  the  two  countries  Iiave  been  increasing 
phenomenally.  To  accelerate  this  tendency,  the 
Panama  Pacific  International  Exposition,  for  which 
Japan  expended  more  than  a  million  dollars,  brought 
to  San  Francisco  during  V.)\i  and  1915  temporary 
visitors  and  workers  in  considerable  numbers.  Of 
late  not  a  Japanese  steamer  arrives  but  that  seventy 
or  eighty  first-class  passengers— oflScials,  bankers, 
government  students,  exporting  ana  importing  mer- 
chants, are  on  l)oard  of  lier.  Counting  all  the  Japan- 
ese steamers  entering  the  liarbors  of  San  Francisco 
and  Seattle  and  Tacoma,  the  arrivals  of  this  class 
alone  from  Japan  will  aggregate  five  to  six  thousand 
a  year.  In  considering  the  recent  increase  of  Japan- 
ese arrivals,  all  these  circumstances  nmst  be  remem- 
bered. To  sound  an  alarmist  note  over  the  increase 
of  such  arrivals,  would  be  criminally  stuj)id. 

The  second  reason  for  the  increase  of  Japanese 
arrivals  in  the  past  few  years  is  found  in  the  fact 
that  those  Japanese,  who  had  returned  to  Japan 
in  large  numbers  during  the  few  years  preceding, 
have,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
"  gentlemen's  agreement,"  been  steadily  conu'ng  back 
to  this  country.  They  have  found  the  economic 
and  other  conditions  at  home  uncongenial  to  them, 
and  have  almost  invariably  availed  themselves  of 
the  privilege  granted  in  the  "gentlemen's  agree- 
ment." 

In  the  third  place,  the  same  agreement  permits 


■iSJ?yiSkSM^:i:: 


JAPANESE  IMMIGRATION  TO  AMERICA 


6S 


the  Japanese  residing  in  this  country  to  send  for 
tlieir  parents,  wives  and  children  with  a  view  to 
making  homes  here.  That  is  why,  in  hite  years, 
Japanese  women,  many  of  wliom  are  the  so-called 
"picture  brides,"  have  been  coming  in  increasing 
numbers. 

In  the  past  session  of  Congress  the  "picture 
bride"  was  made  a  topic  of  discussion  for  the  House 
Committee  on  Imnugration.  Congressman  John  L. 
Burnett  went  so  far  as  to  assert  that  "picture  brides," 
with  few  exceptions,  come  here  with  little  intention 
to  make  homes  for  their  fiances,  and  that  they  were 
in  many  cases  brought  for  immoral  purposes.  Such 
a  statement  is  wholly  unwarranted. 

To  explain  the  picture  bride,  we  must  first  of  all 
explain    marriage    customs    in    Japan.      In    Japan 
when  a  child,  whether  boy  or  girl,  reaches  a  marriage- 
able age,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  parents  to  find  a  suit- 
able partner  for  him  or  her.    Custom,  however,  rules 
hat  the  conduct  of  the  affair  must  be  entrusted  to  a 
go-between,  usually  some  discreet  married  friend. 
Having  found  a  desirable  person,  the  go-between 
arranges  a  meeting  of  the  prospective  bride  and 
groom,  usually  chaperoned  by  their  parents.     But 
before  this  interview  takes  place,  the  parents  on 
either  side  spare  no  pains  in  inquiring  into  the  char- 
acter, social  standing,  family  relations,  genealogy, 
health,  education  and  what  not  of  the  young  man 
and  woman. 

If,  as  the  result  of  this  investigation,  the  young 


9m:^^^S^m^:ii:'^in(j 


''^^f«f.it^*''"«3*^^ 


«4 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


man  and  woman  express  themselves  in  favor  of  the 
ronsuiiimation  of  a  marriage,  the  parents  and  po- 
l)etwecn  proceed  to  make  final  arrangements  for 
the  wedding.  If,  on  the  contrary,  their  opinion  is 
unfavorable,  the  matter  is  dropped. 

Dr.  William  Elliot  Griffis,  one  of  the  greatest 
living  American  authorities  on  Japan,  finds  so  great 
a  merit  in  this  method  of  marriage  that  he  calls  it  a 
real  eugenic  marriage. 

\Mien  a  man  living  in  America  desires  to  marry, 
he  writes  to  his  parents,  asking  them  to  find  a  suit- 
able woman  for  his  bride.  The  parents,  following 
the  usual  customs  and  rules,  fix  on  an  eligible  per- 
son. If  the  prospective  groom  were  in  Jajjan,  the 
customary  meeting  with  the  prospective  bride  would 
follow.  Living  in  America  as  he  does,  however,  this 
meeting  cannot  take  place.  So  he  sends  his  photo- 
graph to  the  woman,  and  receives  her  photog.aph 
in  exchange.  If  this  "interview"  through  photo- 
graphs proves  satisfactory  to  both  parties,  the 
nuptial  knot  is  tied  at  a  ceremonial  dinner  in  which 
the  groom,  living  in  America,  is  naturally  absent, 
but  which  is  attended  by  the  parents  and  relatives 
of  both  sides.  This  done,  the  parents  register  the 
marriage  with  the  proper  authorities. 

In  the  light  of  Japanese  law,  therefore,  the  so- 
called  "picture  bride"  has  already  been  legitimately 
married  before  her  departure  for  America  where  she 
is  to  jt)in  the  groom,  and  no  further  proceedings  are 
necessary  in  order  to  call  themselves  man  and  wife 


JAPANESE  IMMIGRATION'  TO  AMERICA 


65 


before  the  American  law.  But  to  conform  to  the 
American  custom  and  requirements  of  marriage, 
the  couple  upon  the  arrival  of  the  bride,  go  through 
tiie  proceedings  required  by  tlie  American  law. 

Like  any  other  system  of  marriage,  this  Japanese 
system  is  not  without  its  defects.  But  on  the  whole, 
the  picture  bride  is  happily  united.  There  have 
been  only  a  few  instances  in  which  such  marriages 
have  proved  unsatisfactory.  Indeed,  it  seems  to 
be  the  opinion  among  more  experi'i'nced,  conserva- 
tive Japanese  residents  in  America  that  marriage, 
through  the  exchange  of  photographs,  results  in 
more  felicitous  unions  than  in  the  cases  where  the 
young  men  go  over  to  Japan  and  find  the  brides 
themselves;  because  in  the  former  case  the  precau- 
tion, wisdom,  experience  and  good  judgment  of  the 
parents  are  fully  utilized. 

The  Japanese  in  America  must  marry  and  settle 
down  in  domestic  life,  if  they  are  not  to  form  a 
floating,  shiftless,  undesirable  element  of  the  com- 
nmnity.  Since  they  have  shown  a  greater  desire 
for  home  life,  drinking,  gambling  and  other  evil 
practices  among  them  have  become  much  less,  and 
the  moral  condition  of  the  Japanese  community 
has  been  greatly  improved. 

To  ensure  the  happy  marriage  of  the  picture 
bride  it  has  been  the  unwritten  rule  of  the  Japanese 
C'onsulate  at  San  Francisco  not  to  recommend  to 
the  home  Government  the  issuance  of  a  passport 
for  her  unless  the  prospective  groom  can  prove,  to 


liSii.i^5^l^v^  ■' telS  '^^^^^MM^'jfii^ 


.^m^ 


66 


JAPAN  IN  WOULD  POLITICS 


its  satisfaction,  that  he  is  financially  prepared  to 
make  II  home. 

Rci)orts  relative  to  picture  brides,  like  all  stories 
about  Japanese  immigration,  have  been  greatly 
exaggerated.  There  are  no  comprehensive  statistics 
available  of  these  female  immigrants  from  Japan. 
According  to  the  California  Board  of  Health,  there 
were  in  l!)l'-2,  906  Japanese  weddings  in  the  entire 
State;  718  in  1!)13,  HH7  in  1914  and  91.3  in  1915. 
The  record  does  not  show  how  many  of  the  brides 
were  **i)icture  brides."  But  the  record  of  the  Japan- 
ese Association  at  San  Francisco  shows  that  in  the 
fiscal  year  1915  there  were  admitted  to  this  country 
at  the  port  of  San  Francisco  1,7^22  Japanese  females, 
of  whom  8^20  were  "picture  brides,"  the  remaining 
896  consisting  of  tlie  mothers,  wives  (not  picture 
brides,  but  those  who  were  married  while  their 
husbands  were  in  Japan)  and  daughters  of  the  Japan- 
ese residing  in  this  country. 

As  far  as  we  are  able  to  ascertain,  the  Japanese 
Government  has  no  intention  to  demand,  in  any 
measurable  future,  the  abrogation  of  the  "gentle- 
men's agreement."  Japan  recognizes  the  courtesy 
of  the  AVilson  Administration  in  respecting  her 
e<iually  courteous  request  that  tlie  restriction  of 
Japanese  immigration  be  not  made  a  provision  in 
the  statutes  of  the  Vnilcd  States,  but  be  left  to  the 
accommodating  spirit  on  the  part  of  Japan.  In  the 
new  immigration  law  adopted  by  Congress  over 
Mr.  Wilson's  veto,  no  clause  is  found,  prohibiting 


'v-.-t%iMy^^ 


JAPANESE  IMMIGRATION  TO  AMERICA 


67 


Japanese  immigration,  and  the  fact  has  been  appre- 
ciated by  the  Japanese  Government  and  people. 
Modest  as  its  achievements  are,  the  Mikado's 
Empire  has  been  recognized  as  one  of  the  foremost 
Powers  of  the  world.  Naturally  it  sees  an  affront 
to  its  dignity  in  a  statutory  provision  of  a  foreign 
Power  singling  it  out  as  an  object  of  discriminatory 
treatment.  Can  we  not  sympathize  with  its  desire 
to  restrict  the  emigration  of  its  subjects  of  its  own 
accord  rather  than  submit  to  an  exclusion  law  of  the 
T'nited  States,  though  the  effect  would  be  the  same 
in  either  case? 

Japan's  attitude  and  policy  with  regard  to  the 
inunigration  question,  then,  permit  of  no  miscon- 
struction. She  has  in  no  uncertain  terms  told  the 
I'nited  States  that  she  would  voluntarily  stop  the 
emigration  of  her  laborers  to  the  United  States,  and 
she  has  faithfully  adhered  to  the  pledge.  At  the 
same  time,  she  has  unmistakably  intimated  to  the 
American  Government  thot  her  subjects  legiti- 
mately admitted  into  this  country  must  not  be 
discriminated  against.  This  is  a  proposition  just 
and  incontrovertible.  All  that  has  to  be  done  is  to 
extend  citizenship  to  the  Japanese.  It  is  absurd, 
as  it  is  unjust,  that  ignorant  immigrants  from  coun- 
tries far  more  backward  than  Japan  can  be  freely 
naturalized,  while  the  Japanese,  with  all  the  quali- 
fications for  citizenship,  are  compelled  to  remain 
aliens,  however  devoted  they  may  be  to  this  country. 

International  usage,  unwritten  but   nevertheless 


ill 


68 


JAJ'AN  IN  \V()HLl)  l-OLITICS 


in  force,  rules  that  no  nation  should  be  diserinu'nated 
against  by  any  Power  with  whicli  it  is  on  u  plane  of 
cfjuality.  A  nation,  admitted  by  universal  consent 
into  the  coniity  of  tiie  world's  foremost  Powers,  has 
the  ri^dit  to  demand  of  any  foreign  nation,  with 
which  it  enters  into  intercourse,  the  treatment 
usually  accorded  such  Powers.  Now  Japan  is  the 
only  nation  in  the  Orient  which  has  attained  such 
u  position.  In  discussing  the  imi^iigration  (luestion, 
therefore,  Japan  speaks  only  for  herself  and  not 
as  the  champion  of  Asiatic  peoples. 

There  is  another   point   which   Americans   must 
bear  in  mind  in  discussing  the  imnn'gration  (juestion. 
The  i)et  theory  of  Japanese  exclusionists  jias  been 
that  the  American   (Jovernment  has  the  right  to 
decide  what  jx-ople  should  be  admitted  and  which 
should  be  barred  out.     For  the  sake  of  politeness, 
Japan  has  been  willing  to  concede  that  point  in 
favor  of  America.    If  you  would  allow  the  Japanese 
to  be  frank,  however,  they  would  confess  their  reluc- 
tance to  accept  this  American  theory.     Immigra- 
tion is  simply  another  term  for  travel  and  trade, 
and  the  freedom  of  travel  and  trade  from  one  coun- 
try to  another  is  explicitly  guaranteed  in  all  inter- 
national treaties  of  amity  and  commerce.    If  Japan 
restricts  of  her  own  accord  the  immigration  of  her 
subjects  to  this  country,  it  is  not  because  she  recog- 
nizes America's  right  to  discriminate  against  her, 
but  because  .she  prefers  to  retain  American  friend- 
ship rather  than  create  a  serious  issue  over  immigra- 


NlfPP 


JAPANESE  IMMIC.IIATION  TO  AMERKA 


69 


tion.     In  other  words,  Japan's  volunfary  restriction 
i)f  <-iiu'<;rati()n  to  America  is  a  special  act  of  couitoy, 
and  not  an  admission    tliat  America  has  the  right 
of  exclusion.     That  the  n-striction  of  immigration 
is  one  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  United  States 
docs  not  mean   that   .she   may   arbitrarily   exclude 
immigrants  from  one  country  and  freely  admit  those 
from  another.    If  she  finds  it  necessary  to  adopt  an 
exclusion  law,  such  a  law  should  he  made  applicable 
to  all  nations,  or  at  any  rate  to  those  nations  which 
have   been   admitted   into   the   family   of   civilized 
Powers.     If  the  United  States  may  arbitrarily  dis- 
criminate against  one  nation  in  the  matter  of  im- 
migration, may  she  not  likewise  adopt  discrimina- 
tory measures  in   the  matter  of   the  tarifT?     The 
recognition  of  such  rights  would  upset  and  destroy 
all  established  international  usages.     Will  America 
permit  any  foreign  Power  to  impose  especially  high 
duties  upon  her  goods.^ 

Advocates  of  Japanese  exclusion  point  to  Hawaii 
as  an  example  of  the  Orientalization  of  American 
soil,  and  give  warning  that  California  and  the  Pacific 
Coast  in  general  should  not  become  a  second  Hawaii. 
These  superficial  oi)servers  ignore  the  vital  diiTer- 
ence  between  the  situation  in  Hawaii  and  that  on  the 
mainland.  The  fact  is  that  California  could  never 
become  a  second  Hawaii,  even  if  it  were  desired, 
because  the  conditions  prevailing  there  are  radically 
(lifTcrent  from  those  in  Hawaii.  To  arrive  at  this 
conclusion,  it  is  only  necessary  to  know  something 


i^m0mi^mmi 


70 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


of  tlu>  history  of  tlie  sugar  industry  in  the  ishinds. 
To  ])cgin  with,  Hawaii  was  not  a  white  man's  land; 
it  had  been  inhabited  by  (hirk-skinned,  senii-civihzed 
natives.  And  when  the  white  men  secured  the  priv- 
ilege to  exploit  its  natural  resources,  they  brought 
all  sorts  of  Oriental  labor  by  the  shipload  for  the 
sugar  plantations.  The  country  had  neither  the 
white  population  nor  "white  civilization"  when 
the  planters  began  to  import  Oriental  laborers. 

The  conditions  on  the  Pacific  Coast  are  totcd'y 
difTerent.  Here  American  civilization  and  the  Cau- 
casian population  have  been  so  firmly  established 
that  Japanese  immigration,  .so  strictly  checked  by 
the  "gentlemen's  agreement,"  cannot  possible  be- 
come a  danger. 

The  attitude  of  Americans  in  Hawaii  towards 
their  Japanese  neighbors  is  highly  rctssuring.  Th«v 
are  confident  of  their  ability  to  weld  the  heterogene- 
ous population  into  a  unit  mentally  and  spiritually 
homogeneous.  In  the  last  ten  years  40,000  Japan- 
ese children  were  born  in  the  territory.  It  is  only  a 
question  of  time  when  the  Japanese  vote  will  become 
a  powerful  factor  in  the  suffrage  of  the  islands.  How 
will  that  Power  be  employed  by  the  Japanese  voters? 
This  question  is  answered  by  Mr.  Nathaniel  Pfeffer, 
in  the  Xcir  York  Ercnlng  Po.st,  as  follows: 

"That  depends,  they  will  tell  you  in  Honolulu, 
on  us  here  on  the  mainland.  If  we  allow  nn'sunder- 
standing  to  sharpen  to  hostility,  if  we  allow  the 
race  issue  to  boeome  acute,  then  in  Hawaii  it  will 


JAPANESE  IMMIGRATION  TO  AMERICA 


71 


be  tragic.  I>oft  to  themselves,  they  have  full  con- 
fidence that  they  can  solve  those  problems  that  are 
purely  local.  They  have  a  background  and  a  long 
precedent  of  tolerance,  and.  even  more,  of  associa- 
tion. Where  children  have  grown  up  together, 
played  together,  and  gone  to  school  together,  they 
will  minimize  the  importance  of  those  diflerences 
that  distinguish  race  from  race,  they  will  be  less 
likely  to  assume  for  one  dominance,  and  for  the 
other  inferiority.  Nowhere  more  earnestly  than 
in  Hawaii  do  they  pray  for  the  smoothing  of  those 
frictions  between  Japan  and  America  that  are  so 
palpably  artificial.  For  them  the  stake  i;?  not  only 
peace,  but  the  hope  of  a  fine  achievement." 

In  discussing  the  Japanese  immigration  of  to-day, 
it  is  iuiportant  to  bear  in  mind  the  difference  be- 
tween it  and  the  Chinese  immigration  of  the  latter 
part  of  the  past  century,  when  California  raised 
the  cry,  "The  Chinese  must  go!"  The  Chinese 
immigration  from  18o4  to  188^2  totalled  139,455, 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  which  came  to  and 
remained  in  California.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  in 
the  seventies  of  the  past  century  when  agitation 
for  Chinese  exclusion  was  begun,  the  state  of  Cali- 
fornia had  a  population  of  only  5(>(),0()0,  including 
Negroes,  Indians  and  Chinese,  the  apprehension 
that  the  Chinese  might  hinder  the  wholesome  growth 
of  the  "white"  community  in  the  State  was  not 
without  ground.  But  the  conditions  on  the  Pacific 
Coast  have  since  radically  changed,  while  circum- 


A.      '•■  ■ 

^% 


iil 


mi 


^IH^l^^SSS 


72 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


stances  attendant  upon  Japanese  immigration  are 
widely  different  from  those  accompanying  Ciiinese 
immigration.  In  1!)00  tlie  white  population  of 
California  increased  to  l,40'-2,7t>7,  and  in  1910  to 
2,259, G7''2.  It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  the  number 
of  the  Japanese  in  the  State.  The  census  of  1910 
places  it  at  ^1,350.  While  this  seems  to  be  a  con- 
servative estimate,  it  is  perhaps  no  more  conserva- 
tive than  the  number  given  for  the  white  i)opula- 
tion.  Perhaps  the  common  estimate  which  places 
the  number  of  Japanese  at  GO, 000  is  not  far  from 
the  nuirk.  This  number  will  probably  remain 
stationary  if  it  does  not  materially  decrease,  because 
of  the  fact  that  the  gap  left  by  departing  Japanese 
will  be  filled  by  children  born  of  Japanese  parents 
in  the  State. 

With  the  "gentlemen's  agreement"  strictly  en- 
forced, with  Americans  flowing  into  California  from 
Eastern  States  in  ever  increasin'^  streams,  with  the 
opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  stimulating  European 
immigration,  there  is  no  reason  why  California 
should  apprehend  the  "Orientalization"  of  the  State. 


^! 


CHAPTER  VL 
THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 

Anli-Japancse  loRislntion  in  the  West— Proposod  anti-alien  land  bill  of 
Idaho— Culifornia  anti-alien  land  law— Official  statisties  of  Japanese 
landholdin^s  in  California— Examples  of  whimsical  anti-Japanese 
legislation-  Why  politicians  toy  with  the  Japanese  question— Real 
cause  of  California's  hostility  to  Japanese  immigration— Japan's 
land  laws— Rights  of  aliens  in  Jai)an— How  Japan  factii  the  anti- 
Japanese  agitation  here— Fairness  of  the  California  press— (  hanged 
attitude  of  California  lalM.r  towards  Japanesi— San  Francisco 
"sch.H.l  in<idenf'  of  1900  not  a  race  issue— Lalmrs  blunder  in 
backing  the  anti-alien  land  bill-Japanese  standards  of  living  and 
wages— Japanese  sympathy  for  American  labor  unions. 

In  spite  of  all  concessions  Japan  has  made  to 
America  in  the  adjustment  of  the  immigration  (lucs- 
tion  the  States  on  the  Pacific  (\)ast  continue  to 
complain  about  Japanese  immigration,  demonstrat- 
ing their  dissatisfaction    now   and  then  in  various 
whimsical  legislative  proposals.    ^Vith  certain  classes 
of  people  in  that  section  the  habit  of  grumbling 
has  become  so  ingrained  that  they  do  not  know 
how  to  stop  it  even  when  Japanese  immigration  has 
stopped.    That  these  certain  classes  may  not  repre- 
sent any  large  section  of  the  jx-ople  of  the  coast 
does  not  matter,  for  it  is  ofliMi  a  small  minority 
that  leads  a  nation  into  a  serious  predicament. 
I  have  often  wondered  how  nmch  of  the  anti- 

7S 


ll 


74 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Japanese  agitation  in  the  Western  States  is  sincere, 
that  is,  called  forth  l)y  real  necessity.  At  this  writing 
the  legislatures  of  Oregon  and  Idaho  are  each  con- 
sidering bills  prohibiting  Japanese  ownership  of 
land.  Yet  Idaho  has  only  one  thousand  Japanese 
whose  landholdings  scarcely  amount  to  five  hundred 
acres.  In  Oregon  there  are  only  four  thousand 
Japanese,  holding  less  than  a  thousand  acres  of 
land. 

I  am  informed  that  the  real  reason  for  the  pro- 
posed Idalio  law  is  the  grudge  entertained  against 
a  few  Japanese  by  a  group  of  real  estate  dealers. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  when,  in  l!)i;j,  California 
adopt<'d  the  celebraled  anti-alien  land  law  Idaho 
enacted  a  measure  diametrically  opposed  to  the 
California  law,  extending  land  ownership  to  the 
Japanese.  It  appears  that  the  good  Solons  who  put 
this  liberal  measure  through  the  legislature  at  Boise 
represented  a  certain  real  estate  interest  which  was 
to  make  a  handsome  pn^fit  by  selling  a  large  tract 
of  land  to  Japanese.  When  the  law  was  passed,  how- 
ever, the  Japanese  failed  to  make  the  deal.  There 
had  been  no  agreement  made  for  the  deal  prior  to 
the  passage  of  the  law,  but  that  did  not  lessen  the 
nu'sdirected  anger  of  the  disgruntled  interest.  And 
so  in  this  year  of  grace  1{)17,  its  hostility  toward 
the  Japanese  manifested  itself  in  the  proposed  anti- 
alien  laud  law,  whose  passage  was  happily  fore- 
stalled by  the  urgent  recjuest  of  the  (lovernment 
at  Washington.     Who  can  say  that  the  same  bill 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


lO 


will  not  again  be  brought  forward  in  the  coming 

session? 

When  in  1913  California  created  a  worldwide 
sensation  by  adopting  an  anti-Japanese  land  law, 
Japanese  landholdings  in  that  State  totaled,  accord- 
ing to  the  State  B..ard  of  Agriculture,  only  l'-2.7>26 
acres,  divided  into  3:5 1  fan.  s,  and  having  an  assessed 
value  of  $17S,9i)0.  In  achlition,  the  Japanese  leased 
282  farms,  with  a  total  acreage  of  i7,"j96. 

The  number  of  town  lots  held  by  Japanese  was 
218,  with  an  assessed  value  of  $lfi(!,9.>5.  It  is  also 
shown  that  the  Japanese  operated  2,548  business 
establishments.  The  capital  invested  was  in  most 
cases  very  small,  08  percent,  of  the  whole  number  be- 
ing less  tiian  $1 ,000  for  each  case.  The  total  capital 
invested,  exclusive  of  that  represented  by  banks,  was 
$4,075,000.  The  total  annual  business  transacted 
by  these  establishments  amounted  to  $10,114,407, 
of  which  about  37  per  cent,  was  with  Americans. 
The  total  annual  rent  paid  by  these  Japanese  busi- 
ness houses  was  over  $900,000. 

From  these  figures  it  would  appear  that  the  so- 
called  Japanese  peril  in  California  is  a  myth— some- 
thing which  in  reality  never  existed.  A  little  figuring 
will  show  that  the  Japanese  in  California  own  only 
one  acre  out  of  every  8,000  acres  in  the  State.  Their 
total  holdings  of  all  sorts,  including  the  temporary 
leases,  constitute  al)out  one  acre  out  of  every  3,400. 
This  estimated  proportion  may  be  somewhat  smaller 
thaa  the  actual  proportion,  for  the  total  acreage 


wm^'-^'^m^. 


76 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


of  the  State  includes  untillal)le  lands.  But  making 
due  ailowanc-e  for  this  fact,  and  renuMnlxring  that 
the  101„'}'20,000  acres  not  owned  or  leased  hy  the 
.Jai)ane.se  are  in  the  hands  of  about  '2,.50().0(»0  Ameri- 
cans or  European  ininii^'rants,  wjio  are  iii<r('aM'ii<f 
at  the  rate  of  al)out  (JO  per  cent,  in  a  decade,  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  such  small  lioldings  of  the  Japanese 
should  constitute  a  menace  to  the  State,  csf)ecially 
when  Japanese  immi^'ration  has  been  efTectively 
checked  by  an  a^'reement  with  Jai)an. 

As  I  close  the  foregoing  paragraph  I  recall  the 
comical  but  significant  story  of  a  Western  man, 
a  railroad  manager  in  a  Stale  under  the  shadow 
'»f  the  Sierras.  Having  some  sort  of  a  grudge  against 
the  Feih'ral  Government,  he  serves  uj)on  the  un- 
accommodating Administration  the  following  ulti- 
matum: 

"On  account  of  the  discrimination  practiced 
against  my  railroad  ])y  the  Post  Office  l)ci)arlment, 
I  am  i)rcparing  a  car  which  will  be  put  in  service 
April  1,  1!)17,  which  will  bear  the  following  word- 
ing: 'THIS  CAR  FOR  USE  OF  JAPANESE  AND 
DOCS." 

To  emi)hasize  this  gracious  act  this  gentleman 
threatens  to  put  through  the  Stale  legislature  a  bill 
of  much  th.  same  nature  as  the  ('alil'onu'a  anti- 
alien  land  law.  And  this  for  no  other  purpose  than 
to  embarrass  the  Federal  (iovermueut  by  .seeking 
the  questionable  .satisfaction  of  his  personal  grudge! 

It  seeiMH  to  ?!!('  that  anti-Japanese  legi^laliuii  in 


S^U   ._-Uai"  '■ 


'jmjmu.iM'm  >j\.  .as 


-^  "7i  ■i.>k"..iL? 


Si 


ii^L^fK 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


the  West  is  cither  a  disease  contapious  like  cholera, 
or  a  fasliion,  like  women's  hats.    Because  a  Western 
(\)nini()n\vealtli  has  adopte-.i  an  anti-alien  land  law 
other  States  in  the  neif^hhorhood  must  also  have 
something  similar.     But  in  some  cases  such  legisha- 
tion  in  the  West  sprinj^'s  from  motives  not  quite 
so  innocen' .     Tiie  stories  just  told  of  the  Western 
railroad  man  and  of  the  Idaho  land  emhrofjlio  indi- 
cate the  character  of  the   legislation  of   the  last- 
named  category.    Let  me  cite  a  few  instances  show- 
ing how  the  Kgislative  mind  of  the  West  sometimes 
works.     Japanese  fishermen,  let  us  say,  incur  the 
animosity  of  their  rivals  of  other  nationalities  or 
races.     Now  these  envious  rivals  may  be  as  much 
aliens  as  the  Jai)anc>e,  but  they  enjoy  the  privilege 
of  naturalization.     So  they  rush  to  the  legislative 
hall  with  a  bill  depriving  "aliens  inc  ligible  to  citizen- 
ship"  of    the   fishing    license.      Again    the    "dry" 
campaign  is  looming  ominously  upon  the  horizon 
of  a  State  among  whose  chief  products  are  grapes 
and  wines.    To  ward  otf  this  i)rril,  the  "  wet "  interests 
jiropose  a  compromise  measure,  apparently  intended 
to  decrease  the  li(iuor  business  of   the  State,  and 
the  first  iim.xvnt  victims  to  be  sacrificed  by  the 
compromise  are  aliens  or  those  "ineligible  to  citizen- 
ship," ft)r  it  provides  against  the  granting  of  liijuor 
license  to  such  people!    A  sly  proposition,  is  it  not? 
So  are  the  anti-alien  land  laws  enacted  or  proposed 
in  various  States.    Because  the  laws  use  the  general 
phrase  "aliens  ineligible  to  become  citizens,"  their 


i 


'I 


. 


f^s!!c«-«4?SjnNae0p«,i  »MiMiivmiiimu-A.  iti^^fRWBt^jwtjmstniiea^^iiSBaBgts^ 


78 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITK'S 


proponents  naively  assert  that  they  neither  trespass 
upon  the  treaties  with  Ja{)an  nor  are  directed  a^'ainst 
the  Japanese! 

Now  the  (|ijestion  presents  itself,  why  is  it  that 
|)olili(ians  always  s<'izc  with  eaj^'erness  Mf)i)n  sueh 
whimsical  anfi-Japanese  hills,  if  these  hills  have 
no  real  necessity  behind  tiieni?  7'he  only  answer 
is  that  the  Japan<-se  an*  not  allowed  to  share  the 
rights  and  duties  of  citizenshii).  Not  until  citizen- 
ship is  extended  to  the  Japanese  will  spasmodic 
anti-Japanese  legislation  on  the  I*acific  Coast  come 
to  an  end.  In  these  days,  when  Jai)an  lierM'lf  is 
indiscriminately  called  the  <Mu"<,nna,  aye,  the  menace 
of  the  world,  nothing,'  furm'shcs  politicians  so  handy 
a  short  cut  to  notoriety  as  the  introduction  of  anti- 
Japanese  hills.  The  San  Francisco  An/onciut,  not- 
withstandinjjj  many  unkind  words  said  about  it 
by  its  enemies,  oflen  speaks  the  truth  on  public 
questions.    In  a  recent  issue  it  rightly  says: 

"Earlier  in  our  political  history  it  was  part  of 
the  stock  in  trade  of  every  cheap  politician  to  play 
upon  the  inheriled  prejudic*  s  of  (-ir  i)eople  by  a 
process  known  as  twisting  the  lion',  tail.  Whoever 
could  talk  loudest,  most  resentfully,  and  most 
vulgarly  against  everything  and  anything  British 
had  a  political  advantage  over  everybody  else. 
Time  and  gntwth  of  international  amity  has  cured 
that  i)articular  frenzy.  'JMie  British-baiter  is  no 
lontrer  with  us.     Tlien  th.ere  caiue,  particulnrly  on 


m 


ss-^^^ 


mm 


»i3s*=si; 


.= .iai-- : ■;  ^" i ijs: -'  -«_i:-StT  S3^i  akt:'.r!.i^.rJ.SS'<M^ .-,.-i  'A3.-.-:.-J^. x  i: 


*??^r*??= 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


ro 


the  Pacific  Coast,  tlie  furious  hater  of  anything? 
and  everything  Chinese.  There  followed,  nearly 
thirty  years  af,'o,  cnaetment  of  the  Chinese  .-strie- 
tion  law,  and  in  time  that  particular  bit  of  political 
jugglery  lost  its  potency.  The  latest  stunt  in  the 
Pacific  Coast  politician's  bag  of  tricks  is  hostility 
to  the  Ja[)anese.  It  is  n(»t  that  there  is  any  real 
conflict  of  interest,  not  that  anybody  is  suffering 
or  in  reasonable  expectancy  of  suffering  through 
the  presence  here  of  Japanese.  It  is  because  hos- 
tility to  everything  Japanese  is  good  political  stock- 
in-trade." 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  intense  animosity  dis- 
played in  California  towards  the  Japanese  in  the 
few  years  following  190(>  was  due  not  so  much  to 
Japanese   immigration   direct    fro.n   Japan,    which, 
after  all,  had  never  been  very  great,  as  to  the  un- 
fortunate   situation    created    by    the    inmiigration 
en  ma.tfic  of  Japanese  in  Hawaii  to  the  mainland. 
Demand  for  Japanej;e  labor  in  California  and  other 
Pacific  Coast  States  hud  been  so  great  that  certain 
interests    were    unscrupulous    enough    to    charter 
steamers  for  the  sole  purpose  of  bringing  in  Japanese 
laborers  from  Hawaii.     To  the  Hawaiian  Jajianese 
on  their  side,  high  wages  offered  on  the  mainland 
was  a  great  temptation.     Indeed  many  Japanese, 
unable  to  obtain  passports  to  continental  America, 
came  to  Hawaii  only  to  make  that  point  a  stepping 
stone  to  the  mainland.    The  Japanese  Ciovernment 
had  been  exercising  its  influence  to  restrict  emigra- 


7i«r<7TT~ 


•=i.L.'C'--J{- ':  li  l-TC^i 


-•-"■,  .( v •^•*-4., '.  i."=  1  =«itf«-c-  *  -jvi^'i  t fr:;f^ y-v'3 


80 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


tion  to  the  continental  T'nilcd  Slates,  l)iit  did  not 
feel  ohlij^cd  to  limit  passports  to  Hawaii,  knowing 
that  Japanese  labor  was  welcomed  and  was  in  great 
demand  there.  But  the  good  intentions  of  the 
Clovernment  were  nn'sused  hy  many  Jaj)anese,  who 
secured  |)assports  to  Hawaii  with  no  intention  to 
remain  tliere.  Nor  was  this  surprising,  considering 
that  the  wages  j)aid  to  the  sugar  plantation  laborer 
in  Hawaii  were  scarcely  as  nuicli  as  half  the  wages 
paid  the  farm  hand  in  California. 

This,  in  brief,  was  the  main  factor  responsible 
for  the  anti-Japanese  feeling  aroused  in  California 
in  IDOG,  leading  to  the  conclusion  of  the  "gentle- 
men's agreement"  between  Tokyo  and  Washington. 
It  may  be  safely  said  that  what  animosity  there  is 
towards  the  Japanese  on  the  Pacific  Coast  to-day 
is  largely  the  legacy  of  those  fatal  days  of  11)00. 

Of  the  various  legislative  bills  frequently  brought 
against  the  Japanese  in  the  Western  States,  those 
depriving  them  of  land  ownership  are  of  first  im- 
portance. Defenders  of  the  anti-Japanese  land 
i.iw  ])oint  to  the  i)rovisions  of  law  in  Japan  regulating 
land  ownership  by  foreigners  in  that  country.  Such 
men  are  ignorant  of  the  real  status  of  aliens  in  Japan 
with  reference  to  land  ownership. 

In  1!)10  Japan  adopted  a  law  by  virtue  of  which 
foreigners  were  to  be  permitted  to  own  land,  pro- 
vided such  foreigners  came  from  a  country  where 
a  similar  privilege  was  extended  to  Japanese  sub- 
jects.    The  enforcement  of  this  law  has  been  do- 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THK  JAE'ANESE 


SI 


laved  for  various  reasons,  chief  of  wliich  is  the  dif- 
ficulty of  ap|)lyin^  the  reciprocal  j)rinciple  to  such 
countries  as  the  T'niti'd  States  which  has  no  uni- 
form Jilien  land  ownership  law. 

In  tie  meantime,  foreigners  in  Japan  arc  vir- 
tually allowed  to  enjoy  all  the  rights  in  this  respect 
enjoyed  by  natives.  The  Civil  Code  of  Japan 
adopted  in  1H!)8  was  drafted  after  the  Digest  or 
Pandect  system,  and  in  consequence  has  many 
points  of  .similarity  to  the  Civil  Code  of  P' ranee  and 
the  Burgerliches  Ciezetzbuch  of  Germany.  The 
Japanese  Civil  Code  recognizes  the  rights  of  pos- 
session and  ownership,  the  superficies,  the  emphyteu- 
sis, the  servitus  proediorum,  the  lien,  the  preferen- 
tial right,  the  right  of  pledge,  and  the  right  of 
mortgage. 

Of  these  nine  rights,  ownership  in  fee  simple  will 
not  be  conferred  upon  foreigners  until  the  ne  ten 
ownership  law  mentioned  above  takes  effect. 

Of  the  other  real  rights,  all  of  which  are  extended 
to  foreigners,  the  superficies  and  the  emphyteusis 
claim  our  particular  attention.  The  superficies  is  a 
species  of  lease,  but  is  not  encumbered  with  any 
restriction  as  to  its  duration.  It  is  attended  with 
almost  all  the  essential  features  of  ownership. 

The  emphyteusis  is  anothei  kind  of  lease  the 
duration  of  which  is  from  25  to  50  years. 

Foreigners  allowed  to  acfiuire  these  two  real  rights 
virtually  enjoy  the  benefits  of  land  ownership.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  many  aliens  in  Japan  hold  leases  for 


I 


82 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


99  years  witli  the  provision  that  in  ease  the  new 
ahen  ownership  hiw  takes  effect  the  h-ase  shall  be 
ehanj^ed  to  fee  simple  ownership  wilhout  additional 
payment.  This  is  practically  a  form  of  land  owner- 
ship and  tin'  Ja[)anese  Government  so  reeoj^nizes  it. 

A  still  more  imi)ortant  privilege  is  extendi'd  to 
forci^'ners  in  Japan  in  the  matter  of  land  holdinj?. 
The  commercial  law  of  Ja{)an  confers  the  right  of 
land  ownershi{)  upon  cori)orations  orj^'anized  l)y 
foreigners  in  conformity  with  the  requirements  of 
Japanese  laws.  To  enjoy  this  privilege  corporations 
are  not  rcfjuired  to  include  any  Jai)anesc  interest. 

^Moreover,  a  partnership,  which  enjoys  the  right 
of  land  ownership,  may  consist  of  any  number  of 
persons  from  two  upwards.  Sui)posc  a  partnership 
is  composed  of  two  persons,  native  or  foreign.  In 
this  ease  one  of  the  two  may  hold  even  as  much  as 
99  per  cent,  of  the  whole  interest. 

If,  therefore,  an  individual  foreigner  desires  to 
own  land  under  th.e  laws  now  in  operation,  he  may 
organize  a  partnership  with  another  person,  possibly 
one  of  his  close  friends,  Japanese  or  foreigner,  allow- 
ing the  latter  only  one  per  cent,  of  the  entire  interest. 
In  this  way  he  would  have  virtual  control  of  the 
land  ac(iuired  by  the  partnership,  for  the  interest 
of  his  j)artner  would  be  but  nominal. 

But  if  the  foreigner  does  not  care  to  form  a  part- 
nership or  corporation  in  order  to  accjuire  land,  he 
may  either  be  naturalized  and  purchase  land,  or 
secure  the  virtual  privileges  of  land  ownership  by 


-f^S?S^^^^^ 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


83 


means  of  the  superficies  or  emphyteusis  described 
above. 

In  ad(h'tion  to  the  rights  of  foreigners  recognized 
in  the  Civil  Code  of  Japan  we  may  mention  the  so- 
called  "Icase-in-perpetuity"  which  the  Europeans 
and  Americans  obtained  from  Japan  when  the  latter 
was  totally  inexperienced  in  diplomatic  affairs.  In 
every  open  port  the  \Vcstcrn  Powers  caused  the 
Jai)ancse  Government  to  set  a})art  an  extensive 
tract  of  land  for  business  and  residential  purposes 
of  their  citizens  and  subjects.  This  they  called 
the  "settlement,"  and  such  indeed  it  was,  for  here 
Japan  virtually  forfeited  the  exercise  of  her  sovereign 
rights. 

In  the  settlement  the  foreigners  established  what 
they  called  lease-in-perpetuity,  paying  a  small 
rental  to  the  Jai)ancse  Government.  When  the 
old  inequitable  treaties  were  abrogated  in  1898  the 
settlement  was  abolished  and  foreigners  were  free 
to  live  wherever  they  chose.  But  the  lease-in- 
perpetuity  survived  the  abrogated  treaties.  On  the 
land  thus  leased  the  foreigners  erected  residences 
and  ofhce  buildings  valued  at  millions  of  dollars, 
and  yet  they  enjoy  immunity  from  taxation  on 
these  properties! 

The  refusal  of  foreigners  to  pay  rent  upon  these 
valuable  lands  and  improvements  is  perhaps  in 
consonance  with  their  Western  consciences.  To 
the  Japanese,  however,  it  somehow  does  not  seem 
quite  fair.    So  the  municipal  government  of  Ynko- 


* 


ill 


^^?^^^^sm^^s^^s^^^^^^^^m^Bs^^^mj:^^,T^ 


Hi 


84 


JAPAN  IX  WORLD  POLITICS 


hania  has  repeatedly  asked  the  foreign  residents 
to  reh'ncjuish  wliat  appeared  to  it  a  (juestionahlc 
prerogative.  But  the  foreigners,  backed  by  their 
resj)eetive  Hovernments,  liavc  proposed  that  the 
case  be  sul)iuitted  to  the  Hague  tril)unal!  Suppose 
a  foreign  government  had  the  temerity  to  propose 
to  our  United  States  that  such  a  domestic  matter 
as  the  taxation  of  foreigners  be  submitted  to  inter- 
national arbitration;  I  can  well  imagine  how  indig- 
nant such  patriots  as  ]Mr.  Roosevelt  would  be  at 
such  an  outrageous  proposal.  Yet  the  Japanese 
meekly  acc<'ptcd  the  suggestion,  and  at  the  Hague 
tribunal  they  had  the  first  taste  of  Western  justice 
nu'ted  out  to  Asiatics — their  obviously  just  claim 
was  not  granted. 

As  a  native  of  Japan,  it  is  highly  distasteful  to 
me  to  eulogize  the  Japanese.  At  the  risk  of  incurring 
the  charge  of  bad  taste,  however,  I  may  be  per- 
mitted to  submit  that  the  patience  and  poise  with 
which  the  Japanese  faced  the  ordeal  of  anti-Japanese 
agitation  on  the  Pacific  Coast  have  been  adim'rable. 
\Vlu>n  in  1!)()G  San  Francisco,  led  by  a  labor  ad- 
ministration, e\j)elled  innocent  Japanes*'  children 
from  her  public  schools,  Japan  answered  the  chal- 
lenge with  a  contril)ution  of  $'-2t(>.()00,  a  sum  larger 
than  that  contribufcd  by  any  other  single  country, 
to  the  relief  fund  of  the  earlh»iuake-slri(ken  city 
at  the  (iolden  (iafe.  When  in  liJlU  the  legislature 
at  Sacramento  adopted  the  anti-Japanese  land  law, 
Japan's  response  was  u  most  generous  participation 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


85 


in  the  Panama  Pacific  International  Exposition  at 
San  Francisco.  Let  us  liope  that  she  will  in  the 
future  prove  herself  as  lenient  and  magnanimous 
as  in  the  past. 

Fairness  demands  that  equally  high  tributes  be 
paid  to  many  Californians  who  have  justice  and 
fair  play  sincerely  at  heart.  Especially  in  recent 
years  the  press  of  C'alifornia  has  shown  an  admirable 
spirit  of  tolerance.  When  in  1915  a  legislator  at 
Sacramento  threatened  to  introduce  fresh  anti- 
Japanese  bills,  the  Los  Angeles  Express,  a  Progressive 
organ,  came  out  v,ith  this  emphatic  editorial: 

"It  is  not  sufiicient  that  the  question  of  anti- 
Japanoe  legislation  be  lightly  regarded  because 
of  the  knowledge  that  no  bill  of  an  offensive  char- 
acter can  become  law.  Mere  reckless  agitation  of 
the  matter  may  provoke  trouble.  The  only  safe 
thing  to  do  is  to  suj)press  the  agitators,  and  frown 
upon  efforts  to  play  politics  with  legislation  that 
menaces  the  peace  of  the  entire  nation. 

"Members  of  the  legislature  who  imagine  for  a 
moment  that  they  refl(>ct  public  sentiment  when 
they  seek  to  stir  up  the  question  of  anti-Japanese 
legislation  seriously  misjudge  public  sentiment. 
The  people  of  California  want  none  of  it,  as  the 
jingoists  will  discover  to  their  sorrow  if  legislation 
of  this  character  is  attempted." 

To  which  the  Los  Angeles  Tribune  promptly 
assented  in  these  words: 

"There  is  danger  in  the  mere  agitation  of  the 


86 


JAPAN"  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


question,  and  it  is  imperative  that  steps  be  taken 
to  suppress  those  who,  without  hope  of  success  in 
the  eiiactnient  of  jingo  le^^islation,  ii-ipirc  to  noto- 
riety in  connection  witli  the  intnxhiction  of  bills 
aimed  against  the  Japanese.  Any  legislator  who 
attempts  anything  of  the  sort  is  an  enemy  not  alone 
of  the  State,  but  of  the  Nation.  Tiie  highest  pa- 
triotism to-day  is  the  patriotism  that  exerts  itself 
in  behalf  of  peace.  Those  who  would  seek  to  stir 
up  internal ional  complications  by  objectionable 
legislation  are  not  only  unpatriotic,  but  are  actually 
guilty  of  treason.  Members  of  the  legislature  will 
reiiect  ])ul)lie  scntihu'nt  if  they  will  frown  tlown 
the  agitators  of  anti-Japanese  legislation.  California 
wants  none  of  it.  There  is  no  occasion  for  any- 
thing of  the  sort,  and  the  people  throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  State  have  no  sympathy 
with  those  who  may  have  designs  to  jeopardize 
the  national  peace.' 

Senator  James  D.  Phelan,  a  staunch  defender  of 
all  that  goes  with  the  name  of  the  (lolden  State, 
has  of  late  made  In'mself  conspicuous  by  his  char- 
acteristic slat<Mnents  concerning  Japan  and  the 
Japanese.  It  is  both  befitting  and  significant  that 
tliese  slalements  iiave  usually  been  published  in 
the  Hearst  papers,  for  they  chime  in  beautifully  with 
the  utterances  of  those  "patriotic"  publications. 
How  i\lr.  riielan's  occasional  airing  of  anti-Japanese 
views  is  regarded  by  a  large  section  of  his  constit- 
uency may  be  judged  from  the  following  editorial 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE  87 

comment  of   the  San   Francisco   Bulletin,   perhaps 
tlie  hirgest  evening  new^spaper  in  Cahfornia: 

"  It  will  be  unfortunate  if  the  impression  is  created 
at  ^^  ashington  that  Senator  ^Vorks,  Senator  Phelan 
or   Senator   Poindcxter   represent   anything   like   a 
majority  of  their  constituents  when  they  makj  the 
discussion   of   the   immigration   hill   an  excuse  for 
sensational  declamations  against  the  Japanese.     If 
Senator  Phelan  remarked,  as  he  is  said  to  have  done, 
that  *this  government  ought  to  be  conducted  from 
Washington,  not  from  Tokyo,'  he  showed  less  under- 
standing than  was  to  be  expected  of  him.     Such 
forms  of  argument  might  have  represented  public 
opinion  in  California  ten  years  ago,  but  they  do 
not  represent  it  now.    By  her  adherence  to  the  terms 
of  the  Root-Takahira  'gentlemen's  agreement '  Japan 
has  earned  the  right  to  be  treated  with  more  cour- 
tesy than  this,  and  as  far  as  this  paper  is  informed 
on   the   subject,   most   Californians  are   willing  to 
grant  her  that  right.    If  our  representatives  in  Con- 
gress cannot  discuss  Japan  in  a  spirit  at  least  as 
courteous  as  that  displayed  on  the  Japanese  side 
in  the  negotiations  which  preceded  the  'gentlemen's 
agreement'  it  is  ourselves,  not  the  Japanese,  who 
will  appear  the  less  civilized." 

For  the  sake  of  international  peace  and  amity 
it  is  gratifying  that  the  labor  leaders  of  California 
have  also\nodified  their  former  hostile  attitude 
towards  the  Japanese.  When,  in  the  sunnner  of 
1915,  a  Japanese  labor  union  sent  a  representative 


mm 


i4. 


88 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


to  the  conventions  of  tlie  California  and  American 
Federations  of  Labor  with  the  r«'(|uest  that  he  be 
admitted  as  a  fraternal  delepite,  ]Mr.  Olaf  Tveitmoe, 
a  proininent  labor  leader  in  California,  said  to  a 
newspaper  reporter:  "I  would  rather  sit  with  a  Jap 
delej,'ate  than  with  a  lot  of  other  delegates." 

This  utterance  was  amazing  because  INIr.  Tveitmoe 
had  for  ahnost  ten  years  been  regarded  as  hostile 
towards  the  Japanese.  Its  real  sigiu'ficance  lies 
in  the  indication  it  implies  of  the  signal  change 
that  has  come  over  the  sentiments  of  the  class  of 
people  with  whom  its  author  is  identified.  To-day 
the  labor  leaders  of  California  are  willing  to  face 
the  Ja{)anese  question  in  a  conciliatory  spirit.  Be- 
cause of  this  new  attitude  on  the  part  of  California's 
labor,  the  once  celebrat(Hi  Ja[)anese  and  Korean 
Exclusion  IxMgue  of  San  Francisco  went  out  of 
existence  in  1!)14.  Addressing  the  Japanese  at  a 
recent  ban(|uet  at  which  both  Japanese  and  Ameri- 
cans were  present,  Mr.  Walter  MacArlhur,  a  promi- 
nent Democrat  and  labor  leader  in  California,  made, 
in  a  humorous  vein,  a  very  clever  and  exceedingly 
pertinent  oi)servation  by  iiaying:  "The  more  I  see 
you,  the  less  you  look  like  a  Jap!"  The  implication 
is  ob\  ions.  If  Japanese  ami  Americans  only  get 
togftlier  and  become  ac(|uainted  with  one  another, 
the  barrier  between  the  two  must  gradually  vanish. 

It  is  a  salutary  tendency  that  California's  labor 
leaders  have  c-ome  to  regard  the  Japanese  question 
as  an  ccononuo  rather  than  a  race  issue.     "The 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THK  JAPANESE 


89 


objection  of  the  American  to  tlie  Japanese,"  writes 
Mr.  James  AV.  Mullen,  editor  of  the  Labor  Clarion, 
organ  of  the  California  Federation  of  Labor  and 
the  San  Francisco  Labor  (\)uncil,  "was  not  based 
upon  racial  grounds,  but  upon  economic  grounds. 
The  racial  aspect  has  since  been  injected  into  the 
issue  by  designing  per.wn.s:"    With  which  Mr.  AValter 
MacArthur,  agrees  by  saying:  "The  movement  for 
Asiatic  exclusion  is   based  chiefly   upon  economic 
grounds.  ...     It  was  the  injection  of  the  idea  of 
racial  inferiority  -an  idea  that  had  no  place  in  the 
minds  of  any  honest  exclnsiunisf— {hut  led  to  mis- 
understanding and  created  a  breach  between   the 
two  countries." 

One  may  think  that  the  attempted  exclusion  of 
Japanese    pupils    from    the    San    Francisco    public 
schools  was  a  race  issue  and  not  economic.     But  a 
close  examination  of  the  situation  at  the  time  re- 
veals that  the  root  of  the  trouble  lay  in  the  competi- 
tion of  Japanese  with  American  labor.     As  far  as 
Japanese    children    were    concerned    no    complaint 
had  ever  been  made  about  their  presence  in  the 
schools  either  by  the  teachers  or  by  the  parents  of 
American  pupils.    The  real  trouble  was  that  Japan- 
ese immigrants  had  been  coming  to  San  Francisco 
in  comi)aratively  large  numbers  and  cnter'^d  into 
direct  competition  with  American  wi)rkingmen,  most 
of  whom  were  themselves  immigrants  from  other 
countries.      Under  such  circuinsfances  California's 
organized  labor  had  been  clamoring  for  a  stringent 


90 


JAPAN-  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


exclusion  law.  Finding  it  impossible  to  move  the 
Federal  (lovernment  into  immediate  action,  it 
resolved  to  register  its  protests  by  drastic  means. 
The  attempt  to  exclude  innocent  Japanese  children 
from  the  public  schools  and  the  repeated  assaults 
upon  Japanese  restaurants  and  bath-houses  in  San 
Francisco  in  1906  and  l!)07,  were  simply  labor's 
crude  way  of  demonstrating  its  opposition  to  the 
coming  in  large  numbers  of  such  immigrants  as 
would  lower  their  wages. 

The  i)assage  in  l!)13  of  the  California  anti-alien 
land  law  was  largely  due  to  the  vigorous  backing 
given  by  organized  labor.  That  such  a  step  was  a 
great  ec(momic  blunder  on  the  part  of  labor  seems 
incontrovertible  from  the  following  argument  by 
Mr,  Frank  Putnam,  for  some  years  editorial  writer 
on  the  St.  Louis  Post  Dispatch: 

"The  Alien  Land  Law  of  California  was  an  eco- 
nomic blunder.  This  law,  forbidding  the  thirty 
thousand  to  thirty-five  thousand  Japanese  men 
resident  in  California  to  buy  land  or  to  lease  land 
for  more  than  three  years,  condemns  them  to  join 
the  large  army  of  Americans  who  are  landless  and 
homeless.  It  condenms  them  to  be  either  wage 
earners  or  land  renters,  competing  against  American 
wage  earners  and  land  renters  for  employment  by 
the  owners  of  California's  lands  and  industries. 
Most  of  these  Japanese  men,  woidd,  if  permitted, 
buy  small  tracts  of  farm  or  garden  land  and  make 
permanent  homes  thereon.    They  would  in  this  wav 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


91 


cease  to  compete  against  American  wafje  earners 
in  the  labor  market.  Tliey  would  become  tax- 
payers, heli)ing  to  .suj)[)ort  all  social  institutions  - 
roads,  schools,  the  local  ^Governments.  Their  in- 
creased contrihution  to  the  food  supply  wouhl  re- 
duce the  cost  of  liviui?  for  all  residents  of  the  towns 
and  cities.  The  Alien  Land  Law  benefits  only  men 
who  'buy  lal)or.'  It  is  a  law  to  benefit  the  rich  by 
sharpening  competition  among  the  poor  for  em- 
ployment by  the  rich.  I  am  surpri>ed  that  the 
labor  unions  of  California  liave  not  denounced  this 
law  for  this  its  most  api)arent  injustice  to  their 
members.  I  suppose  the  unions  endorsed  the  law, 
bt'lieving  it  would  drive  the  Japanese  out  of  Cali- 
fornia. They  were  mistaken.  It  will  not  do  that. 
For  this  reason:  the  Japanese  laborers  in  California 
are  economically  far  better  off,  even  if  denied  citizen- 
ship and  the  right  to  own  land,  than  any  like  numl)er 
of  Ja{)anese  laborers  either  in  Ja{)an  or  elsewhere 
on  the  globe.  They  will  remain  here.  Their  children 
will  grow  up  here.  If  forbidden  to  own  farms  and 
become  independent  producers  of  food,  they  will 
become  each  year  a  larger  factor  in  the  labor  market 
of  the  towns  and  cities — competitors  there  against 
native  wage  earners.  The  Alien  Land  Law  of  Cali- 
fornia should  have  l)een  entitled,  'A  Law  to  Force 
Asiatic  Inunigrants  Into  Competition  with  .\merican 
Wage  Earners  and  Tenant  Farmers  for  the  Benefit 
of  American  Employers  and  Landlords,  and  to 
Enrich  Absentee  Land  Owners  by  Creating  u  Class 


9^2 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


of  Farm  Renters  \Mio  are  Forbidden  Ever  to  Ac- 
quire Land.'  " 

It  must  be  noted  that  the  low  standards  of  wages 
and  livint?  prevaiHng  among  the  lower  classes  in 
Japan  should  not  be  made  the  pretext  for  exclusion, 
if  Japanese  immigrants  upon  their  arrival  here  show 
themselves  capable  of  adjusting  themselves  to  the 
economic  conditions  prevailing  in  this  country. 
Fnbiascd  Californians  admit,  as  they  indeed  should, 
that  Japanese  laborers  no  longer  work  for  smaller 
wages  than  do  laborers  of  European  origin  of  the 
corresponding  class,  and  that  their  standard  of 
living  is  higher  than  that  of  immigrants  of  certain 
P^uroj)ean  countries.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons 
whv  California  labor  has  ceased  to  see  an  economic 
menace  in  the  Japanese. 

In  my  article  on  "England  and  Japan"  which 
brought  forth  u  storm  of  protests  as  well  as  a  flood 
of  commendation,  I  attributed  Japanese  success 
in  China  partly,  not  wholly  of  course,  to  Japanese 
industry  and  frugality.  One  of  my  critics  writing, 
apparently  in  a  sullen  mood,  to  the  editor  of  the 
Atlanfic  Montlilij,  in  which  the  article  was  published, 
said  that  "frugality  consisting  of  a  little  rice  and 
less  fish  in  contrast  to  our  three  square  meals" 
was  not  the  thing  we  should  wish.  Certainly  not. 
Obviously  this  critic  is  totally  ignorant  of  the  mode 
of  living  in  Japan,  but  he  shows  himself  more  ignorant 
of  his  own  country  when  he  fancies  that  this  sort  of 
retort  will  still  appeal  to  intelligent  Californians. 


THE  PACIFIC  COAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


93 


11 


Wlien  lie  comes  to  visit  California  I  would  advise 
him  to  patronize  Chinese,  Itahan,  Spanish,  Greek, 
French,  German,  or  reguhir  American  restaurants 
rather  than  Japanese  estahhshments,  unless  his 
pocketbook  is  well  supplied  with  cash.  We  can 
smile  with  mingled  complacency  and  pity  when  we 
hear  disgruntled  Americans  or  Europeans,  con- 
stantly brag  of  their  "high  standards  of  living," 
knowing  nothing  of  how  the  Japanese  enjoy  life. 

But  to  come  back  to  California  labor.  During 
the  past  year  or  two,  various  events  have  happened, 
tending  to  create  among  the  laborers  of  that  State 
a  sympathetic  feeling  towards  the  Japanese.  The 
first  of  such  events  was  the  conciliatory  attitude 
of  the  Jai)anese  steamship  concern,  the  Toyo  Kisen- 
Kaisha,  towards  tiie  longshoremen  wlio  went  oa  a 
strike  in  Mav,  1916.  The  San  Francisco  office  of 
this  firm  was  one  of  the  two  shipping  concerns  which 
promptly  accepted  the  demands  of  the  longshore- 
men. 

Then  came  the  strike  of  JJ.OOO  culinary  workers 
of  San  Francisco.  Wlien  the  strike  was  declared 
the  Japanese  employed  by  various  restaurants 
voluntarily  walked  out.  These  Japanese  had  been 
denied  admission  into  the  union  and  had  not  en- 
joyed the  protection  which  was  back  of  the  urnOn 
men.  And  yet  they  had  no  hesitation  in  showing 
their  sympathy  for  the  striking  \»  jrkers  by  quitting 
their  jobs.  The  occasion  furnished  food  for  reflec- 
tion on  the  part  of  American  workers.,  who  were  at 


94 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  P(JLITICS 


heart  conscious  that  they  had  not  heen  scjuare  with 
the  Japs. 

At  this  inoiTient  Air.  Suzuki,  president  of  the 
Laborers'  Friendly  Society  of  Japan,  came  to  San 
Francisco  f(jr  the  second  time.  He  was  aj,'ain  ad- 
milted  as  u  fraternal  d<'lej,'ate  to  tiie  convention 
of  the  Cahfornia  Federation  of  Lahor  held  at  Eureka 
in  October,  and  made  an  impressive  sinrch.  He 
hrou^'ht  with  him  a  letter  from  tlie  Laborers' Friendly 
Society  of  Japan,  inviting'  President  (lomjjers  of 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor  and  representa- 
tive lai)or  leaders  of  ("ahform'u  to  be  present  at  the 
fifth  anniversary  of  tlie  inauiiuration  of  the  Japanese 
lalior  organization  to  be  held  at  Tokyo  this  year. 
The  labor  leaders  invited  would  ha\  e  gone  to  Japan 
in  the  Spring  had  it  not  been  for  the  extraordinary 
situation  develo])ing  out  of  the  European  war. 

At  the  Eureka  convention,  which  I  have  already 
nientioni'd,  an  imj)orlant  resolution  was  adopted 
to  the  effect  that  tlie  executive  cojumittee  of  the 
California  Federation  of  Labor  look  into  the  prac- 
ticability of  organizing  Japanese  workers  in  this 
country  with  a  view  of  alliliating  them  eventually 
with  the  American  Federation  of  Labor.  This  is 
indeed  a  great  stride  towards  the  creation  of  better 
relations  between  American  and  Japanese  workers. 
Another  noteworthy  aspect  of  the  convention  was 
its  omission  to  recommend  any  fresli  legislation  for 
further  restriction  of  the  rights  of  the  Japanese  in 
Calif'tsrnia.     T'p  to  l!)l.'i  ihc!  successive  conventions 


TIIK  I'.U  IHr  (OAST  AND  THE  JAPANESE 


95 


adoplrd  re.s()luti(*n.s  or  platforms  urging  the  pro- 
liiUilion  of  land  owMcrship  liy  the  Japanese.  When 
the  anti-Japanese  land  law  was  finally  a<lo|)ted  in 
1!)13,  the  State  FediTatiun  of  Lahor  and  the  San 
Franeiseo  Lahor  Conneil  put  themselves  on  n'cord 
as  favoring  the  enactment  of  a  more  stringent  land 
law,  de{)riving  the  Japanese  of  the  right  to  lease 
agricultural  land.  But  the  Eureka  convention 
last  year,  contrary  to  the  proceedings  of  the  previous 
sessions,  did  not  adopt  any  such  measure.  Nor 
did  the  j)lat forms  of  the  State  Federation  of  Lahor 
and  the  San  Francisco  Lahor  Council,  in  the  political 
campaign  last  year,  include  any  plank  looking 
towards  further  restriction  of  the  rights  of  Japanese 
in  California.  True,  the  Eureka  convention,  as 
previously,  did  adopt  a  resolution  ohjecting  to 
Oriental  immigration,  but  the  significant  part  of  it 
was  the  divergent  views  the  resolution  called  forth. 
"This  sort  of  resolution  gets  us  nowhere,"  declared 
Hugo  r^rnst,  representing  the  culinary  workers  of 
San  Francisco,  "why  can't  we  face  the  question 
more  squarely  and  h»)nestly  and  organize  the  Japan- 
ese workers  in  our  midst,  which  is  the  only  solution 
of  the  question?"  "  Vou  can't  charge  the  J:ips  with 
unassimilahility."  said  Ri'-hard  Caverly,  veteran 
of  the  Boilermakers'  Union  of  San  Francisco.  "The 
same  charge  used  to  he  directed  against  tlie  'lousy 
Irish.'" 

With    the   Japanese   Government    faithfully    ad- 
hering to  the  "gentlemen's  agreement,"   and  with 


M 


96 


JAPAN  IS  WORLD  POLITICS 


California  labor  showing  u  (Jisposition  to  deal  more 
sfiuart'ly  with  the  Japanese,  we  may  reasonably 
hope  that  the  delieate  question  which  has  taxed 
the  diplomats  of  both  countries  will  cease  to  be  an 
acute  issue. 


CILvPTER  VII 
THE  EXPATRIATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE 

Colonel  Roosevelt's  vision — Flis  prophetic  message  of  1906 — A  fatal  mis- 
take of  Congress— The  crux  i.-f  the  Japanese  qu.stion— Contintntal 
school  of  nationality  law— The  "dual  nationality"  <<f  American- 
born  citizens  of  Kuropean  descent— The  Japanese  law  of  nation- 
ality^The  ex|)atnation  of  American-born  Japanes*^  Their  nation- 
ality not  "dual,"  but  ".single" — The  Japanese  not  the  apotheosis 
of  patriotism- -The  German  nationality  law  of  July,  191:5— The 
reBection  of  Pan-Germanism  upon  Amirican  Germans— Physical 
assimilability  does  not  mean  mental  assimilability— The  mental 
attitude  of  European  immigrants  compared  with  that  of  Japanese — 
Expatriation  of  Japanese  born  in  Japan— Attitude  of  naturalized 
Japanese  in  case  of  American-Japanese  war — Mongolians  both 
Asiatic  and  European — Hyhrid  ra< fS  more  progressive  than  "pure 
races'"— Intermingling  of  Japanese  and  Caucasian  blood -Professor 
Baelz  on  Eurasians— Important  decision  on  a  Japanese  petition  for 
aaturalization. 

Colonel  Roosevelt,  despite  many  unkind  words 
heaped  upon  liim,  ghows  at  tin"'.'  surprising  vision. 
With  special  reference  to  America's  relations  with 
Japan  lie  has  often  taken  a  stand  which  bespeaks 
a  man  of  farsightedness.  Upon  the  termination  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  war,  as  President,  he  immedi- 
ately withdrew  the  American  legation  from  Korea, 
for  he  clearly  foresaw  that  the  Hermit  Kingdom 
had  signed  its  own  doom  through  the  supineness 
and  corruption  of  its  own  officials  and  people. 

His  part  in  the  Korean  drama  will  be  told  in  a 

87 


i 
II 


^S^     J\ 


1)S 


.I\r.\N  IN   WOHLI)  POLITKS 


lator  (•liai)ttT.  Ilore  wo  must  note  liis  prophetic 
iiies>a^e  to  ('onf,'res.s  in  the  fall  ol"  11)00,  reconinieml- 
ing  the  extension  of  eitizenship  to  the  Japanese  as 
the  only  means  of  safeiTuardinp  the  inlu-rent  rights 
of  tlie  Japanese  who  had  been  le<^itimately  admitted 
to  this  country.  Had  Congress  acted  upon  the 
Miggi'stion  and  provided  for  the  naturalization  of 
the  Japanese,  our  relations  with  the  Far  Eastern 
Empire  would  never  have  been  disturbed.  It  would 
have  effectively  forestalled  such  whimsical  legisla- 
tion as  has  since  been  witnessed  on  the  Pacific  Coast 
to  the  detriment  of  the  traditional  friendship  of 
the  two  natiims.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan  in 
ai)preciation  <»f  so  gracious  an  act  on  the  part  of 
the  Executive  and  Congress,  would  have  manifested 
a  spirit  of  accomi'uxlation,  even  greater  than  that 
demonstrated  in  the  willing  acceptance  of  the  "gen- 
tlemen's agreenr.Mit,"  thus  affording  to  the  Pacific 
Coast  a  still  greater  safeguard  against  the  unre- 
stricted inmiigration  of  Jaj)anese  laborers. 

IJut  in  the  year  l!)UG  IMr.  Roosevelt  was  so  far 
ahead  of  the  times,  that  his  recommendation  for  the 
naturalization  of  the  Japanese  was  given  Ihe  cold 
shoulder  where  it  was  not  grcetetl  with  derision  and 
r(>l»uff.  In  the  light  of  the  subse(|uent  unhappy 
history  of  American-Japanese  relations  there  can 
be  little  doubt  of  the  egregious  error  of  this  course. 
Through  its  inability  to  discern  the  great  j)rol)lem 
which  had  begun  to  loom  upon  the  Pacific,  America 
let  .slip  the  golden  opi)ortunity  of  winning  Japan's 


^^ 


m 


THE  EXPATRIATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE 


99 


friendship  jkmI  ^'ratitude,  as  she  liad  won  it  jusf  a 
year  Ix-fore  in  recognizing  Japan's  int'vitahle  destiny 
in  Korea. 

The  ernx  of  the  Japanese  question  to-day  is  that 
of  naturah"zalion.  I  have  repeatedly  emphasized 
the  fact  th.at  Japan  has  no  intention  of  embarrassing 
the  Ignited  States  by  demanch'ng  the  unrestricted 
immigration  of  her  subjects  of  the  laboring  class. 
What  she  would  see  done  is  a  sinifjle  act  of  justice 
toward  the  small  number  of  Japanese  who  are  al- 
ready lawfully  admitted  into  this  country.  In  other 
words,  the  protection  of  these  Japanese  against  such 
unwarranted  legislation  in  the  Western  Stales  as 
I  have  pointed  out  in  the  preceding  chapter,  is  the 
only  favor  which  Japan,  in  the  name  of  international 
peace  and  amity,  is  asking.  And  the  way  to  do  this 
is  to  extend  citizenship  to  the  Japanese.  Shall  it 
be  done,  or  shall  it  be  left  undone  to  the  detriment 
of  the  traditional  friendship  of  tiie  two  nations? 

The  absurd  notion  seems  to  prevail  hen  tiiat  the 
Mikado  does  not  allow  his  subjects  to  exi)atriate 
and  swear  allegiance  to  another  country.  This 
notion  is  due  to  the  utter  ignorance  of  Americans 
as  to  tl-e  Japanese  Law  of  Nationality. 

Let  nie  say  at  once  that  the  Japanese  law  in  this 
respect  is  more  liberal  than  those  of  the  countries 
of  continental  Europe.  Broadly  si)eaking,  there 
are  two  schools  of  nationality  law.  One  is  the  Angh)- 
American  school  which  determines  nationality  ac- 
cording to  the  place  of  })irth.    The  other  is  the  Con- 


m 


100 


JAI'AN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


tinontnl   sclmol   wl.icli   recognizes  allegiance  to  the 
sovereign  I'V  reii.on  «.f  blood-descent.     In  the  light 
of  the  AnuM-ican  law,  all  who  are  born  upon  Ameri- 
can soil  are  cili/ens  of  the  Republic.    On  the  other 
hand,  most  European  countries  claim  as  their  sub- 
jects all  who  are  born  of  their  natives  whether  at 
home  or  abroad.     Section  one,  Article  VII  of  the 
French    Civil    ("ode,    for    instance,    provides    that 
"Kverv  pr.son  born  of  ii  Frenchman  in  France  or 
abroad"    is   a    Fr<  nchman   and   owes   allegiance   to 
France.     A  similar  provision  is  found  in  the  laws 
of   (Jermany,    Switzerland,    and   other   Continental 

countries. 

Here   we   are  confronted   with   a  great  anomaly 
in  tl-.e  form  of  a  "dual  nationality"  for  Americans 
born    of    Fm-opean   parents.      Tliey   are   American 
citizens,  and,  at  the  same  time,  French,  C.ernums, 
Swiss,  an.l  so  on.     In  a  great  crisis  such  as  we  face 
to-dav,  this  anomah)U<  condition  is  a  grave  o})stacle 
to  na"tional  unity.    The  only  logical  and  reasonable 
thing  for  th<'  European  Covernments  to  do  would 
be  to  ameuil  their  laws  of  nationality  and  avoid 
conflict    with    the    American    law,    thus    divesting 
Americans  of  European  descent  of  the  nationalities 
of  tlu-ir  parents. 

What  are  the  provisions  of  Japanese  law  in  this 
respect  ^  ri>  to  March,  l!>l(i,  .Ia|)an  had  a  national- 
ity law  similar  to  that  of  the  (\)ntinental  school 
we  h;!ve  ju>t  m.ted.  But  the  quest icm  of  dual 
nationality,  brought  into  bold  relief  since  the  open- 


THE  EXPATRIATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE  101 

ing  of  the  great  war  by  th^  presence  in  this  country 
of  large  numbers  of  Americans  of  European  parent- 
age, so   ;reatlv  impressed  the  Japanese  in  Americ-a 
that   thev  caused   the  legishit<.rs   of   tlie   Japanese 
diet  to  pass  hist  year  a  new  \a^v  of  nationahty  to 
harmonize  with  the  American  hiw.     This  new  hiw 
provides  that  a  Japanese  boy  who  has  acciuired  a 
foreign  nationahty  by  reason  of  his  birth  in  a  f.)reign 
country,  nuiv,  provided  he  be  domicik'd  m  such 
country,    divest    himself    of    Japanese    nationahty, 
if  his  father  or  other  parental  authority  take  the 
necessary  steps   to  tiuit   end    before  ho  is  fifteen 
years  of  age;  or,  if  he  has  attained  the  age  of  fifteen, 
he  may  himself  take  the  same  step,  with  the  con- 
sent of  his  father  or  other  parental  authority,  which 
is  necessary  until  he  attains  the  age  of  seventeen. 

\pply  this  new  Japanese  provision  to  the  Japam  -- 
children  born  in  this  country.    They  will  all  b. come 
\merican  citizens  if  they  take  the  necessary  steps 
for  expatriation,  for,  in  the  light  of  the  Americar 
law,  thev  are  already  citizens  of  the  Repubhc.    I  n- 
like  European-Americans  their  nationality  will  be 
"single,"  not  "dual."    They  will  owe  their  allegiame 
to  the  Stars  and  Stripes,  and  to  no  other  flag.    Crt dit 
must  be  given  to  the  Japanese  legislators  for  Ihis 
epoch-making,   though   simple   and   wh..ll>    h)gKul, 
«'„ncession  to  the  territorial  principle  of  the  Ameri- 
ican  law.    They  have  blazed  the  path  for  the  Euro- 
pean Governments.     Lot  us  hope  that  the  latter 
will  not  be  slow  in  following. 


W 


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n 


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102 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITICr) 


But  the  new  Japam'se  law  is  far  from  ideal,  be- 
rauso  it  pcnuils  the  Jai)ano.se  army  to  enrol'  tcri- 
('an-l)orn  Ja[)aiu'se  l)oy.s  over  seventeen,  if  y  fail 
to  take  .-.h-ps  for  expatriation  Infore  that  age.  Sueh 
a  reservation  .sli(»ul(l  be  removed.  This  drawback  is, 
however,  only  apparent.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
will  prove  no  imix'dimcnt,  for  the  eagerness  of  the 
Ainerlean-born  Jaj)anese  boys  to  avoid  conscription 
in  the  army  of  a  nation  foreign  to  their  thought  and 
ideals,  is  the  .surest  remedy  for  this  defect.  It  will 
surprise  Aiiierirans  to  know  that  many  Japanese 
young  men  come  to  this  country  mainly  for  the 
purpose  of  «>s(  aping  (enrollment  in  the  army.  Human 
nature  is  the  same  the  world  over,  and  the  Japanese 
is  not,  alter  all,  so  wonderful  an  apotheosis  of  pa- 
triotism. If  e\en  boys  born  and  educated  in  Japan 
are  beginning  to  show  themsehes  apatlu'lic  toward 
military  .service,  liow  can  we  expect  the  Japanese, 
born  and  educated  here,  and  imbued  with  the 
American  spirit  of  freedom,  to  .surrender  tlu-ni- 
selves  to  the  conscription  of  a  country  of  which 
they  have  but  a  faint  idea?  Yon  may  rest  assured 
that  before  they  are  seventeen  they  will  all  avail 
themselves  of  the  privilege  of  expatriation  pro- 
vided in  the  new  Japanese  law  of  nationality. 

We  have  discussi-d  the  nationality  of  "Americans" 
born  of  foreign  i)areiits.  Now  we  must  consider 
the  naturalization  of  foreign-born  residents  in  Amer- 
ica, or,  to  look  at  the  matter  from  the  other  side, 
the  exj)a  trial  ion  of  such  residents. 


THE  EXPATRIATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE 


103 


The  German  nationality  law  adopted  on  July  "^^^ 
191IJ     T^rovides:    "German    citi/ensliii)    is    not    lost 
bv   a   (ierman   who   has,   lu'fore   ac.iu.rin-   foreign 
citizenship,  seeured  fro,n  the  competent  authonl.es 
of  his  home  State  the  VNritten  permission  to  retam 
his  original  citizenship."     This  provision  permits, 
perhaps  is  meant  to  eneourage,  the  aec,uisilmn    .y 
Germans   abroad   of   dual   nationality.      It  enal.les 
Germans  in  America  to  enjoy  all  the  privileges  of 
American  c-itizenship  without  forfeiting  any  of    he 
privileges  of  the  German  subje.t.     It  is  mt(>nded  to 
strengthen  the  German  people  as  a  umt-a  manifes- 
tation of  Pan-Germanism. 

How  does  this  Pan-German  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment at  Berlin  react  upon  the  (lermans  ,n  America: 
Savs  the  celebrated  General  von  Bernhardi : 

''The  isolated  groups  of  Germans  abroad  greatly 
benefit  our  trade,  since  by  pn  lerence  they  obtain 
their  goods  from  Germany,  but  they  may  also  be 
useful  to  us  politically,  as  we  disc-over  in  America^ 
The  American-Germans  have  iormed  a  political 
alliance  with  the  Irish,  and,  thus  united,  constitute 
a  power  in  the  State  with  which  the  Government 

must  reckon." 

This  was  written  in  1910.    When  the  present  wa 
broke  out  Mr.  George  Sylvester  Viereck    Ldilor  ..f 
the  FaiherlamU  faithfully  echoed  \on    Bernhardi  3 
utterance  in  these  fervent  words:  ,       ,  , 

"You  (non-German  Americans)  have  refused  to 
listen  to  our  reasoning.    You  were  deaf  to  our  i)leas. 


'^ 
.* 


f  fit 


mw 


^i&m. 


a^^m 


Wi 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


"Wv  sliiill  ^o  into  the  arena  of  polities.  "We  sliall  try 
to  beat  you  at  y(»iir  own  jj.'iuie.  One  liun<lre(l  and 
seventy  inenihers  of  ("on^ress  are  of  lii^h  extraetion. 
There  is  no  n'ason  why  they  sliould  not  he  joined 
by  one  hundred  and  seventy  of  (lernian  extraetion. 
There  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not  hibor  for  the 
eh'clion  of  men  of  our  own  bh)od  who  are  in  aceord 
witli  our  principles,  whieli  are  also  the  principles  of 
true  Americanism. " 

Duriuf^  theSpanisli-.Vmeriean  war.  Die  (Ircnzhoten, 
a  very  infhuMitial  weekly  m  (lermany,  came  out  with 
this  bold  assertion: 

"We  have  to  consider  that  more  than  .'},()0(),000 
(iirmaiis  live  as  f<»rei<;ners  in  the  I'.iited  States  and 
are  not  j)crsonalIy  interested  in  that  country.  A 
skillful  CJermiin  national  policy  should  be  able  to 
mani{)ulate  this  (lerman  nniltitndc  against  the 
shameless  Auk  rican  war  speculators." 

And  in  the  e.irly  staj^c  of  tiie  present  war  the 
(lerman-.Vmeriean  Society  of  Passaic,  New  Jersey, 
issued  a  manifesto  containing  these  words: 

"Come,  all  of  you.  (ierman  Societies,  (lerman  men 
and  (lerman  women,  so  that,  united  ofl'ensively 
and  defensively,  with  weapons  of  the  s[)irit,  i.  e., 
votes,    we    may    help    our    beloved    Germany    on- 


ward 


To  which  the  late  Mr.  Herman  Riddcr  added 
this  clarion  call: 

"There  have  been  no  traitors  to  the  German 
cau.se  either  among  the  ()(),000,()0()  Germans  in  Ger- 


THE  EXPATRIATION"  OF  THE  JAPANESE 


105 


many  or  among  the  many  millions  of  Germans  and 
their  desrendants  in  this  country." 

I  have  quoted  from  the  (urma.i  law  of  natumahty 
and  given  a  fc-w  exami,les  of  utterances  refleeting 
the  spirit  of  that  law.  simply  to  show  that  races, 
xvhid,  are  apparently  or  physically  as>imdal.le  w.th 
tl,e  An.eric:.n  people,  are  often  far  from    HM"g  as- 
Mmilat<-.1  mentally  and  si,iritually.     And  ni  doing  this 
I  have  no  desire  to  single  out  the  Germans  and  make 
them   the   onlv   targets   of   criticism.      Innn.grants 
fnmi  certain  other  countries  are  perhaps  more  alien 
in  thought  and  i<leals  than  the  (;.-rn,a..s      Many 
Englishmen  live  here  for  years  and  decades  with 
no  intention  of  changing  their  nationality,  and  ti.ey 
,„,,,.tain  no  more  love  or  respec-t  for  tins  c-ountry 
than  do  Germans.     In  fact  their  assumption  <.f  an 
air  of   superiority  often  ra>ps  the  nerv.vs  o     loya 
Americans.      As   for   immigrants   from    South    arid 
East  Europe,  their  measure  of  assumlab.hty  is  fair  v 
well  k.u,wn.    Especially  in  recent  years  mcreasmgly 
large  proportions  of  European  inunigrants  do  not 
lH.con'e  citizens.     In  New  York  (^ity,  for  example 
500,000  of  1,433,749  persons  of  votmg  age  m  UIO 
were    unnaturalized    and    showe.l    no    mtent:on     o 
identifv   themselves   with     i>e    Nation.      Not   on  y 
are  most  of  these  inunigrants  unal.le  to  read  English, 
but  thcv  arc  also  dcHcient  in  the  knowledge  of  their 
own  languages.     These  are  vital  facts  whu  .  should 
b-^  kc',t  in  view  in  discussing  the  -unassumlabihtv 
of  th  J  Japanese,  who  are  eager  to  learn  and  to  adjust 


i 

1? 

iV  •; 

106 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


tht'nis<'Iv<'s  \o  their  new  surroundings,  who  woukl 
huihl  l)()ok  slori's  where  olher  inuni^rarils  would 
set  up  sahxjns.  Is  it  fair  that  America  should  oj)en 
her  doors  of  cifi/enship  without  reserve  to  tliose 
innni^Mants  wliosc  assijuihition  is  only  skin-deep, 
and  slam  them  in  the  face  of  thosi*  who  are  capal)le 
of  assimihition  in  a  deeper  and  truer  meaning  of 
tlie  term? 

But  I  must  come  back  to  the  Japanese  hiw  of 
nafionaUty.  \Ve  have  seen  liow  an  American-horn 
Japanese  can  (hvest  himself  of  Japanese  nationality. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  a  Japanese  horn  in 
Japan  is  allowed  to  expatriate.  The  Japanese  law 
provides:  "A  person  who  has  ac(iuired  a  foreign 
nationality  by  Ins  own  choice  loses  Japanese  national- 
ity." 'i'his  is  reasonable.  But  the  law  provides 
exception  for  the  male  Japanese  of  seventeen  years 
or  more  who  are  not  allowed  to  absolve  themselves 
from  their  inherent  nationality  until  they  shall  have 
served  in  the  army  or  the  navy,  or  unless  they  are, 
for  lack  of  physical  (lualifications  or  for  any  other 
reason,  exemj)ted  from  military  service.  I'nder 
the  conscription  laws  (.>[  Japan  a  boy  at  seventeen 
becomes  a  member  in  the  laiidsturm,  though  his 
active  service  of  three  years  does  not  begin  until 
he  is  twenty.  After  three  years  of  active  .service 
lie  becomes  a  member  of  the  reserve,  corresponding 
to  the  (icrman  landurlir  and  remains  so  until  he 
is  forty.  Tliis  means  that  u  Japanese  l)t)rn  in  Japan, 
if  physically  (jualitied  to  become  a  soldier  and  ac- 


THE  EXPATRIATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE 


10' 


tiially  enrolled,  cnnnnt,  until  he  is  forty,  become 
an  American  citizen  (>ven  in  the  event  of  naturaliza- 
tion l)ein«  extended  to  him.  After  he  has  passed 
forty  he  is  absolutely  free  to  renounce  allegiance  to 
the  Japanese  fla«;.  If  a  Japanese  boy  is  ex(«mpt  from 
enrollment   for   any   reason   he   may   expatriate   at 

any  time. 

This,  in  brief,  is  the  Japanese  law  of  nationality 
and  expatriation.  The  exemi)tion  it  provides  is 
deplorable  and  .should  be  eliminated  as  soon  as 
possible.  On  the  whole,  however,  it  is  more  liberal 
and  progressive  than  the  laws  of  continental  Europe. 
If  the  naturalization  laws  of  the  United  States 
were  so  revised  as  to  extend  citizenship  to  the  Japa- 
ne.se,  many  would  avail  themselves  of  the  newly 
granted  privilege,  for  a  considerable  proportion  of 
the  Japanese  here,  for  one  reason  or  another,  have 
never  served  in  the  army. 

The  question  has  often  been  asked:  What  would 
be  the  attitude  of  a  naturalized  Japanese,  provided 
naturalization  is  extended  to  the  Japanese,  in  case 
of  war  between  Japan  and  America?  Let  me  answer 
this  question  with  an  illustration  from  Japanese 
history,  /he  retainer  of  a  feudal  lord  becatne  the 
adopted  son  of  another  h)rd.  When  war  broke  out 
between  the  two  dans,  the  young  .samurai  was  in  a 
quandary.  How  could  he  take  up  arms  against  his 
former  lord?  Yet  on  the  other  hand,  how  could 
he  be  untrue  to  his  present  lord?  He  reasoned  it  out 
thus:  "To  be  untrue  to  my  new  lord  would  be  an 


•^R't/ft!?«'>iJ^  ^'-TrV^i 


,„S  JAPAN  IN  W™'-"  P"I-ITI'^ 

,,,  „t  lr,.a,l».rv  unworthy  of  the  n-.port  an<l  name 
,    nn-    ,>nn..r  n.a.sler.    I  will  fi.ht  f-r  ."y  yres,.nt 

This  is  the.  spirit  ot  Japan.  ^>.  h.yally.  1  h<  hero 
.,t  ,  ,:  l,„ve  'lory  has  e^ cr  l»-.n  apph,n.-d  and 
ltd  hy  post,.ri,y.     'H.^- ';^-'>^v  "H™hd  •  ap 

k  r,.i,Kl>.  wiUi  .sn.li  taU-s  ot  li.-r..isni.    M.i>  w>  not 
,et      tsmhwiUheth,.  attitude  of  Japan,  >em 

A^lerhlr   ou,.e    they    are    adn,it,ed    into   A.ner.ean 

'"t;;:;'';:^  entie.,  who  o.,i..et  to  the  naturalisation 
„f,e  Japanese  upon  raeial  ,r..unds    aa.l  .hseus, 
;,..,,,,  fro,n    Ihe  viewpoint   o    n>.ern,arnag.. 
^t  us  h.ok  at  the  .,uesli.n.  in  the  broader  l.«ht  o 

'voh,. In  exehahng  or  .liserinunalm^  a^ams 

„,e  Japan..se  on  racial  .rounds,  Anu.,ea    .n  n^s 
the  faet  that   the  Monp.han  race  ,s    .oil.  Asiat.e 
a    '  uropean.     l'resun,ing  that  the  Japanese  are 
;  ,i;"M'on,olian  fanulv    «.ueh  is  a  nujo    po.n  . 
^hy   .shonhl   they   alone  be  d.sernn.nated  .iK.un  t, 
:-,,en  Kuropean  Mongolian,  sueh  as  Iu,s  and  Mag- 
yars    are    allowed    uurestricled    free.lonl    to   enter 
;     .'onutrv  and  the  unlinuted  privileges  of  e.t,.en- 
1    „ V    AVe'nurst  also  r«nend,er  that  ahu.g  the  boMer- 
,nl  w  ere  Asia  n.eets  Europe  the  Caneas.ans  have 
,    gl        treelv    with    the   Mongols.   resuUn.g   n>  a 

T,  id  raee  ;hose  physieal  ^:'-;»;'";».""  "^  ^ 
eide,llv  Caueasian.  I  am  inehned  to  tlnnk  that  the 
jlpale.  born  and  reared  in  An.eriea.  «,11,  by  reason 


THE  FAPATRIATION  OF  THL  JAPANESE  109 

of  their  now  natural  and  social  cnvironniont,  lose 
in  time  niiich  of  tlicir  orifjinal  racial  type  without 
tlie  prc.ccss  of  inlcrmarriage.  Juil^'inK  from  wliat 
has  hapi)cncci  to  the  Mongols  in  Europe,  this  seems 
no  al)surcl  conjecture. 

More  absurd  is  the  contention   that  the   inter- 
niiiif,^Hnf,'    of    Japanese    and    the    Caucasian    blood 
results  in  racial  de.^'eneration.     On  this  particular 
aspect  of  the  Japanese  question  such  eminent  biolo- 
gists   as    Professor    Loeb    and    Professor    Boas,    of 
(  olumbia  X^iivcr.>ity,  have  given  a  verdict  virtually 
supporting  ny  contention.     There  are  T)e()|)le  who 
cherish  superstitious  beliefs  in  the  "purity"  of  race 
or  blood.    As  a  matter  of  fact ,  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  "i)ure  race."    All  races  are  hybrid.     He  betrays 
his  hopeless  ignorance  who  speaks  of   the  Anglo- 
Saxon  as  a  pure  race.     Again  the  Japanese  is  as 
mixed  a  race  as  the  Anglo-Saxon;  in  his  veins  runs 
Malayan,     Mongolian,    and    Aryan    blo<»d.      The 
aborigines  of  Japan  known  as  the  Aino  were,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  foremost  ethnologists  of  the  world, 
Aryans.     Is  it  not  a  blow  to  the  superstitious  be- 
liever in  the  innate  superiority  of  the  Aryan  race 
that   those   Japanese   Aryans   who    remained   pure 
have  totally  degenerated  and  fare  to-day  no  better 
than  the  North  American  Indians,  while  the  Japa- 
nese, who  are  a  conglomerate  of  Malayan,  Mongolian, 
and  Aryan,  are  fast  coming  to  the  forefront  of  civili- 
zation?    The  ancient  Babylonians,   Assyrians  and 
Egyptians  wc  e  perhaps  as  near  specimens  of  homo- 


m&''^--''^mm 


110 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


ficticoiis   r;i((s,   as  can   l>e  found   in   history.      Yet 
wlicre  is  tlK'ir  ^l<»ry  to-day?     Tlu-y  roniaincd  pure 
of  blood,  and  declined  while  yet  pure.    The  '"^'lory 
that  was  Iconic"  was  a  civilization  afTectcd   by  u 
mongrel  race  prochiced  ])y  the  conihination  of  Tro- 
jans,   Etruscans,   Latins,   and   perhaps  some  other 
stocks.      And    Rome    decayed    when    it    ceased    to 
assimilate    alien    blood    strains.      Clnna    furnishes 
another   cxamjjle   of    so-called    racial    purity.      \et 
her  .tar  waned  centuries  ago,  and  her  salvation  is 
hardly  in  sight.     Look  at  America:  She  owes  lier 
vitality  and  progress  to  tiie  contimious  infusion  of 
"new"  blood  from  outside.     As  Dr.  Doremus  Scud- 
der,  a  ])r()minent  pastor  and  publicist  of  Honolulu, 
says:   "Our  New  England  families  are  dying  out, 
but  their  ])laces  are  being  taken  by  pioneers  from 
all  over  the  world,  not  by  scions  of  the  wealthy, 
overculturetl  and  childless,  but  by  honest  workaday 
folk,  some  of  them  victims  of  oppression  in  their 
home  lands;  people  who  have  lived  close  to  the  soil, 
who  breed  large  families  and  by  so  doing  show  them- 
selves unspoiled  by  the  dry  rot  of  physical  incom- 
petence."    Woe  to  America  when  she  shall  receive 
no  more  vigorous  pioneer  stocks  from  abroad,  and 
leave  the  country   to  the  mercy  of  the  men  and 
women,  steei)ed  in  pleasure,  dazzled  with  the  glitter 
of   nuiterial   prosperity,   now   dabbling   in   charity, 
now  making  a  fad  of  birth  control! 

But  I  nmst  not  stay.    America  need  not  entertain 
the  .slighltvst  apprehension  concerning  the  matter 


TMK  EXPATRIATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE 


111 


of  the  intorminjjling  of  Japan  ^^e  and  Caucasian 
blood.  In  the  first  place  cases  ot  such  intennarriafje 
will  1)C  few,  at  least  for  many  years  to  come.  The 
Japanese  are  proud  of  their  hlood  (if  one's  l)lood  is 
anything  one  .should  he  proud  of)  no  less  than  the 
Americans  are  proud  of  theirs.  The  few  cases  of 
intcrmarriai,'c  which  may  occur  here  and  there  need 
cause  no  misgiving,  for  the  average  offspring  of 
Japancse-.Vmerican  parents  is  strikingly  handsome, 
bright,  intelligent  and  charming.  I  have  often 
derived  questionable  satisfaction,  I  am  ashamed  to 
say,  from  encountering  rabid  anf  i-intermarriage 
Americans  (which  may  mean  any  nationality), 
whose  children  are  decidedly  inferior,  V)oth  in  ap- 
pearance and  in  intelligence,  to  the  average  Japanese- 
Caucasian  child. 

Intermarriage  between  Japanese  and  Caucasians 
has  passed  the  <loul)tful  stage  of  experiment.  It 
is  here  to  "stay."  Cases  of  such  marriage,  though 
yet  few,  are  nevertheless  sufficient  to  show  that  it 
is  nothing  to  be  feared.  In  Japan  and  in  the  Eastern 
States  of  America,  children  born  of  respectable 
Japanese  and  Caucasians  have  found  no  difficulty 
in  marrying  either  Japanese  or  Caucasians  of  a 
corresponding  class.  I  know  a  German-Japanese 
who  is  happily  married  to  a  German  nobleman  and 
diplomat.  I  know  an  English-Japanese  whose  hus- 
band is  a  distinguished  Japanese  statesman,  who 
has  occupied  various  portfolios  in  the  cabinet.  I 
know  an  American-Japanese  whose  wife  is  a  daughter 


w 


ill 


■:d'\i^^riB'^'lxt 


112 


JAPAN  1\  WORLD  POLITICS 


of  :i  c!i.stiii,;4uisli('(l  American  clergyman.  That  such 
men  and  women  of  mixed  Caucasian  and  Japanese 
blood  have  l)een  readily  received  in  the  highest 
circles  of  Japanese  and  Western  comnnmities  is  an 
indisputable  indication  that  intermarriage  is  nothing 

to  be  feared. 

I  have  mentioned  Professors  Boas  and  Loeb  as 
two  authorities  on  biology  who  scout  the  prejudiced 
assertions  concerning  intermarriage.     In  this  con- 
nection it  is  interesting  to  note  the  following  state- 
ment made  some  y<-ars  a^o  l)y  Professor  Baelz,  a 
German  pliysician  of  the  Tokyo  Imperial  University: 
"On  this  question  I  may  sfn-ak  with  a  certain 
degree  of  authority,  having  been  the  first,  and  in 
fact  up  to  this  day  the  only  scientist,  who  has  made 
u  special  study  of  the  comparison  of  the  physical 
(jualities  of  the  Japanese  and  European  races.     Be- 
sides, as  a  physician  in  Tokio  during  thirty  years, 
I  had  the  oi)portunily  of  examining  an  unusually 
large  number  of  Eurasians,  and  I  paid  particular 
attention  to  them.     The  result  of  my  observations 
is  that  they  are  a  healthy  set  of  people,  and  I  do 
not  hesitate  to  say  that  not  one  of  the  common 
arguments  against  them   is  supported  by  science. 
They  are  on  an  average  well  built,  and  show  no 
tendency  to  organic  disease  more  than  Europeans 
or  Japam  se  do.     This  is  the  more  remarkable  as 
numy  of  them  grow  up  under  unfavoralde  circum- 
stanles,  the  father  often  having  left  them  with  little 
money  to  the  care  of  a  mother  who  has  no  authority 


ffs^^rm 


mm 


THE  EXPATRIATION  OF  THE  JAPANESE 


113 


over  tlu'in.  This  is  a  particularly  important  point 
if  the  iiioiiil  quail lios  are  considered.  In  Europe, 
too,  we  know  that  abandoned  illegitimate  children 
very  often  turn  out  badly,  and  a  fair  comparison 
must  take  that  into  serious  consideration.  To  make 
quite  sure  about  the  intellectual  and  moral  qualities 
of  the  Eurasian,  I  have  asked  the  opinion  of  the 
man  who  is  belter  qualiBed  than  any  other  to  give 
an  authoritative  judgment— Mr.  Ileinrich,  director 
of  tlie  School  of  the  Morning  Star.  He  luis  had  in 
his  classes,  side  by  side,  Europeans,  Japanese  and 
almost  all  the  male  half-breeds  in  Tokio.  His  opinion 
is,  that  if  properly  brought  up  and  well-looked  after, 
the  half-breeds  are  morally  and  intellectually  in  no 
way  inferior  to  the  children  of  either  parent.  As  a 
rule  they  are  taller  and  more  robust  than  the  Japan- 
ese, and  in  every  branch  of  learning  they  are  fully 
up  to  the  standard  of  their  fellow-scholars." 

Let  the  prejudiced  indulge  in  invectives  and  in- 
sinuations to  their  hearts'  content.  They  will  be 
ashamed  of  themselves  when  great  lights  in  art, 
science,  literature  and  other  higher  achievements, 
sf)riug  from  among  Caucasian-Japanese,  as  they 
moNt  assuredly  will. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  Americans  are,  in  discussing 
the  Japanese  question,  inclined  to  invoke  the  set 
argument  about  the  negro  question.  There  is  no 
comparison  In-tween  the  two.  The  Negroes  were 
brought  here  as  slaves  from  the  jungles  of  a  savage 
country.      The   Japanese  have  behind    thera  cen- 


ir 


npsi^  iLJi'i>k~j«fr&.»- k  sMKv.  '7'A 


114 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


,f  ]\\^]\]:    cultivated  civilization.     They  are 


turics  <) 

us  a  Jai)ancsc  wri 


tcr  proudly  declares,  the  "knights 
among  the  nations,"  and  have  never  heen  brought 
under  a  foreign  yoke.    The  color  of  the  Negro,  like 
the  leopard's  spots,  docs  not  easily  vanish  through 
intermarriage.      On   the  other  hand,   the  offspring 
of  Japanese  and  Caucasian  parentage,  when  united 
to  11  full-hloodcd  Caucasian,  begets  a  child  that  is, 
both  in  i)hysiognomy    and   color,  absolutely  Cau- 
casian.   E(iually  important  is  the  obvious  fact  that 
racial  feeling  against  the  Japanese  in  America  is 
not,  and  it  has  never  been,  half  as  strong  as  that 
against  the  Negro.     Whether  at  hotels  or  at  res- 
taurants,   in   j)ublic   conveyances   or   in   places   of 
amusement,  the  Japanese  are  never  discrimiiuited 
against  in  the  East  and  South,  and  seldom  even  in 
California.    This  may  seem  a  small  matter,  but  it  is 
an  important  indication  that  what  racial  prejudice 
there  may  be  against  the  Japanese  to-day  will,  with 
the  passing  of  years,  gradually  decrease  and  even- 
tuallv  disappear.     This  seems  all  the  more  likely 
if  one  considers  the  many  instances  of  while  la- 
bor* rs    gladly    and    liarmoniously    working    under 
Japanese  bosses  or  foremen. 

In  concluding  this  chai)ter  it  seems  pertinent  to 
cite  the  decision  recently  handed  down  by  Judge 
Charles  F.  Clemons  of  the  Federal  Court  at  Hono- 
lulu, denying  to  Mr.  Takewo  O/awa,  a  prominent 
Japanese  resident  in  Hawaii,  the  privilege  of  becom- 
inf»  an  American  citizen.     The  interest  in  the  case 


THE  EXPATRIATION-  OF  THE  JAPANESE 


115 


lies  in  the  fact  that  the  jiulRe  in  his  decision  frankly 
admitted  that  he  was  meting  out  a  judgment  which 
he  knew  was  not  just.  This  case  pointedly  illus- 
trated the  necessity  of  revising  the  naturalization 
laws  of  this  country. 

Judge  demons  quoted  with  approv^Ubg^follow- 
ing  passage  from  Dr.  William  Elliot  «l8ft  book, 
The  Evolution  of  the  Japanese: 

"There  is  no  necessary  distinction  between  the 
Oriental  and  Occidental,  the  brown  and  the  white 
man.  That  the  *  yellow  brain'  and  the  Japanese 
heart  are  ultimately  different  from  those  of  the 
Yankee  or  the  Briton  is  the  notion  of  tradition,  not 

the  fact  of  science." 

Now,  the  Federal  ju^ heartily  agreed  with  the 
above  view  of  Dr.   &^^  a  great  American  au- 
thority on  Japan,  and  yet  he  was  compelled  to  add 
that  his  ruling  could  not  be  controlled  by  the  worth 
of  the  Japanese,  their  moral  and  intellectual  quali- 
fications; he  must  determine  only  whether  Congress 
had  them  in  mind  in  its  provision  for  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  "free  white  persons"   and  of   "aliens     of 
"African  nativity  and  persons  of  African  descent. 
This  question  the  judge  answered  in  the  negative, 
believing  that  the  term  "free  white  person      does 
not  apply  to  the  Mongolian  race,  of  which  he  thinks 
the  Japanese  is  a  member. 

As  it  stands,  .ne  law.  Judge  Clemons  believes, 
cannot  be  interpreted  as  favoring  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  the  Japanese.    That  he  sees  injustice  m  this 


I 


116 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


law  is  ol.vioiis  from  tl.e  following  suggestion  which 
lie  advaiicocl  in  Jiis  deci.sion: 

"The  n.MKdy  lies  with  Congress,  and  our  alien 
friends  should,  through  their  friends,  or  directly 
seek  that  branch  of  the  government,  and  if  thev 
show  such  devotion  to  the  United  Stales  and  its 
<  onsf.tution  as  this  petitioner  has  shown  in  his 
twenty  years  of  compl.-ie  surrender  to  our  customs 
and  institutions,  his  petition  should  not  fall  on  deaf 


ears. 


It  IS   strange   that   this   important   decision   lias 
received  hut  scant  notice  from  the  public  and  the 
press.     Jml^c   demons  is  .sympathetic  enough   to 
suggest  that  Ozawa  and  lu's  Japanese  friends  urge 
upon  (  oi.grcss  the  need  of  a  new  naturalization  Jaw. 
n.th  due  respect  for  the  judge,  we  must  say  that 
this  cannot  be  done  by  Japanese  who  are  aliens. 
It  IS  not  desirable  that  aliens  should  meddle  with  the 
pohlics  and  legislation  of  a  country  where  thev  are 
resi.lmg  only  as  guests.     It  is.  therefore,  the  duty 
of  fan-mm.Jed,  justice-loving  Americans  to  take  the 
matter   into    their  own    hands    and   employ   their 
energies  and  influence  to  .secure  the  revision  of  the 
naturalization  laws.    As  for  the  Japanese,  they  must 
rema.n  absohitely  "neutral,"  though  they  mav  at 
iK-art  be  intensely  interested  in  such  efforts  on  the 
part  of  their  American  well-wishers. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

Japan's  early  aUitude  towards  China— China's  bhinH«T  in  Korea — 
Chino-.Iapanese  war — F-uropoan  en<Toarhments  upon  China — China 
on  the  verge  of  disruption— Se<rct.iry  Hay  dechins  the  "open  door" 
policy— His  dcfmition  of  the  sunn-  -I{u.^.>iii  ignores  the  Hay  note — 
American  failure  to  back  up  the  policy— .Ia|)un  tlie  only  nation 
resolved  to  fight  for  the  Hay  policy— American  criticism  of  Japan 
unfair— Russia  still  a  nuiiace— Mritish  inroads  into  Tibet— Spheres 
of  influence— The  British  concession  in  Sze-chuan— Japanese  ad- 
herence to  the  open  door  policy— Sphere-of-influcnce  theory  nerds 
KodiBcation— Misinformation  concerning  prcfen-ntial  tariff  en- 
joyed by  Japan— No  discrimination  practiced  by  Japanese  railway 
in  Manchuria — Japanese  efficiency  benefits  all  in  Manchuria — 
Japanese  competition  fair  and  unimpeachable. 

To  understand  Japan's  course  of  action  in  China 
it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  remember  that 
the  isLind  empire  endeavored  for  years  to  keep  her- 
self free  from  European  entanf^'lements  over  the 
Chinese  question.  As  early  as  1884.  France  offered 
her  hand  to  Japan  and  proposed  that  the  two  na- 
tions should  enter  into  an  alliance  with  a  view  to 
coerce  China.  The  Japanese  politely  declined  the 
overture.  They  had  long  been  imbued  with  the 
idea  that  their  relations  with  the  "celestials"  were, 
to  use  a  Chinese  metaphor,  the  "relations  of  the 
lips  to  the  teeth."  Destroy  the  lips,  and  the  teeth 
are    cold.      To   strengthen    this    traditional    belief, 

117 


118 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


General  Ulysses  S.  Grant  in  1879  advised  the  Mikado 
to  beware  of  European  intrigues  and  to  foster  friendly 
relations  with  the  Court  at  Peking.  In  those  days 
it  was  Japan's  sincere  desire  to  cement  friendship 
with  China,  and,  if  possible,  to  declare  the  doctrine 
of  "Asia  for  Asiatics." 

Fate,  however,  decreed  that  the  two  nations 
should  come  to  blows  over  the  disposition  of  Korea, 
the  country  which  China  had  been  scheming  to 
annex.  Jai)an  regarded  the  independence  of  Korea, 
lying  within  gunshot  of  her  archipelago,  as  essential 
to  her  own  existence.  Ignoring  Japan's  repeated 
proposal  that  Korea's  independence  be  not  molested, 
China  proceeded  with  her  own  plans  to  annex  the 
peninsula.  The  Celestial  Empire  saw  in  Japan  only 
an  inferior  small  nation  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  high- 
handed manner.  At  any  rate  Japan  went  to  war 
with  the  absolute  conviction  that  China  was  the 
aggressor,  and  that  she  was  forced  to  fight  a  war 
of  self-defense  against  a  foe  believed  by  the  world 
(including  China  herself),  to  be  far  more  powerful 
than  herself.  When  Japan  brought  China  to  her 
kncH?s,  the  Government  at  Peking  unfortunately 
invited  European  interference  with  the  peace  terms 
in  process  of  negotiation.  The  result  was  the  triple 
interference  of  Germany,  Russia  and  France,  com- 
pelling Japan  to  abandon  the  Liaotung  peninsula 
which  she  had  just  secured  from  China  as  the  chief 
spoil  of  war. 

For  the  time  being  Chinese  diplomacy  seemed  to 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


119 


have  won.  Its  glamor,  however,  soon  vanished, 
and  in  the  course  of  the  few  years  that  followed 
China's  blunder  in  having  invited  European  inter- 
ference became  obvious.  When,  towards  the  end 
of  the  nineties,  the  Powers  of  Europe  began  to  vie 
with  each  other  in  establishing  footholds  in  China, 
Japan's  traditional  policy  of  aloofness  ceased  to  be 
serviceable.  The  doctrine  of  "Asia  for  Asiatics" 
which  she  had  once  dreamed  of  enunciating,  was 
no  longer  practicable.  The  only  course  open  to  her 
was  to  cooperate  with  such  European  Powers  as 
might  be  friendly  to  her,  and  thus  preserve  the 
balance  of  power  against  the  European  intruders. 
In  plain  language,  Japan  had  to  play  the  game  as 
Europe  played  it.  The  result  was  the  Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance. 

The  record  of  European  intrusion  upon  China  is 
indeed  appalling.  We  may  begin  with  the  classic 
event  of  the  British  annexation  of  Honkong  in  1841 
as  the  result  of  the  "opium  war."  In  1800,  Russia 
swindled  China  out  of  the  vast  maritime  territory 
lying  to  the  north  of  the  Amour  River.  In  the  same 
year  the  allied  forces  of  England  and  France  pil- 
laged Peking  and  laid  the  magnificent  Summer 
Palace  in  ashes.  In  1874,  France  wrung  Annam  from 
China,  and  in  1885  Tonquin  was  also  taken  by  the 
same  Power.  In  1887,  even  Portugal  cut  Macao 
out  of  the  huge  pie. 

All   this  was  alarming  enough  to   the   Japanese, 
but  the  infant  nation,  having  just  been  lifted  out 


'  V 


i] 


ll 


mfw^fm^^ 


ISO 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


of  the  cradle  of  seclusion,  was  still  directing  its  un- 
steady stei)s  along  rough  and  untried  roads,  and 
was  in  no  position  to  raise  a  voice  against  Western 
encroaclinient  ujjon  China. 

With  the  (Jernian  seizure  of  Kiau-chow  in  Novem- 
ber, 1897,  the  political  horizon  of  China  assumed  a 
new  aspect  more  menacing  to  the  Japanese.  This 
onu'nous  move  on  the  part  of  Germany  was  followed 
by  the  Russian  occupation  of  Port  Arthur  in  De- 
cember, 1S<)7;  the  British  lease  of  Wei-hai-wei  on 
Ai)ril  3,  1898;  the  French  lease  of  Kwan-chow  Bay 
on  Ai)ril  10,  1898;  and  the  British  lease  of  Kowloon 
peninsula  on  June  3,  1898.  Even  Italy  demanded, 
on  February  28,  1899,  the  lease  of  Sammun  Bay  on 
the  coast  of  Che-kiang  province  as  a  coaling  station 
and  naval  base,  as  well  as  the  right  to  construct  a 
railway  from  Sammun  Bay  to  Poyang  Lake. 

In  this  international  rivalry  for  the  establishment 
of  si)heres  of  influence,  the  outstanding  fact  is  that 
the  European  Powers  were  actuated  by  sheer  lust 
for  territ«)ry.  They  had  no  real  grievance  to  justify 
their  action  in  China.  Towards  them  Chiiui  never 
assumed  an  aggressive  attitude,  as  she  did  towards 
Jai)an  over  the  Korean  dis[)ute.  Situated  thousands 
of  nules  away  from  the  Far  East,  these  European 
ccmntries  could  not  possibly  contend,  as  Japan 
reasonably  could,  tliat  the  unstable  condition  in 
China  was  a  menace  to  them.  The  plain  fact  is 
that  they  took  advantage  of  China's  weakness  and 
were  bent  uj)on  exploiting  the  country  to  satisfy 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


121 


their  own  greed.  Had  Japan  been  strong  enough 
to  call  Ji  halt  to  them,  she  w<.uld  have  unequivocally 
enunciated  an  Asiatic  Monroe  Doctrine  before 
Europe's  scramble  for  Chinese  territory  began. 
But  Japan  was  weak,  and  when  she  at  last  awakened 
to  the  consciousness  of  her  prowess  she  found  Euro- 
pean   nations   already   firmly   fortified    in    Chinese 

territory. 

Following  the   (uTman  seizure  of  Kiau-chow  it 
was   no   secret   that   the   Chancellories   of   Europe 
began  seriously  to  talk  of  the  break-up  of  Chma. 
Not  satisfied  with  obtaining  leases  of  territory  on 
the  Chinese  coast,  they  immediately  entered  into 
sharp  competition  for  railway,  mining,  and  various 
other  concessions.     China  was  divided  into  various 
.spheres  of  interest  or  influence,  and  the  huge  em- 
pire seemed  quivering  upon  the  verge  of  disruption. 
Confronted  by  this  ominous  situation  the  late  Mr. 
Secretary  John  II:iy  addressed,  in  September,  1899, 
a  circular  note  to  the  leading  Powers,  setting  forth 
the  American   attitude   towards  China  which  has 
come  to  be  known  as  the  "open  door"  policy. 

It  may  be  unpleasant  for  Americans  to  learn,  but 
it  is  well  to  admit,  that  it  was  not  Secretary  Hay's 
note  which  prevented  the  disruption  of  Chinese 
territory  or  the  closing  of  the  open  door.  My  knowl- 
edge of  Far  Eastern  diplomacy  in  the  past  score 
of  years  leads  me  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  not 
the  American  Government  but  Japan  which  made 
earnest  efforts  to  enforce  Mr.   Hay's  doctrine  of 


w 


Jis::!^^^mmm 


ui 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


the  open  door.  But  before  attempting  to  prove  this 
contention,  let  us  define  the  meaning  of  this  ceL  - 
brated  doctrine. 

The  term  "open  door"  has  become  the  slogan 
and  watchword  of  writers  on  the  Chinese  situation. 
Strangely  enough,  few  hjive  attempted  to  define  it. 
Mr.  Hay  issued  two  different  circular  notes  on  two 
different  occasions.  The  first  was  dated  September  8, 
1899,  and  the  second  July  3,  1900.  In  the  first  note 
Mr.  Hay's  aim  was  to  secure  equal  commercial 
opportunities  for  all  nations.  In  his  own  language 
the  so-c  lied  "open  door"  was  defined  as  fol- 
lows : 

First:  That  no  Power  will  in  any  way  interfere 
with  any  treaty  port  or  vested  interest  within  any 
so-called  "sphere  of  influence  or  interest"  or  leased 
territory  it  may  have  in  China. 

Second:  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the 
time  being  shall  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or 
shipped  to  all  such  ports  as  are  within  said  sphere 
of  influence  (unless  they  be  free  ports),  no  matter 
to  wiiat  nationality  it  may  belong,  and  that  duties 
leviable  shall  be  collected  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. 

Third:  That  no  power  shall  levy  any  higher 
harbor  dues  on  vessels  of  another  nationality  fre- 
quenting any  port  in  such  sphere  than  shall  be  levied 
on  vessels  of  its  own  nationality,  or  any  higher 
railroad  ciiarges  over  lines  built,  controlled  or 
operated  within  its  sphere  on  merchandise  belong- 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


123 


ing  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities 
transported  through  such  sphere  than  shall  be  levied 
on  similar  merchandise  belonging  to  its  own  na- 
tionals transported  over  equal  distances. 

In  the  second  note,  dated  July  3,  1900,  however, 
Mr.  Hay  enlarged  the  scope  of  the  first  note  and 
came  out  squarely  for  the  maintenance  of  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  China.  The  above  definition 
of  the  open  door  must  be  kept  in  view  in  determin- 
ing whether  Japan's  recent  demands  upon  China 
really  violated  that  doctrine,  as  I  shall  discuss  those 
demands  in  Chapter  X. 

The  principles  enunciated  both  in  the  first  note 
and  in  the  second  are  just  and  incontrovertible, 
but  the  American  public  must  not  permit  itself 
to  be  flattered  into  believing  that  these  notes  of 
Secretary  Hay's  really  accomplished  the  purpose 
for  which  they  were  written.     To  one  European 
Power,  Russia,  at  least  the  American  notes  were 
not  worth  the  paper  on  which  they  were  written. 
Upon  receipt  of  Secretary  Hay's  first  note  Russia 
not  only  expressed  herself  in  favor  of  reserving  for 
herself  the  right  to  levy  customs  duties  on  foreign 
imports  in  her  sphere,  but  demurred  upon  the  Ameri- 
can proposal  with  legard  to  harbor  duties  and  rail- 
way   charges.      With    characteristic    audacity    on 
August  4,  1900,  she  hoisted  the  Russian  flag  over 
the  Chinese  customs  house  in  Newchwang.     She 
poured  her  troops  into  Manchuria  and  was  pre- 
puring  her  way  for  the  immediate  absorption  of  a 


124 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITirs 


territory  of  3(53,700  square  miles.    Russia,  in  short, 
completely  ignored  Mr.  Hay's  "open  dof)r"  note. 

Alarmed  hy  this  critical  situation,  Japan,  in  the 
early  spring  of  1001,  approaclied  (iermany,  Eng- 
land, and  the  United  States  with  a  view  to  securing 
their  co6i)eration  in  checkmating  the  Russian  ab- 
sorption of  Manchuria,  but  none  wouhl  render  .ny 
assistance  to  Japan.  How  pitifully  inexperienced 
the  Japanese  diplomats  were  at  that  time  may  be 
judged  from  their  child-like  h()i)e  that  Germany 
might  do  something  to  help  her  against  Russia. 
Even  the  United  States,  the  very  sponsor  of  the 
"open  Jw.,r"  pi)licy,  declined  to  aid  Japan.  It  is 
the  old  st«)ry—  to  the  living  in  their  need  we  measure 
out  neglect,  reserving  our  praises  for  the  dead  who 
are  beyt)nd  our  charity.  So  Japan  earned,  after 
the  Manchurian  war,  more  aspersions  than  praises 
mainly  because  she  did  not  perish  a  martyr  in  the 
Herculean  struggle  with  Russia.  Yet  the  world 
must  admit  that  had  it  not  been  for  Japan's  deter- 
mination to  fight  Ru.s-ia  single-handed,  the  nuich 
heralded  open  door  proclamation  would  have  be- 
come a  "scrap  of  paper."  Had  this  foine  to  pass 
other  European  Powers  would  immediately  have 
followed  Russia's  suit  and  sliced  for  themselves 
large  sections  of  China.  Indeed,  China  would  have 
ceased  to  exist  as  an  independent  State.  In  chal- 
lenging Russia  in  1904  Japan,  therefore,  fought  not 
only  for  her  own  existence  but  for  the  integrity  of 
China  and  for  the  "open  door"  doctrine  of  America. 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


125 


It  must,  however,  be  frankly  admitted,  what  the 
Japanese   are    reUictant   to    admit,    that    Japanese 
arms  failed  to  attain  the  end  for  which  they  were 
employed  against  Russia.     Blinded  by  the  succes- 
sive victories  they  had  score<l  on  land  and  sea,  the 
Japanese  believed  that  they  had  effectively  shielded 
the  "open  door."    This  was  a  great  delusion.    When 
the  smoke  cleared  away  from  the  fields  of  battle, 
they  found  Russia  just  as  strongly  entrenched  in 
Manchuria  as  before  the  war.     In  Korea  they  suc- 
ceeded in  destroying  Russian  domination,  but  in 
Manchuria  they  were  too  weak  to  cope  with  the 
Northern  colossus.     It  had  been  their  avowed  pur- 
pose  to   drive   Russia   from   Manchuria   and   thus 
realize  the  open  door  in  China,  but  before  they  had 
reached  anywhere  near  the  goal  their  resources  were 
exliausted,"  with  no   nation,   pledged   to   the  open 
door,  coming  to  the  rescue. 

In  diplomatic  language  Japan  succeeded  in  main- 
taining against  Russian  intrusion  the  open  door  and 
the  integrity  of  China;  in  reality  her  efforts  were  a 
failure.     After  the  signing  of  the  peace  treaty  of 
Portsmouth  no  one  realized  this  more  keenly  than 
Japanese  statesmen.     They   saw  Russia  not  only 
occupying  by  far  the  largest  portion  of  Manchuria 
but  scheming  to  include  Mongolia  in  her  sphere  of 
influence.    Far  from  abandoning  her  empire  scheme 
in  the  Far  East  Russia  only  diverted  her  activities 
into  Mongolia  through  which  she  hoped  to  reach 
and  dominate  Peking.    After  the  sacrifice  of  a  hun- 


I 


I 


^g3Bri£^^^?5-^?^S:?i . 


126 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


dred  thousand  lives  and  $1,000,000,000  in  the  titanic 
struggle  that  had  just  ended,  Japan's  position  with 
regard  to  Russia  appeared  as  precarious  as  ever. 
Especially  were  the  militarists,  who  had  faced  the 
brunt  of  Russian  onslaught  in  Manchuria,  fearful 
of  the  Muscovite  revenge  which  they  thought  not 
only  possible  but  probable.  What  could  Japan  do 
but  accept  the  inevitable  and  strengthen  her  foot- 
hold in  Manchuria  to  prepare  herself  against  Russia's 
fresh  aggression? 

No  doubt  this  policy  had  its  flaw.  But  American 
criticisms  of  it  are  strangely  unsympathetic.  Those 
who  sit  serenely  amid  opulence  may  find  it  easy  to 
criticise  the  conduct  of  others  perplexed  by  such 
strain  and  hardship  as  the  Japanese  experienced 
during  the  critical  years  following  190t.  Such 
people  cannot  realize  that  the  Japanese  were  strug- 
gling for  their  very  existence.  As  for  European 
censors  of  Japanese  policy  in  China,  1  have  only 
to  ask  them  to  remember  the  well-known  remarks 
exchanged  between  Dumas  and  his  friend  Cremieux. 
Cremieux,  a  very  liomely  man,  tried  to  make  fua 
of  Dumas'  appearance  and  asked,  "Was  your  father 
a  mulatto.'"  "Yes,"  returned  Dunuis,  "my  father 
was  a  mulatto,  my  grandfather  a  negro,  my  great- 
grandfather a  monkey— my  family  began  where 
yours  ends." 

Since  the  peace  treaty  of  Portsmouth  was  signed, 
not  only  lias  Russia  strengthened  her  position  in 
Manchuria  but  she  has  become  the  virtual  mistress 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CfflNA 


127 


of  Mongolia,  measuring  a  million  square  miles. 
Her  activities  in  the  Khanates  Ix-gan  immediately 
after  the  war  with  Japan,  and  in  the  Chinese  revolu- 
tion of  1911  she  saw  a  golden  opportunity  to  push 
her  interests  in  that  country.  The  result  was  the 
Russo-Mongolian  treaty  of  October  3,  1912,  estab- 
lishing a  Russian  suzerainty  over  Mongolia. 

England,  ever  on  the  alert  to  counteract  the 
Russian  advance,  at  once  took  action  in  Tibet. 
Beginning  with  Colonel  Younghusbp.nd's  spectacu- 
lar expedition  to  Lassa  in  1905,  she  was  busy  ex- 
tending her  influence  in  Tibet,  and  by  1912  there 
were  stationed  in  that  country  at  least  5,000  British 
troops.  In  the  same  year  she  entered  into  a  secret 
agreement  with  Russia,  the  two  countries  dividing 
Mongolia  and  Tibet  as  their  respective  spheres  of 
influence.  In  February,  1913,  England  persuaded 
the  Dalai  Lama  to  borrow  $10,000,000  from  her 
and  to  purchase  from  her  manufacturers  all  the 
arms  and  ammunition  Tibet  might  need.  The  Lama 
also  agreed  to  confer  upon  British  capitalists  the 
exclusive  right  to  exploit  the  mining  and  other 
natural  resources  in  Tibet. 

In  the  meantime  China,  rent  by  revolution,  was 
powerless  to  safeguard  her  interests  in  her  outlying 
territories.  She  made  only  a  feint  of  protest  which 
was,  of  course,  completely  ignored.  Here  it  must  be 
emphasized  once  more  that  neither  England  nor 
Russia  had  any  justifiable  excr  for  utilizing  China's 
internal  trouble  and  estab'.i,'  mg  a  suzerainty  over 


I^!r:^"SSSHPT 


128 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Tibet  or  Mongolia.  Their  only  reason  was  their 
greed.  And  yet  the  press  of  Ameriea  and  Europe 
was  virtually  silent  on  the  British  and  Russian 
intrusion  upon  China.  Can  it  be  that  Christian 
Europe  "ean  do  no  wrong"?  To  our  benighted 
souls  it  is  a  puzzle  that  European  Powers  may  perpe- 
trate any  crime  in  Asia  with  impunity,  while  an 
Asiatic  nation  must  be  execntted  and  condemned 
for  taking  the  necessary  steps  to  prepare  itself 
against  their  further  encroachment  upon  its  back- 
ward neighbors. 

To  know  something  of  the  portentous  possibili- 
ties of  the  British  and  Russian  policies  in  China, 
one  need  only  think  of  the  vaslncss  of  the  territories 
which  they  have  staked  out  for  themselves.  Russia 
claims  as  her  sphere  of  influ<>nce  Outer  Mongolia 
(1,000,000  square  miles),  Sinkiang  (548,000  square 
miles),  and  more  than  three-fourths  of  Manchuria 
(273,000  square  miles).  These  total  an  area  of 
1,821,000  square  miles.  On  the  other  hand.  Great 
Britain  claims  Tibet  (533,000  square  miles),  Sze- 
Chuan  (218,000  s(iuare  miles),  Kwantung  (80,800 
square  miles),  and  the  provinces  along  the  lower 
reaches  of  the  Yantse  River  (about  302,000  sf|uare 
miles),  nuiking  a  total  of  1,199,800  scjuare  miles  for 
the  British  sphere  of  influence.  In  the  South,  France 
claims  Yun-nan  (14(5,700  square  miles)  as  her  sphere 
of  interest.  Before  the  war  derniany  claimed 
Shantung  (55.900  square  miles)  from  whence  she 
was  scheming  to  expand  in  various  directions. 


THE  OPEN  DtKJR  IN  CHINA 


H9 


The  chief  source  of  misconception  on  the  part  of 
Americans  concerning   Far   Eastern   affairs   hcs   in 
their  ignorance  of  Chinese  geography.     Open  the 
map  of  China,  mark  out  the  spheres  of  influence 
cstabhshed  by  European  Powers,  and  compare  them 
with  tlie  Japanese  sphere.    Then  you  will  begin  to 
wonder  why  it  is  you  make  so  much  ado  about  Ja- 
pan's activities  in  China.     As  against  England's 
1.19!),000    sciuare    miles,    and    Russia's    1,821,000 
square  miles,  Japan's  sphere  of  influence,  consisting 
of  South  Manchuria  (90,000  square  miles),  Eastern 
Inner    Mongolia    (50,000    scjuare    miles),    Fukien 
(40,000  sciuare  miles),  and  a  section  of  Shantung 
(18,600  square  miles),  totals  204.(500  s<iuare  miles. 
Remember  that  it  was  not  Japan  which  originated  the 
idea  of  spheres  of  influence.    It  was  because  Euro- 
pean Powers  w<Me  l)ent  upon  dividing  China  inlo  so 
many  spheres  of  influence  that  Japan  was  obliged 
to  step  in  and  take  such  measures  as  nn'ght  be  neces- 
sary to  safeguaru  her  position  in  the  Far  East  agaiust 
any  emergency  that  might  arise  from  such  an  uu- 
haj)py  condition  in  China. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  how  spheres  of  influence 
have  been  established  by  the  Powers.  Japan  paid 
for  her  small  sphere  in  Manchuria  a  billion  dollars 
and  the  blood  of  a  himdred  thousand  of  the  flower 
of  her  population,  for  that  was  the  cost  of  the  war 
which  was  forced  upon  Japan  by  Russia.  On  the 
other  hand,  Russia,  England  and  France  secured 
their   vast   spheres   practically    for   nothing.      The 


i 


"^m 


130 


JAPAN  IN'  WORLD  POLITICS 


price  j)ai(l  l)y  Germany  for  her  sphere  was  the  lives 
of  two  missionaries  wiiose  questionable  conduct 
resulted  in  their  murder  by  Chinese. 

Perhaps  the  crowning  achievement  in  concession 
hunting    was    the    enormous    concession,    covering 
the  vast  i)rovince  of  Sze-Chuan,  which  was  secured 
by  an  Englishman  named  Pritchard  Morgan.    The 
first  contract  for  the  concession  was  made  with  the 
Viceroy  of  the  province  in  1899.     This  granted  to 
Mr.  INIorgan  the  exclusive  right  to  exploit  the      - 
sources  of  Sze-Chuan,  including  minerals,  timber,  and 
water  power.     It  was  provided  that  work  should 
})egin  within  twelve  months  from  date  of  approval. 
Pritchard  Morgan  was  too  shrewd  a  promoter  to  let 
his  chance  slip  for  lack  of  performance  of  his  share 
of  the  bargain.     He  sent  engineers  into  the  field. 
It  is  doubtful  if  they  did  any  actual  work,  but  at 
least  they  surveyed  something.     The  contract  was 
approved,  so  the  story  goes,  by  the  Central  Govern- 
ment in  Peking  on  the  3G4th  day  after  it  was  signed, 
thus  bringing  it  within  the  bounds  of  legality  as  to 
any  payments  made  by  Pritchard  Morgan;  but  on 
the  morning  of  the  SOoth  day,  Mr.  Morgan's  repre- 
sentatives were  notified  that,  as  he  had  not  com- 
menced work  within  the  year,  his  concession  was 
void.    At  this  juncture  the  British  minister  at  Peking 
as  well  as  Downing  Street  came  to  Morgan's  rescue, 
and   the  contract  was  saved.     ^Vhen  Yuan-Shi-kai 
became  President  of  China,  the  concession,  which 
had  been  on  the  tapis  for  tiiirtecn  years,  was  given  a 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CfflNA 


ISl 


new  lease  of  life,  according  to  a  British  group  of 
financiers  the  exclusive  right  of  working  the  vast  oil 
fields  of  Sze-Chuan  as  well  as  mineral  and  other 
natural  resources,  reported  to  be  the  richest  in  China. 
We  have  seen  that  Japan's  war  with  Russia  failed, 
or  at  any  rate  only  partially  succeeded,  to  enforce 
the  "open  door,"  if  we  understand  by  the  open  door 
tiie    maintenance   of    China's   territorial    integrity. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  "open  door"  means  equal 
commercial  opportunities  for  all  nations,  as  defined 
in  Secretary  Hay's  first  note,  Japan  has  not  only 
compelled  Russia  to  observe  the  doctrine,  but  has 
herself  strictly  adh;red  to  it.     In  the  light  of  Mr. 
Iluy's  definition  which  \\c  have  already  quoted,  it 
is  difficult  to  see  how  Western  critics  can  accuse 
Japan  of  "closing  the  open  door."    In  her  spheres  of 
iufiuence  she  has  never  interfered  with  "any  treaty 
port  or  vested  interest,"  has  never  "levied  higher 
harbor  dues"  or  charged  "higher   railway   rates" 
on  foreign  ships  or  merchandise,  and  has  never  inter- 
fered with  the  "treaty  tariff"  of   China.     What 
more  do  Western  critics  expect  from  Japan.'     Do 
they  mean  something  different  from  Secretary  Hay's 
definition  when  they  speak  of  the  "open  door"? 

Considering  that  every  inch  of  South  Manchurian 
soil  was  soaked  with  Japanese  blood  and  that  their 
coffers  were  left  sadly  depleted  by  the  war,  it  would 
not  have  been  surprising  if  the  Japanese,  in  the 
wake  of  the  great  conflict,  had  bc»en  tempted  to 
regard  Manchuria  as  their  own  territory  by  right 


1. 


132 


JAPAN'  IM  WORLD  POLITICS 


of  conquest,  and  to  adopt  there  discriminatory 
measures  calculated  to  advance  their  trade.  Yet, 
on  the  whole,  they  showed  themselves  remarkably 
considerate  in  dealing  with  foreign  commercial 
interests.  As  soon  as  military  rule  was  withdrawn 
foreign  merchants  were  freely  admitted  into  Man- 
churia, and  the  Japanese  railways  there  carried  all 
goods  at  the  same  rates. 

True,  Japan  was  unwilling  to  see  foreign  capital 
construct  in  South  Manchuria  such  railways  as  might 
come  in  <lirect  competition  with  her  own  lines,  but 
here  again  she  was  simply  following  the  example 
set  by  other  Powers  possessing  spheres  of  influence 
in  China.  Ger»nany,  for  instance,  reserved  the 
following  right  with  regard  to  Shantung: 

"The  Chinese  Government  binds  itself,  in  all 
cas?s  where  foreign  assistance,  in  persons,  capital 
or  material,  may  be  needed  for  any  purpose  what- 
ever within  the  Province  of  Shantung,  to  ofTcr  the 
said  work  or  supplying  of  materials  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  German  manufacturers  and  merchants 
engaged  in  undertakings  of  the  kind  in  question." 

Nor  is  this  peculiar  to  Germany.  Similar  pro- 
visions are  found  in  all  treaties  of  concession  which 
the  Occidental  Powers  wrested  from  China  before 
the  Japanese  debut  in  Manchuria.  That  this  was  a 
bad  example  is  no  reason  why  Japan  alone  should 
be  made  a  target  of  censure  for  following  it. 

Personally,  I  believe  that  this  exclusive  policy 
followed  by  the  Powers  in  their  respective  spheres 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


133 


of  influence  in  Ch.na  is  a  mistaken  one,  and  should 
be  gradually  abandoned  not  only  for  China's  benefit 
but  to  their  own  advantage.     A  mile  of  railway 
built  in  China,  whichever  nation  may  finance  it, 
is  of  value  to  all  nations  interested  in  that  country. 
But  such  railways,  to  be  really  beneficial  to  all.  must 
not  be  built  as  enterprises  representing  some  sphere 
of   influence;  they  must  be   built  for  China  and 
managed  by  the  Chinese  Government.    So  lonj;  as 
the  Powers  regard  railways  as  means  of  advancing 
their  respective  interests,  political  as  well  as  com- 
mercial, it  is  idle  to  speak  of  the  "open  door."    That 
this  view,  radical  as  it  may  seem,  is  not  without 
supporters  in  Japan  may  be  judged  from  the  follow- 
ing editorial,  which  recently  appeared  in  the  Tokyo 
Jiji-shimpo,  assuredly  the  most  influential  financial 
organ  in  Japan: 

"The  rapid  progress  of  Japan's  export  trade  to 
China  is  largely  due  to  the  increase  of  China's  pur- 
chasing capacity  stimulated  by  the  introduction 
of  foreign  capital,  which  has  built  railways,  opened 
mines,  and  contributed  in  many  another  way  to  the 
economic  advancement  of  the  country.  Had  it 
not  been  for  the  work  accomplished  by  foreign  capi- 
tal, China's  demand  for  foreign  goods  would  have 
remained  very  small,  and  our  trade  in  China  would 
never  have  forged  ahead  as  it  really  has. 

"The  'open  door'  and  'equal  opportunity'  for 
all  trading  nations  have  been  our  fixed  policy  in 
China.    Unfortunately,  people  have  not  been  lack- 


134 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


ing  w  ho  are  so  short-sighted  as  to  fear  the  competi- 
tion of  foreign  capital  with  our  enterprises  in  China. 
It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized  that  our  wisest 
course  lies  in  the  most  faithful  adherence  to  the 
policy  of  the  oi)en  door,  and  in  encouraging  the 
exploitation  of  natural  resources  with  the  aid  of 
foreign  capital." 

Is  this  not  a  counsel  which  all  Powers  interested 
in  China  would  do  well  to  take  to  heart? 

In  discussing  the  railway  policy  of  the  Powers  in 
China  it  is  pertinent  to  clear  certain  misunderstand- 
ings concerning  the  Japanese  system  in  Manchuria. 

Professor  Jeremiah  W.  Jcnks  is  authority  for  the 
widely  circulated  statement  that  "goods  entering 
China  over  the  Japanese  railway  through  Korea 
enjoy  a  preference  of  one-third  of  the  customs 
charges."  Unfortunately  Professor  Jcnks  dws  not 
tell  the  whole  story,  and  is,  therefore,  misleading. 
True,  a  preferential  tariff  is  applied  to  the  goods 
entering  Manchuria  from  the  Korean  border,  but 
this  privilege  is  extended  to  all  trading  nations. 
Moreover,  Japan  was  not  the  nation  which  initiated 
this  special  arrangement.  As  early  as  18G2  Russia 
obliged  China  to  sign  the  "Convention  for  the 
Land  Trade  between  China  and  Russia,"  in  virtue 
of  which  no  duties  were  levied  within  the  limit  of 
thirty  miles  on  either  side  of  the  Chino-Siberian 
boundary  line,  in  October,  1907,  Russia  secured  a 
new  convention  enlarging  the  scope  of  the  conven- 
tion of  1862.    By  this  new  agreement  goods  trans- 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


135 


ported  by  rail  into  Manchuria  were  to  pay  only  two- 
thirds  of  regular  import  duty,  so  long  ai^such  goods 
remained  within  the  prescribed  area  around  the 
railway  station.  At  Harbin,  Russia's  Manchurian 
metropolis,  this  special  area  extended  to  all  pomts 
within  a  radius  of  three  miles  from  the  station.  At 
other  minor  stations  the  area  extends  to  a  radius 
of  a  mile  or  a  mile  and  a  half. 

In   October.    1910,   Russia   secured    further   ad- 
vantage by  completely  exempting  from  duty  almost 
all  important  merchandise  exported  to  Manchuria 
across  the  Siberian  border.     Under  such  circum- 
stances the  Japanese  traders  in  Manchuria  had  been 
restive  and  had  been  urging  the  Government  at 
Tokyo  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  protect  their 
interests  against  Russia's  unfair  competition.     As 
the  consequence  Japan  in  1913  at  last  persuaded 
China  to  extend  a  preference  of  one-third  of  the 
customs  charges  to  goods  entering  Manchuria  by 
rail  from  the  Korean  border.     She  was,  however, 
considerate  enough  not  to  demand,  as  Russia  had 
demanded,  absolute  immunity  from  duty  for  any 
of  her  exports  to  Manchuria.    Now  the  important 
thing  we  must  remember  is  that  the  above  privilege 
is  not  exclusive  to  Japanese  and  Russian  goods. 
All  goods,  no  matter  from  what  country,  enjoy  the 
same  privilege,  if  brought  by  rail  through  the  Korean 
or  Siberian  border.     If  Russia  and  Japan  derive 
any  special  advantage  from  the  above  arrangement, 
it  is.  due  only  to  the  fact  that  Russian  and  Japanese 


136 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


goods  make  up  by  far  the  larpost  portion  of  the 
imports  that  pass  across  the  Siberian  and  Korean 
boun<hiries. 

Another  misconception  prevaiHng  among  Ameri- 
cans relates  to  a  certain  railway  schedule  in  Man- 
churia temporarily  adopted  by  Japan.     In  March, 
1914,  the  Japanese  Railway  Bureau,  in  conference 
with  the  Korean  Railway  and  the  South  Manchurian 
Railway,  adopted  a  measure  by  which  all   goods, 
Japanese  and  foreign,  entering  Manchuria  via  the 
Antung-Muk<'    i  line,  were  to  be  carried  at  rates 
thirty  per  cent,  less  than  the  regular  rates.     The 
underlying  motive  was  to  make  the  Korean  and  the 
Antung-Mukden  railways  the  main  artery  of  trade 
and  communication  between  Japan  and  Manchuria, 
and  thus  bring  the  two  countries  into  closer  touch. 
When  this  schedule  for  the  Antung-Mukden  route 
became    applicable,    American    cotton    merchants 
complained  a  great  deal,  not  because  the  new  rates 
were   not  applicable   to   their  goods,   but  because 
American  goods,   on   account  of  more  convenient 
steamship  service,  were  accustomed  to  enter  Man- 
churia through  the  port  of  Dairen,  and  not  through 
Korea  and  thence  by  the  Antung-Mukden  railway. 
The  Japanese  railway  authorities  argued  that  the 
new  .schedule  did  not  discriminate  against  American 
merchandise,  and  that  it  was  through  no  fault  of 
theirs  that  the  Americans  could  not  avail  themselves 
of  the  advantages  equally  offered  to  all  traders. 
Yet    the   Americans   continued   to   protest,   urging 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


137 


that  the  Scmth  Manchuria  Railway  should  adopt 
the  same  low  rates  for  the  Dairen-Mukden  line, 
so  that  American  cottons,  preferring  to  enter  Man- 
churia through  Dairen,  should  not  have  to  compete 
at  a  disadvantage  with  Japanese  cottons  trans- 
ported  over  the  Antung-Mukden  line  After  much 
narlev  the  American  merchants,  m  March,  1J15, 
finally  won  the  point,  and  to-day  there  exists  no 
causeof    ompluintby  them.  ,      •      • 

Japan,    commercial    advance    m    Manchuria    is 
due  to  no  unfair  competition  on  her  part.     Mr. 

Fobert  P.  Porter,  of  the  London  ^V^^-T  Tr7'vf^ 
nizes  this  fact  when  he  quotes,  in  h.s  book  The  ^ew 
World  Power,  the  following  letter  written  by  a  British 
merchant  in  Changchun.  Manchuria: 

"With  regard  to  that  part  of  Manchuria  which 
comes  under  Japanese  influence,  too  great  praise 
cannot  be  given.     The  conveniences  and  facilities 
afforded  by  the  Japanese  to  on.  and  all  in  regard 
to   banking   institutions,    railway   communications, 
postal  and  telegraph  service  are  far  and  away  superior 
to  those  afforded  by  the  Ru.si.  -.  and  the  Chinese 
institutions.     The   Yokohama  feper-e   Bank    wi  h 
its  numerous  branches,  enables  foreign  traders  to 
transact  business  on  the  same  lines  as  they  are  ac- 
customed  to  do  in  other  civilized  countries.     Trans- 
actions  with  this  bank  are  free  from  the  exorbitant 
rates  and  the  ,K4ly  redtapism,  to  which  it  is  neces- 
sary  to  conform  in  working  with  either  the  Russians 
or  Chinese.    It  is  a  recognized  fact  that  it  takes  any 


1S8 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


time  over  an  hour  to  get  a  cheque  cashed  at  a  Russian 
bank;  moreover,  the  absence  of  any  knowledge  of 
the  EngHsh  language  renders  transactions  with 
them  considerably  irksome.  Every  employee  in 
the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
a  good  knowledge  of  the  English  language.  Not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  the  Chinese  Customs 
are  supposed  to  manage  the  Postal  Service  in  Man- 
churia, that  service  has  become  practically  con- 
fined to  the  transmission  of  Chinese  correspondence. 
The  Japanese  appear  to  handle  the  greater  part, 
if  not  all,  of  the  foreign  mail  in  a  satisfactory  manner. 

"In  conclusion,  Japan  has  fulfilled  all  her  obliga- 
tions, and  continues  to  do  so,  in  the  tlevelopment 
of  Manchuria,  and  woe  betide  the  day  if  the  coun- 
try comes  under  Russian  influence  or  if  it  is  handed 
back  again  to  the  control  of  the  Chinese.  Too  great 
attention  cannot  be  devoted  to  this  country  by  the 
Press  in  Great  Britain,  in  order  to  direct  the  attention 
of  British  firms  to  the  enormous  prospects  which 
await  them  here  in  various  directions.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  they  will  soon  awaken  to  these  possibil- 
ities. If  these  efforts  are  delayed  too  long  they  will 
find  that  it  is  too  late,  as  other  countries  will  have 
secured  the  business." 

In  her  commercial  rivalry  with  America  and 
other  nations  in  China,  Japan  has  benefited  her- 
self simply  by  taking  advantage  of  natural  laws  of 
trade.  Japan's  geographical  situation,  her  enormous 
investment  in  China,  the  presence  of  200.000  Japa- 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 


1S9 


nese  there  consuming  Japanese  goods,  the  abundant 
supply  of  cheap  hihor  at  her  disposal,  her  familiarity 
with  the  use  of  the  Manchuria  pulse  of  which  she  is 
the  greatest  customer,  a  certain  similarity  between 
the  Chinese  language  and  her  own— these  are  the 
conditions  which  have  been  instrumental  in  the 
advancement  of  Japanese  trade  in  Manchuria. 
These  jxiints  will  be  more  fully  discussed  in  the 
following  chapter. 


CHAPTER  IX 
JAPAN  AND   AMERICA   IN   CHINA 

Japan'i  ambition  to  l)ecome  a  great  commerical  factor  in  China — This 
dcH's  not  conflict  with  American  ciiteqirise — Anti-American  feeling 
in  Japan — Its  raison  d'etre — Baron  Shibusawas  idea  of  American- 
Japanese  cooperation — How  Japan  iK-ncfits  Anu-rica  in  Korea — 
Japanese  press  invite  America  to  rejoin  the  finar.ciiif;  bo<ly  in  China 
— American  international  cor[)oration's  idea  of  cooperation  with 
Japan — Knplish  opposition  to  such  cooperation— American  com- 
plaint alx)ut  Jar).in'.s  unreasonableness — Complaint  of  American 
manufacturers'  export  assiK-iation — Anti-American  circular  of  Brit- 
ish chamlMT  of  commerce — Trade  competition  in  China  after  the 
war  — Kn^land  olistructs  American  trade  in  China— America's 
share  in  (  hina  tra<h'—  Japanese  monopoly  of  China  trade  impossible 
— St'cret  of  Japanese  su<'<-<-ss  in  China — Bean,  t  lie  determinitig  factor 
in  trade  competition  In  Manchuria — Japan,  China's  In'st  customer — 
200,000  Japanese  in  China,  an  asset  to  Japanese  trade — Japanese 
investments  in  China — American  trade  has  not  suffered  in  reality. 

In  discussing  the  question  of  Japanese  immigra- 
tion to  America  in  Chui>ter  V,  I  emphatically  stated 
that  Jai)an  will  make  supreme  efforts  to  relieve  the 
pressure  of  population  at  home  without  causing 
embarrassment  to  America  and  the  British  colonies. 
In  making  such  efforts  she  will  inevitably  follow 
two  lines  of  action.  First,  she  will  utilize  the  terri- 
tories already  under  her  control,  such  as  Hokkaido, 
Korea,  Formosa,  and  a  certain  section  of  South 
Manchuria;  and,  secondly,  she  will  follow  the  foot- 


JAPAN  AND  AMERICA  IN  CHINA 


141 


steps  of  England  and  strive  to  convert  herself  into  a 
Tcat  commercial  nation.  It  is  the  second  line  of 
ntion   which   has   a   direct   bearing   upon   Japan's 

hinese  policy. 

Japan's  foremost  aspiration  to-day  is  to  become 
a  great  factor  in  the  commerce  of  the  world.  If 
she  succeeds  in  this  direction  she  will  be  enabled  to 
support  more  comfortably  than  hitherto  her  in- 
creasing population  upon  the  comparatively  small 
area  of  land  at  her  disposal.  If  her  carrying  trade 
increases,  as  it  probably  will,  in  proportion  to  her 
industrial  expansion,  half  a  million  Japanese  will 
eventually  be  living  on  her  merchant  ships  alone. 

It  is,  therefore,  but  natural  that  she  should  make 
supreme  efforts  to  become  a  domin  mt  economic 
factor  in  China.  She  sees  in  that  country  of  two 
million  square  miles  untold  resources  as  yet  little 
exploited.  She  sees  in  the  four  hundred  million 
souls  of  China  the  possibility  of  creating  a  vast 
market  for  her  merchandise.  These  are  the  bottom 
facts  which  afford  impetus  to  Japan's  Chinese  meas- 
ures, though  her  ambition  on  the  Asian  continent 
nuist  at  times  have  seemed  political  rather  than 
economic. 

In  pursuing  this  policy  Japan  has  no  intention 
of  hindering  American  activities  in  China.  In  his 
address  in  the  Imperial  Diet  two  months  ago  Vis- 
count Ichiro  Motono,  Japan's  Foreign  Minister, 
made  this  statement: 

*'  I  note  with  great  pleasure  the  symptoms  of  real 


m$: 


U2 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


sympathy  manifested  for  some  time  between  Japan 
and  the  Tnited  States.  A  proi)osal  for  eoinmon 
financial  action  has  been  made  by  American  capital- 
ists. The  Imperial  (Jovernment  will  follow  with 
lively  interest  the  development  of  tlie  economic 
rapprochement  between  the  two  conntries." 

There  is  no  reason  why  Japan  and  the  United 
States  cannot  cooperate  in  China,  not  only  for  their 
own  benefit  but  also  to  the  advanta<,'e  of  the  Chinese. 
Once  Japan  clearly  understands  Miat  America  has 
no  political  ambition  in  the  Far  East,  the  former 
will  be  but  too  k'1»J  t«  welcome  the  latter  to 
Ciiina. 

It  may  sound  curious  to  Americans,  but  it  is 
nevertheless  true,  that  a  lar^'e  number  of  Japanese 
are  inclined  to  see  political  ambition  in  American 
policy  in  the  Orient.  They  think  that  America, 
not  content  with  the  enforcement  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  her  own  henn'sphere,  is  embarking  upon 
an  imperialistic  care<'r.  She  is,  they  fear,  stretching 
her  hands  across  the  Pacific,  intent  upon  extending 
not  only  her  commercial  interests  but  her  political 
infiuence  in  China.  In  Secretiiry  Knox's  proposal 
for  the  "neutralization"  of  the  Mauchurian  railways, 
in  his  scheme  to  construct  the  Chincho\v-.\igun 
railway,  in  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company's  project 
to  establish  a  dockyard  in  Fukien,  not  to  mention 
the  American  occupation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
and  the  Philippines,  the  Ja|)anese  see  the  ominous 
rise  of  the  I'nited  Stales  in  world  politics.     They 


JAPAN  AND  AMERICA  IN  CHINA 


143 


think  that  these  American  activities,  like  the  similar 
activities  of  European  Powers,  are  not  merely  com- 
mercial but  political.     They  have  seen  enouffh  of 
t»  e  sinister  desifjns  concocted  by  European  Powers 
against  Korea  and  China,  menacing  the  very  exist- 
ence of  their  own  country.      In  their  minds  it  seems 
difficult  to  differentiate  American  enterprises  from 
European.    Moreover,  Amerii..n  enterprises,  backed 
by  unlimited  resources  and  capital,  will,  they  appre- 
hend, sooner  or  later  drive  Japanese  trade  and  enter- 
prise in  China  to  the  wall,  if  Japan  does  not  take 
measures  oi'  self-protection  against  their  onslaught. 
All  European  investors  in  China  have  enjoyed  the 
backing  of  their  respective  governments.    The  rail- 
ways they  have  built  in  China  are  as  much  political 
railways  as  they  are  commercial.     The  concessions 
they  have  wrested  from  Peking  also  have  political 
meaning.     ^Vi!l  not  the  same  unfortunate  situation 
develop    from    Ameri<;m    investments    in    Chinese 
railways  a:;d  canals  and  mines? 

There  is  another  class  of  Japanese  whose  opposi- 
tion to  American  activities  in  the  Far  East  is  due 
to  different  motives  from  those  I  have  just  <ies(ril)e(l. 
These  Japanese  are  not  so  much  concerned  with 
American  "imperialisiir'  as  tiicy  are  desirous  of 
showing  the  Americans  what  tiu-y  can  do  in  the  way 
of  n^taliation.  Their  mood  is  (iiie  of  resentment 
and  defiance.  They  have  been  resenting  America's 
discrimination  against  the  Japanese  and  her  apparent 
eagerness  to  forestall  all  their  enterprises  in  Mexico 


144 


JAPAN  IN'  WORLD  POLITICS 


and  even  in  South  America.    Tlu'V  have  been  deeply 
annoyed  l)y  the  cry  of  "Wolf."  raised  by  publicists 
at  Washington  and   a  large   number  of  American 
newspapers  every  tiniv^  Japan  takes  a  step  on  the 
Asian  mainland.'  "I^t  us  .show  tiicse  troublesome, 
meddling  Yankees  what  we  can  do  to  them  if  they 
insist  upon  annoying  us  all  the  time  with  no  justifica- 
tion whatever"  is  the  sentiment  of  these  people. 
The  Japanese  are  but  human.     You  cannot  expect 
them  to  turn  their  left  chec>ks  to  you  after  you  have 
slapped   them   on   their   right   cheeks.      Tliey   can 
understand  you  when  you  raise  an  issue  over  Jai)a- 
nese  immigration  to  your  own  country,  but  they  do 
not  understand  and  will  never  understand  why  on 
earth  you  have  to  pursue  tliem  in  Mexico  and  South 
America,  when  there  is  nothing  to  make  ado  about. 
There  was  absolutely  no  truth  in  the  much  exploited 
story  of  the  Japanese  designs  upon  Magdalena  Bay, 
and  yet  one  of  America's  foremost  publicists  intro- 
duced a  resolution  in  the  Senate,  <leclaring  that  the 
United  States  could  not  see  without  grave  concern 
the  acquisition  of  any  harbor  on  the  American  con- 
tinent by  a  foreign  corporation  "which  has  such 
relations    to    another    government,    not    American, 
as  to  give  that  country  practical  control  for  military 
or  naval  purposes." 

Indulging  in  such  fatuous  anti-Japane.se  agitation, 
how  can  American  publicists  eomplain  of  Japan's 
objection  to  the  establishment  by  a  powerful  Ameri- 
can concern  of  a  naval  yard  on  the  coast  of  Fukien 


JAPAN  AND  AMERICA  IN  CHINA 


145 


lying  across  a  narrow  strip  of  water  from  the  Japa- 
nese territory  of  Formosa? 

Fortunately,  however,  Japan  is  not  going  to  follow 
a  poiiev  of  revenge  in  dealing  with  American  enter- 
prise in  China.    She  knows  that  such  a  policy  would 
he  to  cut  off  her  nose  to  spite  her  face.    Ahout  a  year 
ago    Baron    Yeichi    Shibusawa,    foremost    among 
Japanese  financiers,  came  to  this  country   with  a 
view  to  sounding  the  sentiment  of  American  capital- 
ists wita  regard  to  Chinese  enterprise.    It  was  highly 
unfortunate   that   his   real   motives    were    willfully 
misinterpreted  by  a  certain  class  of  Americans  whose 
business  seems  to  be  to  put  unexpected  meanmgs 
upon  every  Japanese  opinion  and  action.     These 
wiseacres  have  been  spreading  the  report  that  Shi- 
busawa's  proposal  is  to  grant  Japan  a  veto  power 
with  regard  to  every  American  enterprise  in  Chma. 
If  this  extraordinary  scheme  were  carried  into  effect, 
they  fancied,  American  capital  would  be  permitted 
to  enter  China  only  upon  Japan's  approval.    Nothmg 
can  be  more  sinister  than  such  a  misinterpretation. 
What  Shibusawa  expressed  was  his  desire  and  hope 
for    the    cooperation    of    American    and    Japanese 
capital.    Certainly  he  did  not  entertain  liie  Quixotic 
idea  (.'■  forbidding  activities  of  American  capitalists 
who  would   invest  in   ("hina  independently   rather 
than  in  cooperation  with  the  Japanese. 

The  aptness  of  certain  Americans  to  misrepresent 
Japan's  measures  in  China  is  m.ii  in  their  ccunmcnt 
upon  the  abandonment  of  th-  Standard  Oil  Com- 


14G 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


panv's  project  of  exploiting  oil  fields  in  China.  They 
tellus  tiiat  the  ])r()je('t  was  dropped  because  of 
Japanese  ohjeelion.  Yet  I  know,  upon  the  authority 
of  the  engineers  who  surveyed  the  oil  fields  for  the 
Standard  Oil,  that  the  ahandonment  was  due  mainly, 
if  not  wholly,  to  the  fact  that  the  fields  gave  no 
promise  of  yielding  sufficient  oil  to  justify  the  enor- 
mous expenditure  involved  in  the  enterprise. 

This   American   hal)it   of   blaming  the  Japanese 
everv  time  something  goes  wrong  with  China  is  a 
serious  impediment  to  the  maintenance  of  friendly 
relations  not  only  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  but  also  i)etween  Japan  and  China.     It  is 
due  to  the  same  mental  habit  of  many  Americans 
that    they    .see    a   menace   to    American    trade    m 
the  Japanese  domination  in  Korea.    And    yet  sta- 
tistics show   that   American   export   trade   to  Ko- 
rea increased  twenty  times  in  the  decade  that  fol- 
lowed  the  establishment  of  Japanese   rule   in   the 
ueninsula.    Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  Japa- 
nese protectorate  American  exports  to  Korea  were 
insignificant,   those  for   iJMKt  having  amounted  to 
only   $1!);),188.     In  the  following  year,   with  the 
advent  of  Japanese  rule,  American  exports  to  the 
country  suddenly  swelled  to  $!M)(5..5.57.     Since  then 
the  progress  of  America's  export  trade  to  Korea  has 
been  both  sleadv  and  rapid,  until  in  V.m  it  reached 
the  hands..me  figure  of  $J},!>2t,Hn.     This  is  all  the 
more   remarkable,   omsidering   that   America   buys 
practically  nothing  from  Korea.    When  we  hear  the 


JAPAN  AND  AMERICA  IN  CHINA 


147 


constant  muttorinf^s  of  rortain  classes  of  Americans, 
we  cannot  help  wondering  whether  such  people  are 
not  really  workin<,'  to  force  Jai)an  to  close  the  com- 
nuTcial  doors  of  the  Orient  against  America.  Surely 
their  complaints  do  not  in  the  least  help  advance 
American  trade  or  enterprise. 

In  the  midst  of  such  perennial  nagRinpr  it  is  highly 
refreshing  to  note  that  certain  financial  groups  in 
Japan  and  America  have  just  entered  into  an  agrei- 
ment  for  harm<mious  cooperation  in  the  promotiim 
of   economic   enterprises    in    China.      Mr.    Willard 
Straight,  President  of  the  American   International 
Corporation  of  New  Y(.rk,    eems  to  be  the  leading 
figure   in   this  new   movement.     Judge   En)ert   H. 
c'lry,  chairman  of  the  United  Steel  Corporation, 
has  also  exercised  his  influence  for  a  similar  move- 
ment.   This  is  the  way  to  promote  American  inter- 
ests in  the   Far  East,  manly  in    its  attitude  and 
constructive  in  its  ideas. 

That  Japan  will,  on  her  side,  welcome  this  new 
movement  started  in  New  York  goes  without  say- 
ing. At  this  writing  the  Japanese  press  is  urging 
American  financiers  to  return  to  their  former  fold 
in  the  so-called  five-Powi-r  group  from  which  they 
withdrew  four  years  ago  at  the  instance  of  the  Wilson 
Administration.  The  five-Power  group,  organized 
six  years  ago  for  the  purpose  of  financing  the  Chine.se 
(lovernment,  consists  at  present  of  hanking  inter- 
ests of  England,  France,  Russia,  Japan  and  Ger- 
many.    Under  the  existing  conditions  in  Europe, 


'  .■  s  J 


€i 


i 


148 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Gcnnanv  is,  of  rourso,  virtually  oxrliuU-d  from  this 
group,  and  the  .lapanosc  press  is  ea^'or  to  have 
America  fill  the  vacancy.  Their  general  seutmicnt 
is  juilged  from  the  following  utterances  of  the  Tokyo 
Jiji-shimpo,    recognized    us    the    most    influential 

organ  in  Japan: 

"China's  most  urgent  need  to-day  is  money,  for 
the  countrv  is  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy.    Under 
the  presidency  of  Li  Yuen  Hung,  the  North  and  the 
South  may  come  to  terms,  hut  even  a  united  Chma 
cannot  maintain  peace  and  order  wilhin  its  borders 
unless  it  has  the  wherewithal  to  keep  tiie  wheels  of 
government  running.    The  bare  cost  of  maintainmg 
China's  machinery  of  administration  is  estimated  at 
$3,()()(),(K)()  p<T  month.     With  no  funds  forthcommg 
from  provimial  governments,  the  Central  Coyern- 
ment  knows  no  means  to  make  the  ends  meet.    Unless 
financial    aid    be    proffered    from    foreign    .sources, 
China's  flickering  hope  for  n-hal)ilitation  may  once 
again   come  to   naught   in   the   recurring  storm  of 

revolution. 

"The  (juestion  is  where  she  may  look  for  aid. 
She  has  been  struggling  to  borrow  money  from  vari- 
ous .sources,  but  as  long  as  the  five-Power  gn)up  i.s 
in  existence  foreign  bankers  would  hesitate  to  ad- 
vance any  conshlerable  sum  without  conferring 
with  that  body.  The  trouble  is  that  the  five-Power 
group  is  in  no  position  to  take  care  of  China's  fi- 
nances. Even  England's  great  resources  have  been 
taxed  to  the  straining  point.    Although  Japan  is  in  a 


JAPAN  AND  AMERICA  IN  CHINA 


149 


better  shape,  her  treasury  alone  is  not  capable  of 
supporting  China,  ^^^lither  but  to  the  I  n.ted 
States  shall  we  look  for  immediate  relief  of  our 
destitute  neighbor? 

"The  reason  for  America's  withdrawal  from  the 
financing  group  in  China  was  that  she  did  not  wish 
to  participate  in  any  arrangement  which  might  oblige 
her,  along  with  the  other  Powers  represented   m 
that  group,  to  interfere  with  the  internal  adminis- 
tration of  China.     If  the  Washington  (Jovernment 
still  entertains  the  same  view,  American  bankers 
would  hesitate  to  join  hands  with  us.     It  is  much 
to  be  hoped  that  the  Wilson  Administration  will 
look  at  the  question  in  a  new  light,  for  without 
prompt  relief  China's  precarious  Government  cun- 
not  become  stable." 

When  in  the  summer  of  1916  the  Siems  Carey  Coni- 
pany  of  St.  Paul,  backed  by  ISIr.  Straight's  Ameri- 
can International  Corporation,  broached  the  project 
of  improving  the  Grand  Canal  of  China,  which  runs 
through  Japan's  newly  accjuired  sphere  of  influence 
in  Shantung,  it  was  reported  from  Peking  that  Japan 
launched  a  protest  against  the  scheme.    Considered 
from  a  legal  point  of  view,  Japan's  vetoing  power 
over  tlu-  project  seems  imlisputable,  because  Ger- 
many,  whose  rights  in  Shantung  Japan  has  suc- 
ceeded, had  enjoyed  in  that  province  the  exclusive 
privilege  of  financing  or  promoting  all  such  enter- 
prises as  was  proposed  by  the  Siems  Carey  Com- 
pany.    And  yet  Japan  had  no  idea  of  employing 


150 


JAPAN  IM  WORLD  POLITICS 


the  veto  against  the  Ameriean  project.  On  the 
contrary,  she  was  desirous  of  cooperatinj^  with  the 
American  interest  concerned.  If  the  arrangement 
tentatively  made  between  the  American  Interna- 
tional Corporation  and  the  Japanese  financial  group 
heconies  definite,  not  only  the  improvement  of 
the  (irand  Canal  but  many  other  projects  will  he 
launched  on  terms  which  will  benefit  China  as  well 
as  the  financial  groups  concerned.  Due  to  the  great 
war.  Japan  has  had  fortune  thrust  upon  her.  To-day 
her  financiers  <an  easily  spare  fifty  to  one  hundred 
million  dollars  for  investment  in  China.  With  the 
coiiperalion  of  American  capital,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  they  will  accomplish  much  in  the  economic 
field  of  China  where  capital  is  urgently  needed. 

The  only  danger  to  this  new  tendency  for  co- 
operation between  Jai)an  and  America  is,  as  I  have 
already  intimatcfl,  the  hostile  counter  movement 
on  the  part  of  those  Americans  and  Europeans  whose 
business  is  to  find  fault  with  the  Japanese.  Already 
a  section  of  the  Chinese  press,  both  vernacular  and 
English,  h:is  been  set  at  work  to  discourage  this 
promising  tendency.  There  is  no  gainsaying  that 
the  English  newspapers  in  China,  edited  by  p:nglish- 
men  and  nnanceu  oy  untisn  iiitci<.j;.o,  v-v-nommv, 
a  great  power.  These  newspapers  are  as  much  on 
the  alert  to  oppose  Japanese  interests  as  they  are 
eager  to  i)romote  those  of  England.  They  are, 
almost  without  exception,  anti-Japanese,  simply 
because  they  see  in  Japan  a  rising  commercial  com- 


JAPAN  AND  AMERICA  IN  CHINA 


151 


potitor    of    Groat    Britain.      The    nu.mont    Japan 
launches   any   new    project   in   China   the   Enghsh 
newspapers  turn  a  united  fn.nt  a^a.nst   it.      Is  it 
anv  wonder  that  American  visitors  in  Ch.na  reading 
no'newspaiKTs  other  than  these,  read.lv  fa  1  m  with 
the  British  views  of  Japanese  activities?     I  lie  native 
press,  which  is  as  frequently  as  not  influenced  and 
inspired    l»y    the   anti-Japanese   utterances   of    the 
English  newspapers,  is  also  ever  ready  to  join  in  the 
pn!^)aganda  of  disc-recliting  Japan.    This  unenviable 
llispcs^tion  is  now  being  exhibited  ..t  the  expense  of 
the  growing  intimacy  U-tween  America  and  Japanese 
financiers   interested   in   China.     Says   the   Peking 
Dailu  Ncirs  of  a  recent  date: 

-the  whole  storv  of  Japanese  intercourse  with 
China  since  the  China-Japan  war  is  a  story  of  per- 
sistent   pressure,    of     unremitting    inconsiderat.on, 
.,f  sludie.1  disregard  of  Chinese  susceptibiht.es.     The 
eommittal  of  any  American  project  int<.  Japanese 
Keeping  may   perhaps  be  a  guaranty  o    eventu^ 
materialization,    but   this    may   be   bought   at   too 
hi.,h  a  cost.     If  we  simply  look  at  the  thing  from 
th^  point  of  view  of  what  will  pay  best,  we  find  an 
insuperable  objection  to  the  'American  "-"^y/";^ 
.T..nnnese  brains'  form  of  cooperation.     It  will  not 
p;;V  A.uerican  interests  to  link  themselves  up  wuu 
intVrcsts  that  reck   nothing  of   (liinese   feeling  c.r 
ri<rhts.     American  enterprise  in  this  country  s  ands 
rcMuarkably    free    from   the    taint   of    in^-"^'f  ^^^^^^ 
commercialism,    perhaps    freer    than    that    of    any 


<li 


i 


MICROCOPY    RESOLUTION    TEST    CHART 

ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No    2 


1.0 


I.I 


]-  ilia 


II  2.5 

[12.2 

2.0 
1.8 


1.25 


1.4 


1.6 


^     APPLIED  IIVl^GE 


-esli-'     St,    York  U609        USA 

"6,   •g^  -  OiOO  -  Phone 
•6)   288  -  5989  -  To, 


131 


JAPAN'  IN'  WOULO  POLITK  S 


other  nationality.     Tlie  lii},'1i(>t  American  interests 
fan  only  he  conserved  hy  tlie  maintenance  of  tlu 
American    tradition.      'Kvil    comnmnications    cor- 
rupt good  manners'   internationally  as  well   as  in 
private  and  personal  life,  and  it  is  to  be  hoiu-cl  that 
American  <-apitalists  will  realize  this.     The  history 
of  the  past  few  months  shows  that  it  is  (juite  un- 
necessary for   American   interests  to   be  entrusted 
to   Japanese    manipulation.      S<'veral    loans,    a   l)ig 
railway  buildinfj  contract,  and  other  by  no  means 
nej;lij,'ible  jjieces  of  business  stand  to  the  credit  of 
American  cnteri)rise  unassisted  by  Japanese  cerebral 
convolutions.      There    is    no    necessary    conflict    of 
interest  between  p:ray  matter  and  clean  hands." 

Such  opposition  was.  of  course,  expected  from 
the  bej^'inninf,'.  It  is  the  natural  outcome  of  the 
unfortunate  Japanese  diplomacy  in  China  durmi,' 
the  i)ast  few  years,  as  w<>ll  as  of  the  British  aptafion 
in  that  country.  While  the  war  in  Europe  is  obli<,'ing 
England  to  focus  her  energies  upon  atfairs  at  home, 
it  behooves  the  Britishers  in  China  to  see  to  it  that 
the  conimercial  field  long  numopoli/ed  by  them  is 
not  invadcil  by  Japanese  or  .\merican  interests. 

It  is  indeed  strange  that  American  critics,  while 
constantly  complaining  about  Japanes<'  competition 
in  China,  are  silent  aboiit  the  m(»re  formidal)le 
ct>mpetition  otfered  by  other  coimtries.  Before  the 
wnr  British  interests,  too,  while  raising  a  hue  and 
cry  against  Japanese  activities,  kept  signif'cantly 
quiet   aliout   (lerman   inroads  into  their  fields.     It 


®33^S? 


JAPAN  AM)  AMKRirA  IN  CHINA 


1.53 


sooms  as  \hovi:]x  Japan  wen-  by  the  whim  of  Allah 
cilh.,!  into  oxi>lrn(v  for  the  specific  purpose  of 
shouldering  all  hlaiucs  which  in  reality  belong  to 
other  countries.  Su.-h  perhaps  is  the  treatment 
which  all  neuv..:ners,  especially  Asiatic  newcomers, 
nuist  experience. 

In  September.  lOKJ,  the  American  Manufacturers 
FAport  Associati.>n  made  a  representation  to  the 
Stale  Department  at  Washington.  The  <locument 
had  special  reference  to  the  Japanese  demands  upon 
(  hina  following  the  clash  of  Japanese  and  (  hmese 
troops  in  Manchuria  in  the  summer  of  1!»UI.  It 
reads  in  i)art  as  follows:  ,  ,       », 

"The  denumds,  while  not  fully  disclosed  by  tlie 
newspaper  reports,  are  suflicicnlly  appreciate,!  by 
this  association  to  warrant  its  belief  that  they  may 
have  as  their  object  the  extension  to  other  parts  of 
China  of  special  interests  for  Japan,  and  result  m 
the  exclusion  of  American  prestige  and  a  handicap 
to  the  extension  of  legitimate  commercial  mterests 
in  the  former  country. 

-The  I'nitcd  States  has  always  stood  foremost 
■IS  the  readv  protector  of  Chinese  sovereignty.  In 
its  wiMh.Mi  this  (iovernmcnt  in  March,  l!)lS.Ui>on  the 

.rpoun.l  of  imi>airment  of  Cliinese  sovereignty,  with- 
drew its  support  from  the  American  l)ankers  then 
negotiating    in    conjunction    with    other    Powers    u 

loan  to  China. 

"The    present    situatiou,    threatening    the    nglit 
of  China  to   independent   action,  juslilio,   in  our 


m 


I 


*l 


"r  I 


154 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLIT     S 


opinion,  niriisurcs  at  least  equally  as  ofTectivc  as 
those  referred  to  ahove. 

"The  hi>lory  of  tli<*  Ja{)anese  activities  in  Man- 
churia is  the  iiistory  of  the  almost  (-(jinplete  los.s  of 
American  trade,  not  a  little  of  which  was  formerly 
enjoyed  by  the  niemhers  of  this  Association.  Should 
the  present  demands  he  granted  by  China  what 
little  bu.Niness  is  now  done  by  Americans  with  the 
Chinese  will  be  cut  or  reduced  still  further." 

I  do  not  wish  to  be  suspicious,  but  this  memorial 
sina<'ks  of  sinister  moti\es  which  are  not  -ipparent 
on  the  surface.  I  hoj)e  I  am  unwarranted  in  sayinj? 
that  it  is  written  at  the  instaiuf  of  certain  American 
manufacturers  or  exporters  of  British  or  (Jerman 
extraction. 

This  representation  of  the  American  Manufactur- 
ers' Export  Association  takes  on  Ji  humorous  aspect 
when  placed  beside  the  following  <-ircular  distributed 
among  Knglish  nuTchanls  in  China  last  year  by  the 
British  Chamber  of  Connnerce  of  Shanghai,  China: 

"(ictliiig  Busy  Our  Anu'rican  frit'ud.s  recog- 
nizing the  possibilities  of  this  market  and  tin  fac-t 
that  European  Powers  are  engaged  at  the  moment 
elsewhere,  are  'getting  busy'  .so  as  to  take  away  all 
the  trade  they  can  from  all  of  us. 

"Organization  -It  is  very  neces  ary  that  British 
merchants  should  recognize  tliat  Americans  have 
been  laying  their  plans  on  very  bn^id  foundations 
and  with  consummate  skill  and  foresight  through 
a  number  of  vears. 


-li£t 


,y^M^f<^-^^M& 


¥i^Mi-fi§^^^^ 


'■^'f.,'3r^r,i','. 


l^^- 


^^'fak*iJ?S■ii'■*.  ■  '<i 


JAPAN  AND  AMERK  A  IN  (HINA 


1.-) 


"Tlie  British  Position- The  Atnoricans  liav«> 
understood  the  Chinese  eharaeter  and  have  aeted 
upon  their  understanding  hetl'-r  than  we  have  or 
can  lioi)e  to  <h).  Wo  have  no  surphis  in(hMnnity, 
as  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  stated,  to  hand  haek  to 
China.  Wv  only  estimated  the  exact  costs  of  otir 
e\pe<htion  and  trade  losses,  consetiviently  thiTe  is 
nothinf,'  h-ft  over.  If  there  were,  it  is  too  hite  for  us 
to  repay  witli  J»ny  hope  of  iinilalin^'  Americans. 
'I'hcy  were  so  \uu^  first  in  the  fi«l«i,  and  have  been 
so  far  the  only  ones,  tliat  any  repayment  hy  our- 
selves would  only  add  to  the  '  Kudos'  ^'ained  by  the 
American  move. 

"British  Effort-. \  consideration  of  the  above 
and  many  other  facts  which  are  v.ithin  the  ken  of 
the  members  of  tlu;  chamber  should  nutk«'  us  realize 
that  we  nuist  fight  for  our  conunercial  position  not 
oidy  against  the  (lermans,  who  were  our  great  com- 
petitors, but  now  against  the  Americans,  who  are 
seriously  endeavoring  to  capture  the  Chinese  marki't. 
It  is  extr  luely  necessary  for  British  merchants  to 
unitedly  strain  every  nerve  to  keep  all  we  have  aiul 
to  increase  our  trade." 

There  is  one  American  in  Shanghai,  President 
C.ilbert  Reid,  of  the  International  Institute  of  (  hina. 
who  has  ;i  char  view  of  the  posf  helium  trade  situa- 
tion in  China.  He  predicts  that  the  keenest  com- 
mercial competition  there  after  the  war  will  be  b<'- 
tween  England  on  one  hand,  and  .Vmerica  and  Japan 
on  the  other.     "It  is  not  yet  quite  clear,"  he  says. 


^  *'.i 

it  : 


mmtmti^^^^^^m- 


156 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  I'OLITKS 


**\vli('tli(T  Kii^'IjiikI's  conflict  will  take  place  first 
with  Japanese  or  with  Americans,  or  wliellier  the 
conflict  with  t hoe  two  Powers  will  he  .sinMiltaneous." 

To  thos<'  Americans  whose  business  is  to  hlame 
Japan  every  time  .scnnethinK  K'«»<"<  wronj;  with  Amer- 
ican l»u>iness  in  China,  I  recommend  a  perusal 
of  the  following'  passa^t'S  from  President  Ueid's 
article  written  almost  two  years  before  America's 
entry  into  the  war: 

"There  is  an  Kn^'lish  law  called  'trading  with 
the  enemy  act.'  This  law.  as  the  various  orders  in 
council,  is  meant  not  merely  for  British  ol)servance, 
but  for  universal  application.  In  fact  there  i.s  more 
of  a  prohiliition  placed  on  others  in  trading'  with 
the  eneniy  than  is  placed  on  the  IJritish  themselves. 
In  a  word,  the  traders  of  all  countries,  neutral  as 
well  as  the  allies,  can  trade  only  under  .sulferauce  of 
Kn^dand. 

"They  may  trade,  of  course,  but  under  no  cir- 
cumstances with  the  (Jermans,  thouj^di  the  trade  be 
in  American  and  ("hinese  goods,  and  not  properly 
(Jerman  i:,ooi\s.  If  they  presume  to  do  as  they 
please  and  trade  with  the  Germans,  then  En^'land's 
mi^dit  is  brou^dit  to  bear,  restraints  on  trade  are 
ingeniously  devised,  and  a  regular  boycott  is  .set 
in  motion.  .Ml  this  is  done  in  the  name  of  law,  for 
the  British  have  a  'trading  with  the  enemy  act.' 

"The  i)o>itiou  of  the  American  merchant,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  American  missionary  and  educator, 
is,  under  this  tremendous  force  of  circumstances,  u 


«■■ 


.-•i-,.r:/-'-iV. 


JAPAN  AND  AMERK  A  IN  CHINA 


157 


suhorclinato  ono— suhonlinatc  to  British  official 
action  oven  inoiv  tlian  to  British  mercantile  action. 
The  only  way  for  the  American  in  China  to  do  any 
l.usiness  at  all  is  to  'ke«'p  in'  with  the  Kni,'li>h.  The 
British  consniate  has  two  lists,  the  black  list  and 
the  suspected  list,  and  on  these  li>ls  American  firms 
as  well  as  British  are  placet!  hy  the  ^ood  pleasure 
of  tiie  British  con>uI  general,  resident  in  China,  and 
dwelling  in  an  international  settlement.  'Instruc- 
tions' are  in  seme  cases  issued  to  Americans,  par- 
ticularly if  they  represent  British  or  Japanese  busi- 
ness houses. 

"If  an  American  merchant  should  presume  to 
goc(tntrary  to  the  will  or  wish  of  his  British  majesty's 
consul  general,  he  will  find  it  difficult  to  do  any 
trade  at  all.  For  financial  reasons  he  will  find  it 
expedient,  during  the  p<riod  <»f  war.  to  do  Kngland's 
bidding,  and  disassociate  himself,  both  in  a  business 
and  social  way,  from  the  (iermans.  This  nuich 
is  clear,  the  American  merchants'  j)osition  is  sub- 
ordinate to  England.  In  fact,  out  here  in  China 
the  Briton  rejoices  in  the  predominance  of  Kngland 
t)ver  all  countries,  a  predomiiuince  which  he  claims 
as  a  right,  and  certainly  as  a  fact  through  superior 
power. 

"(lermany  is  thus  not  the  only  country  which 
lias  advanced  the  theory  that  'might  is  right.'  It  is 
not  a  wrong  theory  which  is  to  1k>  overthrown  by 
Kngland  and  her  allio;  it  is  the  military  and  naval 
power  of  some  other  country  which  nuist  give  plac-e 


n 


♦  j 

♦ifO' 


I' 


:v^«^^i^1^'   ;vfjj&i'      'liii^^ffSs^*^ 


->}i^i^^. 


Vifer^ 


iS^yl^ii^i^^i:^ 


\:,H 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  K)LITK  S 


to  lliat  <»f  Kiitrland.  More  than  oiuc  have  T  li<>ar(l 
it  said  It.v  some  BrihMuT  wlicii  I  coniplaiiu'd  of 
l?rili>li  iiifcrlVrcMcc,  'This  shows  we  have  the  power. 
You  Aiiicri«aiis  can't  do  aii\  thinj^  wilh<tut  us.' 

"The  fact  Ihat  most  of  our  American  firms  are 
carrying'  on  trade  jis  u>ual  with  the  Iirili>h  cannot 
indeed  he  taken  as  proof  that  their  trade  is  under 
restraint,  hut  if  we  look  cIomIv  we  will  .see  that  there 
is  here  pro«>f  of  suhordinalion  to  Kn;,Hand. 

'•When  once  any  of  our  firms  venture  to  have  any 
business  relations  with  Knj^land's  'enemy/  then 
the  American  is  made  t<»  suifer.  No  matter  that 
internafional  law  ^'ives  no  countenance  to  such 
rolraint  on  trade,  if  the  American  can't  help  himself, 
why  .should  he  rush  int(i  needless  trouble?" 

To  show  America's  .share  in  China's  import  trafle, 
let  me  present  a  few  statistical  data. 

The  total  vahu'  of  China's  imports  increased  from 
$:U:K0(>0,0()0  in  1!M)7  to  }«<  N7,0()(M)(H)  in  11)115,  the 
year  immediately  jjrecedin^'  the  war,  showing,'  u  j,'ain 
in  that  period  of  about  '•21'  per  cent.  A  closer  exami- 
nation of  the  details  of  that  trade,  country  by  coun- 
try, .shows  that  in  the  .same  jn-riotl  l!)()7  to  IDl.'i, 
inclusive,  the  imports  fnun  (ireat  Britain  grew  from 
.S(i()..JOO.(K)()  to  $7().;50().(K)();  from  (iermany  from 
$l',>.(i(K).()(H»  to  $'2(),.}()(),()(K);  from  IJel^Mum  from 
$8,200,001)  to  $11. .500.000;  from  Russia  from  $.>.- 
(100.000  (ISOS),  to  $1(J,100.000;  from  France  from 
$2..")00,000  to  $;{.S00,000;  from  India  from  S;{().100,- 
000  to  $  IS,  100.000;  and  from  Japan  froui  $H,J)00,- 


JAPAN  AM)  AMERK  A  IN  CHINA 


1-)!) 


000  to  $80,000,000;  while  the  imports  from  the 
liiiled  States  in  the  .same  i)eri<Hl  f<'ll  from  $'29,- 
K)0,()()0  to  .S-2.').700.(M)0. 

It  will,  therefore.  l)e  seen  that  the  increase  in 
imports  from  Kii>>ia  in  the  period  in  qnestion,  1J>07 
lo  li)i;3,  was  IS.)  per  edit.;  from  Japan,  OS  per  cent.; 
(iermany,  (il  per  cent.;  France,  iil  p'T  cent.;  Bel- 
gium, 40  i)er  cent.;  India,  tJ.'i  i)er  C(at.;  and  (ireat 


Britain,  10  per  cent.;  while  in  the  imj)orts  from  tlic 
I'nited  Stales  there  was  Ji  decrease  of  10  per  cent. 

made  u  considerahle  rednction  in  China's 


Tl 


le  war 


imi)orts  from  Knrope,  <-ulling  otT  entirely  those  from 
(iermany.  Anstria-IInngary  and  Belginm,  and  ma- 
terially reilucing  those  from  Ilnssia,  (Ireat  Britain 
As  a  result  the  ju'rcentage  of  China's 


an( 


I  1' 


ranee 


imports  snpph'ed  hy  the  I'nited  Stat«'s  has  .sligiitly 
increased,  having  lieen  7.1  j)er  cent,  in  1!)U.  and  H.-i 
per  cent,  in  1!)1.5,  against  0  per  cen 


t.  in  l!>i:i.     Tl 


total  valne.  however,  of  China's  imports  from  the 
I'nited  States  in  1915  was  less  than  in  any  year  since 
1910.  having  been  hnt  $'2^2.900.000  against  $2.5,S00,- 
000  in  191:J  and  $2(»,SO0.O0O  in  191-2. 

The  official  trade  fignres  of  the  I'nited  States 
.show  that  e\f)orts  lo  China  in  the  fiscal  y«>ar  1900 
were  to  tlie  vahieof  $1.>.2.J9.000;  in  19i;5,  $24.(i!>9,000, 
and  in  1!)10,  $2.>.1.5<),000.  Exports  to  Japan  in  1900 
tiitaled  $2i).OSl.OOO;  in  191.'},  $.>7.712,000;  in  1910, 
S7.).00S.000.  'I'he  exports  to  China  in  191(5  are 
$9,S99,000  in  exce-s  of  l!>00;  those  to  Japan  in  1910 
are  $45,9-27,000  in  excess  of  1900. 


ItiO 


.lAPAN  1\  WORLD  I'OLITirS 


CompiiriiiK  tlu-  fiMiil  year  lfll«  with  1000,  the 
exports  of  llic  I'liilrd  Stalos  to  ("hina  show  an  in- 
cna.M'  of  Cm  jxt  rent.,  to  Japan  l'>8  per  cont.,  and 
to  Asia,  as  a  whole  (cxchisivo  of  merchandise  for 
Kuropean  countries  sent   to  Asiatic  ports)   136  per 

cent. 

I  have  ^iven  these  fi^'ures  to  show  that  Japan  is 
not  America's  only,  even  chief,  competitor  in  China, 
;iiid  that  while  American  imports  to  China  have  not 
increased,  those  to  Japan  have  increased  phenome- 
nally.    After  all   Kn.uland   is  the  most  formidable 
rival    of    America    and    other    trading    nations    in 
China.      \Ve    have    s<en    that    British    imports    to 
China  in    V)V.\  were   to   the  value  of  $70,000,000. 
But    these    fi^mrcs    represent    imports    from    Great 
Britain  alone,  and  do  not  include  those  from  her 
colonies.     If  we  include  the  hitter,  British  imports 
to  China  reach  the  enormous  figure  of  S.'H 7,000,000. 
True,  Japanese  trade  in  China  has  of  late  increased 
more  rapidly  than  that  of  England,  but  this  is  due 
partly  to  tiie  peculiar,  though  natural  and  legiti- 
mate, advantages  Japan  enjoys,  as  we  shall  pres- 
ently see,  and  partly  to  the  fact  that  Japan  is  a 
n(>wcomer    in    the   field,    starting   from   the   lowest 
rounds  of  the  ladder,  while  such  great  established 
interests  as  those  of  England  had  already  reached 
tin'  highest  steps  before  Japan's  advent  as  u  trading 
factor  in  China. 

The  idea  indiscriminately  propagated  that  Japan 
;.;  intent  upon  securing  the  monopoly  of  the  Chinese 


■fliiPil 


f^^     ^i.-V  .-.  , 


■.,^^s^T^^ 


JAPAN  AND  AMERICA  IN  (  HINA 


1(51 


market  is  innro  ahsiird  than  sinisirr.  Mr.  Roland  Ci. 
r.sher  sjM'aks  the  truth  when  he  says  in  his  Chal- 
lenge of  the  Future: 

"They  (the  Japanese)  see  with  clarity  the  im- 
possibility of  utilizing  in  Japan  more  than  a  portit)n 
of  the  exports  of  C'liina,  or  of  making  in  Jai)an  iTiore 
than  a  part  of  what  the  ChitK'se  nuist  huy.  Such  a 
limitation  upon  Chinese  trade  as  a  monopoly  in 
Japanese  hands  would  fatally  limit,  if  not  de>troy, 
the  very  economic  growth  which  they  wish  to  foster. 
European  and  American  capital  they  will  welcome — 
nay,  they  will  invite — on  those  economic  terms 
which  prevail  in  Europe.  The  purchase  of  Chinese 
goods  hy  for<'ign  mcchants,  the  sale  of  foreign  com- 
modities to  China  will  be  stimulated  to  the  maximum. 
There  will  be  but  one  condition — it  nmst  involve 
no  political  concession  or  extraterritorial  privilege 
not  already  in  existence." 

The  "secret"  of  Japan's  commercial  success  in 
China,  and  especially  in  Manchuria,  is,  in  reality, 
no  secret,  but  an  open  book  to  any  who  has  the  eye 
to  read. 

Western  critics  usually  explain  Japan's  com- 
mercial success  in  China  with  the  hackneyed  two 
words — cheap  labor.  Japan  has  an  abundant  supply 
of  cheap  labor,  which  enables  her  to  turn  out  mer- 
chandise at  com{)aratively  small  cost;  lience  she 
is  able  to  undersell  her  Western  competitors:  such 
is  tlu'ir  simple  reasoning.  There  is  a  less  charitable 
view,  which  attributes  Japai'ese  .success  wholly  to 


IG^ 


JAI'AN  IN  \V()F{LI)  I»()Lmr 


undorliand   incnsnrrs  of  (Hscrlniiniif ion  nini  doulile 
dciiliiii,'.     'Ill*'   fir>t    view   tells  only   half   Jnilli;   tlio 
srcoiid  is  a  slander.     As   I  see  it,  the  first  raii^'  of 
Japan's  ((tniniereial  success  in  China  lies  in  the  fact 
that  Japan,  of  all  fon-i^'n  nations,  lias  Ixcn  the  jrreat- 
«->t  cu-lomer  for  Chinese  products     a  fact  which  has 
enahlcd  Japanese  merchants  to  enter  into  more  inti- 
mate and  laslinj^  business  relations  with  the  native 
tradiTs  and  consumers  than  is  oflu'rwise  possihle. 
Japan,  huyin^  so  nuich  from  (  hina,  must  nee<ls  send 
to  that  country  in  <>\chan;,'e  Iht  manufaclun-d  arti- 
cles.   This  is  the  operation  of  the  simple  »'conomic 
law,  that  the  country  consumini,' the  major  port  ion  of 
thcex|)orts  of  another  country  holds  the  most  advan- 
ta<,'eous  i)osition  in  su|)plyinK  its  necess;iry  imports. 
The  principal  o\|)ort  of  Manciuiria  consists  of  t)eans 
and  i)ean-cake.    IJeforc  the  J{nsso-Japanese  war  the 
Chinese  trader  hrou^dit  the  I)ean  proihict  to  Xew- 
chwanj:.  and  received  in  cxchan^'c  foreii,Mi  jjiece^oods 
and  sundries.    The  Jaj)anese  purchasers  <»f  l)(>ans  and 
l»ean-cak<'  i>aid  the  foreigner  his  profit  on  the  turn- 
over,   plus    the    storage    charges,    light<-rages.    an<l 
freight,    and    were    a|)parenlly    contented    with    u 
situati()n    impossible    for    them    to    remedy.      Then 
came  the  war  and  all  was  changed.     Jai)an  hegan 
an  aggressive  campaign  to  gain  control  of  the  Man- 
churian  trade,  and  success  .soon  crowned  her  efforts. 
As  Mr.  (ieorge  Brouson  Rea.  editor  of  the  Shanghai 
Far  l-'.a.slcrn  licricir,  puts  it : 

"riuier  these  conditions   the   foreign   merchants 


JAPAN  AND  AMERK  A  IN  (  MINA 


lti.S 


and  their  jifjcnfs  in  the  interior  were  [)Iae<'<l  at  a 
(lisaflvanta^e  fntin  th«'  outset.  As  they  (tiiild  in  it 
penetrate  into  the  inferior  and  purehax"  l>eans  l>y 
an  exchange  of  commodities,  they  were  reduced  to 
selh'ni?  their  wares  for  rash—  f lie  one  tiling  the  native 
was  short  on.  If  they  attem|)f«<l  to  follow  the  K-ad 
of  the  Japani'se  and  harter  inerehandix*  for  heans. 
they  were  handicapped  hy  their  various  chartres 
at  Xewehwanj?,  «ind  having?  to  ultimat<'ly  sell  to  the 
Japanese  at  their  price,  which,  of  course,  was  un- 
|)r()fitahle  under  the  then  exist inj^  conditions.  The 
decadence  of  Anierican  and  European  imports  fol- 
lowed as  a  natural  consefjuence.  A  few  venture- 
some American  and  British  j)iece  gcxtds  a;:enfs 
otaolished  themselves  in  the  interior,  firndy  de- 
termined to  win  l)aek  their  lost  trade;  hut,  acfinjj; 
solely  as  sellers  and  unable  to  reciprocate  hy  i)ur- 
chasing  the  products  of  the  farmers,  results  were 
discouraging,  and  they  finally  luid  to  abandon  the 
fi<'ld  as  unprofitable.  This,  in  short,  is  the  real 
reason  for  Japan's  success  in  Manchuria." 

That  reallv  furnishes  the  kev  to  the  Manchurian 
(juestion.  Here  is  a  country  where  there  is  no 
manufacturing  industry,  and  whose  agricultural 
products  can  be  enumerated  upon  five  fingers. 
Beans  and  their  by-products,  bean-cake,  and  Iw-an- 
oil,  constitute  its  only  imjjortant  j)roduce.  What 
can  Western  nations  do  with  them?  The  annual 
crop  of  beans  is  approximately  '•2, 000, 000  tons, 
which  has  a  value  of  $40,000,000.     How  is  Man- 


m 


1(11 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


cliuria  to  dispose  of  this  enormous  (juantity?  The 
Maiuliiiriiins  tluiiiselvcs  do  not  want  them,  for  their 
stai>Ie  food,  as  well  as  their  animal  feed,  is  millet. 
Knrope  and  America  do  not  know,  or  at  all  events 
have  not  known,  how  to  utilize  them.  Japan  and 
China  arc  the  only  places  where  the  goods  can  be 

.soUl. 

The  Ru  so-Japanese  war  proved,  as  we  have 
noted,  u  ^'olden  opportunity  for  Japanese  traders 
to  cstahlish  dir"(t  l)usiness  relations  with  Uw  native 
producers  of  heaiis  or  native  dealers  in  the  com- 
modity, thus  doinj,'  away  with  the  medium  of  foreign 
merchants  in  Xewehwaiig.  Since  the  war  Japanese 
purchases  of  beans  increased  by  lcai)s  and  '  ')unds, 
until  to-day  almost  nine-tenths  of  the  Manchuriun 
j)roduce  is  ]Mircha.sed  l>y  the  Ja])anese. 

So  nnich  for  Manchuria.  In  other  parts  >  <"  China 
Jajan  is  also  a  more  liberal  purchaser  of  Chinese 
products  than  any  other  country.  If  England, 
buying  very  little  of  China,  manages  to  export  to 
diina  8;5»)().(H)0. (»()()  worth  of  goods,  is  it  any  wonder 
that  Japan,  the  b<'st  customer  of  China,  should 
foriic  ahead  in  her  export  trade  to  that  ( ountry.' 

'ilie  second  cause  of  the  rapid  increase  of  Japanese 
trade  in  Cliina  is  the  presence  tluTe  <»f  ^200,000 
Japanese  residents,  who  naturally  consume  goods 
from  their  native  country.  If  they  purchased  Japa- 
nese goods  to  the  modest  annual  value  of  $100  per 
capita,  this  alone  would  amount  to  the  handsome 
total  of  fi<JO.OOO,000. 


*■    ir>- i^'^'^SHBB 


Fffff 


55?flP5»Sffli 


JAPAN  AND  AMtCRK  A  IN  CHINA 


165 


Tlio  third  factor  is  tlic  enormous  invostmont 
Japan  has  made  in  China,  and  especially  in  Man- 
churia. During  the  hist  ten  years,  Japanese  invest- 
ments in  Manchuria,  both  governnieTital  and  private, 
have  reached  $^>(H).000.00().  As  against  these  in- 
vestments, American  capital  in  Manchuria  is  prac- 
tically nil.  Can  America  reasonahly  complain  ahout 
the  decline  of  her  trade,  while  Japanese  exports 
have  been  advancing? 

But  has  American  trade  in  Manchuria  suffered 
so  .seriously  as  some  would  have  us  believe?  It  is 
true  that  American  cottons  have  lost  their  sui)remacy 
in  Manchuria.  From  which,  however,  it  does  not 
follow  that  America  as  a  whole  has  been  a  loser, 
for  the  raw  material  that  feeds  Japan's  spinning 
factories  is  imported  from  the  cotton  fields  of  .\mer- 
ica.  As  I  liave  shown  in  u  foregoing  paragraph, 
American  exports  to  China  in  the  period  between 
lOOO  and  1010  have  increased  only  il't  per  cent., 
while  those  to  Japan  have  increased  1.58  ptr  cent, 
in  the  same  period.  In  1910  American  exports  to 
China  totaled  only  $'25,150,000,  while  those  to  Japan 
amounted  to  $75,008,000.  I  have  also  shown  that 
.\merican  trade  in  Korea  hiis  increased  twenty  tim<>s 
since  the  establishment  of  Japanese  rule  there. 
Moreover,  America  has  sold  no  small  amount  of 
railway  material  to  the  Japanese  railway  company 
in  .Manchuria.  Prior  to  the  war  Russia  built  her 
Manchurian  raiK^  ays  mostly  with  Ikt  own  material, 
while  the  Impi  rial  Railways  of  North  China  used 


M 


166 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


excliisivt'ly  British  material.  But  in  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  Dairen-Cliangchun;,'  hne  an<l  its  l)ranches 
(.700  mik's),  in  the  buihhnK  of  the  Antunf,'-Mukden 
line  (1S(>  nn'K's)  an<J  the  Kirin-Changchun  h"ne  (90 
miles)  Japan  used  exchisively  American  rails  and 
rolhng  stock.  The  other  leading  American  exports 
to  Manchuria — flour,  kerosene,  and  tobacco— are  still 
holding  their  own  against  the  competition  offered 
hy  other  countries.  Taking  it  "by  and  large"  we 
can  see  no  reason  why  America  should  complain  of 
the  trade  situation  in  Manchuria. 


iili 


. 


CHAPTER  X 
JAPANESE  BLUNDERS  IN  CHINA 

Japans  blunders  in  China— The  rhenK-<hi:i-lun  ^nrident— Japanese 
demands  after  the  incident— Chiiui  nc'-ls  Japanese  efficiency  -  How 
Japan  benefits  Manchurian.s  — New  Jii|.ancse  <at>inet  initial. s  a 
new  Chinese  policy— Furei^'n  niini.ster  Monulo's  statement— Japan's 
real  difficulties  in  China— A  Japanese  justiticati.m  <if  tlie  "twenty- 
one  demands"— "Group  five"— Substance  of  the  Chino-Japanese 
Agreement,  May,  1915. 

Nothing  shows  more  clearly  than  Japan's  attitude 
towards  China  during  the  past  few  years  that  the 
Sunrise  Empire  has  adopl<'d  Western  vices  as 
nuich  as  it  has  emulated  Western  virtues.  Tokyo's 
diplomacy  in  the  erstwhile  Celestial  Empire,  notably 
that  revealed  in  the  celehrated  "twenty-one  de- 
mands," is  exactly  the  diplomacy  tiiat  has  for  more 
than  half  a  century  been  practiced  in  that  unhapi)y 
country  by  Paris,  by  London,  by  Vienna,  by  Berlin, 
by  Petrogratl. 

*  We  had  hoped  that  Japan  might,  while  accepting 
all  the  good  that  the  West  might  have  to  offer,  guard 
herself  against  that  l)l:izen  vice  of  the  Occident 
known  as  bullying  diplomacy.  In  her  younger 
days,  when  she  took  treml)liug  steps  into  the  dazzling 
concourse  of  the  great  Powers,  Jii|)an  was  herself 
made  to  suffer  tribulations  and  hardships  at   tiio 

l»i7 


!  \ 


lOH 


JAPAN  I.N  WORLD  POLITICS 


hands  of  t-XJictiiij^  diplomats  wliosc  lioinc  povcm- 
iiicnts  t'litortaincd  no  mercy  towards  tlu»  weak  na- 
tions of  Asia.  Did  not  tlio>o  hitler  cxiMricnces 
un(l('rf,'oiii>  in  Ikt  <lays  of  ai)|)r('nliccsliii)  serve  to 
teaeli  her  the  lessons  of  sympathy  and  tolerance? 
As  the  wheel  of  forhine  tMrne<l  in  her  favor,  did  she 
herself  not  iml)il)e  the  nn«'n\ial)!e  spirit  of  those 
o[)ulent  nations  of  the  Wot  whose  dealing's  with 
minor  nations  ha\e  l)een  <haraeteri/ed  l)y  ^'reed, 
arro^'anee,  and  <'alloiis  indifference  to  the  dictates 
of  s\iiipalhy? 

Ala>!  we  had  exixuted  too  much.  When  Japan, 
upon  the  heels  of  the  fall  of  Tsin^fao,  in>^olently 
eonrroiiled  China  with  the  twenty-one  demands, 
we  were  hiltcrly  tiisappoinled.  Not  that  tho>e  de- 
mands Were  in  i)rinciple  wron^'  and  unjustifiable, 
hut  he<  ause  they  were  j)n'ssed  n[)on  China  in  utter 
di>ref,Mrd  of  the  su>ceplihililies  of  tin'  nation  whose 
frieii<lship  sIk?  had  heen  professinj^  to  value.  The 
details  of  the  lUf^utiations  that  followed  are  too  well 
known  to  retjuire  reiteration  here,  hut  there  are  a 
few  poijits  which  nii^dit  still  he  emphasized. 

In  the  first  place,  Japan  oiii^ht  to  have  pnhlished 
the  contents  of  the  demands  simultaneously  with 
their  presentation  to  China,  and  transmiiled  them 
at  least  to  the  Hritish  l*\)rei<:u  Dllice.  There  was 
no  reason  why  the  Ja|)anese  dii)lomat  should  avoid 
I)Ml»lici(y,  if  he  had,  as  he  undoultledly  did,  sincere 
<'onfidence  in  the  reasonahleness  of  the  demands. 
Instead    c^f    taking    this  sensible   course,    Ije   urged 


JAPANESE  BUNDERS  IN  CHINA 


Ml!) 


i 


f 


upon  President  Yuan  Sliikai  the  observance  of  strict 
secrecy.  Could  any  one  with  conunon  sense  imagine 
that  Yuan  would  keep  silence,  wlien  lie  knew  he 
could  throu^di  puhlicity  arouse  tiie  sympathy  of 
the  world  in  his  favor  and  thus  succifd  in  warding 
off  at  least  some  of  the  demands? 

Even  more  reprehensihle  was  the  overhearing 
manner  in  which  t;.e  demands  were  sul)miltc<l  to 
the  Chinese  President.  With  no  previous  warning, 
with  no  previous  exciiange  of  views  with  the  Chinese 
Foreign  Department,  Japan  abruptly  brought  f(.r- 
ward  an  apparently  formidal)le  set  of  (lemands,  and 
placed  it  <lireclly  in  President  Yuan's  hands,  thus 
ignoring  the  u>ual  chanm'l  and  the  estabhshed 
iti<|uette  of  diplomatic  i)rcscntalion.  To  display 
such  an  attitude  of  insolence  in  dealing  with  Cliina, 
that  country  of  multitudinous  ceremonies  and 
«H)nventionalities,  was  to  invite  contempt,  let  aUme 
the  wounds  it  intlicled  upon  her  pri<le. 

The  negotiations  that  followed  the  presentation 
of  the  twenty-one  demands  dragged  along  for  almost 
five  months^  and  finally  resulted  in  a  comi)romiso. 
Reserving  the  outcome  of  the  parley  for  furtluT 
consideration  in  later  paragraphs,  we  nuist  here 
note  another  untoward  incidt-nt  which  occurred 
in  Manchuria  when  the  ink  was  scarcely  dry  ujion 
the  agreements  resulting  from  the  Japanese  de- 
mands of  January,  1!)!.'). 

In  July,  1!)1(),  a  fracas  took  place  between  Chinese 
and  Japanese  troops  stationed  in  a  little  Manchurian 


170 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


town  railed  fhcnp-chia-tun,  which  is  to  be  the 
terminus  of  u  new  Japanese  line  on  which  work  was 
eonnnenced  a  year  a^'o.  A  Japanese  yx'ddler,  it 
seems,  had  an  altercation  with  u  few  Chinese  Tom- 
mies, resulting  in  the  imprisonment  of  the  peddler 
in  the  Chinese  barracks.  Thereui)on  some  of  the 
Ja[)ancs(»  soldiers  stationed  in  the  town  went  to  the 
heachinarters  of  the  Chinese  troops  with  the  inten- 
tion <tf  releasing  the  captured  Japanese,  A  hot 
ar^'ument  followed,  which  soon  developed  into  a 
rou^'li  and  tumble  fi^dit,  in  which  firearms  played 
an  important  part.  The  result  was  u  few  casualties 
on  Itotli  sides. 

AVithout  entering.'  into  non-essential  details,  that 
was  the  story  of  the  Chcnj,'-chia-tun  incident.  Its 
Jai)anese  version  naturally  puts  all  the  blame  upon 
the  Chinese  troops.  On  the  other  hand,  China 
attributes  the  incident  to  the  unruly  <'onduct  of  the 
Japanese  peddler.  As  in  all  similar  cases,  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  determine  where  the  blame  belongs  in  this 
incident.  Perhaps  the  Japanese  contention  was  as 
nearly  true  as  the  Chinese.  Perhaps  the  Japanese 
peddler  was  no  less  guilty  than  the  Chinese  Tom- 
mies. My  intuition  leads  me  to  the  conclusion 
that  both  were  ecjually  to  blame. 

/  t  any  rate  Japan  should  not  liave  .seized  upon 
the  occasion  to  present  fresh  demands  to  China. 
Even  i)rcsuming  that  the  responsibility  rested  en- 
tirely with  the  Chinese  troops  (which  is  open  to 
debate),  was  the  damage  sutfered  by  Japan  serious 


s==s«sBaBsaaaBHBBsaaaaipapBai^^H 


3s--:Ji: 


JAPANESE  BLUNDERS  IN  CHINA 


171 


rnoiif^h  to  justify  her  in  soi/int;  upon  tlio  incident 


th 


to  press  upon  (  linui  sucli  dcniaiKls  as  ttieser 

1.  Apology  from  tlie  Chinese  autli()riti«^s. 

"2.  Indemnity  for  tlie  killed  and  wounded. 

.'{.  Concession    \o  Japan   of    the    right    to   police 
certain  i)arts  t)f  Manchuria. 

4.  Einploynient  of  Japanese  officers  to  train  the 
Chinese  troops  in  Manchuria. 

IN'rhaps  the  first  two  <leniands  were  justifiahle; 
the  last  two  were  excessive  and  arbitrary.  If  Japan 
were  really  anxious  to  hefriend  China,  even  the 
first  two  .should  not  have  been  propost-d.  Only 
thro»if,'h  magnanimity  and  sympathy  can  Japan 
hope  to  win  China's  friendship,  and  thus  really 
sirengllien  her  position  in  Manchuria  and  in  other 
sections  of  that  country.  That  this  view  is  .shared 
l>y  many  Japanese  publicists  and  editors  is  unfjues- 
tional)le.  As  an  example  of  sympathetic  utterances 
in  the  Japanese  press,  I  quote  the  following  passage 
from  an  editorial  in  the  influential  Tokyo  monthly 
Tdiyu,  edit«'d  by  Professor  K.  I'kita,  an  eminent 
historian  and  journalist: 

"The  reason  why  China  lias  liitherlo  been  unable 
to  trust  Japan  is  because  the  Chinese  could  not 
unth'rstand  the  exact  meaning  of  the  principle  of 
preserving  the  integrity  of  China  advocated  by 
this  country.  Japan's  i)olicy  toward  China  has 
been  very  unstable  since  the  first  revolution  in  l!)l'-2. 
It  is  true  that  she  has  occasionally  declared  to  the 
world  her  advocacy  of  the  principle  of  preserving 


'flip 

SEW 


•Vf'  sji  iik.  -  -L.Jt  "■?',-  .\iAlc:15^!ii5j" 


Pi 


^M!^ismmsss^ss^3^^.^^M 


172 


JAF'AN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


China's  intt'grity,  l)tit  her  actions  have  not  been  in 
strict  accord  with  her  avowals. 

"Hitherto  Japan's  diplomacy  in  China  has  been 
runin'n^  counter  to  the  canon  of  hnsh'ulo,  \\w  Japan- 
ese code  of  chi\alry.  It  would  be  a  Juiracle  if  Chino- 
Jajjanese  friendship  were  to  result  from  such  a  line 
of  <liplomacy. 

"The  best  way  to  establisli  the  desired  intimacy 
between  Japan  and  China  is  for  the  Japanese  to 
formulate  the  ^'uidinj,'  j)rinciple  of  their  diplomacy 
toward  China,  instead  of  ^'rumblin^  about  the  atti- 
tude assuinecl  by  the  Cliine>e  toward  them.  When 
once  this  ^Miidiii;,'  princii)le  is  established,  it  is  most 
important  that  it  should  be  adhered  to  firmly  and 
unflinchin;^ly." 

'I'he  <'nf,'a^'ement  of  Japanese  officers  in  the  train- 
ing of  Manchurian  troops  and  the  policing  of  cer- 
tain parts  of  Manchuria  by  Japanese  officers,  are 
in  ])rinciple  a  wise  policy,  if  only  China  is  farseeing 
enough  to  take  this  view  without  pressure  from  out- 
side. The  inefficiency  and  supineness  of  Chinese 
troops  and  jutlice  are  as  prov«'rbial  as  the  venality 
of  their  officers.  If  w(^  could  only  make  China  see 
the  situation  as  she  should  >  e  it;  if  we  could  only 
persuade  lier  to  cast  aside  her  unnecessary  pride; 
incompatible  with  the  sad  j)light  in  which  she  has 
found  luTself  these  fifty  years;  if  we  could  only 
awaken  her  to  the  urgent  necessity  of  being  frank 
and  honest  with  lierself  as  well  as  with  other  na- 
tions, .slie  w'.i'.jld  «)f  her  own   volititju  come  t«»  s«h> 


JAPANESE  BLINDERS  IN  CHINA 


173 


llic  wisdom  of  horrowirif^  JapaiK'sc  rfficiency  to 
iiifiiso  vitality  into  Jut  wcakcncjl  hody  politic.  But 
tin'  way  to  accomplish  this  end  lies  not  in  coercion 
or  the  apjdication  of  force,  least  of  all  in  the  i)in- 
pri(  king  policy  so  much  in  evidence  in  Japan's 
recent  (lealinj,'s  with  Chitia.  The  oidy  right  method 
f(.r  Japan  would  he  in  the  ])atient  <»l>servancc  of  the 
di.  tates  of  justice,  sympatiiy  and  tolerance.  As 
Mr.  Frederick  Moore,  formerly  Peking  correspondent 
of  the  As>ociated  Tress,  who  is  far  from  being  an 
apologist  for  Japan,  frankly  admits,  the  Manchurian 
natives,  who  liave  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  Japanese 
<  fficiency,  are  .sincerely  appreciative  of  the  new 
regime  ushered  in  by  the  latter  in  Manchuria.  If 
Jai)an  <ontinu<'s  to  benefit  the  natives  through 
efficiiMit  administrative  and  economic  policy,  and, 
at  t!,e  .same  time,  refrains  from  resorting  to  the 
policy  of  coercion  such  as  she  has  disjjlayed  during 
the  past  few  years,  will  not  China  gradually  come 
to  listen  to  Japan's  counsels.^    Says  Mr.  Mooro: 

"The  Chinese  are  a  backward  race,  wasting  their 
opportunities  because  of  ignorance  and  the  intense 
M'lfishness  v,iiich  centuries  of  most  wretched  in- 
dividual struggling  for  sustenance  has  engendered, 
'i'hat  China  would  be  materially  better  off  under 
their  (Japam  se)  organization  cannot  be  disputed. 
Before  the  Japanese  came  to  Manchuria  the  jK'ople 
used  to  raise  enough  soy  beans  to  support  life.  If 
they  raised  more  there  was  no  means  of  shipping 
llii-in,  and  if  tiicv  made  money  lirigj'.nds  or  officials 


mMmm. 


m'^m^^-' 


171 


JAI'AN  IN  WORLD  I'OLITICS 


rol)l)«'(|  tliciii  of  flic  .sur7)Iu>.  To-diiy  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  coolies  cross  the  (inlf  of  Chihli  annually 
from  Shantun/,'  Province  to  help  liarvest  the  ^reat 
h<'an  cro[)s  wliich  i^o  1)V  Jaf)aiie>e  railroad  and  steam- 
ship lines  to  Kurope  and  compete  there  witli  the 
pro<lncls  of  American  cotton  seed.  It  would  l)e  so, 
I  have  no  douhl,  with  all  China,  were  the  Japanese 
to  assinne  control.  The  Japantse  would  profit 
mo>t,  l)ut  the  ("hinese  would  also  jjreatly  l)enefit. 
The  majority  of  the  people  (we  liave  Manchuria 
as  an  example)  would  he  ^'lad  of  the  opportunity 
to  make  a  living'  wiiere  they  are  on  the  constant 
ver<'e  of  starvation  to-dav.  A  coolie  is  luckv  in 
China  to  draw  a  rej^ular  waj,'e  of  three  dollars  a 
month;  he  will  even  raise  a  family  on  that  income." 
In  view  of  the  deplorahle  record  of  Japanese 
measures  in  China  since  the  presentation  of  the 
twi'iily-one  demands,  it  is  hi^'hly  refreshing  to  note 
the  (>arnest  ell'orts  of  the  new  Japanese  Cahinet  to 
readjust  Chinese  policy  in  the  ri^ht  direction.  The 
unmistakahle  indication  of  intention  on  the  part 
of  the  i)resent  ministry  to  re;,'ain  China's  jjood  will 
is  seen  in  the  prompt  cessation  of  the  negotiations 
which  its  j)redecessor.  the  Okuma  cahinet,  liad 
\  ij,'orously  opened  with  China  over  the  clash  of 
troops  in  Manchuria,  the  incident  already  de- 
scrihed  in  the  forej^oinj?  para^'raphs.  As  I  have 
stated,  the  Okuma  Cahinet  demanded  the  right 
of  policing  certain  .sections  in  Manchuria  as  well 
iis  tlic  j)riviK-ge  of  training  Chinese  troops  iu  the 


'W^^M^^^^f^^^^^^^ 


'.&*W 


JAPANESE  BLl  NDERS  IN  (  IIINA 


175 


same  territory  l)y  Japanese  officers.  These  demands 
have  been  withdrawn  hy  the  new  Cabinet,  and  the 
incident  has  been  happily  ch)sod. 

!n  explaining  I;is  admitn'strative  and  foreign  {)olicy 
iM'forc  the  Diet  last  January.  Preiin'er  IV-raiichi 
phasized   th 

lations    with    China.      Viscoun 


em 


re 


le   necessity   of   maintainmij   frieiu 


fr 


dly 


t    I 


cliiro 


Mot 


ono. 


the    Foreign    Minister,    elaborated    the    Premier's 
statement  and  .set  f<trtli  what  may  l)o  called  Japan's 


new 


Chi 


nese 


pol 


lev. 


II 


e  sai( 


"Why  is  it  that  China  at  times  cherishes  towards 
us  misgivings  and  a  certain  animosity?  The  chief 
cause  .seems  to  be  a  tendency  to  interfere  in  the 
internal  quarre's  of  China.  Since  the  overthrow 
of  the  Tsing  I)\  nasty  and  the  establishment  of  the 
republic,  various  political  parties  have  been  formed 
in  China,  and  we  have  in  Japan  people  '  are  in 
sympathy  with  one  or  another  of  thesv  parties. 
These  people  have  a  marked  propensity  to  as.<,ist 
the  particular  party  which  is  in  .sympathy  with 
their  own  political  or  personal  views.  I  believe  all 
these  persons  are  prompted  by  perfect  good-will, 
but  tlie  conse<iiiences  are  <leplorable.  We  have 
gained  nothing  but  the  animosity  of  our  neighbors 
as  well  as  misunderstanding  of  our  real  intentions 
by  other  nations. 

"The  present  Cabinet  absolutely  repudiates  these 
courses.  We  desire  to  maintain  very  cordial  rela- 
tions with  China.  We  desire  only  the  gradual  ac- 
complisiimcnt  of  all  the  reforms  which  China  pro- 


M 


176 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  I1)LITI(  S 


poses  1(»  make  fitr  her  future  (Icvclopnu'iit.  W<*  shall 
spare  no  pains  to  coiiu'  to  Imt  as^iolaiicc,  if  six;  de- 
sires it.  We  sliiill  try  to  lei  her  in;«lerstaii(l  our 
sine«'re  sentiments,  and  it  is  for  lier  to  decide  whether 
to  trust  us  or  not.  W«>  liave  no  intention  of  favoring 
one  or  another  of  the  y)ohfical  ])arfies  in  (liiiia.  We 
desire  to  keep  up  rehitions  of  cordial  auiily  with 
("hina  h«Tself,  hut  not  with  this  or  that  pohtieal 
party.  It  is  essential  for  us  that  China  .should  he 
able  to  develoj)  in  a  normal  maruuT  in  the  p;ilh  of 
profrress.  What  we  fear  U'ost  is  her  <lisiut(\t?ralion 
as  the  result  of  continued  inti  rnal  troulth-^  and 
disorders.  We  shall  make  every  etfort  to  the  end 
that  China  may  never  find  herself  in  such  a  pctsition. 
for  it  is  indispensahle  that  she  .should  maintain  her 
independence  and  territorial  integrity." 

Not  only  is  the  Terauehi  (^ahinet  striving  to  win 
China's  eonfidenee  but  it  is  efjually  anxious  to  re- 
store the  trust  and  good-will  of  the  Powers  interested 
in  China.  Let  us  once  more  (juote  from  Viscount 
Motono's  speech : 

"Nobody  disj)utes  that  Japan  occupies  a  special 
position  in  China.  But  we  nmst  not  ignc^re  the  fact 
that  other  powers  have  vast  int<'rests  in  China,  and, 
in  safeguarding  our  own  interests,  we  must  respect 
carefully  those  of  others,  and  we  nuist  try  first  of  all 
to  m«»ve  in  accord  with  other  jxiwers  with  whom 
we  ha\e  special  agnnMuents  and  try  to  ret-oncile 
our  interests  with  those  of  other  nations.  We  are 
llrudy  cou\iueed  that  such  is  the  beat  policy.     In 


JAPANESE  DLLNDERS  IN  CHINA 


177 


all  that  coiKvrns  the  roinmon  inton-st  of  all  nations 
Japan  has  no  intention  of  following;  an  cfjotistic 
policy  in  China.  She  desires  niost  sincerely  to  work 
in  a^'reenient  with  th<"  inter«'ste<l  powers.  The 
Imperial  (Jovernint-nt  firmly  lu-lieves  thai  with  a 
little  goocl-will  Ji  fompleto  understanding  can  he 
reached  for  the  welfare  of  China  as  well  as  to  the 
advantage  of  all  the  powers." 

It  must  he  frankly  admitted  that  during  the 
tenure  of  the  Okuma  Cabinet,  Japan's  Chinese 
policy  was  of  a  nature  to  arouse  suspicion  and  mis- 
jiivinjjs  on  Ihe  part  of  the  Western  Powers.  With 
sfM'cial  reference  to  American  interests  in  (^Miiiui. 
the  new  Cahinet  .seems  (hvsirous  of  estaltlishiuf?  a 
helter  understanding,'  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States.  "I  note  with  great  pleasure,"  .said  Foreign 
Minister  Molono  in  the  .same  .speech,  "the  .symp- 
toms of  real  .sympathy  manifeste<l  for  .some  time  be- 
tween the  two  nations.  The  Imperial  Ciovernment 
will  follow  with  lively  interest  the  development  of 
the  economic  rapprochement  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. 

Looking  at  the  situation  through  the  perspective 
of  the  eight  months  following  the  resignation  of 
Mar(|uis  Okuma,  there  is  little  room  to  doubt  that 
tlie  real  cause  of  his  retirement  was  the  failure  of 
his  Chinese  policy,  which  not  only  aroused  popular 
discontent  but  called  forth  censure  from  the  "elder 
statesmen."  Martjuis  Yamagata,  dean  of  the  elder 
statesmen,  an  arcii-conservative  but  a  high-minded 


:i.j 


III 


isr-ri-/!!^^^" 


■,-»,'. '."-VTf.t"- 


178 


JAPAN  IN  WOULD  POLITICS 


patriot,  lia«l,  with  painful  ap|)rehen.sion,  lu'cn  watch- 
ing the  ^'towin^'  cstran^'cnK'nt  of  Japan  and  China, 
and  had  conic  to^thc  conclnsion  that  no  one  but 
Field  Mar>lial  ^Ji-iki  Tcrauchi,  then  Governor- 
(icncral  of  Korea,  could  save  the  day.  Conceding 
tl;at  the  chler  slatcsnian  is  an  anachronism  and  an 
anomaly,  we  nHi>t  nevcrtlicless  admit  that  Marcjuis 
Yamagata  was  in  this  case  actuated  hy  the  liighest 
motives.  Whttlier  liis  decision  was  right  we  have 
yet  to  see. 

H<  niofore  Ja[)an's  troulilc  in  Iiandling  the  Chinese 
f|ucsti</n  lias  Ix-eit  due  to  the  faet  that  the  prime 
miuist<T  and  the  foreign  department  enjoyed  hut 
ina(le(|uate  authority  o\er  llu^  department  of  the 
army.  The  minister  of  the  army  is  not  a  civilian, 
but  an  officer.  In  a  Cabinet  cri>is  he  is  not  even 
ol)ligcd  to  resign  with  other  miiii>ters.  The  prime 
minister,  in  most  cases  ji  cixilian,  is  supposed  to 
enjoy  controlling  power  over  all  the  departments, 
and,  indeed,  no  fundamental  policy  can  be  decided 
upon  by  any  single  dcfjartmeut  without  his  consent. 
IJiif  in  the  execution  of  any  fiindaim'nlal  policy 
there  are  details  which  cannot  be  .suj)criutcnded  by 
the  I'rime  minister,  and  in  many  ca-es  details  are 
ju>t  as  important  as  the  fundamental  policy. 

Take  the  Chinese  <niestiiin.  'I'liere  is  no  doubt 
that  Japan  desires  Jo  help  China  establish  u  stable 
go\-eniment.  That  is  the  fui.damental  policy  agreed 
nj)on  in  tlu>  councils  of  the  Caltincl,  whose  members 
are  all  civilians  exccjjt  the  ministers  of  the  army 


JAPANESE  BLUNDERS  IN  CHINA 


179 


; 


and  of  the  navy.    But  the  army  department  mi>ht 
l)e  headed  by  an  offieer  who  wouhl  at  heart  he  apa- 
thetic towards  such  a  pohey.  Now  the  prime  minister, 
acting  upon  the  resolution  of  the  Cabinet,   wouhl 
indicate  to  the  army  minister  the  course  of  action 
to  be  followed  by  him  and  especially  by  his  sub- 
ordinates stationed  in  (Muna.     The  army  minister 
would   apparently  a<,'ree   with   the  i)rime   minister, 
but  in  some  cas<'s  he  would  act  in  a  manner  that 
would   run   counter   to   the  spirit   of   his   professed 
agreement  with  the  premier.     Tiider  these  circum- 
>tances  the  civilian  premier  finds  himself  in  an  em- 
barrassing situation,  for  he  is  not  powerful  enough 
to  dictate  to  the  military  section  of  the  government. 
I  am  inclined  to  think,  though  I  have  no  definite  in- 
fornuition  to  verify  my  belief,  that  some  of  the  de- 
mands presented  by  the  Okuma  Cabinet  to  China 
were  essentially  the  demands  of  the  army  department 
with  which  the  Premier  and  the  Foreign  Department 
had   but   little  sympathy.      I  also  su>pcct   that  in 
some  of  the  troul)les  tlu't  liavc  resulfcd  fntm  the 
contact  of  Chinese  and  Japanese  soldiers  in  ('hina 
the  blame  was  on  the  Japanese  side;  but  even  when 
the  Japanese  troops  were  to  blame  the  army  dv- 
|)artmcnt  at  Tokyo  vould  naturally  try  to  justify 
their  action,   and  oblige  the  civilian   i)rc!uici'  ami 
foreign  minister  to  accept  the  militarist  interpreta- 
tion of  the  matter. 

To  me,  this  lias  been  the  weakness  of  the  Japanese 
government — the   inability   of   the   civilian   section 


HI 


!  1 


180 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


to  control  the  military  sortion.  Tlic  idoal  remedy 
lies,  of  course,  in  apjiointiiif?  civilians  to  the  port- 
folios of  the  army  and  of  the  ?  ivy.  Iinleed,  efforts 
have  heen  made  to  hrin^  ahoufr  this  change,  but 
they  have  thus  far  made  hut  little  headway.  In 
the  meantime,  Ja[)an  nuiy,  as  a  measure  of  expedi- 
ency, do  well  to  j)lace  at  the  head  of  the  Cabinet  a 
man  who  is  not  only  able  to  control  the  army,  but 
is  also  broadminded  and  symi)athetic  towards  China. 

The  right  adjustment  of  her  relations  with  China 
is  Ja[)an's  one  great  problem.  Viewed  in  that  light, 
Terauchi's  assumf)tion  of  power  may  do  iimch  good, 
if  he  will  only  Make  up  his  mind  to  be  just  and  gen- 
erous in  dealing  with  China.  Jai)an's  i)oliey  in 
China  must  of  necessity  be  firm,  but  a  firm  policy 
divorced  from  generosity-  is  worse  than  a  weak  |)oliey. 
If  the  Terauchi  Cabinet  shall  succeed  in  reversing 
Jai)an's  recent  course  of  action  in  China,  and  enun- 
ciate a  new  Molicv  calculated  to  pntmote  friendlv 
relations  with  the  (Jovernment  and  people  of  China, 
it  will  have  rendered  a  great  service,  not  only  to 
the  two  nations  concerned,  but  to  the  cause  of  hu- 
manity and  civilization. 

The  favorable  effect  upon  China  of  the  new  policy 
enunciated  by  the  Terauchi  Cabinet  is  already  per- 
ceptii)le.  During  the  past  two  months  two  special 
envoys  have  ccmie  to  Tokyo  from  the  Chinese  (iov- 
ernment,  both  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  away  mis- 
understandings which  have  cast  a  gloom  over  the 
relationships  of  the  two  nations.    One  of  the  envoys 


JAPANESE  BLL-NDERS  IN  CHINA 


181 


Is  Lu  Sung-vu,  former  minister  to  Tokyo  and  a  liigh 
official  in  ti.e  Department  of  Finame;  the  other  is 
Wang  Tah-h>ieh,  f.).m*T!y  minister  to  Enghiml  and 
to  Japan,  an<l  hitei    Minister  of  Echuation.     They 
have  been  received  with  th.c  utnu»st  eorchidity  by 
the  Japanese  Government  anci  people,     ^i.  appre- 
,.iiifi„n  of  tiiis  manifestation  of  courtesy  on  the  part 
(,f  China,  Japan  is  also  contemplating  the  dispatch 
of  a  special  envoy  to  Peking.     At  this  writing  it  is 
reported  from  Tokyo   that   the  Terauchi   Cabinet 
has  accvded  to  China's  retiuest  for  the  much-needed 
iiierease  of  the  customs  tariff.    These  are  hopeful 
signs.    Whatever  will  eventually  result  from  them 
must  needs  depend  upon  the  duration  of  the  Terauchi 
Cabinet.    Given  a  reasonable  time,  it  may  succeed 
in  carrying  into  execution  what  it  has  been  advo- 
cating. . 

After  all  has  been  said  in  censure  of  the  Chinese 
policv  followed  by  the  Okuma  Cabinet,  we  would 
not  be  fair  if  we  did  not  try  to  understand  the  point 
of  view  of  the  stalwart  advocates  of  a  ''firm"  (  hinese 
policv,  of  whom  Japan  lias  many.    That  point  of 
view^may  be  said  to  be  embodied  in  the  twenty-one 
demands  which  I  have  discussed   in  earlier  para- 
gra|)hs.    However  severely  we  may  feel  constrainei 
to  condemn  the  manner  in  which  they  were  pressed 
upon  China,  we  must  at  least  endeavor  I  J  appreciate 
the  motives  which  prompted  the  Okuma  Cabinet 
to  push  them.    We  nmst  not  permit  the  non-essential 
details  of  diplomatic  parley  which  attended  those 


i 


m. 


lS-2 


JAPAN  IX  nORLD  POLITICS 


drmands  to  ohsrun-  the  cardinal  j)(>iiit  upon  wliirh 
Japan's  policy  liiii^'os.  Tiiat  point  is  licr  doire  to 
boconio  tlic  doininant  factor  in  the  molding'  of  China's 
destiny.  Call  it  an  Asiatic  super-Monroe  Doctrine, 
if  you  will.  The  name  is  iiiiniaterial.  The  important 
tiling'  is  that  Ja|)an,  the  only  Asiatic  nation  efficient 
enough  to  escape  the  yoke  of  p]uroi)e;in  donunation, 
is  aspiring'  to  the  leadership  of  other  Asialic  nations. 
To  me  this  is  a  laudahleamhilion  with  which  America, 
whose  traditional  policy  has  been  to  keep  Europe 
at  Jinn's  lenj,'!lu  nuist  .sympathize.  Once  this  point 
is  frankly  conceded,  even  the  apparently  obnoxious 
"^roup  five"  of  the  Japanese  demands  is  easily 
understood. 

The  ways  of  the  di{)lomacy  of  the  old  scho'  ^ 
matter  of  what  i)ower,  are  al\va\s  devious,  i  he 
world  would  he  better  olT  if  there  were  no  such  thing 
as  diplomacy.  Had  there  been  no  Wilhelmstrasse, 
no  Quai  <rOrsay,  no  Downing  Street,  there  would 
have  been  no  Kasumi-ga -seki  at  T<ikyo.  In  sub- 
mitting the  twenty-one  demands  to  China  in  Jaim- 
ary,  191.3,  Japan  resorted  to  the  usual  methods  of 
dickering.  The  so-called  group  five  w.is  included 
in  the  d<>mands  unquestionably  for  the  i)urpose  of 
driving  the  best  bargain.  The  evidence  of  this  is 
found  in  the  following  instruction  which  Foreign 
Minister  Baron  Kalo  lianded  to  ]Mr.  Eki  Hioki, 
the  Japant'se  Minister  at  Peking,  on  December  .S, 
1!)14,  i.  e.,  forty-six  days  before  the  submission  of 
the  demands  to  the  Chinese  Government: 


JAPANESE  BLUNDERS  IN  CHINA 


183 


'As  regards  the  propo^a 


Is  contained  in  the  fifth 


group. 


tl 


lev  are  presc 


nted  as  tlie  wishes  of  tlie  Im- 

dealt 


,„Tial  (^.overnnuMit.  The  mailers  which  are  dea 
Willi  under  this  category  are  entirely  d.tTerent  ui 
,  haracter  from  those  wliieh  are  included  in  the  hrst 
fnur  groups.  An  adjustment,  at  this  time,  of  these 
nuitters.  some  of  which  have  been  pending  hetween 
the  two  countries,  being  nevertheless  highly  .lesirable 
for  the  advancement  of  the  frien<lly  relations  l)etween 
Janan  and  China  as  well  as  for  safeguardnig  their 
ronimon  interests,  y<.u  are  al>o  re.iuestcil  b)  exercise 
vour  best  efforts  to  have  our  wishes  carried  out. 

Even  if  group  five  were  m)t  "wishes"  but  real 
"demands"  I  see  no  cause  for  excitement,  provided. 
of  course,  they  were  presented  in  a  manner  acce,)table 
to  China.     Take,  for  instance,  the  propo>ilion  con- 
cerning the  supuK-  of  arms.     China's  urgent  need 
to-dav  is  mit-'miO'lHcient  civil  admimstrali.)n  but 
an  eti'ective  svstem  «.f  (U'fense.     In  the  organization 
„f   an   etfective   military   p..wer   t'.ie   unification  o 
arms  is  as  essential  as  the  training  of  ofh<«TS  and 
men.     Can  we  not  understand  why  Japan  expressed 
her  wish  for  the  estaldishment  of   Chino-Japanesc 
arsenals  or  the  purchase  of  Japam-se  arms?     Japan 
believes  that  China's  military  organization,  if  not 
;:uided  an<l  rehabilitated  by  her,  will  eventually  be 
<„nlrolle.l  bv  some  European  nation  by  no  nuans 
congenial  to  her.     Signs  of  this  unhappy  tendrncy 
were  cleaily  discernible  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  war. 


:,<  » 


fll 


184 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Again,  the  employment  of  foreign  advisers  is 
unmi.stakal)ly  tne  of  China's  .sovereign  riglils,  which 
unch-r  normal  conditions  does  not  permit  of  foreign 
interferenee.  But  when  a  nation  proves  so  wayward 
in  the  management  of  its  own  affairs  as  to  jeopardi/.e 
the  welfare  and  safely  of  its  neighbors,  it  becomes 
the  right  and  duty  of  the  neighljors  to  urge  ujjon 
Miat  nation  such  measures  as  will  remove  the  cause 
of  such  embarrassment.  Ditl  not  tiu'  United  States 
])lay  an  important  part  in  the  secession  of  Panama 
from  Colombia?  Has  she  not  assumed  the  control 
of  the  finances  and  police  j)()wer  of  Haiti  when  Haiti 
lias  become  troublesome  to  her?  And  are  n«»t  Amer- 
icans urging  their  (iovernment  to  deal  rigctrously 
with  Mexico?  With  the  Monna*  Doctrine  firndy 
estal)li>hed,  and  i'udowed  with  (>normous  potential 
power  to  back  that  doctrine,  the  rnit<^l  States  may 
remain  equanimous  with  regard  to  ^lexico,  while 
Japan,  enjoying  no  such  advantage,  is  compelled 
to  act  more  promptly  in  China. 

To  many  Japanese  it  appears  obvious  that  China, 
l{>ft  to  her  own  resources,  will  eventually  become 
the  Turkey  of  the  Far  East,  if  it  has  not  already 
become  such.  Students  of  Near  Eastern  affairs  all 
know  what  a  hotbed  of  plots  and  intrigues  the  Turk- 
ish caj)ital  has  been  in  the  past  half  century.  Russia, 
Cicrmany,  England,  France,  Austria,  and  Italy 
all  ])layed  mor«»  or  less  important  parts  in  the  great 
tragi-comcdy  staged  for  the  alien  control  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.    In  their  zeal  to  push  their  selfish 


JAPANESE  BLUNDERS  IN  CHINA 


\S5 


int-rests,  thev  disrcjrardr.l  all  deoency  in  their  diplo- 
nvu'v     Thcv  emplc.vod  women  of  tlubious  character, 
l.rih'ed  euniKhs.  corrupte<l  officials,  a.ul  spread  over 
tlu-  whole  country  a  network  of  espDnafie.     in  this 
rivilrv  for  the  control  of  the Suhlinie  Porte  Germany 
proved  a  winner.    >Vhat  is  the  result  ?    Not  only  has 
the  Turkish  (lovernn-ent  become  a  tool  ni  the  hands 
,.f  Germany,  hut  the  Turkish  army  and  navy  have 
iKvn  dominated  by  the  Kaiser's  officers      The  fa  e 
<,f  Constantinople  is  a  vivid  lesson  to  Chma  an.i  to 

"'T'lr  Americans,    unable    to    understand    Japan's 
siTH'ular  position  in  the  Far  East,  it  perhaps  makes 
hut  little  difference  whether  China  is  donunatcd  by 
Kngland,  Gerniany,  France,  Russia,  or  J^P^^"-    1'  ••;;'" 
th;japanc>e  point  <.f  view  it  is  different.    ^^  .th  the 
historv  of  European  diplomacy  in  the  Near  and  l^ar 
Fast  before  them,  the  Japanese  cann.>t  but  shudder 
at  thought  ..f  the  .lay  when  China  shall  be  held  fast 
in    the   grip   of   Europe.      Can   Anierica   guarantcH.. 
tluit   no  European   Power  will   dominate   (  hma   if 
Japan  stays  away?     To-day  China  employs  U  o 
Englishmen  as  advisers  and   minor  <.fficials,   UKU 
Frenchmen,  o.'U)  Germans,  4G3  Russians,  and   \rV 
Americans.     Japan,  whose  destiny  ^' ^^ ^^''^^^^^^ 
interwoven  with  that  of  China,  has  only  ^207  officials 
cmi)l.)ved  bv  the  Chinese  Government. 

\iv  ("hino-Japancse  agreement 


The  substance  o 
of  last  vcar  is 


briefly  toUl.     Japan  agrees  t<)  return 


Kiau-chow  to  China,  prov 


ided  the  Powers  will,  after 


•  rig 


i 


iiu 


■  1 


lit 

I'M 

■fiA 

m 


I 


186 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  I'{)F,ITI("S 


the  war.  permit  Japan  to  dispose  of  it  in  this  manner. 
In  eastern  Inner  Monj^oha,  Japan,  in  order  to  offset 
the  Kii>^ian  domination  of  Outer  Monf,'oha,  proposes 
toe>lal»Msh  a  foofhohl.  In  South  Manchuria,  Japan 
secured  the  <'\lension  of  the  lease  of  Port  Arflnir  and 
of  the  concession  of  the  South  Manchuria  raihvay. 
She  lias  al>o  ohtained  for  Japanese  suhjects  the 
privilep"  to  travel,  reside,  tnd  eni;af,'e  in  aj,'ricul- 
tura!  and  commercial  j)ursuit>  in  any  part  of  South 
Maiuliuria.  This  will  ^'really  facilitate  the  indus- 
trial development  of  Manchuria.  ^Vith  all  the  limit- 
aiions  they  liad  to  contend  with  in  the  })ast.  the 
Japanese  liave  already  created  in  Manchuria  a  vast 
new  industry,  tlu'  hean  industry,  benefiting  not 
only  the  natives  of  Manchuria  hut  tens  of  thousanils 
of  coolies  of  Shantung  j)rovinoe.  Where  ten  years 
ago  ^Nlani-hurian  farmers  barely  eked  out  a  living, 
they  are  to-day  exporting  i^^lO.OOO.UOO  worth  of 
beans  and  lu'an-cake.  This  is  entirely  due  to  Japa- 
nese enlerprise. 

One  may  find  an  objectionable  feature  in  the  pro- 
vision that  the  Chinese  police  regulations  and  Chi- 
nese taxation  mersures  in  Manchuria,  to  be  applied 
to  the  Japanese  nuist  l)e  api)roved  by  the  Ja{)anese 
consul.  This  is  a  penalty,  which  a  backward  na- 
tion with  no  ellicient  modern  law  or  administra- 
tion nuist  usually  pay. 

^^ilh  regard  to  Fukien.  Province,  close  to  the 
Japanese  island  of  Formosa.  China  engages  not  to 
gra!5t  any  forcigti  Power  the  right  to  build  any  ijhip- 


JAPANESK  BUNDERS  IN  CHINA 


18- 


yar.l,  military  or  naval  station.  Finally.  China 
pn.nii.srs  to 'safopuanl  tlio  Japam-sr  investment, 
amounting  to  more  than  SlO.OOO.i »(>(),  in  the  Han- 
y.  li-pinK  Company,  and  not  to  eontract  for  it  any 
lureijxn  loan  other  than  Jai)anese. 

This,  then,  is  the  snm  total  of  the  new  privileK<^> 
wliidi  Japan  lias  seenred  fnmi  China.  What  Japan 
was  trvinj;  to  do  in  China  was  to  prepare  herself 
ai:ain>t  any  emerg«>m-y  that  may  at  any  moment 
ariM-  in  tliat  aj^'ilated  eonntry.  .Xrmap-ddon  m 
Kuroi)e  has  for  the  time  hein^'  stopped  the  (mslanght 
of  tl:e  Powers  npon  China.  After  iho  war,  however, 
a  >liarp  internatiimal  rivalry  will  he  resnmed  for  the 
rotitrol  ..f  the  eonntry,  both  politically  and  e.)m- 
nierciallv.  Whichever  side  may  win  in  the  war,  I 
cannot  l.nt  apprehend  that  China  will  he  the  next 
iield  of  rivalry  amon^'  the  Enropean  Powers. 

l)iscussin<,'\\meriea's  post  hrllum  i)osition  among 
the  Powers  the  Xiir  Vorlc  Evenimj  Mail  sounds  this 

;'rim  warning: 

•America  needs  her  funds  and  her  sons  mohdized, 
..rganized,  prepared  for  her  own  defense  in  the  stern 
.lavs  that  will  f..now-  this  war.  Those  days  %m11  hnd 
great  nations  armed  to  the  t(>eth,  insolent  in  victory, 
hunlened  with  (U'ht,  freed  from  the  moral  scruples 
tiiat  use('.  to  keep  nations  true  U)  international  ohh- 
Iv  for  undeveloiH'd  South  and  Central 


gations,  greet 
America,  envious  o 


f  America's  fat   prosperity.     No 


niie  who  IS  wnlmg 
aliead  of  U? 


lling  to  think  can 


fail  t 


o  see  w 


hat 


IS 


n 


W 


:/,«^, 


■-^--^-j 


188 


JAPAN  IN  UORLU  POLITICS 


If  SO  rcsourreful  and  opulent  a  nation  as  AmeriVa 
entertains  such  misgivings,  how  much  n.ore  natural 
that  .jaj)an,  that  .small,  impecunious  counlrv  Jyini,' 
next  door  t.,  the  possible  coming  storm-centor  of 
international  rivalry,  should  feel  restive  as  to  her 
position  after  the  war.     I'ndouhtedly  Japan  thinks 
It  necessary  to  entrench  lierself  in  China  at  the  mo- 
ment when  such  a  move  se*Mn.s  most  effective      In 
the  light  of  Europe's  past  dealings  with  the  Orient 
who  <an  say  that  she  is  wrong.'     Whether  Japan 
has^  been  g(,ing  al)out  the  task  in  the  right  way  is. 
as  I  have  already  argued,  another  matter. 


al 

>K 
of 

IT 
CS 
3- 

n 
It 
n 


CHAPTER  XI 
AMERICA  AND  JAPAN  IN  KOREA 

Misconception  conocrninj?  Japanese  rule  in  Korea— ^v-natur  Stone's 
resolution — American-Korean  treaty  of  1SH<— Chinese  plot  in 
Korea — Korean  envoy  to  America — Aniericii  tacitly  n-i'oinii/.es 
Chinese  suwrainty  over  Korea— Japan  tirst  to  rccojjnize  Korean 
independence — Factional  feuds  in  Korea  China  eajrer  to  annex 
Kon\'i — Chino-Japaneso  war — Japanc.v  efforts  to  n-fonn  Korea — 
The  Russian  intrijjue  in  Korea — Russo-Japanes*'  war — Knd  of 
Korean  independence — The  op«'n  d<K>r  iu  Korea  never  closed. 

More  than  ten  years  liave  elapsed  since  the  cs- 
tahhshment  of  Japanese  rule  in  Korea,  and  it  seems 
reasonable  to  assume  that  the  world  lias  liad  ample 
time  to  understand  clearly  why  Japan  liad  to  assume 
rontrol  of  the  erstwhile  Hermit  Kin<,'dom.  Yet  the 
grievous  fact  is  that  the  American  puhlic  is  far  from 
having  grasped  the  real  meaning  of  the  Korean 
episode.  There  are  certain  classes  of  tritics  whose 
ajjtitude  for  misinterpreting  Japanese  policy  on  the 
Asian  ccntinent  falls  little  short  of  genius.  Thanks 
to  the  diligence  of  such  critics,  Jai)an's  real  task  in 
Korea  has  been  obscured  under  the  storm  of  censure 
and  denunciation  hurled  upon  her.  Since  Japanese 
diplomacy  erred  deplorably  in  the  presentation  of  the 
recent  demands  upon  China,  these  critics  have  re- 
doubled their  energy  in  attempting  to  discredit 
Japan.    Admitting  that  Japan  has  committed  many 

ma 


i^t 


*1 


ii» 


Hi 


>r1 


190 


JAPAN  IN  WOHLI)  I'OLIJK  S 


bl.indiTs  iM  Iht  (l.-alin^s  with  Korea  a,ul  Thina 
«'.s,Hvially  tlM-  laft.T,  it  ,nn>t  n.nrrtl.dr.ss  he  con- 
ed.,] tli.-.t  in  Kona  .she  has  taken  a  eo„rse  which 
pmnitt.',!  of  no  alternative  a  ta>k  that  was  im- 
I.os(.,|  upon  her  l.y  the  in.poteney  and  degeneration 
of  the  i)<-in'n>nhtr  kin^'doru. 

Kven  more  n.i.chievous  than  the  efforts  of  these 
mti.s  IS  the  inj.vtinn  of  the  Korean  <|uestion  into 
the  internal  iH,lifies  <,f  this  eo.inlry.     When  Senator 
Khhu   K.,„t  rriticis,.,!  IV.vsident  Wilson's  failure  to 
protest    a^'ainst    the   C;ernian    ravage   of    Belgium 
Senator  Stone,   a   h-adiuij  Democrat   in   the  upf)er 
house,  replied   to  the  challen-e  of   the   Rcpul.lican 
S'Tiator  with  u  rcs,,lution,  setting,'  forth  the  hmg- 
for-ollcn  record  of  Mr.  Koof's  dcalin-s  with  Korea 
^«n<l  Japan,  when  Kor(>a's  existence  as  an  indepen- 
dent .state  was  al.out  to  c(>a.,e.     The  resolution  was 
of  course,  odcrc.l  for  the  mere  purjH.se  of  sluclding 
J  resident  \\  ilson  from  the  .scathing  attacks  of  Mr 
Root.     J)id  n,.t  JVesident  Rooscv..'^  ami  S>-rr,.tary 
Root  ac(,uiesr-e  in  the  Jaj)ancsc domination  of  Korea' 
Uliy  l.lame  Mr.   Wilson  for  lu's  failure  to  protest 
agam.st  the  CJerman  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality.' 
In   view  <»f   thc.e  unfortunate  and  uiiwarrantVd 
exi)loilations  of  the  Korean  question,  it  .seems  neces- 
sary to  put  l,.>fore  the  public  the  real  nature  of  tiie 
matter     the    history    <,f    American    relati<.ns    with 
K.Mva  and  of  the  circumstances  which   ii..'vital)lv 
led  to  Japanese  control  of  that  country. 

It  is  true  that  the  Americun-Koreaa  Treaty  of 


AMERICA  AM)  JAPAN  IN  KORF.A 


191 


May  22.  ISS-Z.  solemnly  dfrlarcs:  "If  other  powers 
ileal  unjustly  or  ofjprcssively  with  either  p>veminent, 
the  <tfher  will  e\e' t  their  pxxl  offices,  on  hein^  in- 
furnied  of  the  ease,  to  hriii^'  afxnit  an  ainieahle  ar- 
riiii^<'iiient,  thus  .showing?  tiiei.-  friendly  fj^lint;." 
This  provision  was,  however,  virtually  ruillified  as 
early  as  IHHS  si-venteen  years  l»'f<  re  the  Iloos-velt 
administration  aeffuieseed  in  the  Japanese  ahsorp- 
tion  of  Korea.  It  is  stran^'e  that  no  American  au- 
thority on  di{)lomacy  seems  to  recoj^ni/e  this  im- 
l)ortant  fact.  Before  hlannn^  Mr.  Uoosevt-lt  and 
his  Secretary  of  State.  Senator  Stone  and  his  eol- 
Icaj^'ues  should  have  hiamed  President  Harrixtn  and 
his  Secretary  of  State.  The  vital  question  is  whether 
these  Presidents  and  Secretaries  of  State  were  really 
to  hlame  for  i^'uoring  the  Korean  treaty  of  lISH-i. 

Let  us  j)au>e  for  a  moment  and  consider  the  first 
article  of  the  Korean-American  treaty  ai)ove  (juoted. 
This  article  provides,  as  we  have  .seen,  that  Korea 
and  America  are  imder  nmtual  ohli^ration  to  protect 
each  other'.-.  w«'lfare  agains*  ♦he  encroachment  of 
•>tlKT  Powers.  The  absurdity  of  such  an  article 
ought  to  be  obvious,  for  it  is  the  chimera  of  chimeras 
to  presume  that  a  decrepit  nation  like  Korea  could 
come  to  the  rescue,  should  a  great  nation  like  the 
I'nited  States  be  attacked  by  a  third  Power.  The 
Hermit  Kingdom  was  as  weak  and  helpless  in  1882 
as  she  has  been  ever  since,  and  one  wo\ild  almost 
think  that  it  was  a  bit  of  AmeriLan  humor  which 
actuated  Commodore  Schufeldt  to  put  in  tlie  fore- 


If 


m 


w^ 


-M-.,--*? 


I 


19-2 


JAPAN  IN  WOHLO  I»()I,ITIC.S 


Rronn<l  <,f  1Ih>  tnvity  a  provision  whoso  iniprartira- 
hiht.v    was   a    foroKonc   f-oru-ltision.      As    llic   yoars 
rolled  on,  tli,>  },o,«.Ie.ss  forxlition  of  Korea  }>eeame 
more  and  more  vvi,\vu\,  until  tin'  s'.^r,.  ,,,,,  reaehed 
wherein  she  had  to  he  .suhjeef  to  the  rule  of  either 
nussia  or  Japan.     It  is  ohvi„Ms  that  when  a  nation 
IS  so  utterly  destitute-  of  the  c,ualities  necessary  for 
the  maintenance  of  its  in.le,,en,ience,  reams  of  trea- 
ties and  conventions  are  of  little  avail  in  jjropping  up 
the  decaying,  state.     The  question   as  to  whether 
Korea  should  remain  an  in.lependent  nation  was  a 
question   which   had   to   he  r-o.Hi,|cn-d   not   from  a 
le^'ul,  but  from  a  i)oliticaI  i)oint  of  view. 

To  say  that  the  Cnited  States  had  from  the  ho- 
gmmng  no  intention  to  adiiere  to  tlu-  spirit  of  that 
treaty  would  he  to  charKc  her  with  iusinceritv,  and 
I,  for  (me,  .refer  to  think  that  the  course  of  events 
that  followed  the  conclusion  of  that  treaty  reveal-d 
to  her  th(  hopelessness  of  Korea's  case,  necessitating 
a  radical  alteration  of  her  policy  towards  the  Hermit 
Kingdom.     It  was  the  .same  state  of  things  which 
forced  Jai)an  to  abandon  her  first  av(,wal  of  a  pur- 
pose to  uj)hold  the  indep<-ndence  of  Korea.     How- 
ever that  may  },<•,  here  we  are  chiVHy  concerned  with 
the  fact  that  the  recognition  by  America  of  the  in- 
''n"'ndence  of  Korea  was  virtually  re,,ealed  in  18H8. 
when  (  hina,  acting  upon   the  pretension   that  the 
IHMimsular   county    was   one   of   h^r   vassal   states 
caused  the  recall  of  the  Korean  minister  at  Washing- 
ton, against  wliich  America  launched  no  protest 


AMERICA  AND  JAPAN  IN  KOREA 


193 


In  188.'J  Prince  Min  Yonj^-ik.  the  nephew  :)f  tlie 
Queen,  accompanied  l)y  a  ninnher  of  protjressive 
yoiiiif,'  Koreans,  proceeded  to  ^^.lshiIlJ,'ton  to  ratify 
the  treaty  of  \HH-2.  Min  ha<l  heen  recoj,'nized  as 
one  of  the  leatiers  of  the  faction  which  stood  ft)r  re- 
form and  pro^'ress,  hut  upon  his  return  home  from 
America  in  1SS4.  he  cast  his  h>t,  for  what  reason  is 
not  known,  with  tlie  reactionary  or  Cliinese  faction, 
and  in  consef|uence  was  severely  wounded  hy  an 
assassin  heh)ngin^  to  the  radical  party.  Three 
years  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  Korea  de- 
cided to  install  a  lef,'ation  at  Washington.  At  this 
time  China  exercised  paramount  influence  over 
Korea.  Li  Ilung-chanj,',  one  of  tlie  shrewdest  dij)- 
Inmats  China  has  ever  i)roduced,  ha<l  sent  his  ablest 
lieutenant.  Yuan  Shi-kai  (later  President  of  China), 
to  Korea  with  the  .secret  instruction  that  he  should 
endeavor  hy  all  means  to  vindicate  Chiiui's  claim 
lor  suzerainty  over  Korea.  When,  therefore,  "^'uan 
learned  of  Korea's  plan  to  despatch  u  minister  to 
.Vrnerica  he  lost  no  time  in  launching  a  vigorous 
j)rotest  against  the  arrangement,  asserting  that  a.s  a 
vassal  state  of  China  Korea  had  no  right  to  send 
her  political  re[)resentative  to  any  foreign  coimtry. 
The  Chinese  diplomat  employed  all  .sorts  of  tactics 
from  persuasion  to  thnvit  in  the  effort  to  prevent 
the  departure  of  the  K)rean  nnnister.  But  the 
Seoid  court,  lieartened  by  Atnerican  hacking,  would 
not  yield,  and  let  the  im'mster  leave  Seoul  on  his 
journey  to  America  before  Yuan  detected  the  plan. 


!^- 


I   ■    i! 


» 


194 


JAPAN   I\  WORLD  I'OLITKS 


On  lli.>  vvv  of  his  (l.parliire  Ynari  knew,  to  liis  proat 
chagrin,    that    li<>    was   outwit  fed,    and    hurrit.l    his 
liciilenant  <loun  to  Chciiiulix)  wlicmr  the  mission 
was  to  sail  o.i   thi-  American   naval   vessel  Oma/ia. 
He  threalened   that,   unless  the  im'ssion   was  forth- 
with  onlend   h;,(k    to   Seoul,    ho   would   return   to 
China,    intimating'   therel.y   that   a   calamity   would 
ix-fall  Korea.     JJul  in  reality  Vu;;n  had  no  intention 
of  adopt in<,'  drastic  measures,  for  he  feared  that  .such 
iiCourse  nu'^ht  emhroil  China  in  trouble  with  the 
I  mied    Slates.      'J'h(>    American    ^'overmnent    des- 
palche<l  the  ()„ni/i,i  to  exoit  the  nn'ssion  as  far  as 
the  Japanoe  jx.rt  of  \a<rasaki.  and.  what  was  .still 
more   important,   an    American   citizen    was   to   uc- 
comi)any  the  i)arly  in  the  caj)acity  of  adviser. 

At  the  last    m..ment   Yuan   rece.led,  and  allowed 
the  Korean  nnmsler  to  .star!,   thou^di  ]ie  imposed 
upim  him  the  following'  conditions:  That  the  Korean 
minister,   nfxm   hi>   arrival    in    Washin^'ton.   should 
first  of  all  j)ay  .•<     all  up<.n  the  Chinese  minister,  who 
would  present   him  to  the  iVesident;  that  in  puhlic 
I'imctions   particij)ated   in   hy   the  diplomatic  corps 
the  Korean  nniiister  should  never  i)recede  his  Chi- 
m-se  colleaKue:   that   on  all  important   matters  por- 
tannii^'  to  the  Korean  l.e<,'afion  the  Chinese  minister 
should    iir>t    of  all    he  consulted.      Acceptin^r   these 
conditions  the  Korean  nn'nisler  hoarded  the  Omaha. 
The   pictm-es,,ue    party    hurst    upon    Washington 
in  January,   ISSS.     The  Chinese  nui.i.stiT  there  jiad 
already    aniiouucefl    that   iie   would   introduce    tlie 


vtJ\':= 


"-.-.;  -^^  -iV 


,,("-.-. 


-  V.5v^i^U- ^:'alSs:^ 


1^ 


AMERK  A  AM)  JAPAN'  I\  KOREA 


185 


Korean  minister  as  vassal  envoy,  and  insisted  upon 
( ar  \ing  out  this  annf)uneenient.  But  Dr.  Horace  N. 
All.  II,  American  a(i\isei  to  the  Korean  nu'nisler,  de- 
•  iiried  to  accept  such  humiliatiiif;  treatment,  and 
irisi>fed  tliat  the  procnlation  of  the  Kon>an  repre- 
sentative re(|uircd  no  introchicf ion  from  the  Chinese 
Lcijation.  At  this  juncture  the  American  govern- 
ment .showed  no  de>ire  to  exercise  its  influ«"uce  in 
favor  of  the  Korean  envoy,  and  tohl  him  that  the 
matter  was  one  tliat  had  to  he  settled  hetween  the 
Chinese  and  Korean  ministers.  After  nnich  argu- 
ment and  counter  argument  Dr.  AHen  succeeded  in 
preM-nting  the  Korean  minister  witliout  Chinese 
mcdiiition,  although  lie  felt  constrained  to  t«Mider 
Ills  resignation  as  advisor  to  the  Korean  L<'gation, 
assimiing  all  the  resj)onsil)ility  f(jr  the  course  .  ir- 
.sue<l.  Ilis  resignation,  however,  was  not  to  e\.jn- 
erate  the  Korean  nu'iiisler,  much  less  did  it  solve 
the  (pK'slion  of  whether  the  representative  of  Mie 
Korean  ruler  should  at  u  foreign  cajjital  he  treated 
as  an  envoy  from  an  ijulependent  nation.  The  Chi- 
iies«'  governuK'nt.  seeing  an  affront  to  its  dignity  in 
the  manner  in  which  the  matter  was  settled  in  Wash- 
ington, demanded  explanation  of  the  Seoul  court 
for  the  conduct  of  the  Korean  minist<'r.  Not  satis- 
fied with  the  apologies  offered,  China  further  de- 
manded that  the  mim'ster  he  recalled  and  {)um'shed 
for  having  slighted  the  legation  of  tiie  suzerain  State. 
The  unhappy  minister  was  ordered  home  to  Ik*  dis- 
graced in  order  to  "save  the  face"  of  the  Chinese. 


,  -Jl 


ill 


ft 


19(5 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


and  the  Korean  D'gation  at  Wasliin^'fon.  though 
allowed  to  remain  there,  l)eeanie  less  tl         lomiiial. 

'J'he  inevitable  infen'uee  froiii  this  ej  ^ode  is  that 
Anieriea  was  far  from  whole-hearted  in  iii)holdin^ 
Korean  independence,  and  when  she  acfjuiesced 
in  the  hij^h-handed  measure  whieh  China  adopted 
in  reealliiif,'  and  humiliating?  the  first  Korean  minister 
to  \Vashiiif:ton,  she  \irtually  recognized  China's 
suzerain  power  over  Korea,  tlius  converting  into  a 
dead  letter  the  first  article  of  the  treaty  of  18S2. 
TIm'  American  (iov<Tnment  had  perceived,  seventeen 
years  hefore  the  I{oo>  -velt  administration  did,  that 
MO  lugh-sounding  proclamations  and  solemn  cove- 
nants could  maintain  the  ind<'|)<>n(lencc  of  a  nation, 
which  had  neither  determination  nor  ability  to  up- 
hold itself.  The  withdrawal  of  the  American  I-«<'ga- 
tion  from  Seoul  in  1!)().5  was  merely  an  ei)ilogue  to 
the  drama  writtiMi  as  early  as  1SS8. 

I  have  descrihed  America's  diplomatic  relations 
with  Korea.  More  important  is  the  part  played 
hy  Japan. 

Of  all  the  nations  Japan  was  the  first  to  recognize 
the  independence  of  Korea.  In  the  seventies  of  the 
past  century  Japan  sent  an  envoy  to  Korea  only  to 
meet  a  rude  rebuff  at  her  portal.  Not  only  did 
Korea  refuse  to  enter  into  friendly  relations  with 
Japan,  but  she  fired  upon  a  Japanese  vessel  which 
was  peacefully  at  anchor  off  Chenudpo.  Following 
this  outrage  Japan  .succeeded  in  1870  in  wresting 
from  Korea  a  treaty  t>f  cominerce  and  amity,  the 


AMERICA  AND  JAPAN  IN  KOREA 


first  covenant  ever  entered  into  by  Korea  vvitli  any 
foreign  nation. 

The  f^reatest  significance  of  this  treaty  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  dealt  with  Korea  as  an  independent  State, 
thus  ignoring  the  suzerainty  China  claimed  to  pos- 
sess over  that  country. 

The  conclusion  of  this  treaty  naturally  placed  a 
heavy  responsibility  upon  Japan's  shoulders,  for 
her  adherence  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  treaty 
must  necessarily  stir  the  ire  of  China,  which  was 
then  universally  regarded  as  immensely  more  power- 
ful than  Japan.  Having  herself  em<T/,'ed  from  tre- 
meadous  political  upheaval  only  several  years  before, 
Japan  was  far  from  prepared  t(j  run  single-handed 
the  gauntlet  of  such  a  powerful  enemy.  Following 
Japan's  lead,  several  Western  Powers  likewise  con- 
cluded .similar  treaties  with  Korea,  but  their  ad- 
vocacy of  Korean  independence  was  only  half- 
hearted, for  did  not  these  Western  Powers  accept 
without  protest  the  note  from  the  Seoul  court,  stat- 
ing that  these  treaties  would  make  no  change  in  the 
status  of  Korea  as  a  vassal  State  of  China?  \«)t 
only  this,  but  England  and  Russia  practically  de- 
parted from  the  spirit  of  their  treaties  with  Korea, 
when  on  the  occasion  of  the  Russian  occui)ation  of 
the  Korean  island  of  Chetvwen  (Port  Hamilton)  in 
1885,  these  Powers  negotiated  not  with  Korea,  the 
rightful  owner  of  the  island,  but  with  China.  Even 
the  United  States,  which  had  the  privilege  of  re- 
ceiving the  first  envoy  Korea  ever  sent  to  tlie  West, 


f-i! 

N 

m\ 


il 


198 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


nv.uh   no  oflForts   to   prevent    China   from    recalling 
and  punishing'  the  minister. 

Alone  and  nnaided.  Jaj)an  Ix.ldly  nndertook  to 
uplK.Id  the  indcFM-ndenee  of  Korea  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy,  which  had  hrouglit  pressure  to  hear  upon 
the  Seoul  court  like  an  incuhus.  It  soon  hecame 
evident,  however,  that  the  peninsular  people  were 
decrepit  beyond  the  point  of  renovation.  Following 
upon  the  heels  of  the  treaty  of  iS7(i,  a  spirit  of  re- 
form in  the  internal  affairs  of  Korea  flushed  the  sky 
with  a  li..,dit  of  hoj).',  which  seemed  to  forcKll  the 
approach  of  sunshine  after  an  arct !  winter.  A  Japan- 
ese officer  was  invited  to  reform  the  degenerate  army 
of  Korea,  and  a  few  i)rogressive  Koreans  were  ad- 
mitted into  the  government. 

Api)arently  Kon-a  was  committed  to  the  cause  of 
progress.     IJut   it  .soon   transpired   that  th(>se  pro- 
gressive statesmen  were  merely  dupes  of  a  designing 
clique,  which  had  made  a  feint  of  espousing  a  reform 
policy  simply  as  the  means  of  ousting  from  power 
the  opposing  clique,  led  by  the  arch-chauvinist  and 
conservative   Pniice  Tai-wun.     Only   a  spark   was 
needed  to  kmdle  a  fi<Tee  factional  feud.    That  s[)ark 
was  found  in  the  military  riot  of  18S^>,  causerl  l,y 
the  .shameless  peculation  of  a  few  officers,  who  lineil 
their  pockets  at  the  expense  of  thvir  .soldiers.     At 
the  instigation  of  JVince  Tai-wun,  the  rebels  forced 
their  way  to  the  palace,  intent  upon  murdering  all 
those  who  were  in  power,  not  excluding  even  the 
queen,  the  avowed  antagonist  of  the  conservative 


-ri^i 


AMERICA  A\U  JAPAN  IN  KOREA 

y)rin('<\  With  tlio  utmost  inconsistency  the  insurgents 
;il>()  iimrdcrcd  tlic  Japanese  officer  cntrustt'd  witli  the 
reforinati(jn  of  the  Korean  army,  liurned  the  Japa- 
iie>e  L<'gation.  and  forced  tlie  Mikado's  niini>ler, 
with  his  stair  and  iiis  <(»untrynu'n,  to  heat  a  retreat 
to  ("henuilpo.  'J'his  unfortunate  riot  re>iilted  in  an 
af,'reement  )»y  which  Korea  was  to  pay  JajMii  an 
inrleuinitv  of  5.50, 000  ven;  l)ut  wlien  she  paiil  its 

«  t  I 

first  instalhnent  of  1.50,000  yen,  Japan  ma^Miani- 
inously  renn(iui>hed  lier  chiiin  to  the  remainder  of 
the  indemnity.  In  tiiis  matter  Japan  was  actuated 
hy  her  .sympathy  witli  the  de{)h'te(l  coiuh'tion  of  tlie 
Korean  treasury  as  nuich  as  hy  the  less  altruistic 
desire  (»f  instilhng  in  the  Korean  mind  a  friendly 
sentiment  towards  her.  Some  twenty-five  years 
later,  the  same  motives  actuated  the  I'nitcd  States 
to  reliiuiuish  in  faxor  of  China  licr  claim  to  the 
g'Tater  portion  of  the  Box<T  indeuuiity. 

Again  the  hop<;  of  K(jrea*s  regeneration  was  held 
out  onlv  to  fade  awav  like  the  flash  of  a  meteor.  A 
('(jterie  of  progressive  Koreans,  who  returne<l  from 
Japan  imhued  with  progressive  ideas,  organized 
themselves  into  what  was  known  as  the  Tnd«'pend- 
ence  Party,  whose  ohject  ''as  to  consolidate  Korean 
independence  by  adoi)ting  progressive  measun-s. 
The  king  himself  .seenu'd  well  disposed  to  heed  the 
advice  i)l  these  reformers,  and  endorsed  the  invitation 
of  two  Japanese  as  advisors  to  the  court.  Acting 
.ipon  her  avowed  policy.  Japan  hacked  the  Inde- 
!)e!id(*nco  I'a^rtv  and  all  tlie  movements  c-iilful-iited 


'1. 


r- 


'I 

■A 

,-Sa 


*;^ 


p 


Ik 


m 


is 


■;.'(»() 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  I>OLITIf  S 


to  fnrtluT  tlic  raiise  of  proj^ress.  At  tlio  same  time, 
liowevcr,  Jai)an  was  careful  to  ini[)re.s.s  these  pro- 
gressives witli  tlie  <lan<,'er  of  "forcing  the  pace,'* 
for  she  was  well  aware  that  u  State  like  Korea 
could  not  l»e  suddenly  aroused  from  the  torpor  of 
centuries.  Hut  the  inexperienced  radicals,  to  whom 
the  regeneration  of  their  country  seemed  a  case  of 
"now  or  never,"  were  too  impatient  to  refrain  from 
rash  measures,  whih'  the  conservative  ch'(|ue  was 
employing  all  its  resources  in  its  attempt  to  expel 
the  radical  element  from  the  achninistration.  At 
this  juncture,  China  threw  her  influence  on  the 
<-onservative  si<le  of  the  scale,  and  the  unsuccessful 
coup,  resorted  to  hy  the  indiscreet  radicals,  left  the 
govermncnt  in  the  hands  of  the  reactionaries.  Again 
I  lie  Ja{)anese  Ix-gation  was  reduced  to  ashes,  and  a 
nuniher  of  Japanese  officers  and  residents  were 
murdered. 

The  decade  following  this  ruinous  upheaval  wit- 
nessed u  confiimous  encroachment  by  China  upon 

Korean  administration,  and  the  gradual  elimination  of 
Japanese  influence  from  the  peninsula.  All  this  w  hile, 
however,  Japan  protested  time  and  again  against 
China.  China  was  thoroughly  intrenched  in  the 
Hermit  Kingdom,  and  just  as  thoroughly  was  Japan 
determined  to  uphold  the  independence  of  the  help- 
less nation.  The  crash  between  the  two  Powers 
was  only  a  matter  of  time.  By  1S!)4  the  little  island- 
ers of  Nii)pon  W(Te  thoroughly  prepared  to  settle 
tlH^   malf^T   by   war.      Having  perceived   ttuit   the 


II I 


AMERICA  AND  JAPAN  IN  KOREA 


801 


intrrnal  administration  of  Komi  had  hwn  goinj? 
from  l)ad  to  worse,  Japan,  in  that  yoar,  proposed 
to  China  that  the  two  Powers  e(M>perafe  in  exeeutinj? 
reforms  to  maintain  the  integrity  ol  the  peninsuhir 
i<inKdom.  This  proposition  China  met  with  a  flat 
refusal.  The  result  was  the  war  of  1S!)4  1S!).5,  in 
the  wake  of  whieh  Korea  was  left  in  Japan's  liands. 
Hut  even  the  shoek  of  the  great  war  that  swept 
through  their  own  country  proved  powerless  to 
awaken  the  dull  people  of  the  peninsula.  Tiiheeding 
Japan's  advice  to  rehabilitate  their  internal  affairs 
along  new  lines,  they  did  nothing  hut  (juarrel  among 
themselves,  or  at  best,  play  at  all  manner  of  silly 
pastimes. 

Soon  after  the  war  Japan  sent  to  Korea  one  of 
her  ablest  statesmen  in  the  ])erson  of  Count  Inouye, 
with  the  instruction  to  urge  u|)on  K«)reu  a  pro- 
gramme of  reform.  To  facilitate  the  execution  of 
this  programme,  Japan  loaned  Korea  .$1,.>00,00(). 
But  all  the  sane  advice  offered  by  Japan  fell  upon 
deaf  ears,  and  the  Koreans  went  on  repeating  the  old 
story  of  plots  and  counter-plots  among  tlKtuselves. 
This  unfortunate  state  of  things  was  largely  respon- 
sible for  iiie  assassination  of  the  queen  on  October  8, 
1895,  although  the  Japanese  Ciovernment  itself 
could  not  avoid  the  responsibility  in  so  far  as  it 
failed  to  foresee  that  the  appointment  to  the  post 
of  minister  of  Korea  of  an  indiscreet,  unscrupulous 
man  might  entail  an  embarrassing  situation. 

The  piilitical  situation  in  Korea,  already  disturbed 


hi 


Cf 


h 


)) 


i,    t 


204 


JAPAN   IN  WORLD  l-OUTKS 


hy  \hr  cDiilimions  fa<tioiiaI  feuds  and  the  consequent 
as.sa.sMuation  of  the  (,iie.T..  heeanie  worse  eonfounde.l 
hy  the  appearance  of  Kusmu  on  the  scene  with  all 
her  .sinislcr  <lesi>n.s.  aimed  at  the  disintegration  of 
Korea.  Tiie  indolent,  unpatriotic  people,  weary  of 
Jai)an's  insistence  u]um  reform,  readilv  hand.-d 
themselves  over  to  Russia,  which  would  have  none 
of  reform  and  progress  in  the  peninsula,  hut  would 
let  things  go  along  the  old  way,  knowing  that  this 
would  admiraMy  serve  Ikt  pur|)ose. 

Thus  the  curtain  rose  on  a  new  scene  in  February, 
18!)(i,    wln-n   the   weak-niin<led   king  practically   re- 
niovod  Jms  court  to  the  Russian   Legation,  anil  im- 
meduitely  ordered  the  nmrder  of  all  the  nu-nisters 
known  t<.  he  fri<'ndly  towards  Japan.      Thenceforth 
Russian  activities  in  Korea  I.ecame  more  and  more 
onunous,  an.l  seemed  to  lea.l  the  peninsular  nation 
into  the  final  stage  of  disintegration.     As  it  hecame 
more  and  more  evident  that  the  R-issian  absorption 
of  Korea  was  merely  a  matter  of  time,  Japan  be- 
came restive  and  made  another  effort  to  stay  Rus- 
sian encroachment.     The  result  was  the  agreement 
of  April   ^25,    1898,   which  contained   the  following 
article:  ^ 

"The  Imperial  governments  of  Russia  and  Japan 
recognize  definitely  the  sovereignty  and  entire  inde- 
pendence of  Korea,  and  pledge  thcMuselves  mutually 
to  abstani  from  all  direct  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  tiiat  country." 

But  all  these  i)ledges  and  agreements  were  of  uo 


w 


AMKKK  A  AM)  JAl'.N   I\   KoRKA 


•20:5 


u-c,  for  Russia's  ulliniat<*  plan  was  t(»  add  Korea  to 
litT  own  niai),  TIm'  iiiatl<T  could  he  discussed  only 
in  tlic  lau^'ua^'c  of  .nIioI  and  sIhIK  if  Japan  was  to 
((>ii\  incc  tlic  great  While  ( '/.ar  of  the  unju.-<li(iahility 
of  his  pretensions.  'I'lie  war  that  ensued  was  the 
final  act  in  the  great  drama  of  the  Ru»o-Japanese 
rivalry  in  Korea;  and  the  puhlie  nnist  he  sadly 
deficient  in  ptilitical  in>i-ht  if  it  does  not  perceive 
that  the  war  and  the  conse(|uent  estahlishnient  of 
a  Japanese  |)rotectorale  over  Korea  was  forced  upon 
the  Mikado's  Enijjire  l>y  the  necessity  of  safj'guard- 
iiig  her  vital  interests,  indeed  her  very  existence. 

'I'he  war  left  Japan  in  a  position  to  act  in  Korea 
./(/  lihifiim.  But  before  a>suniing  the  direct  control 
of  Korean  adniini>lralion,  Jaj)an  exhausted  all  her 
;:i)od  efforts  in  her  attempt  to  Juaintain  Korea's 
independence.  Thus,  in  Fchruary,  1!)04,  when  the 
Russians  in  Manchuria  were  retreating  before  th<' 
onslaught  of  the  Japanese,  Japan  concluded  a  pro- 
tocol with  Korea,  in  which  the  Seoul  court  pronnst-d 
to  adopt  the  advice  of  the  Tokio  government  **in 
regard  to  improvements  in  adsninist ration,"  while 
the  Mikado's  government  pledged  itself  *"t<)  ensure 
the  safety  and  repose  of  the  Imperial  House  of 
Korea,"  and  to  "guarantee  the  independence  and 
ferritorial  integrity  of  Korea."  The  Tokyo  adminis- 
I  rat  ion  .spared  no  pains  in  urging  upon  the  Korean 
ruler  the  necessity  of  atlministering  the  government 
in  accord  with  modern  principles.  But  the  venality 
and  supincuc  s  of  the  Korean  ofFiciaU  had  become 


i'd 


ill 


'I 

..    t 


l^^4 


204 


JAPAN  I\  WOHLI)  I>()LITICS 


such  tiiat  any  aiiiounf  of  ^rood  advico  proved  of  no 
avail.      Far   from   .sinct-rc   in   cooiM-rating   with   the 
JapaiKsc   in   carrying'   out    adnnnist native   reforms, 
they  hindered  theni  at  every  j)oint  hy  resorting  to 
plots  and  intrigues,  in  which  they  were  past  masters. 
In.stead  of  endeavoring  to  improve  tlie  conditions 
of  their  own  country,   tli(>y   foohshly  conspired   to 
subvert  the  new  order  of  thi;.gs  l.y  invoking  the 
assistance    of    a    third    |)ower.      It    was,    therefore, 
inevitable  that   in   Xovember,    lf)0.3.   Japan   should 
assume  the  control  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  Korea, 
sending    ]Vin<e    Ito    to    Seoul    as    resident-general! 
who    was    invested    with    the    i)ower    to    direct    all 
matters    relating    to    the   external    relation    of    the 
country. 

This  oi)isode,   however,   made  no  cliange  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  the  omntry.    The  Korean  emperor 
and  officials  still  enjoyed  initiative  power,  and  were 
at  liberty  to  adopt  or  reject  Japan's  advic-e  as  they 
I)lease(l.    And  thus  the  Japanese  were  rei)eating  the 
same  experience,  the  uselessness  of  wliich  liad  been 
indisputably  i)roved   during  the  thirty  years   that 
preceded.      But   at   last  Japan's   patience   was  ex- 
hausted, when,  in  the  spring  of  1907,  the  Korean 
enij>eror  again  .sent  his  emissaries  abroad,  this  time 
to  the  Hague  Conference,  hoping  to  embroil  Japan 
m  international  complications  over  the  disposition 
of  the  Korean  question. 

And  thus  the  curtain  went  up  on  the  last  act  of 
the  Korean  druiiia,  w})..n  in  July,  1907,  Japan,  de- 


AMFJtK  A  AM)  JAPAN   IN  KOHKA 


i(\3 


sf)airinj,'  hocause  of  the  trfarlu  iisiu'ss.  iinpotency 
;m(l  iiKloIcncf  of  the  Korean  ruirr  and  ollicials, 
\vn>lr(l  from  them  an  aKreeineiit  co needing,'  to  her 
the  control  of  infernal  affairs  of  the  {x'tiinsuhi.  In 
tlie  meantime  the  emperor,  knowing'  that  his  game 
was  h)st,  ahdieated  on  July  IH,  1!)()7. 

This<'{)is()<Ie  virtually  vmlrtl  the  Korean  tragedy  — 
a    tra^'edy    whieh    miyht    n<v<T   have   ht-en   enacted 
had   Korea  hee(h'd  Japan's  advice  thirty  years  be- 
fore.     In  si)eaking  of  the  American  occupation  of 
the    Phihppines,    Mr.    Roosevelt    once    .said:    "The 
incvitahle  march  of  events  gave  us  the  control  of 
the  Philippine  Islands  at  a  times  so  opportune  that 
if  may  without  irreverenc<*  he  called  i)rovidential." 
The  .same  may  he  .s;iid  with  reganl  to  the  Japanese 
control   of   Korea.      It    was   "the   inevifahh'   march 
».f  events"  which  drifted  Japan  into  tlie  haven  where 
.^he  now  finds  lierself.     And  again  with  Mr.  Roose- 
velt the  Japanese  would  .say  that  "unless  we  show 
ourselves  weak,  unless  we  show  ourselves  degenerate 
sons  of  the  sire.s  fnmi  whose  loins  we  sprang,  we 
must  go  on  with  the  work  we  have  undertaken." 
Furthermore,  the  Japanese  control  of  Korea  seems 
far  more  justifiable  than  the  American  occui)ati(m 
of  the  Philippines,  inasmuch  as  Japan's  interests  in 
Korea,    political    and    economic,    were    immen.sely 
more  vital  than  were  those  of  the  Ignited  States  in 
the  Philippine  Islands.     To  the  Mikado's  Empire, 
the  sacrifice  of  these  interests  and  the  abandonment 
of  Korea  to  a  third  Power,  bent  upon  terriLoriui 


i 


) 


ill 


•  ?.* 


m 

m 


Mil 


M 


si06 


JAPAN'  IN   WUHLD  I\)LITICS 


ai,'f?randizcment,  .seemed   to  spell  a  menace  to  her 
o\\  II  existence. 

So  mnch  for  Japan's  diplomatic  dealing's  wilh 
Korea.  Now  tlie  question  is  whether  the  Japanese 
control  of  ti.e  peninsula  has  heen  prejudicial  to 
forei^'n,  and  especially  American,  interest. 

It  is  trite  to  .say  that  the  "open  door"  of  Korea 
lias  neviT  been  closed.     Jap.in  has  never  adopted 
any   measure   inimical    to   forei^m    interests   in    the 
peninsula.     It  is,  of  course,  not  p'ven  to  Jai)an  to 
•sacrifice  her  own  interest  in  order  to  promote  that 
of  other   nations,   hut   her   methods   in   competing' 
with   Western  nations  have  always   lu-en  and   will 
ever  l)e  Ic^rit  i,„ate.    Japanese  capital  may  seek  to  huy 
up  American  enterprises  in  Korea,  as  it  indeed  has 
<loiie  in  the  case  of  the  Seoul  electric  trolley  lines, 
hut  that  would  simply  he  a  <-ase  of  ^'ive-and-take,* 
and  if  the  terms  offered  are  not  acceptable  the  Amer- 
icans are  under  no  ol>li',Mtion  to  sell.     Ask  Messrs. 
Collhran  and  IJostwick  whether  they  sold  the  trolley 
lines  in   Seoul   under  a^'reeahle  circumstances  and 
on  .satisfactory  conditions,  and  they  will  not  hesi- 
tate  to   answer   in    the   afTirniative.      In(|uire   also 
wln>lher  tiiere  is  any  occasion  for  af)preliension  as 
to  the  future  of  the  American   mininj;  concern  in 
Korea,   and   you    will   readily  disc-over   that    not  a 
fleeting'  shadow  is  cast  over  their  hn^ht  i)rospect. 
The  metals  produced  are  purchased   by  the  Japa- 
nese ahiK.st  on  the  six.t.  thus  doin^'  away  with  the 
trouble  of  slnppin^'  them  to  distant  countries,  and 


AMERICA  AND  JAPAN  I\  KOREA 


207 


ii; 


the  mine  owners  a\\  hear  testimony  to  the  sati.sfae- 
tory  state  of  their  transactions  with  the  Japanese 
l)uyers. 

As  for  America's  export  trade  with  Korea,  I  Iiave 
already  proved  that  it  lias  increased  hy  leaps  and 
l)<)unds  since  the  inaiij^uration  of  the  Jafjaiiese  re^'ime. 
He  talks  through  his  hat  who  conii)lains  about  the 
(losing  of  the  Korean  doors  against  America.  It 
i>  lime  that  the  An:encan  advocates  of  the  "open 
tioor"  in  the  Far  East  should  pause  and  think 
whether  their  cause  will  he  served  l)y  indulging 
in  sentimentalities  and  platitudes,  not  unmixed 
with  insinuations  and  allegations,  at  the  expense  of 
Japan's  reputation. 


J- 


vm 


wmm 


k 


CHAPTER  XII 
JAPAN  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES 

Japanrsc  intrrcourse  with  th.'  Philippim-s  fhnv  n-nturirs  apo— Toyo- 
tomis  utiihitic.n  to  conqui-r  th.-  i>lan.is  Japan  <l<.s,-.i  .I.H.rs  after 
Toyotonii's  death— Japan's  present  attitii<|p  toward  th.;  Vh\\i\y 
pines— Filipino  attitude  towards  Japan— Japanese  rontrol  of  the 
Philippines  impracticabU — The  islan.ls  not  «iiite<l  to  Japanese 
colonization— Two  conditions  under  whieh  Ja|)an  may  take  the 
Philippines— Why  Japan  did  not  object  to  the  American  occupation 
of  the  islands— What  Japan  wanta  on  the  islands— American  occu- 
pation beneiiciai  to  Japan. 

Three  centuries  ago  Japan  came  i)retty  near 
attacking  the  Phihppines.  But  for  the  sudden'demise 
of  Toyotomi-Hideyoshi,  tlie  licro  who  conceived 
a  pigaiitic  scheme  of  confjucst,  the  flag  of  Nippon 
miglit  have  been  phinted  in  the  ishinds. 

The  story  of  the  abortive  expedition  to  the  Phihp- 
pines broached  hy  Japan's  empire  builih'r  of  three 
centuries  ago,  betrays,  in  a  most  striking  manner, 
the  natural  aspiration  of  the  islanders  to  explore 
the  hinds  and  seas  to  the  southwarf!.  In  the  nn"ddle 
of  the  sixteenth  century  they  began  to  venture  forth 
into  the  yet  unknown  world,  seeking  riches  in  the 
islands  that  lay  off  the  coast  of  China.  Stimulated 
by  the  expansion  policy  of  Toyotonii  the  seafaring 
spiril.  of  the  islanders  soon  blossoFued  info  daring 
enterprise.     No  less  than  three  hundred  vessels,  all 

iv6 


JAPAN  AND  THE  P»ILIPPINP:.S 


409 


very  small  and  none  exceeding  three  or  four  hundred 
ton^.  braved  the  rough  seas  and  frequented  the 
roasts  of  Tonking,  Annam,  Siani,  Borneo  and  Java. 
One  undaunted  soul,  Ilasekura-Rokuyt'uion  by  name, 
vvvn  crossed  the  Pacific  to  Mexico  in  a  small  ship 
on  his  way  to  the  Pontiff  at  Rome.  Another  sailed  to 
Siam  and  cjuelled  the  insurrection  which  had  been 
disturbing  the  country.  In  ai)|)reciation  of  this 
service  the  King  of  Siam  betrothed  one  of  his  prin- 
cesses to  the  Japanese  hero,  '*  Little  Ja{)ans"  sprang 
up  at  various  points  visited  by  the  Japanese  rovers 
of  the  sea,  many  of  whom  were  undoubtedly  pirati- 
cally inclined  rather  than  engaged  in  legitimate  trade. 
It  was  in  this  period  full  of  venturesome  spirits 
that  Tovotomi-IIidevoshi  conceived  a  fantastic 
scheme.  He  saw  the  vision  of  a  vast  empire  of  which 
no  other  place  than  Peking  was  to  !)e  the  Mikado's 
<;ipital.  As  for  himself  he  would  set  up  a  govern- 
ment at  Ningpo  in  South  China  whence  he  would 
sway  not  only  the  southeastern  section  of  the  Asian 
continent,  but  the  Philipi)ines,  Borneo  and  Java. 
In  his  letter  to  the  Viceroy  of  (loa,  Portuguese  India, 
dated  October  H),  1591,  Toyotomi  even  intimated 
his  intention  to  carry  an  expedition  into  India. 
•About  a  month  later  he  sent  an  envoy  to  Manila 
an<l  bluntly  told  the  Spanish  Viceroy  there  to  sur- 
render at  onee,  lu.less  he  |)ri'ferred  the  humiliation 
of  capitulating  at  the  point  of  the  Japanese  sword. 
The  Viceroy  was  highly  indignant  at  the  affront, 
but    considering    the    complications    then    existing 


I  n 


I. 

,1 

'I 

u 


I' 


I 


iilO 


JArW  IN  WORLD  IHJLITICS 


between  Holland  and  Sjjain,  wrole  a  courteous  hut 
noncommittal  reply.  So(»n  after  this  incident  Cath- 
olic missionaries  were  sent  to  Japan  from  the  Philip- 
pines. They  found  the  Jai)anese  favorably  disposed 
toward  the  new  rcli^n'on.  In  the  course  of  a  few 
years  th<>y  succeeded  in  converting'  no  less  than  eight 
thousand  .souls.  In  the  meantime  correspondence 
was  kept  up  b<'tween  Toyotomi  and  the  Viceroy 
of  the  I'hilipi)ines,  without,  however,  arriving  at 
any  agreement  as  to  the  proposition  ui)on  which 
Toyotomi  insisted  from  the  first. 

At  this  moment  a  peculiar  incident  occurred  in 
Southern  Japan.  A  Spamsh  vessel  calh-d  the  San 
I'hilippo  was  wrecked  off  the  coast  of  Tosa  Province. 
Her  pilot,  who  survived  the  disaster,  boastingly 
told  the  emissary  sent  l)y  Toyotomi  that  the  secret 
of  Spain's  territorial  expansion  lay  in  the  .skillful 
employm<>nt  of  religion  and  missionaries  as  fore- 
ruimers  of  rotKiulsfddorcs.  I'oyotonn*,  who  had  never 
suspected  the  ulterior  motives  of  the  nu'ssionaries 
from  the  JMiilipj)ines,  was  greatly  surprised  by  the 
confession  of  the  ind'screet  sailor,  and  immediately 
ordered  tlwir  execution.  This  undoubtedly  made 
Toyotomi  all  the  more  anxious  to  subjugate  the 
Philippines;  but  his  dream  of  emi)ire  was  destined 
to  be  c;irried  with  him  into  his  grave,  for  he  <lied 
suiMe-ily  in  the  fall  of  1.5!)S. 

It  was  thus  that  Japan  first  came  in  contact  with 
the  Pliilippines.  Had  not  Toyotomi's  successors 
adopteil  a  drastic  policy  of  exclusion  in  order  to  keep 


wax^aEsric 


f? 


•*5r 


t..i<sjftu:'    -.^r 


•?!v^*!^ 


■■.,»as*i>«i- 


JAPAN"  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES 


!2II 


out  tlie  designing  missionaries  who  were  said  to  be 
the  van  of  S{)anish  conquerors,  Japan  might  long 
siiue  have  become  the  mistress  of  the  Southeastern 
Pacific.  But  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate,  which  suc- 
ceeded Toyotomi  as  miUtary  magistrate  of  Japan, 
not  only  exchided  foreigners  from  Japan  but  pro- 
liihiled  the  Japanese  from  going  abroad.  To  make 
i-ohition  complete  it  put  an  injunction  upon  the 
liiiilding  of  seagoing  vessels.  With  the  cessation  of 
her  overseas  activities  Jai)an's  progress  was  arrested. 
A\hcn  she  was  awakened  half  a  century  ago  by  the 
imi)act  of  foreign  cannon  balls  she  found  herself 
lagging  hoi)elessly  behind  the  Western  nations  in 
navigation  and  other  useful  arts  and  sciences. 

In  the  fifty  years  that  followed  Japan  has  striven 
might  and  main  to  catch  up  with  the  advanced 
nations  of  the  West.  With  the  acquisition  of  modern 
arts  of  war  and  peace  she  is  taking  up  the  enterprise 
which  her  sons  droi){)ed  three  centuries  ago. 

With  these  historical  antecedents  before  us  is  it 
any  wonder  that  the  Japanese  are  to-day  crying 
for  southward  advance?  We  can  fully  understand 
and  appreciate  even  such  bold  advocates  of  south- 
ward expansion  as  Mr.  Yosaburo  Takakoshi,  thimgh 
vvedc[)recate  his  jingoistic  utterances,  which  are  liable 
to  defeat  the  very  purpose  which  he  wishes  to  attain. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  Japan  should,  in  order  to 
extend  her  influence  and  interest  in  the  south,  ab- 
sorb the  islands  now  under  the  American,  Dutch  or 
French  flags.    Confining  our  discussion  to  the  Philip- 


'■i : 


\\ 


i 


ij 


fi 


^1^2 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  IH)L1TKS 


pines,  if  niiist  he  i'iiii)ha.siz(>(I  tluit  Japan  jIocs  not 
covt't  tlic  territory.  She  would  of  course  take  it  if 
she  could  ^'et  it  for  a  soni,'.  It  is  al).surd  to  tell  Amer- 
icans that  Japan  would  not  take  Hie  Philippines 
even  for  a  ^'ift.  She  would  he  glad  to  acce[)t  them, 
if  America,  with  the  unreserved  consent  of  tlie  Fili- 
pinos, were  to  hand  them  over  witlu)ut  re<,'ret  or 
reluctance.  But  the  Japanese  know  the  Philippine 
situation  too  well  to  fancy  even  for  a  moment  that 
the  islands  can  he  liad  for  the  asking.  They  know 
that  an  atte?npt  to  ac(|uire  the  territory  will  cause 
endless  trouble  and  countless  expenditure,  for  the 
Filipinos,  who  have  l)een  opjKising  American  rule, 
will  more  strenuously  opjjose  Ja{)anc>e  rule.  Ccr- 
tainly  the  Japanese  are  not  foolish  enough  to  think 
that  such  Ji  game  is  worth  the  candle. 

There  is  something  naive  ahout  the  hackneyed 
assertion  that  the  Japanes(«,  being  an  Asiatic  race, 
would  he  more  successful  than  any  Caucasian  people 
in  ruling  the  Philipi)ines.  This  is  the  argument 
advanced  hy  well-meaning  Americans  advocating 
the  transfer  of  the  Philipi)ines  to  Japan.  Even  the 
American  residents  in  the  islands,  or  at  any  rate 
many  of  them,  are  o[)enly  voicing  the  same  senti- 
ment. This  futile,  if  sincere,  argument  is  due  to 
their  <lisregard  of  the  peculiar  psychology  of  the 
l)ackward  j)eoples  of  the  Orient.  These  peoples, 
having  been  accustomed  to  Western  domination 
for  so  long,  look  up  to  Occidental  peojjles  as  their 
superiors,  while  tlicv  !'»ok  down  upon  tlic  Japanese 


;,  i^SSTi.trV'P: 


r?^ 


-^^ 


JAPAN  AM)  THE  PHILIPPINES 


21S 


as  upstarts  and  imitators  of  the  Occidental.     This 
is  the  attitude  particularly  of  the  Filipinos. 

The  Filipinos  cherish  the  lu'lief  that  they  are 
superior  to  the  Jai)anese.  They  are  proud  of  the 
fact  that  they  have  enjoyed  the  influence  of  Western 
civilization  for  four  centuries,  while  it  is  only  fifty 
years  since  Japan  has  come  under  the  same  influence. 
They  use  the  Spanish  hmj^ua^'e  derived  from  Ivatin, 
the  hmguage  to  which  the  world  has  paid  homage. 
'I'luMr  customs  and  manners  have  been  influenced 
hy  Christianity,  and  they  think  that  their  ideas 
and  sentiments  are  more  similar  to  those  of  the  Occi- 
dentals than  to  those  of  the  Japanese. 

In  view  of  tlie  unwillingness  of  the  Filipinos  to 
remain  even  under  the  American  yoke  in  spite  of 
all  the  generosity  which  the  Americans  have  show- 
ered upon  them,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  they 
•should  even  so  much  as  consider  accepting  the  rule 
of  an  Asiatic  race  which  they  regard  with  mingled 
suspicion  and  contempt.  The  United  States  has 
i)een  expending  thirty  million  dollars  a  year  in  the 
Philippines.    Certainly  Japan  can  never  be  so  liberal. 

Turn  from  the  material  benefits  to  the  political 
freedom  conferred  upon  the  Filipinos  by  American 
rule,  and  you  will  be  convinced  that  they  have  not 
the  slightest  reason  to  welcome  Japanese  colonial 
administration,  which  is,  like  that  of  most  P^uropean 
Powers,  decidedly  different  from  the  colonial  policy 
of  the  I'nited  States.  The  American  Government 
lias  inaugurated  in  the  IM'.iliiMiines  a  congress  com- 


. 


Ij 


'^^-*  -HTi-T"  ( 


^-J.vlr..-. 


m 


JAI'AN   IN  \\(JKL1)  rol.lTK  S 


posed  of  roproscntatives  clcftcd  l)y  tlio  people.  In 
this  Ic^'islati\-e  Ixxly  not  an  American  is  represented. 
Tlie  J''ilipinos  Jiave  ;i  (|iia>i-(al»inet  as  well  as  a 
.senate.  Most  of  the  inij)ortant  po>ts  in  the  central 
^'((verntnent  are  oc(iii>ie<i  l»y  tlie  natives,  while  the 
local  functionaries  are  all  natives.  American  of- 
ficials are  retnrniii^  lioi.ie  in  increasing  nnmlxTs. 
'l\vo  thousand  American  teachers,  who  went  to  the 
islands  in  the  early  .slaj^e  of  American  administration 
there,  lia\e  hecn  ^M-adiiaJly  returnin;^  to  America, 
and  ti  day  in  most  scluxils  even  the  tcachin<^  of 
Kngli.^h  is  dt)ne  l»y  n.itives.  In  the  primary  schools 
the  i)Upils  are  taught  to  .sing  the  patricjtie  .songs 
sudi  as  "My  Native  I.and,  the  Thilippines,  the 
Philippin«'s!"  Such  freedom  will  not  he  allowed 
under  Japanese  rul«'.  It  would  l)e  the  height  of 
folly  on  the  i)art  of  the  Filipinos  to  cast  off  Ameri- 
can i)rotection  in  order  to  accei)t  Japanese  domina- 
tion. 

But  .suppose,  for  argument's  sake,  that  Jai)an 
was  anxious  to  aimex  the  territory.  What  can  .she 
do  \\ith  it.^  She  cannot  <'oloni/,e  it  to  any  appre- 
ciate extent,  for  the  climate  there  is  against  the 
Japanese.  If  Jajjan  is  anxious  to  obtain  u  colony 
it  i.s  mainly  hc;ause  she  must  relieve  the  congestion 
of  population  in  her  own  territory.  What  good 
would  it  do  to  Jajian  to  ac(|uire.  at  a  great  sacrifice 
of  hlood  and  treasure,  a  territory  where  her  people 
cannot  thrive.'  That  the  tropical  climate  of  the 
i'liilippmcs  ilocs   not   afford    wholesome   and   com- 


JAPAN  AM)  THE  PHILIPPINES 


«15 


furtiil)le  alxulo  to  tin'  Japanosc  is  <)l)vi()U.s  from  tlie 
t;i(  f  t!i;it  they  cannot  cope  sncccssfully  even  with 
tlic  <liiiiate  of  Forni(»sa  wliich  is  much  niiMer  than 
tli;:t  of  tlie  Pliihppines.  Cohl  calcnhition  convinces 
us  t'lat  it  would  he  far  more  profitahle  f»)r  theJapa- 
II. M-  not  to  tamper  with  the  territorial  autonomy 
uf  tlie  riiilippines.  hut  to  confine  their  activities 
there  to  the  exploitation  of  resources  and  the  de- 
\.'l..pment  of  trade,  with  the  cooperation  of  the 
natives. 

There  is  another  factor  wliich  militates  against 
J.i|)anese  settlement  in  tlie  Philippines-I  refer  to 
the  presence  of  lar^'e  numlxTS  of  lahorers,  Chinese 
and  native,  who>e  wai,'es  are  lower  than  those  de- 
manded hy  Japanese  lahorers.     In  spile  of  the  appli- 
cation of   the  (Miincse  exclusion   law,  there  are  al- 
ready scmie  oO.OOO  Chinese  in  the  islands.     When 
th(>  exclusion  law  is  removed,  with  the  withdrawal 
..[■  .Vmerican  suzerainty,  the  Chinese  will  pour  into 
the  country  in  increasinf,dy  large  numhers.     This  is 
a   condition   which   the  Jai)anese  cannot  afTonl  to 
lose  si<,'ht  of.  if  they  wish  to  find  in  the  t«'rritory  an 
outlet  for  the  surplus  population  of  their  own  country. 
Had  climatic  and  other  conditions  in  the  Philip- 
pines been  congenial  to  Japanese  immigration  there 
would  have  already  heen  a  considerable  nmnber  of 
Japanese  there,  because  no  restrictive  law  has  been 
applied  to  Japanese  immigration.    The  fact  is  that. 
in  spite  of  the  favorable  attitude  always  maintained 
iiv  tlie  Amcncuns  m  mi.-  i^idii-.is  v •  .i.-j-^" — 


■  f 


I 


.v-3;:ii:.^;; 


=ESvJV5ft=«;5,?W::^=S*.^»-;.r-?^< 


^^^>^S^&iS& 


r^a^Sg^ae^'TS' 


21G 


JAPAN  !.N  WOULD  IHJLITK  S 


lal)()r(Ts,    ilic    Jiifjaufsc    ijopulation    there    scarcely 
exceeds  two  thousand. 

Tlie  idea  of  converting'  llie  territory  into  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  Japanese  Kini)ire,  therefore,  seems 
highly  impractical.  But  if  Japan  were  ever  to  ac- 
quire the  Philippines,  the  acfpiisition  would  he  made 
only  under  one  of  two  conditions.  First,  she  would 
not  decline  to  become  the  mistress  of  the  country 
if  the  Filipinos  would  willingly  place  themselves 
under  the  rule  of  the  Mikado.  Business  sense  for- 
l)ids  Ja|)an  to  fig  I  for  the  al»sor{)tion  of  the  islands 
at  any  <-onsi(leral'le  cost  of  Mood  and  money.  Sec- 
ondly. Jaf)an  might  he  comju-IIed  to  annex  the  coun- 
try, cv<n  against  her  will,  if  its  internal  conditions, 
after  the  withdrawal  of  .Vmerican  authority,  were 
such  as  to  invite  the  aggression  of  ambitious  Euro- 
pean I'(»wers. 

The  second  point  is  the  more  vital  and  must  be 
<lriven  home  to  the  reader.  After  her  hitter  ex- 
perienci'  in  China  and  Korea  where  she  had  to  con- 
front on  the  field  of  battle  two  mighty  military 
Powers  of  Furoi)e,  one  after  the  other,  Japan  will 
not  pernnt  any  third  Powit  to  encroach  upon  the 
territorial  rights  of  the  Philippines,  after  the  benevo- 
lent government  of  the  Fnited  States  there  has 
become  a  thing  of  the  past.  Fv«n  the  American 
suzerainty,  with  all  its  indisputable  altruism  and 
its  unmistakably  well-meaning  policy,  was  not 
entiri'ly  welcome  to  the  Jai)anese  who  saw  an  im- 
ptiiali>tic  lendcncy  in  tlie  westward  expansion  of 


»5r 


H^gSf 


f5*s??is^5isssE?^prrT:s^ 


^^^^S 


-■■A  ■ 


JAPAN  AND  THK  PIIILIPPINKS 


217 


American   territory.     Japan  did  not  raise  a  voice 
a^Minst  the  American  occupation  of  the  PhiUppines 
<,nly    because   the   overwhehning   majority   of    the 
Mikado's  subjects  had  been  convinced  that  America 
was  their  best  friend,  and  harbored  no  sinister  de- 
NJ^Mis  eithci-  upon  the  Philippines  or  upon  Japan. 
Their  knowledge  that  the  establishment  of  Amer- 
<an  rule  in  the  Far  Kast  was  incompatible  with  the 
cardinal  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  di<i  not 
prevent  them  from  according  hearty  approval   to 
the  American  advent  in  the  Philippines.     Indeed 
their  welcome  of  American  administration  was  so 
wholehearted   that   Prince   I  to   proffered    his   g()od 
i.tlices  to  the  (Jovernment  at  Washington,  saying 
that  he  would  be  pleased  to  go  over  to  the  Philippines 
and    persuade   Aguinahh),  leader  of    the    insurgent 
natives,  to  (juit  the  vain  struggle  and  accept  with 
good  grace  the  new  rule  which  promised  to  be  liberal 
and    benevolent.      Had    America's    relations    with 
Japan  in  1S!)H  been  as  unhaj)py  as  they  have  been 
during  the  past  few  years  a  different  story  might 
have   been   written,   for   under  such  circumstances 
Japan  would  not  have  permitted  American  domina- 
tion of  the  Philippines  to  pass  unchallenged. 

What  Japan  really  wants  in  the  Philippines  is 
not  territorial  rights  but  economic  i)rivileges  such 
as  have  been  enjoyed  by  her  ecpially  with  all  nations. 
If  the  Japanese  were  ever  to  become  an  important 
factor  in  the  economic  life  of  the  islands,  it  would 
ii.it  be  as  laborers  l>ut  as  eiitni>n-neur.'i  aiding  in  the 


M 


I 


218 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  HJLITK  S 


oxfiloilation  of  tlic  natural  rosfuirrcs  of  tlic  t<'rritory, 
with  the  assistance  of  tlie  chcaj)  lal»or  which  ran 
rcachly  he  secured  in  the  islands.  As  I  write  I  learn 
from  the  newsjiajxTs  of  Mainia  that  a  Jaj)anese 
concern  has  recently  purchased  an  exteii>i\-e  sugar 
phmtation  at  Manihi  f«»r  $1,()'2(),(M»).  It  is  n\^n  re- 
jxtrted  that  Ja|)anese  interests  are  negotialiiig  for 
.supir  lands  in  Xegros  and  f(»r  hemp  lands  in  Min- 
danao. Tiiis  is  fjuite  f)lausihle  and  in  perfect  har- 
mony with  the  natural  desire  of  the  Japanese. 

In  the  advt'iit  of  Japanese  «iit<'rprise  in  their  <-oun- 
try,  tiie  I-'ilipim,  ■  ; ccd  .see  no  alarming  .signs.  Once 
they  are  convinced  of  Japan's  jMaceahie  intentions 
they  will,  I  trust,  wclconu' Japanese  capital  and  under- 
takings. It  would  he  tot  he  nmtual  advantage  of  hoth 
peoj)lesthat  the  pluck, industryaud  cnterprisecharac- 
terislie  of  the  Japanese;  .should  he  infused  info  theeco- 
nomic  fiher  of  the  islands.  Suspicion  is  t!ie  curse  of 
j)rogres.s  and  of  amicahle  relations  hetween  nations. 
It  is  unfortunate  that  the  w(»rld  has  hecome  so  suspi- 
cious of  Jaj)an  that  every  move  slie  makes  nowa<Iays 
is  viewed  in  dist«)rted  lights.  That  Japan  ohliterated 
Korean  autonomy  and  set  uj)  a  sphere  of  influence 
in  Manchuria  is  no  argument  iliat  she  will  do  the 
same  in  the  Philip{)ines.  Such  a  conclusion  can  he 
reached  only  in  complete  disregard  of  historical 
hackground.  Only  hecause  her  hand  was  forced 
hy  the  ruthless  aggressi(»n  of  European  J'owers  has 
Japan  ahsorhcd  Korea  and  hecome  a  dominant  po- 
litical factor  Hi  Manchuria. 


r^Stt 


JVrAN  AM)  TIIK  rHlLHTlNKS 


«19 


^Mien  u  wcll-nioanirif,'  Snijitor  at  Washington 
^ii^'^'«'slc(l  on  the  floor  of  the  .S-nalc  that  the  I'hihp- 
piiH's  1m'  transferred  to  the  sun  flai,'  of  tlie  Mika<lo, 
the  Ja|)an«-s(*  couhl  not  hut  .NMiilc.  The  sii<,'i;«->f ion 
is  a  curious  paradox  l»ein^',  on  tlie  one  hand,  hi^'hly 
xrifiinental,  and,  on  the  other,  hi^dily  nialerialistie, 
|insuniin.i,'  that  the  doHar  can  aeeoinph'>h  e\er\- 
thing.  'I't>  >ay,  as  <l<>es  many  an  American  editor, 
liiat  Japan  may  take  this  .su.::ir<"<t  ion  seriously  is  an 
t.utrage  upon  the  intelligence  of  tlie  Japanese.  K\en 
a  (  liihl  knows  that  America  has  no  riglit  to  sell  the 
IMiilippines  to  any  foreign  Power,  and  that  the 
I'ilipinos  would  fight  such  an  ignonn'nious  <leai  to  a 
finish.  Both  the  .Vmericaiis  and  the  Filipinos  ma\- 
rot  assured  that  Japan  will  ne\  fr  Ik*  so  fooli>h  as  !(» 
licheve  that  tin?  l*hilip{)in»'s  may  one  tine  morning 
drop  into  her  lap  with  no  etForl  on  her  part. 

It  is  oi)vious,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  that  tiie  occu- 
pation of  tlie  IMiilippines  by  .America  is  inconsistent 
with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  whicli  presup{)o>es  that 
the  Tnited  Stales  should  take  no  hand  in  tl:e  politi- 
cal alVairs  of  other  continents,  as  she  insi>ts  upon 
excluding  foreign  political  inlluence  from  her  own 
hemisphere.  Yet  Japan  is  rca<ly  to  admit  that  in- 
ternational affairs  cannot  always  l»e  adjusted  in 
perfect  acconl  with  any  fixed  doctrine  or  theory. 
From  a  purely  .selfish  or  comnu-rcial  point  of  view 
the  Japanese  are  well  aware  that  t!ie  contiruM'd 
.\inerican  occupation  of  the  Philippines,  at  least 
for  MjMie  liiue  to  CoUic,  will  be  hcnclieial   li»   thcjii. 


i 


240 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  I^OLITICS 


since  it  will  usher  in  better  sanitary  conditions,  ad- 
vaneerl  means  of  eoniniunieation  and  an  up-to-date 
school  system,  all  tending  towards  the  stimulation 
of  Japanese  enterprise  and  trade  in  the  islands. 

After  all  has  been  said  and  done  we  must  not  forget 
that  the  peoj)les  of  the  Vnr  P/ast  stand  upon  com- 
mon ground.  In  the  years  to  come  they  must  by 
nuitual  eoojjeration  establish  and  enforce  .something 
like  a  Monroe  Doctrine  f<»r  their  own  world.  To  con- 
sume themselves  in  petty  suspicion  and  disgraceful 
(juarrel  is  to  toll  their  own  knell.  This  .sentiment  on 
their  part  no  natit)n  can  understand  and  appreciate 
better  than  ilovs  the  rnited  States,  whose  policy 
in  the  Americas  has  been  to  keep  the  Powers  of 
Europe  at  arm's  length. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
JAPANESE  "DESIGNS"  UPON  MEXICO 

Sensational  reports  about  the  Japanese  in  Mexico — Sfatisti<»  of  the 
Japiincs*' — Viscount  Yenomoto's  project  — Ili.s  dream  of  Kl  Dorado 
ru 'ely  disp«'lle<l — A  thriving  Jiipanc-ie  colony  in  Chiupiw-- Tho.«(e 
"iOO.'KMJ  Japanese  troops"  in  Mexico  Uncial  kinship  l>«>tween  the 
Japanese  and  the  Mexicans — (Jugiielnio  F<-rn'ro's  views — Japanes<- 
in  the  Mexican  army — Mexicans  more  friendly  to  the  Japs  than  to 
the  ("iHngoes — The  "hig  interests"  in  Mexict) — The  (Jerman  prop- 
aganda— The  Japanese  designs  upon  Magdalena  Hay — The  truth 
about  the  Magdalena  Bay  scare — Why  Charles  M.  Schwab  failed 
in  China — A  case  of  tit  for  tat — Why  the  Mikado  refused  to  receive 
Felix  Diaz,  Huerta's  8p«>cial  envoy — The  Japanes*-  in  South  America 
— Gen  plot  to  unite  Mexico  and  Japan — Secretary  Lansing's 
denial  dijuppointing. 

As  a  rule  man  is  endowed  with  five  senses-  no  more, 
no  less.  But  now  and  then  whims  of  Nature  create 
human  beings — and  journalists — whose  senses  nuni- 
her  more  than  five.  These  creatures  seem  to  possess 
that  sixth  sense,  known  in  the  case  of  carrier  pigeons 
as  orientation. 

The  word  seems  to  be  especially  applicable  just 
now  to  these  agitated  American  peoi)le  and  far- 
sighted  newspaper  men  who  see  things  across  the 
Mexican  border  which  are  invisible  to  on'-'ury  ob- 
servers. They  are  blessed  with  the  ex'  ^ordinary 
faculty  which  might  be  designated  as  the  telescopic- 
Mi 


t* 


^a^^m. 


m 


JAPAN   I.N   \V(JHLD  I'OLITICS 


eye.  These  [)e<)i)|e,  for  instaiue,  see  '200.000  trained 
Japanese  soldiers  in  Mexico  w  lien  the  total  Japanese 
population    in    the   country   of   the   Montezuinas  — 

men,  women  and  children  docs  not  exceed  -2.000. 
They  see  a  Ja|)anese  dreadnought  puri)o>cly  heaclied 
on  'I'ihuron  Island  not withslandinj^  the  fact,  oni- 
phatically  attested  l»y  Adnn'ral  Win.slow,  that  there 
i.s  nowhere  in  Mexican  waters  vvni  the  .shadow  of  a 
Japanese  warship.  Tlx-y  see  a  Jai)anese  naval  ha.se 
on  Turtle  Bay,  j,Miarded  hy  a  fonnidahle  flevt,  in 
the  ease  of  the  lone  .l.sa//n/,  a^'round  on  a  reef,  and 
endeavoring'  to  ^r{  afloat  with  llie  assistance  of 
another  ship  or  two.  They  see  the  hand  of  Ja[)an 
iHuidin^'  that  «)f  Carranza  in  writiiii,'  protests  af,'ainst 
the  **i)utntive  <'Xpeditions"  of  lh(>  American  army. 
'I'liex'  .see  a  fle<  t  of  Ja[)anese  merchantmen  l>ringinj.j 
arms  and  amnnnn'tion  to  the  t/r  facto  (iovermnent 
of  Mexico  from  the  Mikado's  arsenals  at  a  time  when 
all  the  materials  «,'f  war  which  Japan  can  p().ssi!)ly 
.spare  are  heinj^  shipped  to  Russia  and  iier  allies. 
They  .see  a  Japanese  tiriuj,'  at  Ann'ric.in  sailors  on 
l)oard  the  Ainnipolis  at  Ma/.atlan.  in  apparent  i^mo- 
rance  of  the  fa<  t  that  it  was  the  Mexican  nioh  which 
went  crazy  and  fired  the  first  shots. 

These  are  only  a  i\'W  of  the  wonderful  things  which, 
of  all  men,  the  .\merican  endowed  with  th«'  sixth 
.seiiM"  is  privileged  to  see.  Shall  we  envy  him  ln".s 
priviU-^^e.  or  shall  we  j)ity  him  for  having'  to  sit  up 
nij,dits  lu'cause  of  the  evil  specters  er<'ated  l>y  his 
extraordinary  faculty?    Wo  think  we  can  under.Nland 


^— ?3sr 


i  ..■.-J» 


,■<;.'■•• 


:.-2_-  -ii>i'ju.v*rjj^ 


s!npiS!ses:34?^7^«»*  :fe 


JArANESK  '  I)KSK;NS     I  I*()\  MKXH'O 


«^3 


what  the  editor  of  tlie  C'hiea^'o  Tribune  meant  the 


ithcr  (iiiv  when  Im*  .said:  "'J'lie  next  ^reat  war  \vi 


II 


lie  l)i'f\v«rn  the  two  great  i/cllow  raees — the  Japanese 
and  the  Anieriran." 

IJiit  this  is  nctt  the  f)lac<'  for  humor.  In  deferenee 
to  the  .solemn  mood  of  the  far-sighte<|,  if  for  no  other 
naMin,  we  nuist  not  ji-st  when  talking  about  the 
.Japanese  in  Mexico. 

To  he  earnest,  tlu-n,  what  are  the  real  facts  about 
the  -lapanese  in  Mexico.^  According  to  the  investi- 
gation of  the  Japanoe  l«'gation  at  Mexico  City,  there 
are  at  tin's  writing  in  the  Mexican  Republic  some 
,'.•)((()  Japanese,  of  whoin  about  U(H)  are  women  and 
(!n'ldr(ii.  Of  l,7(tO  male  adults  the  majority,  say 
alioiiL  ,S()(),  are  niining  laborers;  400  are  farmers  and 
larrn  Ialiorer>;  "iUi)  are  domestic  servants,  and  the 
itiuainmg  .')<)()  include  sl«>rekeepers,  physicians,  car- 
penters, tailors,  fishermen  and  miscellaneous  la- 
lorers.  Of  tin;  leatling  citi<'s  where  the  Japanese 
|.iipulalion  mnnbcrs  more  than  u  hundred,  Mexico 
<'ity  claims  IJOO,  (\)atzai'oalcos,  ("hihuahua.  (iuada- 
laja.:i  and  Jaurez  100  each.  The  miiuTs  are  em- 
l)loye<|  mostly  in  the  copper  and  silver  mines  of 
(Jiiliiiahna  and  Coahuila. 

'J'he  most  prosperous  Jaf)anese  comnnnn'ty  in 
^lexico  is  found  in  Sokotuisko  (\)unty,  in  the  State 
of  Chiapas.  This  county  has  an  area  of  .'5(>t  s(|uare 
iiu'les,  and  is  inhabitc;!  by  (lO.OOO  people.  Of  this 
po|)nlati<in  '■I.'AH)  are  of  fonign  origin  or  descent 
l.SOO  (Juatemalans,  410  Chinese,  J)0  (lermans,  7.5 


w 


I' 


fl 


u 


224 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Spaniards,  100  Japanese  and  a  handful  of  Americans, 
En^'lishnien  and  Frenchmen. 

Tlie  genesis  of  tliis  tliriving  Japanese  community 
in  Chiapas,  if  so  small  a  population  as  100  may  be 
said  to  constitute  a  community,  may  be  traced  to  the 
unsuccessful  attempt  of  a  Japanese  statesman,  the 
late  Viscount  Buyo  Yenomoto,  to  establish  an  ex- 
tensive colony  in  Chiapas  about  twenty  years  ago. 
The  Viscount,  one  time  Minister  of  Agriculture  and 
Commerce,  was  persuaded  by  Mexican  promoters  to 
take  150,000  acres  of  government  land  in  Chiapas 
with  a  viow  to  converting  it  into  a  coffee  plantation. 
The  price  was  very  low,  and  the  terms  were  liberal. 
Yenomoto,  then  a  private  citizen,  was  tempted  to  try 
his  hand  in  the  new  venture.    To  a  man  accustomed 
to   prohibitory   prices   of    land    in    his   own   coun- 
try, the  Mexican  project  must  liave  seemed  a  veri- 
table Kl  Dorado.    In  18J)7,  he  scut  the  first  contin- 
gent of  32  settlers  to  the  Chiapas  .settlement.     But 
it  ilid  not  take  long  to  discover  that  the  land  was  far 
from  flowing  with  milk  and  honey.    The  expenditure 
which  the  venture  called  for  proved  more  than  Yeno- 
moto could  endure,  and  the  vast  tract,  for  which  he 
had  paid  but  the  first  installment  or  two,  was  aban- 
<lone(l  after  a  brief  experiment.     With  the  land  re- 
verting to  the  Mexican  Government  the  S'i  colonists, 
most  of  them  destitute,  dis[>ersed  to  different  parts  of 
Sou  I  hern  M<'xico. 

Thus  eniletl  Yenomoto's  dream.     From  the  ashes 
of  the  docmied  experiment,   however,   rose  a   new 


tmf^^'^ficf  ■^s^it/f^s^s/'um^^Msssi 


'ifc£'=.'r--^»3,-=Ar 


mm 


■>t'c  .   ^a4<l%;VAi 


5TP* 


3S-i?^^.^ 


JAPANESE  "  DESIGNS ••  UPON  MEXICO 


225 


«(»l<)ny  (lostincfl  to  IxTonie  prosperous  Ix'yond  all 
cxpt'ctations  of  tlie  first  founder.  A  f<'W  enterprising 
iiiciiilxTS  of  the  original  colony  saw  a  chance  to  open 
.siiiall  shops  in  Escuitla.  Fortune  soon  smiled  upon 
llicm  and  the  modest  stores  grew  steadily  until 
f()-(lay  they  have  become  a  predominating  economic 
factor  in  Chiapas. 

The  foremost  figure  in  the  Japanese  community 
in  Chiapas  is  one  S.  Terui,  head  of  the  Japanese 
Mexican  Coiiperative  Society,  which  owns  large 
grain  and  stock  farms,  an  extensive  plantation,  as 
w«  11  as  a  large  acreage  of  wlhi  land.  Its  trading 
<lt'I)artment,  with  headtjuarters  at  E.-.cuitla,  op**rates 
a  string  of  stores  in  various  towns  and  villages. 
These  stores  supply  the  surrounding  country  with 
f)rovisions,  dry  goods,  hardware,  agricultural  im- 
i)iements,  and  what  not.  Next  to  this  company 
the  Kobashi-Kishimoto  firm,  engaged  in  similar 
linos  of  trade,  is  the  most  prosperous.  So  enter- 
[)rising  are  these  two  firms  that  they  maintain  medi- 
<'al  departments  in  their  respective  stores,  and 
employ  not  only  competent  druggists  l)ut  also  well- 
qualified  physicians.  In  u  country  where  medical 
practice  is  particularly  backward  this  unique  in- 
novation is  highly  appreciate*!  by  the  natives  and 
has  proved  a  great  success.  Most  of  the  successful 
Japanese  in  Chiapas  have  married  Spanish  or  Mexi- 
can women,  and  are  treated  by  the  natives  with 
great   respect. 

Apart  from  the  Chiapas  colony,  Mexico  has  not 


I 


^HO 


JAPW  IN  WORLD  I'OLITK  S 


yi't  seen  any  Japant'se  enterprise  to  speak  of.  The 
stra^'^'lin^  trail  of  Japane.s<'  iinnn'^ration  lias  left 
no  impress  \ipon  the  tountry,  niainly  due  to  the  fact 
that  Japanese  immigrants  have  been  contract  la- 
borers, imported  l»y  plantation  owners  or  railroad 
companies.  In  the  few  years  following  1!K)()  more 
than  a  thousand  Japanese  were  l)rought  by  the  Ke- 
basho  Cultivation  Company,  an  American-Hritish 
firm,  to  the  sugar  beet  ])lantation  of  -^o.OOO  acres  at 
Oakenia,  about  1  M)  miles  inland  from  the  port  of 
Coatzacoalcos  on  the  Culf  of  Mexico.  About  the 
same  time  some  '•2. ()()()  Jai)anese  lal)orers  were  im- 
port etl  to  be  employed  in  the  buihlingof  the  (Juada- 
lajara-Swapan  section  of  the  Mexican  railway. 
Dissatisfied  with  the  treatment  they  received,  these 
laborers,  upon  the  ex[)iration  of  the  contract  terms, 
gradually  deserted  the  plantation  and  the  railroad. 
To-day  the  Kebasho  plantation  employs  but  a 
hundred  Japanese,  while  only  150  Japanese  are  work- 
ing on  the  Mexican  railroad.  A  considerable  mun- 
ber  returned  home  while  the  others  were  scattered 
over  different  parts  of  the  country.  The  failure  of 
the  first  attempt  at  Japanese  emigration  to  Mexico, 
put  a  damper  upon  the  zeal  of  the  emigration  pro- 
moters both  in  Japan  and  in  Mexico,  and  no  con- 
siderable mnnber  of  Japanese  have  since  come  to 
Mexico. 

These  are  the  Jai)anese  whom  we  see  described 
as  'iOO.fHM)  trained  soldiers!  We  liave  noted  that 
out  of  the  total  of  "-.J.OOO  Japanes«>,  .'UM)  are  women 


■m£T^^im^^^s^im^^mm,mr.^m-.  , 


JAPANESE  "DESIGNS'  UPON  MEXICO 


2*7 


'.11 


nnd  cliildrcn.  Of  the  remainin)^  1.700  not  more  than 
10  per  c'<'nt.  have  had  nn'litary  traiin'iifj.  To  make 
^200.000  trained  soldiers  out  of  1,700  odd  Japanese 
would  tax  the  brains  of  the  greatest  mathematical 
genius  of  the  world.  To  some  peoi)le,  lu)\vever,  it  is 
uolhinff  difficult;  they  have  performed  the  feat  so 
often  that  the  public  is  beginning  to  think  that  maybe 
after  all  1,700  Japanese  are  numerically  ecjual  to 
200.000! 

Not  wishing  to  indulge  in  dubious  humor,  I  shall, 
at  once,  endeavor  to  account  for  the  obvious  hyper- 
bole so  often  published  in  the  newspapers.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  not  easy  to  tell  a  Japanese  from  a 
Mexican,  especially  when  a  Japanese  is  acclimati/ed 
to  Mexican  environment.  The  theory  lias  l)een 
advanced  that  in  remote  anticjuity  the  Japanese 
and  the  Mexicans  were  of  the  same  racial  family 
and  shared  the  .same  abode,  perhaps  on  the  Ameri- 
can continent.  The  theory  is  not  yet  proved,  but 
the  fact  remains  that  the  two  races  greatly  resemble 
each  other  at  least  in  physiognomy.  Guglielmo 
Ferrero,  the  brilliant  Italian  liistorian  and  philoso- 
l)her,  adds  .strength  to  this  view,  held  by  many 
eminent  ethnologists,  when  he  writes  in  the  Paris 
Figaro: 

"To  what  race  do  these  populations  (natives  of 
Mexico  and  South  America)  Ixlong  which  have 
resisted  with  so  much  vigor  Euro{)ean  con(iuest  and 
immigration?  It  is  not  necessary  to  be  a  learned 
anthropologist  to  find  in  them  a  certain  resemblance 


i! 


■■^im^^^w9^^s^^mmM,^S5'm.4i^mauL,,^tR^':^^sim^' 


'i^iH 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  IHJLITICS 


to  tlie  Japjincst'.  I  .sliall  never  forpet  the  impression 
pro<iu(('<i  on  me  at  I'spallata,  in  tlie  Andes  Moun- 
tains, l)y  the  men  who  came  to  take  the  mail  from 
the  Arf,'entine  Rei)ubHe  across  this  coh)ssal  mountain 
ranj^'e  into  Chik'.  'Are  these  men  Japanese?'  I 
asked  one  of  the  persons  who  accompanied  me. 
'They  may  he  Japanese,'  was  the  answer,  'for  tlu>re 
are  a  consick-rahle  numl)er  of  them  in  Chile,  and 
they  are  just  as  likely  to  be  Chileans."* 

Is  it  any  wonder  that  .some  wild-eyed  reporter, 
catching'  a  ^'limpse  of  a  i>as>in^'  train  full  of  Mexi- 
can .soldiers,  .should  really  think  that  they  were 
Japanese  troops  landed,  perchance,  fnmi  a  Japa- 
nese warship  at  Mazatlan  or  Manzanilo?  So,  after 
all,  it  is  the  Japanese  who  are  to  blame,  is  it? 

In  justice  to  our  good  friends  of  the  fourth  estate, 
let  it  be  .said  that  a  small  numl)er  of  Japanese  no 
doubt  have  joined  the  Mexican  army,  some  on  Car- 
ranza's  side,  .some  on  Villa's.  The  statement  issued 
on  July  2  last  by  Governor  Estaban  Cantu,  of  Lower 
California,  categorically  denying  the  presence  of 
Japanese  soldiers  in  the  army  of  the  de  facto  Govern- 
ment, is  perhaps  too  sweeping.  Thanks  to  the 
chaotic  state  of  the  country,  not  a  few  Japanese 
formerly  employed  in  mines  or  on  farms,  have  been 
left  without  empK)yment.  It  would  have  been  sur- 
prising if  none  of  such  Ja,  unese  had  been  driven  by 
poverty  to  join  the  army  which  at  least  secures  them 
from  starvation. 

MortTjver,  it  is  reasonable  to  presume  thiit  some 


JAPANESE  "DESIGNS"  ITON  MEXICO 


2«9 


Japanese,  l)y  reason  of  long  residence,  have  become 
>t>  attached  to  Mexico  that  they  really  espouse  the 
raiisc  of  tlie  Mexicans.  It  is  nothing  extraordinary 
that  some  twenty-one  Japanese  living  in  I>ower 
California  should  address  a  letter  to  the  dc  facto 
(M)vcrnincnt,  as  they  stn-ni  to  have  done,  strongly 
urj^'ing  the  latter  to  resist  the  military  occupation 
of  Mexican  soil  hy  tiie  army  of  the  I'nited  States. 
The  photograph  of  this  letter,  written  in  Japanese 
« Iiaractcrs,  was  puhli^hcd  in  the  Mexican  periodical, 
the  Acrion  Mumlial,  for  May  27.  As  reported  in 
American  newspapers,  it  was  made  to  appear  that 
the  letter  emanated  from  San  Francisco  and  was 
an  indication  of  the  anti-American  propaganda 
instituted  by  Japanese  in  California. 

The  racial  kinship  api)arently  existing  between  the 
Japanese  and  the  Mexicans  has  proved  a  great 
advantage  to  Japanese  settlers  in  Mexico.  There 
is  no  prcjudicHi  between  them,  and  they  have  freely 
intermarried.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  the 
Japanese  have  been  most  cordially  rt>ceived  by  the 
natives,  and  the  Japanese  have  bi>en  ready  to  re- 
ciprocate by  showing  them  due  respect.  Of  course, 
the  Japanese  have  had  their  share  of  the  miseries 
<iitailcd  by  the  lawlessness  of  the  country;  but  on 
the  whole  the  natives  have  bii^n  more  friendly  to- 
wanls  the  "Japs"  than  towards  the  "(iringoes." 
As  years  pass,  iiitcrmarna;;e  between  tlie  two  races 
will  become  more  and  more  fn'(|uent.  And  the 
iiijcctiun  of  Japanese  blood  into  the  veins  of  the 


i! 


fW 


i:n) 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Mrxiciin  jM'ople  may  yet  prove  the  irdomption  of 
tlic  coiMitry,  if  tlu'  best  cliaractcri^tics  of  a  race  are 
coiKomilant  with  its  l)l<)od.  (Vrtaiiily  Mexico 
ne««ls,  and  needs  ha<lly,  the  infusion  of  greater  in- 
telli^M-nce,  in^'enuity,  wisdom,  pluck  and  industry 
into  its  political,  social  and  economic  fiber. 

I  am  reluctant  to  favor  the  view  advanced  by 
many  Americans  that  certain  big  interests,  eager 
to  precipitate  American  intervention  in  Mexico  or, 
what  is  l)etter,  Americ  '  amiexation  of  at  least  the 
northern  half  of  Mexico,  are  responsible  for  the 
circulation  of  irresponsible  reports  concerning  tlie 
alleged  Japanese  activities  in  that  country.  It  is 
perhaps  nothing  more  than  a  coincidence  that  the 
newsi)apcrs,  whose  publishers  own  vast  lands  in 
Northern  Mexico,  happen  to  be  the  champions  of 
intervention  aiul  of  thinly-veiled  advocacy  of  an- 
nexation. Describing  one  of  the  land  holdings  of 
one  of  such  publishers,  the  Mexican  Herald,  for 
Augu>t!24,  1908,  says: 

"With  over  a  million  a<Tes  of  the  finest  agricul- 
tural and  grazing  land,  with  large  herds  of  blooded 
cattle,  liorses  and  sheej)  roaming  over  this  vast 
domain,  the  big  Hearst  cattle  ranch  and  farm  in 
Chihuahua  is  the  peer  of  any  such  estate  in  the  world, 
whether  it  lies  in  the  great  corn  belt  of  Illinois  or 
Kansas,  or  stretches  for  miles  across  the  wind-swept 
prairies  of  Texas  or  Oklahoma.  Two  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  of  barbed  wire  fence  enclose  a  portion 
of  this  vast  ranch  and  within  the  euciosure  graze 


HCj^Ssr^ 


JAPANESE     DESIGNS-  UPON  MKXK  O  <3l 

f;().(,00  thoroiishbnd  Herofords,  l'2->.0()()  finr  sluvp 
atul  nuiny  thousand  iicad  of  lu.rM-s  and  hou>. 

Til*'   inrre   onuineration   of    instances   .similar    to 
the  ahovc  wouhl  fill  many  i)a-cs.     N<.w  tho  theory 
„f  anti-intorvi-nlioni-,ls  is   that   these  l.i^'   niterests 
are    dt^hberatelv    spn  a.h'nj?    ahirinist     ri.ws    ahout 
Japanese    "designs,"    for    tlie    sinister    pnrpi.>e    of 
searing'  the  Americ  m  (.ov-rnment  into  takn.«  steps 
towards  intervention  or  annexat  ion.    At  this  part  icu- 
hir  moment  the  engineers  of  the  (iernian  propaganda 
are  doing  thi  ir  part  in  creating  the  apparition  of 
Japanese  invasion  in  Mexico.      Ever  sin<-e  the  be- 
ginning of   the  European   war   the   Ocnnan   press, 
publicists  and  writers  have  been  making  gratuitous 
efTorts  t.)  convin<e  the  Americans  of  the  in<'v.tabihty 
of  their  olu^h  with  the  Japam-se  in  the  l^acd.e  and 
in  M  •\i<-o.    From  the  great  mass  <.f  (ierman  propa- 
gamla  literature  of  this  nature,  U-t  me  qrote  the 
folh.wing    passage   penned    by    Professor    Rucfeala- 
bouger  of  Heidelberg  l'niver>ity: 

"The  Japanese  glances  are  wistfully  as'  across 
the  Pacific  to  America,  ^^'llether  cthnologK  >lly 
and  antliropologically  tenable  or  not,  f..r  d.'cades 
the  most  popular  theory  preached  in  Japan,  particu- 
larly in  the  University  of  Tokyo,  is  that  the  Japa- 
nese are  descendants  of  the  old  Mexicans,  who  were 
subjugated  bv  the  Spaniards.  In  the  recent  Mexican 
troubles  Japan  ma,le  untiring  efforts  to  manifest 
her  svmpathics  to  tlie  Mexicans,  particularly  so 
whenUnited  Stales  troops  occupied  Mexican  tern- 


i'H 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  Pf)LlTI(  S 


tory  fVcra  Cruz).  J;ii)an  will  make  her  infliK-nrc 
felt  in  Crntral  and  S)Ufli  America  at  the  exfiense 
of  the  T'niled  States." 

I'lirposefiil  literal  tire  (if  tin's  nature  lias  been 
welcomed  with  avith'ty  l>y  advocates  of  pn-pared- 
ness,  for  it  certainly  conies  in  handy  in  their  efforts 
to  attain  their  ends. 

Of  the  numerou.s  .stories  concerning  Japanese 
"desi^'iis"  on  Mexico  that  of  the  liistoric  "Ma^da- 
lena  liay  incident."  in  which  even  a  distingui.shed 
publicist  at  Washin^'ton  [)layed  an  important  part, 
has  made  perhaps  the  strongest  impression  upon 
the  public.  So  imi)orlant  in  the  American  mind 
i.s  the  incident  that  I  f<*el  justified  in  giving  an  au- 
thentic account  of  it  which  lia.s  never  been  presented 
before  the  tribimal  of  pul)lic  oi)inion. 

That  no  nation  will  ever  think  of  establishing  a 
naval  base  at  such  u  place  as  Magdalena  Bay,  as 
the  Japanese  w<>re  said  to  have  designed,  may  at 
once  be  granted,  for  the  geological  and  climatic 
conditions  of  the  country  preclude  such  an  attempt. 
It  is  u  .s])ot  condenmed  by  nature  to  be  u  desert  be- 
yond reclamation.  The  bay  itself  is  a  noble  stretch  of 
water,  landlocked,  placid  and  deep.  But  the  entire 
region  extending  for  more  than  400  nules  along  the 
ocean  is  absolutely  rainless.  If  one  were  to  live 
there  one  would  have  to  have  fresh  water  carried 
by  ships  from  Todos  Santos  at  the  extreme  southern 
tip  of  the  pem'nsula.  The  nearest  point  available  as 
a  source  of  water  supply,  Todos  Santos,  is,  neverthe- 


JAPANESE  -DESICNS  •  IF'ON'  MEXKO 


i^ii 


less,  300  inih'S  from  Majidalena.  Tlio  gvolo^u'ul 
asfXTt  of  tlu'  rff^ion  is  forbidding'.  Mr.  JariH-s  H. 
Wilkins.  for  many  years  an  ixplorrr  «)f  tlu'  Panfic 
Coast  of  Mi'xi((»,  writing'  in  tlio  San  Frantisco  Bulle- 
tin, says  of  the  country: 

'•  I  am  more  or  less  familiar  with  all  the  ^'roat  desert 
regions  of  North  AnxTiea— with  Death  Valh-y,  the 
region   around  Salton  Sea,  and   the  ino>t  desolat*' 
n-^'icms  of   Ttah.      None  of  these  display   the  true 
desert   conditions   so   impressively  as   the   territory 
of   the   Hale   concession    (Ma^'dalena    Bay   region). 
It   is  a  weary  expanse  of  rock  and  sand,  glittering 
under  a  iK'rpetual  sun-lifeless,  treeless,  without  u 
hlade  of  grass  or  a  plant  except  the  tenacious  or- 
chilla  or  an  occasional  p«'taya  cactus.     There  is  not 
a  drop  of  living  water  on  the  tract;  only  here  and 
then-  are  scmie  small,  uncertain  water  holes.     The 
.sole    inhabitants    are    a    f«w    heartbroken    l(K)king 
lizards  that   gain    a   sustenance   God   alone   knows 

1»» 
low. 

This  rainless,  barren  region,  fully  400  miles  long 
and  50  miles  deep,  has,  since  the  seventies,  been 
known  as  the  Hale  concession,  as  a  San  Francisco 
entrepreneur  named  Joseph  P.  Hale  once  had  the 
exclusive  concession  to  gather  orchilla,  the  only 
desert  plant  that  took  a  fancy  to  thrive  there,  and 
which  wa.s  valuable  in  dyeing  silks  in  the  days  when 
aniline  dyes  were  unknown.  But  when  the  coal 
tar  derivatives  replaced  the  orchilla  the  concession 
became  valueless,  and  Hale,  or  his  heirs,  in  1901  or 


fill 


^^^^mS^t 


234 


JAI'AX  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


tlicrrahouf  ofTcrcd  the  concrssion  for  sale  for. $1.30,000, 
or  Irss  tliiiu  llin<'-f«»iirlli.s  of  a  cent  an  acre. 

This.  th«ii,  is  Ma^'daleiiu  IJay.  Certainly  not  a 
pleasing  or  pn.niising  picture.  In  the  face  of  a 
hostih'  fl«<'t  Ji  garrison  at  Ma<,'(lal<'na  would  soon 
perish  of  thirst  and  liunucr.  ("ould  any  man  nor- 
mally intelligent  he  so  (^uixotie  as  to  make  any 
serious  effort  to  set  nj)  a  naval  base  or  u  colony  in 
such  u  plaet'?  And  for  all  we  know,  leaders  of  the 
Japanese  Navy  have  never  enjo\<>d  the  reputation 
of  being  particularly  soft  in  the  head. 

But  I  know  how  the  tempest  in  the  teapot  started. 
It  started  from  various  sources. 

In  J)eceinl)er,  1!)10,  a  Jajjanese  named  Yokoyama, 
manager  of  theToyo  Ilogei  Kaisha  (Oriental  Whaling 
Company)  of  'r(tkyo,  .siMured  from  the  Mexican 
(Government  a  fishing  concession  along  the  Pacific 
Coast.  The  concession  was  far  from  exclusive,  for 
Americans,  (Jernums,  Englishmen  and  others  had 
enjoyed  the  same  j)rivilege.  For  lack  of  the  neces- 
sary caj)ilal,  the  Oriental  Whaling  Company  has 
failed  to  utilize  the  privilege. 

The  c(»ni'ession  had  nothing  to  do  with  Magdalena 
Bay,  for  it  coven-d  ciily  the  .section  lu'tween  Salina 
Truz  and  ]\Ianzanilt).  But  it  was  readily  exploited 
l)y  .sensation-hunters  and  hy  those  with  their  own 
axes  to  grind.  Ahout  the  ;.ame  time,  that  is,  in  the 
early  spring  of  IDl'i,  another  Japanese,  engaged  in 
lishingat  Monterey.  California.  ti»i)k  a  trip  to  Magda- 
lena  Bax  at  the  invitation  of  J.  S.  Blaikhurn,  repre- 


JAPANESE  "DESIGNS  •  n>ON  MEXICO 


235 


srntative  ^'  t 'lo  Jolin  Henry  Company  of  New  York, 
urf,'ani/e«  '\vr  tlie  laws  of  Maine  for  the  purpose 
of  exploit  ,  lie  Maffdalena  Bay  region.  This  coni- 
[)any,  cr/rv  to  open  iij)  Magdalena  IJay.  offered 
alluring  terms  lo  u  Ja{»anes«',  Ofojiro  X«)da  l>y  name, 
and  asked  liim  to  start  u  fishing  establishment  and 
alx)  to  hrin.^  Jai)anese  settlers  there.  X«)da,  <'s- 
corted  by  Blackburn's  aj^ent,  went  to  Lower  Cali- 
fornia, and  inspected  the  bay  and  the  surrounding 
country.  lie  reached  the  conclusion  that  not  until 
human  beinf,'s,  as  well  as  cows  and  liorses,  learn  to 
>ubsist  on  sand  and  sea  water  would  Ma^dalena 
IJay  ever  be  colonized.  Neither  could  he  see  how 
the  fishing  industry  could  pn)fitably  be  establish'! 
at  such  a  place.  So  nothing  resulted  from  Noda's 
trip.  Xoda,  one  of  those  ne'er-do-wells,  trying  his 
hand  at  everything  and  succeeding  in  nothing,  <lied 
almost  penniless  in  Sacramento  in  the  Sjiring  of  l!)l(l. 
And  this  was  the  man  whom  the  newsj)apers  pre- 
sented to  the  public  as  an  emissary  of  the  Mikado's 
Government! 

While  trying  to  interest  Xoda  in  the  Mag(hilena 
Bay  scheme,  the  John  Henry  Company  also  ap- 
proached a  Japanese  steamship  company,  the  Toyo- 
Kisen-Kaisha,  with  a  view  to  importing  Jai)anese 
settlers.  The  colonization  plans  h;id  been  communi- 
cated to  Secretary  of  the  Xavy  Mr.  (ieorge  von 
Meyer,  who  in  turn  sounded  the  State  Department 
on  the  mader.  Assistant  Secretary  Mr.  Huntington 
Wilson  had,  it  was  rep«)rled,  written  to  the  John 


236 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Ilcnry  Compuny,  statinj?  that  the  plans,  as  suh- 
niitt<'(l  to  him,  would  not  bo  ol.jectod  to  by  the  State 
Department.  But  approved  or  vetoed  on  the  part 
of  the  State  Departni'-nt,  the  project  had,  from  the 
heginninf,',  no  hope  of  realization,  ft)r  the  simple 
reason  that  the  land  on  Magdalena  Bay  is  utterly 
unsuited  to  colonization. 

But  all  this  furnished  fire  enough  to  heat  the  tea- 
pot.    With  due  fanning  by  the  yellow  journals  and 
their  dubious  allies,  the  fire  soon  became  hot  enough 
to  cause  a  tempest  in  the  i)ot.     The  result  was  the 
solenm  and  formidable  resolution  offered  on  August  i, 
Vn'i,   by   Senator   Henry   Cabot   Ivodge,   declaring 
that  the  T'nited  States  could  not  see  without  grave 
concern  the  ac(|uisition  of  any  harbor  on  the  Ameri- 
can continent  by  a  foreign  corporation  "which  has 
such  relaticm  to  another  government,  not  American, 
as  to  give  that  country  practical  contrt)!  for  military 
or  naval  purposes."     The  recent  caiuird  about  the 
Japanese  attempt  to  establish  u  naval  base  on  Turtle 
Bay  and  at  Panama  is  fashioned  from  the  fantastic 
material  furnished  by  the  fairy  tale  of  Magdalenu 
Bay  five  yt'ars  ago. 

These  little  incidents  would  be  of  no  particular 
significance  were  it  not  for  the  unhappy  influence 
which  they  are  likely  to  pnuluce— have  already  pro- 
duceil-  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean.  It  was  soon 
after  the  enactment  of  the  Magdalena  Bay  comedy 
that  Mr.  Charles  M.  Schwab's  Bethlehem  Steel 
Compamy  secured  or  tried  to  secure  from  the  Chinese 


JAPANESE  "DESIGN'S  ■  UPON  MEXICO 


237 


m 


riovrrnniont  a  concession  to  cst.abllsh  a  dockyard 
on  the  coast  of  Fukicn  province,  lying  across  a  nar- 
row .strip  of  '.vatcr  from  the  Japanese  island  of  For- 
mosa. It  would  have  been  nothing  sliort  of  a  miracle 
had  the  Japanese,  after  seeing  the  I^»dge  resolution 
and  all  that,  not  raised  a  voice  against  this  American 
project,  which  was  infinitely  more  fonnidahle  than 
an  innocent  concession  such  avS  was  secured  hy,  or 
offered  to,  Japanese  on  Ihe  Pacific  Coast  of  Mexico. 
Anyhow  tlie  Sehwal)  project  came  to  naught.  It 
does  not  take  nnich  stretching  of  the  imagination 
to  see  that  it  was  a  case  of  tit  for  tat.  .\nd  the  case 
is  l)ound  to  l)e  re{)eat<'d  many  timi's  hereafter,  if 
.Vmorica  insists  upon  investing  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
with  new  meaning  from  time  to  tim«'.  so  as  to  ex- 
clude Japanese  subjects  and  bona  fide  Japanese  en- 
terprise from  Mexico  and  from  the  countries  further 
south. 

.\s  long  as  .Vmericans  assume  such  an  irrational, 
unfriendly  attitude  towards  th<'  Japanese  in  Cen- 
tral and  South  America  they  must  be  ready  to 
accept  without  astonishment  any  move  which  the 
Japanese  TJiay  make  in  China  and  Kon-a  with  a  view 
to  blocking  and  frustrating  .\merican  enterprises. 
If  tlu!  Americans  com[)lain  about  it  thev  are  not 
^'ood  si)ortsmen.  So  far  Ja|)an  has  done  nothing 
to  li.ilt  American  enterprise  in  the  Far  Fast,  except 
in  such  a  portentous  case  as  the  IJethlchem  Steel 
project  in  Fukien.  In  sjiite  of  all  Western  insinua- 
tions with  regard  to  Jaj)ane«e  policy  on  the  Asian 


v-<»: 


238 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  PTJLITK  S 


fontiin'iit.  .I;i|);in  li.is  jilways  .s<'<>n  to  it  that  the 
lalclislriiii^  of  tlic  coiiiiiKTcial  doors  of  the  Far  East 
is  placed  oiitsid*'.  If  tlic  Amcr'r'ans  <lo  not  try  to 
\)u\\  tlic  siring,  or  do  not  know  how  to  pnll  it,  their 
trade  in  the  Orient  nuist  languish  of  their  own 
fault. 

It  is  well  to  emphasize  the  faet  that  Japanese 
emigrants  liave  never  eonie  to  Mi^xico  or  South 
America  in  any  eon>ideral>le  numbers,  except  where 
tempting  inducements  liave  l)(>en  offered  l)y  govern- 
ments or  plantation  owners  in  tho-.e  countries.  For 
.some  time  the  (ntvermnent  of  the  Slate  of  Sao  Paulo, 
Brazil,  oll"<'rcd  bounties  to  Japanese  immigrants, 
thus  hoping  t(»  facilitate  the  development  of  the 
colfee  plantations.  In  Peru,  also,  i)rivate  interests 
were  responsil)le  for  the  stimulation  of  Japanese 
immigration.  And  yet  there  are  to-day  not  more 
than  21,S7H  Japanese  in  entire  South  America,  i.  c, 
l,-).Mi'2  in  Brazil,  5.4'2S  in  Peru,  G83  in  Argentina, 
and  :>(».)  in  Chile. 

Japan  lias  no  desire  to  create  serious  issues  with 
America  over  the  Mexican  situali<»n.  She  has  had 
more  <'liances  than  oni;  to  "test"  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, if  sIh'  wished,  for  lur  suhjecls  have  often  been 
preyed  upon  and  even  murdered  by  bandit-like 
>b\ican  troops  of  one  faction  or  another.  Had 
she  been  bent  upon  making  mischief  .she  could  easily 
liave  found  excuse  to  lodge  protests  with  the  Mexican 
(lovernmeiil,  such  as  it  was,  for  tiie  .sole  purpose  of 
(Mubarrassing  the  (iovernment  at  Washington.     To 


JAPANESE  "DESIGNS'  IPON  MEXICO 


239 


tli<*  contrary,  Japan  lias  Ix-cn  so  fastidiously  consid- 
•  ratcof  the  susccptihilitics  of  tlic  American  Ciovern- 
mcnt  and  people  that  the  IMikado  politely  refused  tf) 
extend  official  reccnlioii  to  P'erix  Diaz,  whom  the 
Iluerta  (iovcrnnier.t  <lisj)atched  to  Tokyo  as  special 
envoy  in  February,  1!)1.'5.  Japan  felt  constrained  to 
take  this  embarrassing  and  delicate  step  for  fear  that 
official  recognition  >  f  tlu'  Diaz  mission,  at  the  mo- 
ment when  she  was  anxiously  watchinj*  the  acts 
of  tiie  California  le<fislature  which  had  proposed  an 
anti-Japanese  land  law,  and  when  the  embers  of  the 
Ma;,'dalena  Bay  incident  'vcre  still  smoldering,  uught 
l.e  far  from  pleasing  to  the  American  nation.  Japan's 
l.i:,'hly  diplomatic  note  of  regret  reached  Iluerta 
alter  Diaz  had  already  proceeded  as  far  as  Van- 
couver, British  Columbia,  on  his  way  to  the  Mikado's 
<apital.  Virtually  stranded  there,  the  envoy  saved 
his  face  by  going  to  Paris. 

I  cannot  conclude  this  chapter  without  .saying  a 
few  words  on  the  dramatic,  though  grotestjue,  plan 
made  by  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  Dr.  Zim- 
mermann,  for  embroiling  Mexico  and  Ja|)an  with 
the  United  States.  As  I  have  already  .said  in  a  fore- 
I)aragrapli,  Germany  has,  e\er  since  ih<'  o|)ening 
of  the  war,  been  engaged  in  underhand  activities 
extremely  embarrassing  to  Japan.  Through  various 
chaimels  and  by  dubious  means  she  has  been  >()read- 
ing  fal.>e  news  with  regard  to  Japan's  attitude  to- 
wards America.  P'oreign  Minister  Zinunermann's 
Utter  instructing  \'on  Eckhardt.  the  German  minis- 


:i 


240 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


tor  to  Mexico,  to  bring  about  a  Mexican-Japanese 
alli.uue  wi».s  the  last  straw. 

Dr.  Zimmemiann's  letter  permits  of  two  inter- 
pretations. Either  it  was  meant  to  intimidate  the 
I'nited  States,  or  it  was  written  to  send  a  coquet- 
tish glance   towards  Japan.    It   will   serve  neither 

purpose. 

Obviously     Germany    has    misjudged    Japanese 
sentiment.    The  fact  that  there  is  in  Japan  a  good 
deal    of    pro-derman    feeling    and    admiration    for 
(lerman  valor  and   efficiency  does  not  mean   that 
she  is  wavering  in  her  belief  in  the  cause  of  the  En- 
tente Powers.     It  docs  not  mean  that  she  is  half- 
hearted in  supporting  her  allies.    The  utulercurrent 
of  pro-German  sentiment  in  Japan  is  due  mainly 
to  the   presence   in   considerable   numbers  of   pro- 
fessors and  technical  men  trained  and  educated  in 
German  universities.     Politically,   however,  Japan 
has  pledg'  1  herself  to  the  cause  of  her  allies.     Ger- 
many must  know  that  once  Japan  gives  her  word 
to  a  foreign  Power  she  ne\er  breaks  it. 

It  is  highly  regrettable  that  the  American  public 
is  inclined  to  entertain  doubt  and  even  suspicion 
as  to  Japan's  attitude  towards  the  Mexican  game 
of  Germany.  True,  Secretary  Lansing  promptly 
issued  a  statement  exonerating  Japan  from  all 
charges  in  connection  with  the  plot.  To  the  Japa- 
nese, however,  the  statement  was  sonuwhal  dis- 
appointing; it  did  not  .seem  emphatic  enough  to 
meet  the  monstrous  suspicion  thrown  upon  an  inno- 


JAPANESE  -DESIGNS"  UPON  MEXICO 


^41 


<rnt  nation  by  a  designing  Power.  If  even  the  most 
fastidious  regard,  which  Japan  has  tliese  many  years 
iiivarial)ly  shown  towards  American  sensitiveness 
al)t)ut  IMexieo,  has  not  convinced  tlie  American 
Government  and  people  of  her  sincerity,  what  in- 
deed can  be  done  to  convince  them? 


niAFIKR  XIV 

AMERICA  AND  THE  AX(.LO-JAPANESE  AL 

LIAXCE 


The  first  AnKlo-.Iapancse  allianc*' — It  a<<i)ril<<l  Japan  no  material  !)ono- 
fit  -  Its  n-al  .siKni(i<ancf-  Its  iMinfit  to  F.tit'laiul  Tin;  M<,.nd  al- 
liance Its  riKMin  d'i'lrr — The  tliini  alliaiiee  anil  the  Aiiicriean 
siluatiiiii  Japan's  «liity  in  the  pnxiit  war  Why  Japan  enterjil 
into  the  war  -l)ipl(iiiialic  ne^;i)liati<>iis  lK•tv^el■n  T<ikyo  nn<l  lyondon 
after  KriKhitiil  <lei  hiri'<l  war — The  f  ut  lire  of  the  nlliame  to  l>e  deter- 
mined liy  Hii>.->ia's  attitude — The  An^lo-Japanese  niliaiK  e  and  the 
Rii>s.i-Japatiese  entente  Mrilish  ami  Japaiie>ce  interests  in  China- 
Japanese  CKiiiplaint  al>oiit  Fn^'lanil's  "seKishness" — Kngland's 
coni|)laint  alwjiit  Japan's  a>;f;res.sivene.ss— The  "do^!  in  the  manger" 
—  British  interfercnee  with  the  Hindus  in  Japan— Japan's  duty  in 
India. 

Nothing  at  this  moment  ftirnisli(>s  so  much  food 
for  spcciihition  as  th»'  n<>\v  ali-riuiKMit  of  t!i«'  Powers 
likely  to  follow  in  the  wake  of  Arnuigeddon.  Itnly 
lias  (Iropi)e(i  out  of  the  Dreihimd.  Eroni  Berlin 
have  eonie  whispers  of  a  separate  peace  with  Russia. 
In  Pctroi^m.rl  miitterings  have  been  heard  of  Russia's 
ciissatisfaction  with  the  way  En^'land  li:is  l)een  treat- 
ing her.  And  in  Eni:I;iiid  the  voice  of  disapproval 
of  Japan's  aggressive  policy  in  China  has  hcen  grow- 
ing louder.  Is  this  an  indication  of  Downing  Street's 
<lesire  to  break  with  Tokyo  when  the  treaty  of  alliance 
terminates  in  19'il.' 


AMERICA  AM)  THK  ANGLO  JAPANESE  ALLIAN(  E    243 

In  tlio  Far  East  eciually  momentous  develop- 
iiHiits  arc  taking  place.  Japan  has  already  entered 
into  a  new  convention  with  Russia  which  may  easily 
<levelop  into  an  alliance.  Will  slie  couple  the  com- 
pact with  an  cnUnle  with  Germany?  Not  a  few 
Japanc  >e  writers  and  puhlicists  have  come  forward 
with  tril)utes  for  (lennan  cfHcieney,  while  no  fewer 
Germans  have  h(  en  urginf»  the  wisdom  of  making 
up  with  the  Japanese.  The  German  ollicers  and 
men  who  capitulated  to  the  Japanese  at  T>ingtau 
have  Ix'en  aeconled  tlu?  most  courteous  treatment 
ever  sin<  e  their  arrival  in  Japan.  As  if  adding  signif- 
icance to  the  incident,  a  section  of  the  Japanese 
I)ress  began,  soon  after  tlie  fall  of  Tsingtau,  to  voice 
.sentiments  by  no  means  flattering  to  England.  Will 
Japan  prove  after  the  war  so  rash  as  to  cut  asunder 
the  ties  of  alliance  which  have  united  her  to  England 
during  the  past  fifteen  years? 

Not  only  are  these  questions  of  vital  interest  in 
the  study  of  world  politics,  l)ut  they  have  direct 
influence  upon  our  relationship  with  Japan.  By 
joining  hands  with  England  and  France  in  the  present 
war  the  United  States  has  become  Germany's  avowed 
enemy.  For  years,  perhaps  for  decadi's,  to  come 
Germany  will  not  forget  the  luuts  which  she  be- 
lieves we  have  unnecessarily  and  rutlilessly  inflicted 
upon  her.  It  is  not  unthinkable  that  she  will,  after 
the  war,  nuike  earnest  efforts  to  reconcile  Japan  and 
align  herself  with  that  Far  Eastern  Empire.  The 
sensational  disclosure  of  the  Gernuin  plot  to  bring 


i 


244 


JAPAN  IN  WOULD  I'OLITICS 


al)()ut  a  triangular  <()aliti<.ii  iH'twtt-n  Mexico,  Japan 
and  (M-rniany,  as  wril  as  tln^  sul)sr<|iirnt  .s|Ht'(lu'.s  of 
Dr.    Ziiniiicrinann,   ilic   Kaiser's   Foreign   Minister, 
justifying'   this  draniatic   niov<',   may   be   regarded 
as  an   indication   <.f  (Jcrniany's  desire  to  befriend 
Japan.      So   lonf,'   as   America   remained   contented 
with  enforcing,'  the  Mctnroe  Doctrine  in  tliis  hemi- 
sphere, slie  had  Httle  reason  to  be  concerned  with 
the  'entan^'hng  alliances"  of  the  I'owers  of  the  old 
world.     But  the  part  she  has  now  undertaken  to 
j)lay  in  the  world  war  nujst  perforce  greatly  influence 
licr  future  position  among  the  l»owers.     It  is,  then, 
„hvious  that  Japan's  relations  with  European  Powers 
after  the  war  will  in  no  small  measure  affect  our 
own  relations  with  her.     It  is  with  this  fact  in  view 
that  I  alt<-mpt,  in  this  and  the  two  following  chap- 
ters, to  forecast  the  post  hrlliirn  alignment  of  the 
Powers  with  Japan  as  the  central  figure.     Let  us 
first  study  Anglo-Japanese  relaticms. 

To  forecast  the  future  of  the  Anglo- Japanese 
alliance  it  is  osential  to  know  something  of  its  past. 
The  fust  alliance,  coiuluded  on  January  .SO,  1!M)^2, 
was  of  far  greater  significance  than  was  realized 
hy  its  authors.  On  the  face  of  it,  the  treaty  ac- 
<or<led  Japan  no  tangible  benefit.  It  partook  rather 
«.f  the  nature  of  a  .shadowy  assurance  against  attack. 
It  simi)!y  iirescribed  that  if  either  high  contracting 
l)arty  should  beccmie  involved  in  war  with  a  third 
Power,  the  high  contracting  party  would  maintain  a 
strict  neutrality  and  exercise  its  influence  to  prevent 


AMERICA  AND  THE  A  NT,  LCV  JAPANESE  ALLIANC  E    245 

other  Powers  from  joining'  in  hostilities  against  its 
ally.  It  was  only  in  the  event  of  a  thin!  Power  or 
Powers  joining  in  hostilities  against  cither  high  eon- 
traeting  partv  that  the  other  was  existed  to  come 
to  its  assistance.  Now  the  only  Power  expected 
at  the  time  to  encroach  upon  Japan's  rights  was 
Russia.  Since  there  was  hut  little  prohability  of 
any  third  Power  joining  Russia  in  the  event  of  a 
Russo-Japanese  war,  it  was  not  thought  likely  that 
England  would  he  called  upon  to  render  mih'ary 
assistance  to  Japan.  Thus  the  risk  run  by  (ireat 
Britain  was  very  .snuill. 

The  statesmanship  of  I^rd  Salisbury  and  Lord 
Landsdowne  foresaw  all  this  an.l  more.    A  victorious 
Japan,  in  the  then  approaching  war  with  Russia, 
meant  the  checkmating  of  the  Russian  advance  m 
the  Far  East,  a  nightmare  of  the  British  statesmen. 
Even  if  Japan  were  defeated  at  the  hands  of  the 
Muscovite,    Jie   Far   Eastern   situation,   .so   far  as 
British   interests   were  concerned,   could   not   have 
become   worse.      Open-minded   publicists  of   Great 
Britain  have  ham  frank  enough  to  admit  this  ad- 
vantage bestowed  upon  tlu«ir  country  by  the  alli- 
ance.   As  Mr.  Alfred  Stead  put  it : 

'•For  Great  Britain  the  gain,  even  bvforc  the 
Russian  war,  was  much  more  substantial.  British 
diph.macv  assumed  a  new  importance  at  Peking 
when  backed  by  Japan,  and.  amongst  other  results, 
the  Tibetan  expedition  was  rendered  iK)ssible.  Since 
the  beginning  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  and  the 


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JAPAN'  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


consequent  revelation  of  Japan's  power,  the  ad- 
vantages to  British  diplomacy  in  Euroi)e  ha\  been 
very  considerahie.  In  fact,  British  foreigu  policy 
all  over  the  world  has  been  influenced  and  strength- 
ened by  the  alliance.  The  destruction  of  the  Baltic 
Fleet  enabled  four  British  battleships  to  be  sent 
home  to  play  a  very  important  part  in  the  dij)lo- 
matic  crisis  in  Europe.  We  owe  so  much  to  our 
alliance  that  we  should  thank  our  lucky  stars  that 
Japan,  the  nmch-courted  new  Power,  paramount 
in  the  Far  East,  is  anxious  not  only  to  renew  the 
alliance,  but  also  to  extend  its  scope." 

Was  the  treaty,  then,  a  one-sided  agreement.' 
To  be  frank,  the  alliance  did  not  accord  Japan  much 
material  benefit.  True,  England  financed  Japan  in 
the  latter's  struggle  with  Russia,  but  that  would 
liave  been  done  anyway,  even  in  the  absence  of  the 
treaty  of  alliance.  The  real  advantage  Japan  re- 
ceived from  the  alliance  was  something  that  could 
not  be  spoken  of  in  terms  of  dollars  and  cents. 

The  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  of  1902  was  one  of 
the  most  romantic  incidents  in  the  history  of  the 
nations.  It  was  not  merely  an  alliance  between 
two  nations,  but  a  hand-clasping  between  two  hemi- 
spheres which  had  long  appeared  as  though  ordained 
by  providence  to  remain  forever  separated.  It  was 
the  first  uiuon  of  the  East  with  the  West,  the  first 
recognition  that  an  Asiatic  nation  was  capable  of 
rendering  assistance  to  a  foremost  Power  of  the 
Occident.     The  advantage  thus  gained   by  Japan 


^^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^W!^m!^^^^ 


v^rr  i-v^^-y-^ra;!;-: 


AMERICA  AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPAN f:sE  ALLIANCE    247 

was  of  necessity  sentimental,  but  its  si^'nificance 
was  none  tlie  less  great.  Japan  was  definitely  recog- 
nized as  an  important  factor  in  world  politics,  and 
was  accorded  a  place  in  the  concourse  of  the  world's 
great  Powers.  No  Ion;^'er  was  her  voice  to  be  ignored 
in  the  disposition  of  Far  Eastern  questions. 

The  diplomatic  feat  accomplished  by  I^rd  Salis- 
bury and  1/ord  Landsdowne  in  concluding  the  alli- 
ance with  Japan  was,  coming  as  it  did  at  the  moment 
when  the  Kaiser  was  holding  up  l)efore  Euroi)e  the 
picture  of  the  yellow  peril,  particularly  remarkable. 
The  far-seeing  English  statesmen  knew  the  ulterior 
motives  of  the  astute  monarch's  dramatic  "appeal" 
to  Christendom,  and  refused  to  be  beguiled  or  scared 
by  liis  cry  of  the  Oiionlal  menace.  To  the  contrary, 
they  saw  in  Japan's  sudden  awakening  and  rapid 
progress  great  possibilities  not  only  for  the  advance- 
ment of  England's  own  interest,  but  for  the  regenera- 
tion of  the  Orient. 

Japan's  brilliant  victory  over  China,  regarded  as 
the  sleeping  Hercules  of  the  East,  was  the  event 
which  first  elicited  British  admiraticm.  The  excellent 
discipline  and  great  cfriciciuy  tlisplaycd  l)y  Japanese 
officers  and  troc^is  during  the  lioxer  disturbance  of 
1900  intensified  the  respect  already  entertained  by 
the  Englishmen  for  the  Japanese.  In  contrast  to  the 
lawlessness  and  brutalities  of  the  troops  from  cer- 
tain Christian  countries  the  humane  conduct  of 
the  Mikado's  "heathen"  soldiers  was  indeed  con- 
spicuous.    It  was,  therefore,  not  merely  incidental 


in 


::.*r'-*»sss;«S-rt!^i.i«>r,5»l'='Si*.=l5i'kr 


<h;rt^*-,ra»e*'"#-5ail-f3nt:i 


i248 


JAPAN  IX  WORLP  POLITICS 


that  the  Anglo- Japanese  alh'ance  follow<'(l  upon  the 
heels  of  the  Boxer  trouhles. 

The  first  treaty  of  allianee  was  not  a  defensive 
and  offensive  allianee  in  the  true  sense  of  the  term. 
In  the  war  with  Russia,  upon  which  Jai)an  staked 
her  very  existence,  the  instrument  was  useful  to 
Japan  only  in  so  far  as  it  assured  England's  moral 
support.  It  was  only  towards  the  end  of  the  war 
that  rireat  Britain  came  out  sfiuarely  for  an  un- 
qualified alliance  and  agreed  to  east  her  lot  with 
Japan  in  the  event  of  another  war.  The  result  was 
the  secimd  Treaty  of  Alliance  of  .\ugust  \2,  1!)0.5. 
In  j)lace  of  the  lukewarm  provision  of  the  first 
treaty  the  new  treaty  contained  the  following  definite 
article: 

*'If  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack  or  aggressive 
action,  wherever  arising,  on  the  part  of  any  Power 
or  Powers  either  contracting  parly  should  he  in- 
volved in  war  in  defense  of  its  territorial  rights  or 
special  interests  (in  P^astern  Asia  and  India),  the 
other  contracting  party  will  at  once  come  to  the 
assistance  of  its  ally,  and  will  conduct  the  war  in 
common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement 
with  it." 

This  new  agreement  was  made  jjuhlie  when  the 
outcome  of  the  peace  conference  at  Portsmouth 
was  quivering  in  the  balance,  Jai)an,  anxious  to 
end  the  war  on  honorable  terms,  Russia  wishing 
to  continue  hostilities  until  she  was  in  a  position  ti^ 
dictate  lier  own  terms.     It  went  into  effect  on  the 


AMERICA  AND  TI.E  ASCUViAPANt^K  ALUAN.K    .49 

,    .  i>  wH  si"ne<l.    Hiul  it  not  contmncd  an  .irticlo 
tsum:r:u  apV,.:.-aU,,„  ;;.  the  ..  ^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

•     A!..nrliiiria   the  now  alliance  would  n.i\c  mt 
on  in  Manchuria,  int.  i  np^cnt  peace 

"T't.:e";l.U  o.  „,a„,.  students  „f  jntcrnaUona. 
::--:'rSi;  t.  see^  t...  .  an^ 

^:raS=:if:!.4n--.r^; 

Mt  not  on,,,  in  Euro,,  .^t  ;;;    '-^^-^  ;'.; St  the 
g„„rd  her  it.lerest  in  1  .l«t  •"'"■"      J,,.,  „,i„„r 

-"'t!::::;::ver*:rt"^t.oHd 

purpose  m  rcnovui^  i  ^^^^^ 

7rt;:;'m:tiu:h':.a^^^^^^^^^ 

C  sXSingiy    deHeient    in    '-^'f;-^;- ,  »„' 

.,„.,  ,,i,  a  to  see  *'-;.J^t  °sS-y™  PP'ea 

::^:::^:i;rt^:'tade„rs„.t,,e..ne^ 

*ot  her  vigorous  n>ove,uent  towa^s  ^^J-  J'^^^ 
„oul,l  indeed  have  been  '''■".■•'*'8''l^'» j^-";  t"''- 
dis„.rned  the  on.inous  s.tuat.on  "-'"«  °  J^,^  V 

-ri;v:nii.e:^rc:En«^annd„uLd>y 


I 


9.50 


JAPAN  IN'  WORLD  POLITICS 


had  in  view  such  a  calamity  as  she  faces  to-day, 
ohhginj^  her  to  remove  Jicr  troops  from  Asia  and  to 
transfer  her  warshij)3  from  Oriental  to  European 
waters.  The  part  pla\-e(l  hy  Germany  in  the  Morocco 
incid<'nt  and  in  the  Near  P^astcrn  situation  attests 
the  ahove  interpretation. 

But  the  treaty,  comini?  in  the  psychological  mo- 
ment when  Japan  needed  foreign  sympathy  and 
encouragement  most  keenly,  was  welcomed  in  the 
Mikado's  Empire  with  great  enthusiasm  and  ap- 
preciation. The  press  were  effusive  in  praising 
England's  chivalrous  spirit  in  renewing  the  alliance, 
and  l)elieve<l  that  the  new  treaty  was  of  no  small 
influ(>nce  in  determining  tl:e  Russian  attitude  at 
the  peac*'  conference.  And  indeed  the  alliance  lias 
exercised  great  influence  in  preventing  Russia  from 
waging  a  war  of  revenge  against  Japan. 

The  second  treaty  of  alliance  was  to  liave  remained 
in  force  for  ten  years,  but  circumstances  obliged  its 
revision  four  years  before  its  termination.  Upon 
the  luels  of  its  conclusion  events  followed  one  another 
in  rapid  succession.  Korea  had  ceased  to  be  a  prob- 
lem. British  influence  in  Tibet  had  been  firndy 
established.  But  the  greatest  factor  which  neces- 
sitated its  revision  was  the  signal  change  that  had 
come  o'.cr  the  relationship  between  Japan  and  the 
Unif<Hl  States. 

Beginning  with  the  now  historic  "school  incident" 
in  S;in  Francisco,  the  anti-Japanese  agitation  in 
California  liad  become  portentous  i-nough  to  threaten 


.i 


AMERICA  AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    251 

the   amicable   relations   between    the   two   nations 
Tlie  Japanese  statesmen,  of  course,  did  not  so  much 
as  dream  of  ever  going  to  war  on  a.-count  of  the 
(\aliforuia  question,  for  they  certainly  had  the  wit 
to  foresee  that  war  would  never  solve  the  nnnngra- 
tion  question.     They  would  have  b(>en  exceeduigly 
stupid  had  they  failed  to  see  that  war  wilh  America 
presupposed   the    withdrawal   of   all    the   Japanese 
population  from  this  country  and  the  abandonment 
of  all  hope  of  sending  any  emigrants  to  these  shores 
for  manv  vears  after  such  a  war. 

And  yet  no  small  section  of  the  press  showed  a 
disposition  to  exploit  the  California  ciiiestion  to  the 
detriment  of  friendly  relations  which  the  two  ( .overn- 
ments  were  anxious  to  maintain.     This  was  where 
Fngland's  apprehension  came  in.    Should  Japan  and 
the  United  States  fall  out,  would  n.)t  England,  as 
Japan's  allv,  be  called  upon  to  come  to  Japan's  assiNt- 
ance?      A  careful  examination  of  the  preamble  and 
articles  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  all  that 
was  needed  to  be  convinced  of  the  mipossibihty 
of  applving  the  treaty  to  a  war  that  might  develop 
out  of  the  immigration  or  California  question.    But 
the  feeling  of  uneasiness  prevailing  both  in  America 
and  in  England  was  something  that  could  not  be 

ignored.  . 

Consequentlv  the  Mikado's  Government  thought 
it  the  part  of  wisdom  to  assure  the  Americans  and 
Englishmen  that  the  Auglo-Japanese  alhance  couM 
never   be   applied    to    an   American-Japanese    war. 


-^,.-h\ 


U-i.:( 


■^m 


iM 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Thus  in  the  third  tmily  of  iiUijinco  signed  on  July  13, 
1911,  Japan  a^Tced  to  insert  the  following'  artiele: 
"Sh.mld  either  High  Contracting  Party  conclude  a 
treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  a  third  Power, 
it  is  agreed  that  nothing  in   tliis  agreement  shall 
entail  upon  such  contracting  Power  an  ol)ligation 
to  go  to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such  treaty 
of  arbitrati(m  is  in  force."     Almost  sinmltaneously 
the  I'nited  States  entered  into  a  general  arbitration 
treaty  with  Great  Britain.     To  those  who  have  the 
eyes  to  read,  these  instruments  ought  to  be  sufficient 
to  convince  that  Japan  has  no  intention  to  drag 
England  into  the  war  which  many  fire-eaters  think 
unavoidable  between  Japan  and  the  United  States. 

In  renewing  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Japan  for 
the  second  time.  Great  Britain  had,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  alliance  of  1905,  an  eye  upon  Germany.     So 
far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  British  interest  in  the 
Far  East  was  no  longer  in  danger.    There  is  reason 
to  believe  that  in  1911  or  thereabouts  the  two  Euro- 
pean  Powers   entered    into    an    understanding   de- 
fining their  respective  spheres  of  influence  in  Tibet 
and   Mongolia.      In   the   meantime,   the   Mikado's 
Empire  not  only  effectively  checked  the  Russian 
advance  on  the  China  Sea,  but  succeeded,  by  dmt 
of  shrewd  diplomacy,  in  healing  the  hurts  Russia 
had  been  nursing  after  her  defeat  in  Manchuria. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  German  advance  in  China 
had  assumed  such  an  ominous  asj)ect  that  England 
had  begun  to  doubt  the  security  of  her  own  position. 


^i&fi-'-: 


SIF1k1^^^SM1?^3^^^^5 


AMERICA  AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    253 

Evon  wlu«n  the  smoke  of  battle  was  still  hovering 
over  the  plains  of  Manchuria  (lUOo),  the  hnlhant 
British  writer  on  Chinese  atfairs.  Mr.  B.  L.  Snnpson. 
cleariv  foresaw  the  approaehing  cot.fliet  of  the  (.er- 
n.an  pro.rannne  with  the  estahlished  Br.t.sh  power 
in  the  Far  East.    Ilesai.l: 

"For  the  (lernian  programme   (m   (  »nna)    is  as 
clear  as  the  light  of  day.     ^^  ^ /^"  J'^^"  Z^";^;;; 
naval  base  somewhere  in  the  region  of  hwatow  vmU 
l,e  required,  and  then,  linked  by  a  system  o   (.erman 
railways,  a  huge  slVe  of   Northern        -'txa  '   -d 
Southern  China  will  be  praetually  ruled  from  Beriin 
It  may  seem  nebulous  and  vague  to  those  who  sit 
in  the  darkness  of  blissful  ignoranee    ar  away,  but 
it  is  patent  to  those  whose  business  it  is  to  follow 
audacious  Empire  plans.     Tientsin   will  mark  the 
extreme  Northern  limit  of  these  -f  •^;«--' ^^'  ^"^^ 
the  Northwestern;  Hankow  the  Central  \\ est;  and 
Swatow  the  extreme  South.     Including,  therefore, 
great  portions  of  nine  or  ten  provinc-es  of  China 
L  German  programme  is  so  framed  tha    it  dashes 
direetly  with  no  other  Power  in  the  world  excepting 

"^  Conlered  from  the  British  side,  therefore,  the 
new  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance,  was  ecjn- 
cluded  chiefly  with  a  view  to  forestalling  possible 
German  aggression  both  in  China  -d  Europe 
Jipan  on  the  other  hand,  considered  the  trea  y 
;;  be "f  gn.t  value  as  a  means  of  furthering  friend^ 
relations  with  Russia.    'Without  the  influence  of  the 


wm 


«^J«i«s??>-^ 


254 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITICS 


Brilisli  alliance,  it  is  open  to  qiiestion  wln'tluT  Japan 
could  have  succeeded  as  she  did  in  reconciling  Russia 
in  so  short  a  period  after  the  war. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance 
of  1!)11  was  concluded  with  a  view  to  preparing  the 
two  sea-powers  against  the  portentous  rise  of  Ger- 
many. They  had  in  view  just  such  a  case  of  emer- 
gency as  the  present  war  wherein  England  might 
l)e  enabled  to  remove  her  troops  and  men-of-war 
from  the  Orient,  leaving  the  protection  of  that  region 
to  the  Japanese.  Japan  was  glad  enough  to  enter 
into  the  compact,  mainly  because  she  saw  a  perpetual 
menace  in  the  occupation  of  Kiau-chau  by  an  Euro- 
pean Power  whose  sovereign  liad  long  been  actively 
engaged  in  prejudicing  the  whole  Occident  against 
Japan. 

In  the  present  Titanic  conflict,  then,  Japan's 
duty  permits  of  no  misconstruction.  ^Vith  the  text 
of  the  treaty  before  us,  we  can  readily  understand 
wliy  Japan  joined  hands  with  Great  Britain  in  the 
present  war.  It  is  obviously  England's  right  to 
call  upon  Japan  for  aid,  while  it  is  Japan's  duty  to 
respond  to  England's  call.  Read  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty  of  Alliance  carefully,  and  yoii  will  notice 
that  u-hcrcrcr  either  high  contracting  party  be  at- 
tacked by  a  third  Tower  the  other  high  contracting 
party  is  recjuired  to  come  to  its  assistance  in  the 
regions  of  the  Far  East.  The  treaty  does  not  say 
"aggressive  action  in  the  Far  East,"  but  "aggressive 
action  wherever  arising."     The  stale  of  affairs  de- 


':^* 


'•^^.T^. 


tsC/X:^ 


.-}i^/^.^^-^:i^'^-^  -(-. 


AMERICA  AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    255 


scribed  in  the  treaty  had  certainly  <() 


me  in 


ence 


hv  the  time  Enghmd  asked  for  Japan's 


to  exist- 
1. 


au 


and  Japan  could  not  shirk  the  respon.sibihties  put 
upon  lier  shoulders  by  the  treaty.  .    ,  ,  • 

It  is  amusing  to  see  the  American  press  mdulgmg 
in  all  manner  of  allegations  with  regard  to  Japan  s 
entry  into  the  war.     Friends  of  Germany  claim  tliat 
the 'tide    of    American    sentiment    turned    against 
England  the  moment  she  called  upon  Japan  to  act. 
Why  the  American  public  should  be  reluctant  to 
recognize  Great  Britain's  obvious  right  to  ask  for 
Japan's  aid  is  difficult  to  understand.    Back  of  this 
"much  ado  about  nothing"  is  perhaps  racial  preju- 
dice    Had  Japan  been  a  Caucasian  race,  no  nations 
would  have  criticised  England's  act  in  calling  upon 
Japan  at  such  a  moment  of  grave  danger,  and  no 
one  would  have  questioned  Japan's  right  and  duty 
to  join  hands  with  her  ally. 

The  plain  fact  is  that  Japan  did  not  enter  into  the 
war  without  conferring  with  England  fully  and 
frankly."  For  the  information  of  prejudiced  critics, 
it  is  necessary  to  put  this  fact  on  record. 

On  August  3,  that  is,  the  day  before  England 
declared  war.  Sir  Conyngham  (Jreene,  the  British 
Ambassador  to  Japan,  hurried  back  to  Tokyo  rom 
his  summer  villa  and  immediately  requested  an 
interview  with  Baron  Kato,  the  Foreign  Minister 
At  this  conference  the  British  Ambassador  informed 
Baron  Kato  that  his  Government  was  compe  led 
to  open  hostilities  against  Germany  and  desired  to 


256 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  I'OLITKS 


ascertain  whether  Japan  would  aid  England  in  the 
event  of  British  interests  in  the  Far  East  being 
jeoi)ardi7,ed  by  German  activities.  Baron  Kato 
answered  that  the  question  before  him  was  so  serious 
that  he  could  not  answer  it  on  his  own  account. 

On  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  Count  Okuma 
convened  a  meeting  of  all  the  Cabinet  members. 
Bearing  the  resolution  of  this  meeting,  Baron  Kato, 
on  August  4,  called  upon  the  British  Ambassador 
and  told  the  latter  that  Japan  would  not  evade  the 
responsibilities  which  she  had  assumed  in  entering 
into  alliance  with  England. 

At  this  time  Ja|)an  did  not  expect  to  be  called 
upon  to  declare  war  at  once.  But  on  August  7  the 
British  Ambassador  asked  for  an  interview  with 
Baron  Kato  and  told  the  Foreign  Minister  that  the 
situation  had  developed  in  such  a  manner  as  would 
oblige  Japan's  immediate  entrance  upon  the  war. 
On  the  evening  of  that  day  Premier  Okuma  re- 
quested the  "elder  statesmen"  and  his  colleagues 
in  the  Cabinet  to  assemble  at  his  mansion.  The 
conference  lasted  until  2  o'clock  the  next  morning. 
Before  it  adjourned  Japan's  policy  had  been  defi- 
nitely fornmlated. 

The  Japanese  press  is  in  all  probability  right  when 
it  says  that  Japan  and  England  were  obliged  to  act 
promptly  in  order  to  frustrate  Germany's  scheme 
to  transfer  Kiau-dmu  to  the  Chinese  Government 
before  she  was  comi)elled  to  hand  it  over  to  Japan. 
Had  Germany  succeeded  in  carrying  out  this  scheme 


AMEUK 


A  AND  Tin:  ANGLO-JAPAN ^:^K  ALl.lANCK    ^"i' 


she  would  still  liavo  enjoyed,  in  virtue  of  Article  o 
of  the  Kiau-cliau  eonventi..n  of  1W»S.  the  privilege 
of  sKuriiif?  in  some  future  time  **a  more  suitable 
territory"  in  China.  Tiiis  was  exactly  the  condition 
which  the  allies  did  not  want  established  in  (1iina. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  were  forced  hy  a 
third  Power  to  abandon  Kiau-chow,  either  peacefully 
or  hv  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword,  China  would 
no  hmger  be  under  ol)ligation  to  ''cede  to  Germany 
a  more  suitable  place." 

In  the  present  world  war,  as  during  the  precedmg 
decade,  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  has  proved  to 
he  of  mutual  advantage  to  the  high  eontractmg 
parties.  Will  it  survive  the  great  upheaval  which 
is  shaking  Europe  from  its  foundation?  With  Kiau- 
chow  restored  to  Chinese  sovereignty,  and  with 
Russia  becoming  more  and  more  friendly  towards 
Japan,  has  the  raison  d'etre  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  virtually  ceased  to  exist?  In  a  word,  what 
will  be  the  future  of  the  alliance? 

That  the  future  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance 
largely  depends  upon  Russia's  attitude  after  the 
war  seems  indisputable.  If,  at  the  peace  conference 
that  is  to  follow  the  war,  Russia  is  given  what  she 
has  been  coveting,  she  will  continue  to  be  friendly 
with  Great  Britain  and  will  keep  (iennany  at  arm's 
length.  In  tiiat  case  there  is  no  reason  why  Japan 
would  not  renew  the  alliance  with  England,  though 
perhaps  in  more  or  less  modified  form.  She  has 
already  entered  into  an  entente  cordiale  with  Russia. 


i't'.-^Miy  \C 


^'^v'fe;^ 


r-K** 


■>^ 


.258  JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 

Bv  renewing  the  alliance  v/itli  Enj^land,  she  ^vill 
b«-()n.e  a  partv  lo  a  triangular  combination  and 
thus  secure  herself  against  Germany's  n<,t  nnprobable 
desire  for  revenge.  England,  too,  ^vill  be  anxious 
to  participate  in  such  a  combination,  for  she  knows 
that  she  will  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  Germany  s 
bitterest  enmity  for  many  years  after  the  war 

If    on  the  other  hand,  Russia  is  dissatisfied  with 
the  outc-ome  of  the  peace  parley,  and  shows  herse 
incliiu-d  to  be  reconciled  with  Gern-any,  Japan  w.  1 
of  ncccssitv  hesitate  to  continue  the  alliance  with 
Englan.l  on  the  same  basis  as  hitherto.     For  it  is  a 
foregone  conclusion  that  Japan  will  avoid,  if  she 
can  possibly   do   so,   another  disastrous   war  with 
Russia,  knowing  that  her  resources  are  too  hm.led 
to  ( ope  with  Russia's  tremendous  potential  strength. 
Japan's  present  relationship  with  Russia  is  one  of 
entente  conUale,  and  not  one  of  alhauee,  for  the  re- 
cently c-oncluded    convention    provides  no  mutua 
obligations  of  the  high  contracting  parties  to  extend 
armed  assistance  to  each  other.     On  the  contrary, 
the  Anglo-Japanese   alliance,   in   its  present  form, 
obliges    either    high    contracting    party    to    render 
armed  assistance  to  the  other  in  case  either  is  m- 
volved  in  war,  defendin-  its  territorial  or  special 
interests  mentioned  in  the  treaty.     Shcmld  Russia 
and  England  cease  to  be  f rien.ls  as  the  result  of 
the   peace   conference   and   eventually    become   in- 
volved in  war,  into  which  Germany  might  be  easily 


draw 


;n  as  Rus'sia's  ally.  England,  upon  the  strength 


AMERICA  AND  THE  AXGLQ-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    259 

of  the  present  alliance,  would  oblige  Japan  to  open 
hostilities  against  Russia  and  Germany.  The  in- 
stinct of  self-preservation  must  impel  Japan  to 
avoid  such  a  disastrous  course. 

Much  has  of  late  been  said  of  Japanese  discontent 
with  the  alliance  with  England.     But  the  pubhc 
has  forgotten  that  before  Japan  began  to  complam 
of  England's  "selfishness"  many  British  newspapers 
and  p^ublicists  had  long  been  assailing  Japan.     As 
early  as  1908  such  men  as  D)rd  Stanhope,  F.  B. 
Wooman,  B.  L.  Simpson,  and  Lancelot  Loton  openly 
attacked   Japanese   ambitions,   and   urged   the   re- 
adjustment of  England's  Far  Eastern  policy.    The 
same  sentiment  has  been  voiced  in  not  a  few  English 
newspai)ers.     At  that  time  Japanese  publicists  and 
press  said  nothing  to  return  British  "compliments^ 
Japan's  whole  attention  has  been  devoted  to  the 
recuperation  of  her  energy  and  to  the  readjustment 
of  her  position  in   Manchuria.     As  she  gradually 
recovered  from  the  shock  of  the  Russian  war,  she 
began  to  cast  about  and  found  that  England's  atti- 
tude towards  her  had  been  far  from  cordial.     She 
began  to  wonder  whether  her  European  ally  really 

cared  for  her. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  after  the  fall  of  Tsingtao 
that  a  few  Japanese  newspapers  ami  publicists  openly 
altaeke<l  British  policy  in  the  Far  East.  The  reader 
will  recall  that  when  Japan  decided  to  enter  mto 
the  war  England  dispatched  a  cruiser  and  a  contin- 
gent of  troops  to  participate  in  tin  siege  of  Tsingtao, 


260 


JAPAN  IN  ^^ORLD  POLITICS 


the  Cicrnian  stronghold  in  Kiau-chow.     t'pon  the 
fall  of  Tsingtao  one  or  two  newspapers  in  Tokyo 
cair.e  out  with   the  assertion   that  England,  upon 
the  strength  of  the  part  she  had  played  in  tl:e  cap- 
ture of  Tsingtao,  coveted  the  northern  half  of  the 
Tienlsin-Pukow   line   controlled   hy   Ciermany.      It 
was  also  rumored  that  England  was  averse  to  the 
extension    of    Japanese    influence    in    Shang-tung, 
formerly  Germany's  sphere  of  itifluence.    How  true 
these  statements  were  only  those  within  the  inner 
official  circles  at  London  and  Tokyo  can  tell.     The 
fact  remains  that  they  did  no  small  injury  to  the 
cordial  re'ationship  between  the  two  nations. 

In   tht    celel)rated   Japanese   demands  i)resented 
to  China   in  January,   1J)1">,  Japan  expressed  the 
"wish"  tliat  China  grant  her  the  privilege  of  con- 
structing a  railway  connecting  Wuchang  with  the 
Kiukiang-Xanchang    line,    in    which    considerable 
Japanese  <apital  had  been  invested,  as  well  as  the 
railways   between   Nan-chang   and   Ilangchao   and 
between   Nan-chang  and  Chaochou,  provided  that 
Great  Britain  would  not  object  to  the  concession. 
These  cities  are  in  the  Yangtse  Valley,  which  Eng- 
land has  long  since  staked  out  as  lier  own  sjiherc  of 
influence.      Whether   England   put   her  foot   uf)on 
Japan's  scheme  to  secure  the  above-niuned  railway 
concessions  is  not  known,  but  the  significant  fact 
was  that  the  British  press  severely  criticised  that 
particular  i)hase  of  the  Japanese  demands.     At  any 
rate  Japan  failed  to  get  the  concessions. 


.  --.Z'.h 


AMERICA  AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    261 

Most  Britishers  in  China  are  anti-Japanese.    They 
beHeve  that  the  Japanese  are  their  inevitable  rivals 
in  the  Far  East,  an.l  cannot  understand  why  their 
Government  should  tie  its  hands  with  an  alliance 
with  Japan  and  render  itself  unable  to  check  Japanese 
ambitions.     They  can  see  only  the  $-,000,000  000 
they  have  invested  in  China,  and  resent  the  gradual 
incursions  of  Japanese  trade-s  into  the  fields  long 
monopolized  by  them.     They  often  fail  to  see  the 
situation  in  the  broader  light  of  internat.omil  rela- 
tions.    ^Vhat   would   have   become   of   the   British 
prestige  in  the  Orient,  had  England,  lending  ear  to 
the  ill-considered  counsels  of  her  people  in  China, 
baile  good-bye  to  Japan  in  1911? 

But  this  feeling  of  the  "  dog  in  the  manger     is  not 
confined  to  the  Britishers.     The  Japanese  entertain 
the  same  sentiment  with  regard  to  certain  parts  of 
China,  notably  Manchuria,  where  their  mvestments 
amount  to  $^250,000,000.     The  blame   is  on  both 
sides      The  idea  of   the  exclusive   "sphere  of   in- 
fluence" is,  as  I  have  pointed  out  in  the  chapters  on 
China,   pernicious   and   must   be   modified,    if   not 
abandoned.     To  one  looking  at  the  situation  from  a 
detached  point  of  view,  it  seems  incomprehensible 
that   England   cannot   be   more   generous   towards 
Japanese  enterprise  in  the  Yangtse  Valley    wule 
Japan  is  likewise  inclined  to  look  askance  at  Britisli 
activities  in  Manchuria.     The  "valley"  has  an  area 
of  36^2,000  square  miles.     Certainly  England  cannot 
monopolize  such  a  vast  territory  in  additk  a  to  Tibet, 


il 


11 


u^i: 


il 


m^^ma.^;^. 


262 


JAPAN  IX  WORLD  POLITICS 


533,000  square  miles  in  area.  One  fails  to  under- 
stand why  she  should  be  reluctant  to  see  Japan  build 
there  a  few  hundred  miles  of  railway  which  would, 
after  all,  as  much  benefit  her  as  Japan.  In  the 
Japanese  si)here  in  South  Manchuria,  measuring 
90,000  square  miles,  we  know  of  no  instance  of 
British  enterprise  being  hindered  by  the  Japanese. 
When  in  1913  the  British  Government,  on  behalf  of 
the  Anglo-Chinese  corporation,  sounded  the  Japanese 
Government  as  to  whether  objection  would  be  made 
to  the  corporation's  project  to  lay  a  railway  between 
Kingshao  and  Chaoyang  in  Ma-ichuria,  Japan 
cheerfully  endorsed  the  plan. 

As  for  trade  compeiilion,  no  one  should  complain 
of  his  defeat  as  long  as  his  successful  rival  observes 
the  rules  of  sportsmanship.  Despite  all  unkind 
words  that  have  been  said  about  the  Japanese,  one 
must  concede  that  their  commercial  success  in  China 
has  largely  been  due  to  their  perseverance,  industry, 
agility  and  frugality,  as  well  as  the  peculiar  advan- 
tage they  enjoy  in  China  due  to  the  circumstances 
which  I  have  fully  described  in  Chapter  X.  More- 
over, you  cannot  succeed  in  business  in  China,  where 
competition  is  so  keen,  by  spending  in  a  luxurious 
office  only  four  or  five  hours  the  day,  devoting  the 
rest  of  the  time  to  golfing  and  dinners  and  socials. 

The  growing  friendship  between  the  natives  of 
India  and  the  Japanese  has  furnished  another  cause 
for  suspicion,  not  to  say  irritation,  on  the  part  of 
England.     It  is  nothing  new  that  even  bona  fide 


WiV 


•POBnM 


AMERICA  AND  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE     263 

Japanese  travellers  and  merchants  in  India  are  sub- 
jected to  espionage  by  British  ofruials.  Not  only 
have  the  Englishmen  in  India  been  suspicious  of 
those  Japanese  likely  to  come  in  contact  w.lh  the 
radical  elements  of  the  Hindu  population,  but  they 
have  shown  a  disposition  to  exclude  Japanese  com- 
mercial enterprises  from  the  country. 

The  read  r  will  recall  that  in  the  summer  of  191.> 
British  warships  fire«l  at  and  stopped  two  Japanese 
merchantmen    in    Chinese    waters.     Bo..rding    the 
Japanese  vessels  the  English  officers  examined  docu- 
ments and  seiml  a  number  of  Hindu  passengers, 
who  were  afterward  imprisoned  or  executed  in  Hon- 
kong.     About  that  time  the  Japanese  Government 
at  the  request  of  the  British  Government,  ordered 
all  the  Hindus,  known  as  radicals,  out  of  the  country 
on  short  notice.     Some  of  those  Hindus  were  un- 
doubtedly revolutionists,  but  there  were  also  men 
whose  ideas  were  sane  and  far  from  dangerous.    To 
drive  thcin  all  out  of  the  country,  giving  them  no  alter- 
native but  to  go  to  Shanghai  or  Honkong,  where  grim 
fate  awaited  them,  did  not.  to  many  Japam-se.  seem 
just      When,  in  the  summer  of  11)06  Sir  Rabindra- 
nath   Tagore,   India's  foremost   poet   and   savant 
visited  Japan,  the  Japanese  Government,  again  at 
England's  rcciuest,  watched  him  so  closely  that  the 
distinguished  guest  made  no  effort  to  conceal  his 
disgust.     All  these  incidents  called  forth  very  caus  le 
criticisms  directed  against  both  the  British  and  the 
Japanese  governmeuls.     Mu.t  Englan.l,  which  has 


i\ 


III 

h 


2G4 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


for  many  drrades  been  a  havrn  of  rcfvifjc  for  political 
exilrs  from  the  CtnitiiR'nl,  show  hcrsi'If  so  intolerant 
of  a  liandful  of  Hindu  ratlicals  scH-kin;?  refuf,'e  in 
Japan?  TIuf  was  the  feeling  expressed  by  not  a  few 
newspapers. 

The  provision  of  the  cxistinj^  treaty  of  alliance 
as  to  Japan's  duty  with  regard  to  India  is  not  clear. 
Siij)pose  India  rose  in  rebellion  while  England's 
hands  were  full  in  Europe:  would  Japan  be  required 
to  (juell  the  insurrection  in  virtue  of  the  alliance? 
Jajjan  would  undoubtedly  prefer  British  rule  for 
India  to  (lernian  or  Russian  doniinalion,  if  the  coun- 
try liad  to  be  dominated  by  some  Euroj)ean  power; 
but  the  i)oint  is  that  she  would  be  reluctant  to  take 
part  in  crushing  the  just  aspirations  of  the  Hindus 
for  independence  and  freedom. 

After  all  lias  been  said  and  done  we  might  still 
have  safely  predicted  the  renewal  of  the  alliance 
five  years  hence,  had  it  not  been  for  the  difficulty 
of  forecasting  the  post  helium  attitude  of  Russia. 
It  is  to  be  lit>ped  that  with  the  downfall  of  the  pro- 
German  faction  at  IVtrograd,  Russia's  friendship 
with  England  will  be  more  wholehearted,  thus  en- 
suring the  contimuition  of  the  entente  conlialc  now 
binding  the  two  Powers.  At  any  rate  Japan  prays 
<hat  she  will  not  have  to  face  the  embarrassing 
situation  wherein  she  may  be  obliged  to  choose  be- 
tween Russia  and  England  as  her  partner  after  the 
war. 


CHAPTER  XV 

AMERICA  AND  C.ERMAN-JAPAXESE 
RELATIONS 

German  overtures  to  Japan-Frankfurfr  Zeilung  on  Japan  an.l  Amer- 
L-AUil".ie  of  Gern.an-Ameri..ans-(;ern..n  U.n,pera„u.nt  .i.tr.-r- 

ent  from  Japanes.^Fnndamontal  principle  ..f    (...rman  pol..;v    m 
21  F.r  E.4-lTin.-e  Hismarck     (Vn.Tal  IWn.har.l.  -  rhe  Ka...  s 
game  in  the  Chino-Japan.se  .ar-Cerman  "a-lvi.e      «"  ■'-••;;" 
Ger.nano,-,upationof  Kiau-<-how-TheKa,s..rs,an,e  ,n  the  Hu.«o- 

Japanoe  war-Japane.e  fear  of  Germany  nut  easy  to  re.uove. 

It  is  iiKlcod  a  far  cry  from  tl.o  Japanese  capttiro  of 
Kiau-chow  to  the  Mikado's  allia.uo  with  the  Ka.ser, 
yet  so  ironical  is  fate  that  M.cii  a  turn  of  afht.rs  after 
the  war  is  not  w  holly  unthinkal)le.     Have  not  Russia 
and  Japan,  locked  in  deadly  combat  only  a  decade 
asc  become  virtual  allies?     Already  in.licat.ons  are 
abroad  that  such  a  card  is  at  least  in  the  diplomatic 
game  of   Berlin.     I  have  already   referred   to  Dr. 
Zimmcrmann's  note,  instructing  \on  Eekhardt,  the 
German  minister  to  Mexico,  to  bring  about  a  coali- 
tion between  Mexico  and  Japan. 

Admiral  von  Truppel,  former  Governor  of  Kiau- 
chow,  franklv  admits  that  "German  work  in  China 
can  no  longer  be  carried  on  without  taking  Japan 
into  ccmsideration."  According  to  a  writer  for  the 
McClurc  Newspaper  Syndicate,  the  German  press 

H)5 


u 


!l 


I 


i" 


2(56 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


suddenly  ceased  criticising  Japan  wlien  the  latter 
presented  the  celel)ruted  twenty-one  demands  to  the 
Chinese  (Joveriinient  in  January,  1915.  In  the 
official  circles  at  Berlin,  it  is  reported,  pains  are 
taken  to  do  nothing  that  would  hurt  the  suscep- 
tibilities of  the  Japanese.  In  a  pamphlet  entitled 
"Volkerdanunerung  im  Stillen  Ozean,"  Dr.  George 
Irnier,  who  spent  some  twenty  years  in  the  diplomatic 
service,  asserts  that  "Germany's  colonial  future 
must  lie  in  the  neighborhood  of  Europe,  in  Africa 
first  of  all,"  and  regrets  that  Germany  has  antago- 
nized the  peoples  of  the  Far  East  by  painting  a  pic- 
ture of  the  Yellow  Peril  that  in  reality  never  existed. 
A  complete  readjustment  of  Germany's  Oriental 
policy  is,  he  urges,  of  the  utmost  importance  if  she 
is  to  mend  her  shattered  prestige  and  to  enjoy  her 
due  share  in  the  development  of  trade  in  Eastern 
Asia.  In  another  pamphlet  entitled  Japan  in  the 
World  War  and  the  China  Problem,  Dr.  II.  Snu'dt, 
who  was  in  Japan  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
openly  advocates  the  formation  of  a  German- 
Japanese  alliance. 

Whether  Germany  will  eventually  become  Japan's 
travelling  companion  o  the  diplomatic  road  is  a 
question  which  nujst  vitally  affect  America's  own 
position.  By  declaring  war  upon  Germany,  wo  have 
incurred  the  bitter  enmity  of  the  German  government 
and  i)eople.  >Yill  not  Germany  court  Japan's 
friendship  for  the  very  purpose  of  embarrassing  us.^* 
And  will  Japan,  on  her  side,  prove  so  reckless  as  to 


WlHIiliilil 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JA"ANESE  RELATIONS    267 

accept  the  proffered  hand  of  Germany  with  a  view 
to  settling  outstanding  scores  with  the  United  States. 
Already  German  newspapers  are  publishing  com- 
ments of  a  seditious  nature.     Sa>s  the  influential 
Frankfurter  Zdtimg,  for  one: 

"One  must  admit  that  Wilson  is  wise,  and  that 
all  the  Americans  are  wise,  if  they  now  arm.     For 
us  Germans  this  wisdom  is  not  of  much  importance, 
for-  a  fact,  which  dcK^s  not  yet  seem  to  be  fully 
realized  -it  is  only  half  directed  against  us.     There 
is  another  who  must  be  expected  to  watch  atten- 
tively  the   seizure   by   America   of    this   favorable 
opportunit  V  to  put  off  her  military  weakness  without 
seeming  gu^ilty  of  'militarism.'      This  other  is  Japan. 
Nobody  can  doubt  that  a  reckoning  between  Japan 
and  America  lies  in  the  womb  of  time  and  mast  m- 
falliblv  be  born  one  day.     What  a  splendid  oppor- 
tunity for  America  now  to  catch  up  Japan's  immense 
military  advantage,  and,  under  the  temporary  pre- 
tense of  hostility  to  Germany,  to  work  for  permanent 
motives  of  hostility  toward  Japan,  while  remaining 
pretty  sure  that  not  everybody  will  see  it.     The 
moment  could  not  be  chosen  more  skillfully.      For 
Japan  can  onlv  be  annoyed,  and  can  not  protest. 
Outwardly  Japan  must  clasp  the  new  friend  to  her 

heart."  , 

There  is  another  factor  which  complicates  the 
situation  still  worse.  We  must  remember  that  there 
are  many  millions  of  German-Americans  whose 
attitude  and  sentiment  are  naturally  influenced  by 


i| 


i  I 

3    1- 


SB£.'> ykl^SSttr^EXS.!'  27'^ 


208 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


the  policy  of  tlicir  native  country.  In  the  maintc- 
nanceof  amity  and  friendship  between  the  Far  lOastern 
Empire  and  the  Republic,  therefore,  the  German- 
American  population  is  a  factor  which  must  be 
seriously  considered.  Prior  to  the  war  the  Cierman 
elements  in  this  country  had  no  more  reason  to  be 
lioslile  towards  Japan  than  had  the  other  American 
stocks.  With  Kiau-chow,  dertnany's  military  and 
commercial  base  of  operation  in  the  Orient,  seized 
by  the  Japanese,  the  feeling'  of  the  Gernuin-Ameri- 
cans  luis  been  deeply  stirred,  and  to-day  many  are 
extremely  outspoken  in  con<lenHiing  the  Japanese. 
If  they  are  determined  to  avenj^e  the  wronf,'.s  which 
they  think  Germany  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese,  they  are  capable  of  doing  incalculable 
injury  to  the  amicable  relations  between  Jai)an  and 
this  country.  The  bold  propaganda,  which  some 
German-Americans  have  been  carrying  on  in  the 
interest  of  their  native  land  ever  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  furnishes  an  indication  of  the  length  they 
may  go  in  their  agitation  against  Japan,  once  they 
make  up  their  minds  to  estrange  the  two  countries. 

I^'t  us  at  once  admit  that  there  is  a  good  deal  of 
pro-German  sentiment  in  Japan.  We  nuist  at  the 
same  time  remember  that  whatever  friendly  feeling 
there  is  towards  Germany  is  largely  due  to  the  in- 
fluence of  those  Japanese  who  have  been  trained 
and  educated  in  German  universities.  In  the  field 
of  international  politics  and  diplomacy  it  cannot  be 
gainsaid  that  Japan  entertains  grave  fears  of  the 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS    2G9 


Kaiser's  Empire.     Moreover,  there  seems  to  l)o  in 
(lerman  diplomaey  and  militarism  sometliiiij?  that 
repels  the  subtle  nature  of  the  Jajjanese.     ^Ve  need 
not  dwell  ui)on  the  Kaiser's  impetuosity,  so  much 
in  evidence  in  Germany's  activities  in  Europe.     To 
the  Japanese  it  is  not  necessary  to  recall  Lou  vain 
and  Dinant,  and  the  so-called  policy  of  "frightful- 
ness"   practiced   by   Germany  since   the   beginning 
of  the  present  war.     The  Japanese  have  themselves 
.seen  enough  of  (Jerman  diplomacy  and  militarism 
in  their  own  henn'sphere.    To  their  ears  the  Kaiser's 
cclei)rated  instructions  to  his  troops,  dispatched  to 
the  scene  of  the  Boxer  disturbance  in  China,  still 
.sound  the  note  of  terror.    "Kill  and  burn  everything 
tliat  lies  in  your  way"  was  tlie  keynote  of  that  in- 
struction.    Compare  it  with  the  Mikado's  rescript 
to  his  .soldiers: 

"The  soldier  and  the  sailor  sh(  1  esteem  valor. 
Ever  since  the  ancient  times  valor  nas  in  our  coun- 
try been  held  in  high  esteem,  and  without  it  Our 
subjects  would  be  unworthy  of  their  name.  How 
then  may  the  soldiers  and  the  sailors,  whose  pro- 
fession it  is  to  confront  the  enemy  in  battle,  forget 
even  for  one  instant  to  be  valiant?  But  there  is  true 
valor  and  false.  To  be  incited  by  mere  impetuosity 
to  violent  action  cannot  be  called  true  valor.  The 
soldier  and  the  sailor  should  have  .sound  discrimina- 
tion of  right  and  wrong,  cultivate  .self-possession, 
and  form  their  plans  with  deliberation.  Never  to 
dcspiiic  an  inferior  enemy  or  fear  a  superior,  but  to 


'270 


JAPAN  IN*  WORLD  POLITICS 


do  one's  duty  as  soldier  or  sailor — this  is  true  valor. 
Those  who  thus  appreciate  true  valor  should,  in 
their  daily  intercourse,  set  genth-nos  first  and  aim 
to  win  the  love  and  esteem  of  others.  If  you  affect 
valor  and  act  with  violence,  the  world  will  in  the 
end  detest  you  and  look  upon  you  as  wild  beasts. 
Of  this  you  should  take  heed." 

In  comparing  these  two  imperial  instructions  we 
cannot  help  wondering  if  there  is  not  something 
radically  different  in  the  dispv  sition  of  official  Ger- 
many and  that  of  official  Japan.  However  that  may 
be,  we  are  assured  that  Gennany's  iHplomalic  deal- 
ings with  Japan  have  not  btvn  of  a  nature  to  enlist 
the  confidence  and  .sympathy  of  the  latter. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  German  policy  in 
the  Orient  was  voiced  by  Prince  Bismarck  when  he 
told  Prince  von  Bulow:  "In  Russia  there  is  a 
serious  amount  of  unrest  and  agitation  for  territorial 
expansion  \^hich  may  easily  result  in  an  explosion. 
It  would  be  best  for  the  peace  of  the  world  if  the 
explosion  took  place  in  Asia,  and  not  in  Europe. 
We  must  be  careful  not  to  stand  in  the  way,  other- 
wise we  may  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  it." 

In  these  few  words  the  Iron  Chancellor  set  forth 
Germany's  fundamental  policy  in  the  Far  East. 
The  conversation  took  place  towards  the  end  of  the 
"eighties,"  and  in  the  "nineties"  this  fundamental 
policy  began  to  show  itself  in  German  activities  in 
Eastern  Asia. 

There  is  not  a  shadow  of  doubt  that  the  principle 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS    271 

laid  down  by  Bismarck  has  been  closely  followed  by 
his  successors  and  the  Kaiser.  It  explains  the  raisnn 
d'etre  of  that  historic  picture  of  the  "Yellow  Peril" 
painted  by  the  versatile  German  Emperor.  It 
furnishes  a  key  to  the  general  attitude  of  Germany 
towards  Japan.  It  shows  why  Germany  seemed 
always  anxious  to  divert  Russia's  attention  towards 

the  Far  East.  . 

It  would  be  scandalous  to  presume  that  the  Kaiser 
was  foolish  enough  to  believe,  even  for  a  moment, 
that  the  Japanese,  rallying  under  their  sun  flag  all 
the  Sghting  forces  of  Asia,  would  march  across  the 
continent  and  trample  under  foot  any  territory  of 
Europe.  Onlv  a  perverted  mind  could  conceive 
such  a  case.  In  no  other  light  than  that  of  the  funda- 
mental principle  upon  which  Germany's  Far  Eastern 
policy  is  established  can  we  account  for  the  Kaiser's 
picture  of  the  Yellow  Peril. 

WTiile,  on  the  one  hand,  conspiring  to  divert  Rus- 
sian ambition  to  the  Far  East,  German  diplomacy 
was  at  work  to  prevent  the  establishment  of  har- 
monious relations  between  China  and  Japan.    Says 
General   Friedrich   von   Bernhardi:    "The   political 
rivalry  between  the  two  nations  of  the  yellow  race 
must  be  kept  alive.     If  they  are  antagonistic,  they 
will  both  probably  look  for  help  against  each  other 
in  their  relations  with  Europe,  and  thus  enable  the 
European    Powers    to    retain    their    possessions    in 
Asia."      This   frank    utterance,    coupled    with    the 
confession  of  Prince  vnn  Bulow.  leaves  no  room  to 


272 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


doubt  that  Germany's  Far  Eastern  policy  was  based 
upon  the  tlicory  that  Asia  must  remain  the  happy 
liunting  ground  of  European  nations. 

It  is  this  political  inimorahty,  practiced  by  the 
mihtary  and  bureaucratic  leaders  at  Berlin,  which 
Japan  has  fo'ij,'iit.  It  cannot  be  too  strongly  em- 
phasized that  the  Japanese  entertain  no  animosity 
towards  individual  Germans.  Japan  has  sent  many 
students  to  German  universities  and  has  welcomed 
many  German  scholars  and  experts  to  lier  educa- 
tional institutions  and  her  various  governmental 
dei)artments.  And  Japan  is  sincerely  grateful  for 
all  that  German  civilization  has  done  for  her.  This 
accounts  for  the  absence  of  enthusiasm  over  the 
Japanese  victory  at  Kiau-chow.  German  prisoners 
in  Japan  have  been  treated  with  the  utmost  cordial- 
ity. True  to  the  most  advanced  principles  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Japan  even  permitted  German  mer- 
chant vessels,  which  had  entered  Japanese  harbors 
before  the  declaration  of  war,  to  depart  unmolested. 
These  ships  fled  to  ^Manila  where  they  were  interned, 
only  to  be  seized  by  America  upon  her  entry  into 
the  v^ar. 

It  was  a  feeling  of  fear,  ratlur  than  a  sentiment 
of  bitter  animosity,  which  actuated  the  Japanese  to 
declare  war  upon  (iermany  and  join  hands  with 
Great  Britain  in  observance  of  the  terms  of  the  alli- 
ance. It  is  unjust  to  say  that  the  Japanese  are 
nursing  rancor  and  are  reluctant  to  forgive  Germany 
for  robbing  them  of  the  spoils  of  the  war  with  China. 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS    273 


Had  ricrmany  only  refrained  from  constantly  as- 
suming a  provocative  attitude  towartls  Japan  during 
the  past  twenty  years,  the  latter  would  have  been 
hut  too  glad  to  forget  the  Liao-tung  incident  and 
the  grim  picture  of  the  Yellow  Peril  which  had  done 
much  to  prejudice  the  whole  Occident  against  the 
Japanese  »nd  other  Asiatic  peoples. 

When,  therefore,  a  Japanese  asserts  that  Germany 
is  a  "menace"  to  his  country,  he  is  not  repeating 
the  stereotyped  diplomatic  cant  which  has  of  Irte 
become  the  byword  of  writers  and  speakers  on  the 
European  situation.  On  the  contrary,  he  has  sub- 
stantial evidence  to  prove  his  assertion.  And  in 
proving  it  he  does  not  necessarily  ])oint  to  the  Ger- 
man seizure  of  Kiau-chow  or  to  the  Gernum  inter- 
ference with  the  Chino-Japanese  peace  terms,  for 
these  are  merely  a  few  of  many  manifestations  of 
the  fundamental  Far  Eastern  policy  of  the  W"i\- 
helmstrasse  so  clearly  described  by  Bismarck  and 
von  Bidow. 

Wlien  the  Kaiser,  hand-in-glove  with  the  Czar 
and  the  French,  deprived  the  Mikado  of  the  Liao- 
tung  peninsula,  the  Jajjanese,  not  yet  well  versed 
in  the  diplomatic  practices  of  Europe,  could  not 
clearly  understand  why  Germany,  of  all  Powers, 
should  be  the  prime  mover  in  that  sordid  scheme  to 
bully  them  out  of  the  spoils  of  war.  Only  vaguely 
did  they  susy)ect  the  German  desire  to  ingratiate 
herself  into  Riissia's  favor. 

We    now   know  that    Germany,  in    driving   the 


1 


i 


274 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Japanese  out  of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula,  had  a 
two-fold  aim  in  view.  First,  she  wanted  to  win  the 
(V,ar's  good  will  by  clearing  Russia's  way  of  Eastern 
advance,  and  secondly,  she  wanted  Russia  to  occupy 
the  peninsula  so  that  the  Muscovite  would  not  raise 
objection  to  the  seizure  of  Kiau-chow  which  he  was, 
on  luT  pr.rt,  contemplating. 

To  drive  this  home  to  the  reader  it  is  pertinent  to 
describe  in  detail  how  Germany  ordered  Japan  out 
of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula. 

In  the  middle  of  April,  189.5,  Japan,  after  brilliant 
victories,  concluded  a  peace  treaty  with  China.  On 
the  day  tne  treaty  was  signed  at  Shimonoseki  be- 
tween Prince  Ito  and  Li  lling-Chang,  all  Japan  was 
celebrating  the  glorious  termination  of  the  war. 
Newsboys  tore  through  the  streets  waving  extras 
with  the  bold  headlines:  "China  cedes  Liao-tung 
Peninsul:> !"  The  Rising  Sun  was  flying  over  every 
house,  and  the  cries  of  banzai  were  heard  before  the 
palace  of  the  Mikado. 

Suddenly  out  of  the  blue  came  the  report  that 
Germany  had  a[)proached  Russia  and  France  with  a 
view  to  force  the  retrocession  of  the  Liao-tung  penin- 
sula. The  report  was  soon  confirmed.  Then  the 
whole  country  was  stricken  with  grief  and  shame. 
Never  was  Japan's  honor  so  ruthlessly  outraged. 

On  the  morning  of  April  2;')d  the  German,  French, 
and  Russian  minislirs  at  Tokyo  deigned  to  present 
themselves,  one  aflcr  the  other,  at  the  Foreign  De- 
partment, each  bringing  with  him  a  note  admonish- 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS     ^75 

ing  Japan  for  aflfronting  the  Powers  by  taking  the 
Liao-tung  peninsula.  The  German  "advice"  was 
of  the  most  peremptory  nature,  and  the  masterful, 
overbearing  macner  in  which  it  was  handed  to  the 
Foreign  Department  by  the  Kaiser's  envoy  is  still 
a  topic  of  occasional  conversation  amc  -^g  the  Japa- 
nese. The  German  Minister  brought  two  copies  of 
the  advice,  one  in  German,  the  other  in  the  Japanese 
language  transcribed  in  Roman  letters. 

The  note  was  very  brief  and  bluntly  stated  that 
the  Japanese  occupation  of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula 
was  a  menace  to  the  Chinese  capital  and  would 
jeopardize  the  peace  of  the  Far  East.  "Therefore," 
it  concluded  "the  German  Government  advises  the 
Japanese  Government  to  abandon  the  idea  of  occupy- 
ing the  territory." 

The  original  note  even  contained  such  a  threaten- 
ing phrase  as  this— "Japan  is  weak,  Germany  is 
strong;  the  outcome  of  an  armed  conflict  between  the 
two  countries  is  obvious." 

Yes,  Japan  was  weak  at  the  time;  wherefore  she 
had  perforce  to  swallow  the  medicine  so  kindly  ad- 
ministered by  Germany— to  make  her  strong.  Like 
a  docile  youth.  Japan  accepted  the  advice  of  the 
three  Powers  and  on  May  10, 1895,  the  Mikado  issued 
the  following  rescript: 

"Devoted  as  we  unalterably  are  to  the  principles 
of  peace,  we  were  constrained  to  take  up  arms 
against  China  for  no  other  reason  than  our  desire  to 
secure  for  the  Orient  an  enduring  peace. 


276 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


"Now  llie  friondiy  rocomniendatiou  of  the  three 
Powers  was  eciually  prompted  by  the  same  desire. 
Consulting,',  therefore,  the  hest  interests  of  peace,  and 
animated  by  a  desire  to  not  bring  upon  our  people 
added  hardship  or  to  impede  the  progress  of  national 
destiny,  by  creating  a  new  competition  and  thereby 
making  tiie  situation  difficult  and  retarding  the 
restoration  of  peace,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  accept 
such  reconunendation. 

"By  concluding  the  treaty  of  peace  China  had 
already  shown  her  sincerity  of  regret  for  the  viola- 
tion of  her  engagements,  and  thereby  tiie  justice  of 
our  cause  has  been  proclaimed  to  the  world. 

"Under  the  circumstances  we  can  find  nolhin-:  to 
imi)air  the  honor  and  dignity  of  our  Empire  if  ^  ,vv 
yield  to  the  dictates  of  magnaninjity  and,  taking  into 
consideration  the  general  situation,  accept  the  advice 
of  the  friendly  Powers." 

Thus  the  Japanese  withdrew  with  what  grace 
and  dignity  they  could  from  the  peninsula.  On  the 
day  the  Imperial  Rescript  was  issued  many  a  tragical 
scene  was  enacted  at  Port  Arthur  where  the  Japanese 
troops  were  still  encamped.  One  officer  killed  him- 
self in  protest  against  the  abandonment  of  Port 
Arthur;  many  cut  their  fingers  and  with  their  own 
blood  wrote  petitions  urging  the  Government  not  to 
be  bullied  by  the  Powers. 

When  the  triple  interference  had  become  immi- 
nent Japan  earnestly  recjuested  England  and  Amer- 
ica to  employ  their  good  offices  and  restri.in  the 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS    277 


hands  of  the  three  Powers.  But  no  aid  was  forth- 
coming. Had  EngUmd  and  the  I'nited  States 
exercised  their  influence  in  Japan's  favor,  the  great 
Manchurian  struggle  of  190-1.  would  have  been 
forestalled  and  Japan  would  nt)t  have  declared  war 
upon  tlic  Kaiser  in  the  present  world  conflict. 

Germany's  interference  with  the  peace  terms  be- 
tween China  and  Japan  was  only  the  first  in  the 
string  of  events  calculated  to  estrange  the  two  coun- 
tri<«s.  The  Kaiser's  part  played  in  the  Chino-Japa- 
nese  peace  negotiations  belongs  to  one  of  those  pages 
in  history  which  may  never  be  fully  written,  l)ut  it  is 
generally  believed  that  the  Kaiser  advised  China  to 
sign  the  peace  treaty  proposed  by  Japan,  intimating 
that  he  would  induce  Russia  and  France  to  join  him 
in  his  effort  to  frustrate  the  treaty. 

Looking  back  at  the  situation,  it  seems  strange 
that  Japan  was  not  even  permitted  to  insert  in  the 
revised  peace  treaty  an  article  forestalling  the  passing 
of  theLiao-tung  peninsula  into  the  nandsof  a  hostile 
Power,  for  that  territory  in  the  possession  of  Russia 
or  Germany  could  not  but  prove  a  menace  to  the 
very  independence  of  Japan.  Japan  no  doubt 
wanted  to  neutralize  tliat  danger  zone,  or  secure  a 
right  of  preemption  over  it,  but  she  was  given  to 
understand  that  the  intervening  Powers  would  not 
allow  her  to  press  for  any  such  guarantee. 

So  the  Japanese  withdrew  without  any  guaranty 
whatever.  WTiat  was  the  result?  Only  a  year  or  two 
later  Russia  occupied  the  self -same  peninsula  from 


, ' 


I  li 


278 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  I'OLITICS 


which  the  Czar  and  Kaiser  drove  the  Japanese  in 
the  name  of  llie  peace  of  the  Far  East  and  the  main- 
tenance of  the  territorial  integrity  of  China.  It  was 
plain  that  the  Kaiser  agreed  to  connive  at  the  Rus- 
sian occupation  of  the  Liao-tung  Peninsuhi  on  con- 
dition that  the  Czar  would  not  object  to  the  German 
seizure  of  Kiau-chow. 

And  the  German  occupation  of  Kiau-chow,  com- 
ing as  it  (lid  in  the  wake  of  Japan's  evacuation  of  the 
Liao-tung  peninsula,  was  especially  distasteful  to  the 
Japanese.  They  could  not  see  why  the  Kaiser 
should  have  preached  to  them  so  diligently  about  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China  and  the  peace  of  the 
Far  East,  when  he  was  waiting  for  the  first  opportu- 
nity to  plant  his  flag  on  Chinese  territory. 

That  first  opportunity  was  afforded  the  Kaiser  by 
the  murder  by  Chinese  of  two  German  missionaries 
in  Shantung  Province.     The  missionaries  belonged 
to  tlie  mission  of  Bishop  Anzer,  who  was  noted  for 
his  militancy.    The  Berlin  Government  immediately 
instructed  its  minister  at  Peking,  Baron  von  Heyking, 
to  demand  of  the  Chinese  Government  the  cession 
of  Kiau-chow  Bay  and  its  adjacent  territory.    Before 
diiiia  had  time  to  answer  the  German  note,  four 
German  cruisers  suddenly  appeared  in  Kiau-chow 
Bav  and   lauded   a  large   detachment  of  marines. 
^Yhat  could  poor   China  do  but  obey  the  mandate 
of  the  Kaiser  and  sign  the  "murder  convention"?  ^ 
The  immediate  outcome  of  the  territorial  ambi- 
tions displayed  in  the  German  occupation  of  Kiau- 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS    279 

chow  and  other  siniihir  instances  was  the  Boxer  dis- 
tur'oance,  tlie  gruesome  story  of  wliieh  is  still  fresh 
in  our  memory.     Wlien  the  Boxers,  filled  with  a 
desire  for  revenge,  besieged    the   legation  quarters 
in  Peking,  Japan  at  once  proposed  to  the  Powers 
that  she  he  permitted  to  rush  her  troops  to  the  scene 
of  disturl)ance  and  r -scue  the  beleaguered  foreigners. 
Again  the  Kaiser  intervened.     Unless  Japan  could, 
he  insisted,  guarantee  that  her  action  would  by  no 
means  interfere  with  the  interests  of  other  Powers, 
the  German  Government  could  not  consent  to  her 
proposal.    Had  it  not  been  for  the  Kaiser's  obstruc- 
tive tactics,  Japan  would Juive  landed  her  troops  at 
Tientsin  nuich  sooner  thaXshe  did.     And  when  the 
Japanese  soldiers  were  at  last  allowed  to  land  in 
China,  even  the  Kaiser  had  to  admit  that  they  were 
the  most  orderly  and  most  plucky  of  all  the  foreign 
troops  which  the  Boxer  incident  brought  to  China. 

The  Boxer  disturbance  did  not  stop  foreign  ag- 
gression in  China.  On  the  other  hand,  it  aggravated 
the  situation  by  affonhng  the  covetous  Powers  fresh 
excuse  for  grabbing  Chinese  territory.  Russia,  for 
one,  lost  no  time  in  utilizing  the  incident  and  rush- 
ing troops  into  Manchuria  in  large  numbers.  The 
German  Emperor,  though  by  no  means  fond  of  the 
Czar,  was  all  that  time  encouraging  the  Muscovite 
ruler  to  concentrate  his  attention  upon  the  Far 
East,  thus  hoping  that  Germany  might  be  free  from 
Russian  rivalry  in  Europe.  In  September,  1901, 
the  two  rulers  met  at  St.  Petersburg  and  came  mto  a 


280 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


definite  understanding  with  regard   to  Russian  ac- 
tivities in  Manehuria. 

Then  came  the  great   war   between  Russia  and 
Japan.     The  jNIikado  saw  in  the  Russian  aggression 
in  Manchuria  and  Korea  an  inuuinent  danger  to  the 
very  existence  of  liis  country,  and  determined  to  stay 
the  INIuscovite  advance  even  at  the  point  of  the 
sword.     Shortly  before  the  opening  of  hostiHties  be- 
tween Japan  and  Russia,  the  London  Times  pubUshed 
an  article  reporting  the  existence  of  a  secret  under- 
standing in  virtue  of  which  the  Kaiser  was  to  render 
clandestine  assistance  to  the  (V.ar  in  the  event  of  a 
Russo-Japanese  war.     AVhethcr  the  London   Times 
was  correctly  informed  we  have  yet  to  see,  but  it  is 
at  least  significant  that  in  the  course  of  the  war 
Germany  showed  Russia  many  marks  of  good  will, 
which  at  times  amounted  to  the  violation  of  neu- 
trality.    It  was  no  secret  that  a  Gennan  steamship 
company  sold  to  the  Russian  Government  a  number 
of  vessels.     When   the   Baltic  squadron  of  Russia 
under  Rozhestvenski  was  proceeding  to  the  Far  East, 
the  same   German   company   permitted  one  of  its 
steamships  to  accompany  the  Russian  warships  and 
help   them   secure  coal   in   their  long  voyage.     All 
these  events  called  forth  protests  from  the  Japanese 
(iovermuent,  but  of  course  the  German  Government 
paid  no  attention  to  such  protests. 

When  the  Jajjanese  troops  were  measuring  swords 
with  the  Russians  on  the  plains  of  Manchuria,  the 
Japanese  army  extended  to  a  German  Prince  the 


AMERICA  AND  GERMAN-JAPANESE  RELATIONS    281 

privilege  of  proceeding  to  the  front  with  the  army. 
Abusing  the  courtesy  tlie  Prince  was  found  secretly 
sending  war  reports  to  the  German  Government  or 
the  Kaiser  without  previously  suhmitling  them  to 
the  censoring  officers.  C'onsideriug  the  secret  assist- 
ance which  Germany  was  rendering  Russia  through 
all  stages  of  the  war,  you  can  well  imagine  the  con- 
sternation of  the  Japjiucse  Generals  upon  discover- 
ing the  true  mission  of  the  Prince. 

Such  is  the  history  of  German  diplomacy  towards 
Japan.     It  is  a  history  which  camiot  easily  be  for- 
gotten by   the  Japanese.     Not  that  the  Japanese 
are   unforgiving   or   uncompromising,    but   because 
Germany  has  inspired  in  their  hearts  a  feeling  of  awe, 
too  deep  to  be  removed  unless  German  policy  shows 
unmistakable    signs   of    a    fundamental    alteration. 
The  unpleasant  memory  instilled  in  the  Japanese 
bosom  of  reckless  German  activities  in  the  Far  East 
has  been  unhappily  accentuated  by  the  unscrupulous 
conspiracy   of   the   Wilhelmstrasse   to   embroil   this 
country   with   Japan,   wi.en   the   latter   is   making 
supreme  efforts  to  maintain  and  promote  friendly 
relations  with  America.    If  the  alienation  and  even- 
tual hostility  of  Japan  and  America  be  one  of  the 
aims  of  German  dii)lomacy  in  striving  to  win  Japan's 
good  will,  a  German- Japanese  rapprochement  must 
be  the  remotest  possibility. 


CHAPTER  X\l 

AMERICA  AND  THE  RI  SS0-JAPAXE5E 
ENTENTE 

American  objection  to  Russo-Japanese  friendship — Its  reason  removed 
by  the  liberation  of  Russia— Why  Japan  fought  Russia— Why  Japan 
ni-eds  Russia's  friendship— Russia's  former  empire  scheme— Russia's 
ambitions  in  the  Far  East— Her  encroachment  upon  Manchuria — 
American  failure  to  check  Russia— Japan  di.-.gusted  with  foreign 
criticisms — History  of  Russi>-Japanese  rapprorhemcnt—Virst  con- 
vention— S-cond  convention— The  latest  convention  almost  an 
alliance — Its  real  object— It  d<M's  not  affect  American  interests- 
Special  agreements  l)etween  Russia  and  Japan. 

Wlicn,  in  1907,  Japan  took  the  first  stop  towards 
an  entente  with  Russia,  Mr.  Jacob  H.  Scliiff,  who 
had  Ikoii  hirgely  instniniental  in  floatin/^  in  America 
the  Mikado's  loans  for  the  war  with  Russia,  came 
out  squarely  in  opposition  to  this  new  move  on  the 
part  of  Tokyo,  and  declared: 

"It  can  certainly  not  give  any  satisfaction  to  the 
American  people,  when  they  find  Japan,  to  whom 
they  had  lent  their  unreserved  support  in  h<T  desper- 
ate struggle  for  self-preservation  hardly  more  than 
a  decade  ago,  joining  hands,  under  the  protection  of 
England,  with  her  erstwhile  foe  who  souglit  to  crush 
her,  and  thus  combine  against  the  forces  of  civiliza- 
tion, who  wish  to  see  established  a  strong,  self- 
reliant  China,  rather  than  an  impotent  vassal  state, 

282 


M«?&i|"  ■■  . 


AMERICA  AND  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  ENTENTE     iHS 

a  second  Inc'ia.  America  will  be  the  last  to  deny 
Japan's  dearly  purchased  right  to  work  out  her  mani- 
fest destiny  on  the  Asian  continent,  but  Japan  must 
not  seek  to  do  this  by  acting  in  unison  with  Russia, 
whose  methods  of  government  are  not  such  that  its 
blessings  ought  to  be  permitted  to  be  extended  be- 
yond its  own  borders." 

America's  objection  to  Russo-Japanese  friendship 
is  chiefly  sentimental.  Most  Americans  entertain 
innate  dislike  of  Russia.  Vii-wed  in  the  lurid  light 
of  gigantic  autocracy,  her  exile  system  and  her  op- 
pression of  the  Jews,  Russia  presents  an  unpleasant 
picture.  The  recent  revcjlution  in  Russia  must, 
however,  .serve  to  dissipate  nuich  of  the  justifiable 
prejudice  which  the  American  people  have  enter- 
tained toward  the  Muscovites.  If  the  new  demo- 
cratic cai)inet  at  Petrograd  manages  to  outlive  the 
uncertain  conditions  which  have  inevitably  followed 
the  recent  revolution,  and  succeeds  in  establishing 
a  stable  government  in  the  face  of  the  reactionary 
forces  conspiring  to  undermine  it,  America  will  not 
hesitate  to  extend  the  hand  of  friendship  not  only 
to  the  Russian  people  but  to  tin;  Russian  govern- 
ment. Under  such  new  circumstances,  such  objec- 
tions as  have  been  raised  by  Mr.  Schiff  against  a 
Russo-Japanese  entente  will  be  removed.  They  will 
also  serve  to  disarm  those  habitual  alarmists  who 
see  in  the  alliance  of  Russia  and  Japan  a  grave  men- 
ace to  American  interests  in  the  Far  East. 

In  discussing  Tokyo's  attitude  towards  Petrograd, 


2H4 


JAPAN  I\  WORLD  POLITK  S 


it  is  of  tlir  foremost  importance  to  rememl)er  that 
Japan,  f«.r  ol)vious  reasons,  eould  not  afT.)r(l  to  keep 
on  antagonizing  Russia.    Japan  did  not  fight  Russia 
in  the  missionary  spirit.     To  protect  lier  interests 
in  Korea  and  Manchuria,  and  to  safeguard  her  very 
exi>tence  menaced  by  Russian  descent  upon  those 
countries,  was  the  only  reason  which  impelled  her 
to  measure  .swords  with  the  Muscovites.     It  would 
he  the  height  of  folly  on  the  part  of  Japan  to  cherish 
animosity  towards  Russia,  when  she  knows  full  well 
that  she  cannot  afford  to  wage  another  costly  war 
against  her  foe  of  1004.     If  the  Russians,  regretting 
their  past  l.lunders  in  the  Far  East,  show  themselves 
.sincerely  desirous  of  entering  into  amicable  relations 
with  Japan,  the  latter  must  by  all  means  respond  in 
a  .spirit  of  friendship. 

Notwithstanding  all  insinuations  indulged  in  by 
American  newspapers  that  Japan  has  been  increasing 
her  armament  with  an  eye  upon  the  United  States, 
no  one  familiar  with  Japan's  icv-'  -motive-  ^an  doubt 
for  a  moment  that  her  ab.sorbing  concern  has  been 
Russia's  po.ssiblo  revenge  upon  her,  as  well  as  China's 
precarious  condition  which  threatens  to  become  at 
any  unexpected  moment  a  storm  center  of  inter- 
national rivalry.     Japan's  victories  over  Russia  in 
the  war  of  l!)04-.3,  brilliant  as  they  were,  were  far 
from  dealing  a  fatal  blow  to  the  Russian  position 
in  Manchuria.     Upon  the  terminatioii  of  the  war 
the  Japanese  found  the  gaunt  figure  of  the  Muscovite 
looming  upon  the    horizon  of    Manchuria  as  men- 


'^^^^^2iM 


AMERICA  AND  THE  RLSSO-JAI'ANESK  ENTENTE     285 

acingly  as  ever.     Aftor  the  sacrifict;  (if  a  hundred 
thousand  Hvt-s  and  a  Ijilhon  dollars  in  tlu>  tilani<- 
struK^'le    tliat   hud    just   ended,    the   Japanese   suc- 
ceeded in  dislodging?  Russia  only  from  one-fourth 
of  the  Manchurian  territory,  leaving,'  the  remaining 
three-fourths    in    the    clutdu'S    of    the    Muscovite. 
Not  only  was  Russia  i)ermitl«>d  to  strengthen  her; 
liold  upon  by  far  th(?  greater  portion  of  Manchuria, 
but  she  embarked,  inunediately  after  the  war,  upon 
the  gigantic  .scheme  of  converting  the  vast  territory 
of    ^Mongolia    into    her    protectorate,    thus    hoping 
eventually  to  reach  and  dominate  IVking.     In  tlu" 
vast  empire  scheme  conceived  by  the  Czar's  military 
entourages'  in  the  historic  days  of  Viceroy  Aloxieff 
nothing  short  of  the  ccmiplete  absorption  of  Man- 
churia and  North  China  was  Russia's  aim.     With 
his  way   in   Manchuria  blocked   by   the  Japanese, 
the  northern  bear  set  another  snowball  rolling  from 
the  frozen  shores  of  the  Baikal  in  the  direction  of 
Mongolia.     Who  knows  but  that  the  snowball  may 
yet  roll  on  uotil  it  reach-^  Mie  gulf  of  Chili  by  way 
of  Peking?     In  the  light  of  the  history  of  Russian 
expansion  such  an  apprehension  is  more  than  justifi- 
able.    According   to   Foreign   Minister   Miliukoff's 
recent  statement,  even  the  new  democratic  govern- 
ment at  Petrograd  seems  almost  as  imperialistic  as 
its    reactionary    predecessor.      It    is,    undoubtedly, 
with  a  view  to  preventing  such  an  eventuality  that 
Japan  has  been  striving  to  e.^iablish  a  foothold  in 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.     In  persuading  China,  in 


2S6 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


the  treaty  of  May  -2.5,  1!)1.3,  to  open  Inner  Mongolia 
to  tlie  trade  and  residence  of  foreigners,  Japan  hoped 
to  erect  a  protecting  wall  between  P<'king  and  that 
section  of  Mongolia  already  doniiiiuted  by  Rnssia. 

Japan  lias  been  taking  every  precaution  to  pro- 
tect vulnerable  points  against  any  emergency  that 
may  develop  from  the  Russian  domination  of  Mon- 
golia and   North   Manchuria.     At   the  same  time 
she  has  been  fully  aware  that  lier  resources  are  too 
limited  to  wage  another  war  against  the  Northern 
Colossus.     In  the  war  of  l(K)4-.>,  as  I  have  already 
noted  in  a  previous  chapter,  lu-r  resources  both  in 
men   and    money   proved   too   small   to   cope   with 
Russia's  treniendcnis  resources,  thus  compelling  her 
to  accept  peace  terms  far  from  satisfactory  to  her. 
And    when    the    peace    treaty   of    Portsmouth    was 
signed  the  world   was  reluctant  to  give  credit   for 
what  Jipan  had  accomplished  in  the  interest  of  the 
open  (h.or  and  integrity  of  China.    On  the  contrary, 
she  was  made  an  object  of  suspicion  and  fear,  a 
target  of  insinuation  and  aspersion.    In  books,  maga- 
zines and  newspapcTs  she  was  charged  with  pursuing 
a  policv  which  ran  directly  counter  to  the  open  door 
doclriiie  enunciated  and  defended  by  the  late  Secre- 
tarv  INIr.  John  Hay.  _ 

As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  not  America  which 
initiated  the  doctrine;  neither  did  she  make  any 
MTious  effort  to  defend  it  when  Russia  was  about  to 
absorb  INIanchuria.  Before  Secretary  Hay  issued 
the  famous  "open  door"  notes  in  September,  1891), 


AMERICA  AM)  THE  RISSO-JAPANESE  ENTENTE     287 


and  in  Jnly,  1900,  Great  Britain  enunciated  the 
same  principle.  But  Imth  p]nf,'land  and  the  United 
States,  when  confronted  by  tlie  imminent  danger  of 
China's  disruption,  failed  to  back  up  the  doctrine 
they  had  proclaimed.  To  Russia  the  American  notes 
were  not  worth  the  paper  on  which  they  were  written. 
T'pon  receipt  of  Secretary  Hay's  first  note  Russia 
not  only  expressed  herself  in  favor  of  reserving  for 
herself  the  rifjht  to  levy  special  duties  within  her 
sphere  of  influence,  but  demurred  to  the  American 
proposal  with  regard  to  harbor  duties  and  railway 
charges.  With  characteristic  audacity  she  hoisted 
on  August  4,  1900,  the  Russian  flag  over  the  Chinese 
customs  house  at  Newchwang,  and  in  August,  1901, 
the  Imperial  Russian  Controller  of  Newchwang 
issued  the  following  proclamation: 

"As  this  port  has  now  reverted  to  the  control  of 
the  Imperial  Russian  Government,  all  you  who 
have  matters  in  dispute  and  tlie  like  should  bring 
your  petition  to  the  superintendents  or  other  Govern- 
ment officers,  where  redress  can  he  obtained  and 
cases  settled  in  perfect  justice  and  impartiality.  .  .  . 
If  after  the  issuance  of  these  presents  there  be  founfl 
any  person  disobeying  this  proclamation,  I  will 
punish  the  delinquent  severely  and  will  exercise 
no  mercv." 

In  a  word,  Russia  completely  usurped  the  Chinese 
customs  in  Manchuria.  As  the  London  Tiincn  re- 
ported at  the  time,  the  Russian  Administration  at 
Dalny    (now    Dairen)   refused   the    Americans   the 


'zm 


JAi'AN  IN  \V()RLD  POLITICS 


nrrmission  to  build  warehouses  for  the  storapo  of 
\,neriean  kerosene,  ainl  unnounee.l  tlie  intention 
(,f  excluding,' Ameriean  oil  allof^'elher  from  Manchuria. 

The  Russian  aulhoriti.-s  looke.l  upon  the  Americans 
with  k<H-n  suspicion  if  they  ventured  further  than  a 
couple  of  miles  from  Newchwang,  and  refused  to 
recogni/.e  British  passports  in  Manchuria,  insisting 
that  all  British  subjects  travelling  in  that  country 
must  possess  llussian  passports,  which  were  procured 
from   the  Russian   A.lministration  at   Port  Arthur 
with    great    difficulty   and    unnecessary    delay.      In 
\pril     Vm,   the  Czar  demanded  that  the  Peking 
r.overnment  agree   not   to  open  any   new  port  in 
:^Ianchuria,  nor  admit  new  consuls  from  any  third 
Power  without  previous  cons-nt  of  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment.    Russia  had  also  obtained  the  exclusive 
right  to  navigate  the  Amur,  the  Sungari,  and  the 
Ussuri,  forbidding  the  vessels  of  any  country,  other 
than  China  at   :  herself,  to  utilize  those  waterways. 
Thus  completelv  isolating  Manchuria  from  the  out- 
,i,le   world,   Russia   was   busy   pouring   her   troops 
into  that  country,  and  was  preparing  her  way  for 
Ihe   immediate   absorption   of    a    vast    territory   of 

:u;;{.700  sciuare  miles.  ,   ^    xr  .       i 

Put  \o  this  test  what  did  America  do?  Not  only 
<lid  she  not  ta.ke  any  positive  action  to  enforce  the 
o„en  <ionr  policy  but  she  decline.l  to  assist  Japan, 
tho  onlv  nation  <lelermined  to  stay  the  Russian 
•ulvaiur.  In  tlu'  early  .spring  of  1901  Japan,  alarmed 
l,v   the  ominous  activities  of   Russia,   approached 


AMERICA  AND  THE  RISSO-JAPANESE  ENTENTE     589 

England,  Gi'-many,  and  the  United  States  with  a  view 
to  securinj^  their  cooperation  in  i)reventing  the  Rus- 
sia absorption  of  Manchuria.  None  gave  encourag- 
ing rej)ly.  Obviously  England  and  America  were  not 
willing  to  offer  the  sacrifice  of  blood  and  treasure  upon 
the  altar  of  the  open  door  so  sacred  to  them. 

Thus  Japan  was  compelled,  alone  and  unaided, 
to  challenge  Russia,  staking  her  very  existence  upon 
the  issue  of  the  combat.  In  the  war  that  followed 
Japanese  blood  .soaked  every  inch  of  South  Man- 
churian  .soil.  When  the  conflict  came  to  an  end, 
Japan  was  rewarded  with  no  })raise  but  found  her- 
.self  indicted  by  the  very  nations  whose  avowed 
principles  of  the  open  door  in  China  she  had  .so 
valiantly  defended.  The  world  ai)parently  iorgol 
that  had  it  not  l)een  for  the  sword  of  the  J.  Mnese 
the  much-heralded  open  door  notes  would  avc; 
been  converted  into  .scraps  of  j)aper,  and  that  the 
way  would  have  been  opened  then  and  there  for 
the  disruption  of  China's  huge  territory. 

Japan  was  frankly  disgusted  at  the  unreasonrble 
attitude  of  the  Powers,  and  was  convinced  of  the 
thanklessness  of  the  costly  task  she  had  undertaken 
for  the  sake  of  the  "open  door"  in  China,  and  of  the 
folly  of  assuming  an  antagonistic  attitude  towards 
Russia  which  might  oblige  her  once  mor«'  to  fight  a 
single-handed  battle  with  the  Northern  Colossus, 
She  .saw  no  alternative  to  u  policy  whose  purpose 
was  to  .secure  her  positions  in  Korea  and  Manchuria 
by  establishing  friendly  relations  with  Russia. 


k! 


aiK) 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


There  is  another  factor  which  lias  influenced  the 
Japanese  niincl  in  fa^•or  of  an  entente         uale  w.th 
Russia.     Japan  must  have  Russia's  c    operation  to 
turn  her  Manchurian  railways  into  a  hnanc^il  suc- 
cess     For  some  time  after  tlie  war  the  Russian 
(ioverninent  tried  to  cripple  Japan's  railway  enter- 
prise by  refusing  to  establish  any  traffic  connnect.on 
l,etween    its   Eastern    Chinese   and   Jai)an  s   South 
Manchuria  railway.     ^Vithout  this  connection  the 
South  ^Manchuria  system  c»,uld  not  expect  to  have 
any  share  in  the  infer-'^ontinental  tratfic  between 
Europe  and  tlie  Fa.   East.     How  was  Japan  to  at- 
tain this  end  without  befriemling  Russia?    She  had 
borrowe.1  of  England  $'20,000,000  for  her  railway 
enterprise  in  Manchuria.    How  was  she  to  pay  this 
debt  if  she  did  not  take  advantage  of  every  oppor- 
tunity that  could  be  utilized  without  infringmg  upon 
the  rights  of  other  nations? 

The  history  of  the  rapprochement  which  lias  cu^ 
minated  in  the  convention  signed  on  July  3,  1916, 
is  briefly  surveyed.    The  first  step  towards  an  entente 
cordiale  between  Tokyo  and  Petrograd  was  taken 
two  vears  after  the  war  of  190  i-5,  when  the  two 
.M.vernments  signed  a  convention  binding  each  of 
U.e  high  contracting  parties   (1)    "To  respect  the 
actual  territorial  integrity  of  the  other,  and  all  tlic 
rights  accruing  to  one  and  the  other  party  from 
treaties,  conventions  and  contracts  in  force  between 
them   an.l   (  hina."      (^2)  "To   recognize   the   inde- 
pendence and  the  territorial  integrity  of  China  and 


AMERICA  AND  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  ENTENTE     491 

the  principles  of  equal  opportunity  in  whatever 
conrerns  tlie  commerce  and  inchistry  of  all  nations 
in  that  empire,"  and  (3)  To  sustain  and  defend  the 
maintenance  of  the  fitatuft  quo  and  respect  for  tiiis 
principle  hy  all  pacific  means  within  their  reach." 

Such  was  the  substance  of  the  convention  signed 
on  July  30,  1!>07.  Almost  simultaneously  a  con- 
vention arranging  for  the  connection  of  the  Russian 
and  Japanese  railways  in  Manchuria,  a.  treaty  of 
commerce  and  navigation,  as  well  as  fisheries  con- 
vention, were  entered  into  between  the  two  nations. 
There  was  nothing  umisual  in  the  treaty  of  commerce 
and  navigation,  but  in  the  fisheries  convention  Russia 
made  important  concessions  in  favor  of  Japan. 
It  bestowed  upon  Japanese  subjects  the  right  to  fish 
along  the  entire  Russian  coast,  with  the  exception  of 
inlets  and  rivers,  on  the  Behring  Straits  and  the 
Okhotsk  and  Jai)an  Seas. 

This  placed  Japan  and  Russia  on  a  relationship  of 
entente  curdiale.  And  yet  the  Russian  people  were 
f;jr  from  understanding  Japan's  true  motives  and 
inrtruttn?nr^^  A  group  of  Russian  officers,  headed 
by  (JemTal  Kropotkin  and  General  Linevitch,  still 
entertained  the  notion  that  the  [)eace  treaty  of 
Portsmouth  was  naught  but  an  agreement  of  truce, 
and  that  Russia  was  bound  to  declare  a  war  of  re- 
venge upon  Japan.  Toward  the  end  of  1!)09  the 
popular  feeling  of  suspicion  with  regard  to  Japan 
had  become  so  intense  that  the  Russian  Government 
felt  obliged  to  issue  a  statement,  assuring  the  public 


'■i\H 


JAPAN  I.N  WOULD  I'OLITICS 


„f  Japiiii's  sinc-crity  in  (Irsirin^  to  roniain  at  peace 
with  lliissiii.  ^Villl  l\ln)K'-a«rs  position  made  so 
cU-ar  by  this  voluntary  htalrniont,  the  way  was  paNxni 
for  tlie  two  countries  to  enter  into  a  new  convention 
on  July  4,  1!)1(),  reassertinf,'  tlie  principles  established 
in  the  previous  aj^'reement.  Li't  the  convention 
itself  explain  its  nature  and  object: 

"With  the  object  of  facilitating  communications 
and  develoi)ing  the  commerce  of  nations,  the  high 
contracting  parties  nuitually  engage  to  lend  to  each 
otlu  r  iheir  friemily  cooperation  with  a  view  to  the 
amelioration  of  their  respec»-'e  railway  lines  in 
Manchuria  and  the  improvement  of  the  connectmg 
service  of  the  said  railways,  and  to  abstain  from  all 
eompetilion   prejudicial   to   the   realization   of   this 

object. 

"Each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  engages  to 
maintain  and  resj)ect  the  iitatus  quo  in  Manchuria 
resulting  from  the  treaties,  conventions  and  other 
arrangements,  concluded  up  to  this  day,  between 
Japan  and  Russia,  or  betweH.«n  either  of  these  two 
pow(>rs  and  (  hina. 

"In  case  any  event  arises  of  a  nature  to  menace 
the  .staiua  fy«o  above  mentioned,  the  two  high  con- 
tracting parties  shall,  in  each  case,  enter  into  com- 
numication  with  each  other  in  order  to  arrive  at  an 
nnderstanding  as  to  the  measures  they  may  judge 
necessary  to  take  for  the  maintenance  of  the  said 

atatiis  quo.'' 

From  such  a  treaty  it  seemed  but  a  step  to  a  vir- 


AMERICA  AND  THE  Rl  SS()-JAPANESE  ENTENTE     293 

tuul  allianro,  WTion  tlu*  European  war  broke  out 
Japan  not  only  offered  to  supply  Russia  with  arms 
and  anmuinilion,  hut  emphasized  her  friendship  by 
returning  to  the  Czar  all  the  weapons  of  war  which 
she  had  eai)tured  in  the  Manehurian  war,  and  l)y 
restoring  to  the  Russian  flag  the  three  warships  also 
captured  by  the  Japanese  during  the  same  war. 
To  cor. vcy  his  appreciation  of  these  generous  acts 
on  the  part  of  Japan,  the  Czar  sent,  in  May,  191.5, 
Grand  Duke  George  Michaelovitch  to  the  court  of 
the  Mikado.  It  was  an  open  secret  that  the  (irand 
Duke,  ostensibly  on  an  errand  of  felieifation,  came 
intrusted  with  the  mission  of  sounding  the  Japanese 
Government  as  to  the  possibility  of  strengthening, 
and  enlarging  the  scope  of,  the  entente  eordiale  then 
existing  between  the  two  nations.  The  negotiations 
that  followed  finally  bore  fruit  in  the  convention  of 
July  3,  1916. 

To  call  the  new  convention  an  alliance  is,  perhaps, 
not  quite  correct.  A  treaty  of  alliance  nuist  jjrovide 
nnitual  obligations  on  the  part  of  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  to  render  armed  assistance  to  each  other 
in  case  their  respective  interests  are  in  danger.  The 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  for  "nstance,  provides  that 
"if  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack  or  aggressive 
action,  wherever  arising,  on  the  part  of  any  power  or 
powers,  either  high  contracting  party  shouhl  be 
involved  in  war  in  defense  of  its  territorial  interests 
or  special  interests  mentioned  in  the  preamble  of 
this  agreement,  the  other  contracting  parly  will  at 


21)4 


JAPAN  IN  WOULD  POLITICS 


omc  come  to  the  assistance  of  its  ally,  and  will  con- 
duct tlie  war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual 
agreement  with  it." 

The  new  Russo-Jai)anese  convention  contains  no 
such  i)rovisi()n.     Let  the  c«)nvention  tell  its  own  tale: 

"First.  Japan  will  not  become  a  party  to  any 
arrangement  or  political  combination  directed  against 
Russia.  Russia  will  not  become  a  party  to  any  ar- 
rangement or  political  combination  directed  against 

Japan. 

"Second.  In  case  the  territorial  rights  or  special 
interests  in  the  Vnr  East  of  one  of  the  contracting 
l)arlie.s  recognized  by  the  other  contracting  party 
are  menaced,  Japan  and  Russia  will  act  in  concert 
on  the  measures  to  be  taken  in  view  of  the  support 
or  cooperation  necessary  for  the  protection  and  de- 
fense of  these  rights  and  interests." 

This  is  the  text  of  the  laconic  instrument.  We 
have  yet  to  see  what  Russia  and  Japan  really  mean 
by  "mutual  oupport  and  cooperation."  Does  it 
simply  mean  a  moral  or  financial  support,  or  is  it  an- 
oth<T  phrase  for  armed  assistance?  If  the  purpose 
of  diplonuicy  be,  as  it  has  too  often  been  in  the  past, 
to  make  a  treaty  capable  of  two  constructions,  the 
Russo-Japanese  convention  may  be  an  entente  cor- 
diale  or  a  downright  alliance  according  to  the  con- 
venience or  inconvenience  of  the  high  contracting 
parties. 

The  most  significant  part  of  the  convention  lies  in 
the   wide  application   which  it  apparently  permits. 


m^irjx^aMms 


m 


AMKUK  A  AND  THE  Rl  SSO-JAFANESE  ENTENTK      29,'} 

While  it  is  obvious  that  the  now  covenant  aims 
chiefly  lo  secure  the  respective  interests  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  its 
scope  is  not  restricted  to  these  two  countries  l)ut 
covers  the  entire  P'ar  East.  Where  are  we  to  seek 
the  rai.fon  d\'trc  of  such  a  comprehensive  conven- 
tion? Against  what  particular  Power  or  Powers  do 
Russia  and  Jaj)an  propose  to  protect  their  interests 
after  the  present  war  in  Etirope? 

In  spite  of  the  fatuous  efforts  of  certain  American 

publicists  and  newspajx-rs  to  create  the  impression 

that   the   new   convent i«)n    is   directed   against   the 

United  States,  the  immediate  occasion  for  and  the 

real  objective  of  the  alliance  is  Germany.     Japan 

fears  that  Germany,  smarting  under  the  surrender 

of  Kiau-chow,  will  let  no  opportunity  pass  unutilized 

to  challenge  Japan's  position  in  China.     At  the  peace 

conference  that  ?s  to  follow  the  war,  Germany  will 

employ  every  means  to  regain  Kiau-chow.     Should 

.she    fail    to    regain    Kiau-chow,    .she    will    by    all 

means  try  to  regain  the  Shantung  railways  now  held 

by  the  Japanese.     To  forestall  such  eventualities  it 

is  of  the  foremost  importance  that  Japan  should 

enjoy  tli    >upport  not  only  of  England  but  of  Russia. 

So  far  as  American  interests  in  the  Far  East  are 

concerned  the  convention  will  make  but  little  change 

in  the  present  situation  in  the  Far  East.     This  is 

obvious  not  only  from  the  text  of  the  convention  but 

in  the  light  of  the  motives  which  prompted  the  two 

Powers  to  conclude  it. 


'I 


$i;  ^:M•-i^■■^.■••    ■ 


j^ll^^J^tBtSSm^SSiM 


'iUii 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


Ixjng  before  the  (X)nelusion  of  the  new  pact  Amer- 
ica was  uniiiistakahly  given  to  understand  tliat  no 
enterprise  or  investment,  having  political  or  com- 
mercial importance,  could  he  launched  in  Manchuria 
witlumt  due  recognition  of  the  preponderating  in- 
terest held  hy  Russia  and  Japan  in  that  territory. 
This  is,  of  ct)urse,  not  to  say  that  both  Japan  and 
Russia  are  anxious  to  bar  out  American  capital  and 
enterprise  from  Manchuria.  It  simply  means  that 
America  must  not  ignore  the  peculiar  position  occu- 
pied by  Russia  and  Japan,  but  must  take  it  into 
consideration  in  launching  any  scheme  which  will 
seriously  affect  the  political  and  economic  status  of 
Manchuria. 

That  principle  was  fairly  well  established  when 
Japan  and  Russia  oi)posed  the  niMitralization  of  the 
Manchurian  railways  proposed  by  Secretary  Kno.x, 
and  when  they  combatted  the  Chino-American 
l)roject  to  construct  a  railway  of  700  miles  between 
(;hinchow  and  Aigun. 

I  have  always  maintained  that  Secretary  Knox's 
proposals  with  regard  to  the  Manchurian  railways, 
imfortunate  as  they  were,  did  not  emanate  from  any 
sinister  motive.  Ilis  only  fault  was  his  failure  to 
realize  the  singular  political  situation  in  M.mchuria. 
To  Jai)an,  her  railway  holdings  in  Manchuria,  though 
totalling  only  700  miles,  meant  a  loss  of  100,000  lives 
and  a  cost  of  $1,000,000,000.  In  the  face  of  such  an 
appalling  sacrifice,  it  might  well  have  been  conceded 
that  she  had  the  right,  as  long  as  she  conformed  to 


W 


AMERICA  AND  TUB  RrsSO-.IAPANF.SE  F.NTKNTK     '297 

the  principles  of  the  open  door,  to  opornto  tin-  nul- 
ways,  so  tluit  pnxveds  from  tin-  traffic  nii<:lit  assist. 
if  ever  so  little,  in  lightenint,'  tlic  financial  burden 

entailed  hv  the  war. 

As  for  the  Chinchow-Aij,'un  railway  sclMinc  con- 
ceived by  Wall  Street  iiia^'nalrs  and  backed  by 
Mr.  Knox,  Japan,  in  virtue  of  tlie  Chino-Japanese 
protocol  of  l!)Or>,  had  the  ri^dit  to  veto  it.  She  was, 
however,  willing  to  waive  the  right  and  was  ready 
to  indorse  the  American  enterprise  on  the  conchtion 
that  she  be  allowed  to  build  a  lin<>  io  effect  a  June- 
tion  between  the  South  Manchuria  system  and  the 
proposed  C'hino-American  line.  Unt  Russia  was 
uncompromising  and  was  «letermined  to  put  her 
foot  upon  any  such  scheme. 

And  so  both  the  Chinehow-Aigun  railway  project 
and  the  proposal  to  neutralize  the  Manchurian  rail- 
way bore  no  fruit.  This  unhappy  incident  dealt  a 
serious  blow  to  America's  further  enteri)rises  in 
Manchuria.  Had  America  realized  more  fully  the 
singular  position  which  Japan  had  attained  in  Man- 
churia through  the  ordeal  of  blood  and  fire,  and 
shown  herself  more  considerate  in  dealing  with  the 
Japanese,  in  the  initial  stage  of  her  Manchurian 
diplomacy,  American  capital  and  enterprise  might 
have  been  welcomed  at  least  in  that  section  of  Man- 
churia which  had  come  under  Japanese  influence. 

When  the  new  Russo-Japanese  convention  was 
made  public  both  at  Tokyo  and  at  Petrograd,  it 
was  rumored  that  the  new  convention  had  attached 


I 


-2<)H 


JAPAN  IN"  WORLD  POLIYir-, 


to  it  a  set  of  a^'reemonts  which  the  two  Governments 
preferred  to  withhold  from  tlie  puhhe.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  there  is  nothing  secret  about  these  sej)arate 
agreements. 

From  tlie  point  of  view  of  immediate  material 
l)enefits,  this  so-called  "secret  treaty"  is  perhaps 
more  valuable  to  Japan  than  the  main  convention. 
Its  substance,  as  reported  in  the  Japanese  press,  may 
he  sunmiarized  as  follows: 

1.  Russia  cedes  to  Japan  the  Changchun-Taolais- 
liao  section  (about  70  miles)  of  the  ("hangchun- 
Ilarbin  branch  of  the  Russian  railway  in  Manchuria 
p\)r  this  Japan  pays  Russia  about  $7,000,000  in  war 

supplies. 

^2.  Russia,  with  the  consent  of  China,  extends  to 
Japan  the  privilege  of  navigating  the  Second  Sungari 

River. 

Of  the  two  terms  the  first  is  the  more  important. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  at  the  peace  conference  at 
Portsmouth  Japan  insisted  upon  securing  the  Russian 
railway  from  Port  Arthur  to  Harbin,  measuring 
some  37()  miles.  Russia,  however,  strenuously 
opi)osed  the  Japanese  demand,  and  agreed  to  cede 
only  43G  miles  between  Port  Arthur  and  (^hang- 
ehun.  Japan  has  ever  since  coveted  the  renuiining 
1  U)  miles  fnmi  Changchun  to  Harbin,  the  Russian 
metropolis  of  Manchuria,  for  that  section  of  the 
line  traverses  the  heart  of  a  rich  agricultural  country 
producing  enormous  quantities  of  beans,  Manchuria's 
chief  product.    Although  much  of  the  beans  pro- 


AMERK  A  AM)  TIIK  RISSO  .JAPAN  ESK  ENTENTE    ^00 

ducod    in    that    section    have   been    transported    to 
Dairen  over  Japan's  South   "    anchuria  system,  no 
small   quantity   has  l)een   shipped   north   over   the 
fhan«ehun-IIarl)in  line  of  the  Russian  system,  ulti- 
matelv   to  find   an  outlet  at  the  Rtissian   port  of 
Vladivostok.    With  the  ae(iuisition  by  Japan  of  the 
southern    half   of    the    Changchun-Harbin    line,    at 
least  two  hundred  tliousand  .sacks  of  beans  will  be 
added  to  the  traflie  of  the  South  Manchuria  railway. 
No  less  important   is  the  privilej^e  of  navigating 
the  Sec(md  Sungari  River.     In  virtue  of  the  Aigun 
treatv   of    1838,    Russia    has    hitherto   enjoyed    the 
exclusive  right  to  navigate  the  Anmr,  the  Sungari, 
and  the  Ussuri  River,  affording  a  great  stinmlus  to 
Russian    commerce    and    industry    in    Manchuria. 
Now  the  Second  Sungari  River,  which  is  the  largest 
tributarv  of  the  main  Sungari,  traverses  the  Japanese 
sphere  of  influence,  and  yet  the  Japanese  have  been 
denied  the  privilege  of  sharing  with   the  Russians 
and  Chinese  in  the  benefits  offered  by  that  great 
artery  of  trade  and  communication.     The  Second 
Sungari  originates  in  the  Chang-Pai-Shan,  the  Eter- 
nal White  Mountains,  on  the  Korean  border,  and 
joins  the  main  Sungari  at  a  point  about  a  hundred 
miles  north  of  Petuna,  a  city  of  .some   lO.OOO  in- 
habitants, and   about  two  hundred  miles   west  of 
Harbin,   Russia's   political   and   commercial   center 
in  Manchuria.     The  river  becomes  navigable  for 
vessels  of  shallow  draught  at  the  city  of  Kirin,  the 
capital  of  Kirin  Province,  about  four  hundred  miles 


^m^ 


800 


JAPAN  IN  WORLD  POLITICS 


from  the  point  of  confluence.  Kirin  is  fitly  termed 
l)y  tlie  natives  the  "Inland  Dockyard"  of  Man- 
churia, as  it  is  the  center  of  the  shipbuilding  indus- 
try, producing  numerous  junks  to  be  used  on  the 
Sungari  River. 

The  opening  of  the  Second  Sungari  to  Japanese 
enterprise  will  prove  a  valuable  asset  to  the  Japanese 
railway  system,  for  the  waterway  joins  the  Japan- 
ese railway  at  Tao-lai-shao,  which,  in  virtue  of  the 
new  agreement  with  Russia,  becomes  the  northern 
terminus  of  the  main  line  of  the  South  Manchuria 
system.  At  Kirin  it  also  joins  the  Kirin-Changchun 
railway,  a  Chino-Japanese  enterprise. 

Important  as  the  new  privikgcs  secured  by  Japan 
are,  they  are  far  from  what  she  really  desired.  She 
desired  to  purchase  the  Russian  line  up  to  Harbin, 
seventy  miles  more  than  the  mileage  actually  ob- 
tained, and  to  secure  the  right  to  utilize  the  main 
stream  of  the  Sungari  River  as  well  as  the  Second 
Sungari.  Nevertheless  Japan  has  made  a  great 
stride  in  Manchuria.  The  concessions  she  has  ob- 
tained will  afford  her  easier  access  to  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia. 

I  have  described  Russia's  Far  Eastern  policy  in 
the  past,  as  well  as  Japan's  misgiving  engendered 
by  that  policy.  Whether  the  democratic  tide  which 
has  .«et  in  at  Petrograd  will  materially  influence  her 
foreign  policy  with  reference  to  Mongolia,  Man- 
churia and  China,  we  have  yet  to  see. 

PrlDled  in  the  United  States  of  Amariea 


'T^HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a  few 
of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects. 


Japanese  Expansion  and  American 

Policies 

By  J.  F.  ABBOTT 

Of  Washington  University 

New  edition.  Cloth,  izmo,  $1.50 

Here  Professor  Abbott   sums  up   dispassionately  and 
impartially  the  history  of  the  diplomatic  and  social  rela- 
tions of  Japan  with  the  United  States,  and  in  particular 
gives  the  facts  that  will  enable  an  American  to  form  his 
own  opinion   as  to  the  possibility  of  future  conflicts  be- 
tween these  two  countries.     The  work  is  neither  pro-Japan 
nor   anti-Japan,  but   seeks,    rather,  to   present   the   case 
justly.     The  author  emphasizes  the  importance  of  an  in- 
telligent  understanding  of  the  subject,  believing  that  in 
spite  of  the  present  lull  owing  to  acute  interest  in  Euro- 
pean affairs,  it  is  yet  a  problem  that  will  periodically  and 
persistently   come  to  the   fore  until    it   is   satisfactorily 
solved.     Professor  Abbott  has  given  careful  study  to  Far 
Eastern  matters  for  the  past  fifteen  years,  has  traveled  at 
various  times  throughout  the  Orient  and  previous  to  the 

Russian  War  was  an  instructor  in  the  Imperial  Japanese 

Naval  Academy. 


THE  MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  Mew  York 


The  Japanese  Problem  in  the  United  States 

By  H.  a.  MILLIS 

Professor  of  Economics  in  the  University  of  Kansas 

Illustrated,  tlP,  $1.50 

"The  book  reveals  careful,  painstaking,  and  conscien- 
tious investigation,  and  forms  a  valuable  addition  to  the 
concrete  studies  of  alien  races  in  the  United  States." 

—  American  Economic  Review. 

"  An  interesting  and  useful  book.  It  presents  in  brief 
compass  and  readable  form  the  essential  facts  about  Japa- 
nese  settlement  in  this  country,  and  reduces  to  definite 
outline  and  proper  perspective  a  problem  which  is,  for  the 
most  part,  revealed  to  us  only  in  lurid  and  terrifying 
glimpses  through  the  vapors  of  popular  agitation." 

—  T/te  Survey. 

•'  A  conscientious  and  valuable  document." 

—  T/ie  Spectator,  London. 

"A  most  important  contribution  to  our  knowledge  of 
that  vital  problem  —  our  national  attitude  toward  the 
Asiatic."  —  Providence  Journal. 

"  One  of  the  best  expositions  of  the  Japanese  question 
that  has  yet  appeared.     It  is  thorough  and  exact." 

—  Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

FubUihtn  64-66  Fifth  ATWUe  K«w  York 


American  World  Policies 

By  WALTER  E.  WEYL 

Author  of  "The  New  Democracy" 

Cloth,  i2mo,  $2.25 

This  is  a  most  timely  volume  in  view  of  the  recent  entrance 
of  the  United  States  into  the  Great  War.  Just  how  the  United 
States  stands  upon  the  great  economic  questions  with  which  the 
world  will  have  to  deal  after  the  war  is  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance. Every  thinking  American  should  inform  himself  along 
these  important  lines. 

"Very  shrewd,  too,  is  Mr.  Weyl's  analysis  of  the  attitude  of 
America  toward  international  problems— an  analysis  which  in 
large  part  justifies  the  viewpoint  of  the  whole  book  by  showing 
to  what  an  extent  the  soul  of  America  has,  so  to  speak,  grown  out 
of  the  soil.  .  .  .  In  a  comparatively  brief  space  the  author  gives 
unusually  dear  views  of  all  sides  of  the  subject  .  .  .  exceedingly 
clear  and  interesting  analysis  of  world  politics."— ^'or/A  Ameri- 
can Review. 

"Informative,  stimulative,  \.\me\y." —Boston  Daily  Advertiser. 

"To  find  so  fine  and  true  and  well  reasoned  an  interpretation 
of  that  attitude,  which  has  been  so  shockingly  misrepresented 
at  home  and  deplorably  misunderstood  abroad,  is  something 
to  be  thankful  for.  ...  It  is  a  book  that  will  make  for  far- 
sightedness, for  clarity  of  thought  and  sanity  of  judgment  in 
the  deciding  of  many  of  our  problems."— Boo^won. 

"Mr.  Weyl  is  a  close  rcasoner  and  his  book  is  not  only  in- 
tensely interesting,  but  most  stimulating  to  thought."— PAJ/a- 
delphia  Public  Ledger. 

"An  eco.iomic  philosophy  so  neatly  balanced,  so  suavely 
expressed  and  of  such  elastic  fibre."— iV.  Y.  Sun. 


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Publishers         64-66  Fifth  Avenue         New  York 


AN  INQUIRY  INTO 

nn         KT    .^  £  D  AND  THE  TERMS  OF  ITS 

1  he  INature  or  r  eace    perpetuation 

By  THORSTEIN  VEBLEN 

Author  of 

"The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class" 

"Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution" 

"The  Instinct  of  Workmanship" 

Cloth,  12",  $2.00 

Professor  Veblen's  new  book,  "The  Nature  of  Peace,"  is  a 
close  analysis  of  war  and  the  basis  of  peace.  It  is  of  special 
interest  just  now  on  account  of  its  insistence  upon  the  absolute 
destruction  of  the  German  Imperial  State  as  the  only  assurance 
of  a  permanent  peace.  The  ideals  towards  which  civilization 
is  moving  make  the  elimination  of  the  dynastic  powers  abso- 
lutely necessary.  "The  new  situation,"  says  Professor  Veblen, 
"requires  the  putting  away  of  the  German  Imperial  establish- 
ment and  the  military  caste;  the  reduction  of  the  German  peo- 
ples to  a  footing  of  unreserved  democracy." 

A  democratization  of  the  Dynastic  powers,  Japan  and  Ger- 
many, must  be  followed  by  provisions  for  better  methods  of 
government;  by  more  just  distribution  of  wealth  for  the  world 
at  large;  and  by  a  general  neutralization  of  citizenship  through- 
out the  world.  This,  Professor  Veblen  thinks,  can  be  accom- 
plished gradually,  perhaps  by  neutralizing  trade,  colonies,  etc. 

"The  most  momentous  work  in  English  on  the  encompassment 
of  lasting  peace.  There  are  many  books  that  aim  to  give  geo- 
graphic domicile  to  the  kind  of  tinkered  peace  that  is  likely  to 
come  out  of  this  war,  but  I  know  of  no  book  that  gives  so  plain 
and  positive  account  of  the  terms  'on  which  peace  at  large  may 
be  hopefully  installed  and  maintained,'  and  I  know  of  no  dis- 
cussion so  searching  as  to  'what  if  anything  there  is  in  the  pres- 
ent situation  that  visibly  makes  for  a  realization  of  these  neces- 
sary terms  within  a  calculable  future.'  .  .  .  Where  The  Nature 
of  Peace  seems  to  me  to  rise  far  and  away  above  the  current 
discussions  of  supernationalism  is  in  its  comparative  freedom 
from  unanalyzed  conceptions.  .  .  .  Nothing  more  significant 
has  been  written  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war." 

—The  New  Republic. 

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Publishers        61-66  Fifth  Avenue        New  York 


The  Faith  of  Japan 

By  TASUKU  HARADA 

President  of  Dobhisha  University,  Kyoto,  Japan 


?/. 


There  are  excellent  works  on  the  religions  of  Japan,  but  Presi- 
dent Harada  is  the  first  authority  to  write  (.n  Us   aith.    He  ex- 
pounds not  rcli«ious  systems,  but  those  "^^^-^^Xle"'?  j 
bv  which  the  Japanese  live.     From  his  people  s  complex  n 
Ciou.  inheritance  he  deftly  singles  out  those  elemental,  ethical 
and  religious  beliefs  which  have  come  to  be  the  common  property 
o?all  Ja'panese,  no  matter  what  their  formal  rehg.ous--or.n-e- 
liKious-affiliations.     The  students  of  history  and  ethics  n^  ill 
discover  here  fresh  leads  and  the  Christian  will  gladly  note  the 
new  points  of  contact  with  the  Japanese  mind. 

"Shintoism,  Confucianism,  Buddhism,  Christianity  and  even 
Bushido  are  all  interi^reted  in  a  lucid,  illuminating,  and  fraternal 
spirit."— H/c   Independent. 

Studies  in  Japanese  Buddhism 

By  a.  K.  REISCHAUER 

Cloth,  8vo 

This  book  is  by  an  American  of  the  Middle  West  who    for 
twelve  vears.  has  l.een  a  professor  of  ethics  and  philosophy  in 
'clU-e  in  Tokyo,  Japan.    The  writer  presents  the  beginning  o 
mcUml'm  in  SmUhern  Asia  and  the  devdopment  of  this  into 
he  prevalent  Buddhism  of  Japan.     The  historic  stages  of    he 
K)rthern    eligion  are  carefully  traced,  Buddhistic  books  which 
Ive  w^n  influence  and  authority  in  Japan  are  discussed  and  the 
V.  rious  rel  gious  denominators  in  Japan  comprehended  under 
BuUW^ma're  sketched.    The  relations  of  the  Christian  churches 
n    laoan   to  the  worshippers  of   Buddha  are  also  pictured. 
Thiughtful  Americans,  who  believe  that  the  J^P--  ^^^^^^ 
cnminn  more  and  more  our  intimate  neighbor,    will  ;^<-l'-ome 
this  volume  as  revealing  the  inmost  thoughts  of  the  Japanese 
nation.  __ 

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